' 


•  «  -v  f , , 


fHii:  '•  ri:  H-; 


BT  701  .067  1908 

Orr ,  James,  1844-1913. 

God's  image  in  man  and  its 
defacement  in  the  light  of 


l 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2019  with  funding  from 
Princeton  Theological  Seminary  Library 


https://archive.org/details/godsimageinmanit00orrj_1 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN  AND 


ITS  DEFACEMENT 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


AND  ITS  DEFACEMENT 


IN  THE  LIGHT  OF  MODERN  DENIALS 


BY 

JAMES  ORR,  D.D. 

PROFESSOR  OF  APOLOGETICS  AND  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY 
UNITED  FREE  CHURCH  COLLEGE,  GLASGOW 


0 

!  (1 1 


i  L.  V 


FOURTH  EDITION 


I 


NEW  YORK 

A.  C.  ARMSTRONG  AND  SON 

3  and  5  WEST  i  8th  STREET 
1908 


Being  the  Lectures  on  the  L.  P.  Stone  Foundation , 
Princeton  Theological  Seminary ,  N.y.y  U.S.A. , 

i9°3"I9°4 


Edinburgh  :  T.  and  A,  Constable,  Printers  to  His  Majesty 


PREFACE 


The  lectures  in  this  volume  were  delivered  on 
the  L.  P.  Stone  Foundation  before  the  professors 
and  students  of  Princeton  Theological  Seminary, 
from  September  28  to  October  3,  1903.  They 
are  now  published  in  accordance  with  the 
desire  of  the  Faculty.  Additional  matter,  with 
references  to  books  and  articles  which  have 
appeared  since  the  delivery  of  the  lectures,  are 
put  in  footnotes  and  in  the  Notes  at  the  end.  I 
have  to  express  my  thanks  to  the  Faculty  and 
students  of  Princeton  Seminary  for  the  great 
courtesy  with  which  they  received  the  lectures. 

The  lines  of  doctrine  followed  in  the  lectures 
are  the  same  as  those  laid  down  in  my  volume 
on  The  Christian  View  of  God  and  the  Worlds  with 
parts  of  which  this  book  may  be  compared. 
They  run  counter,  I  am  well  aware,  to  many 
currents  of  modern  opinion,  even  in  Christian 


VI 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


circles.  If  any  are  stumbled  on  this  account,  I 
can  only  plead  that  I  must  speak  as  I  believe.  I 
confess  that  the  newer  tendency  to  wholesale 
surrender  of  vital  aspects  of  Christian  doctrine 
at  the  shrine  of  what  is  regarded  as  4  the  modern 
view  of  the  world  ’  appears  to  me  graver  than  it 
does  to  many.  The  modern  view  of  the  world — 
which  is  in  reality  not  one  view,  but  a  congeries 
of  conflicting  and  often  mutually  irreconcilable 
views — must,  it  is  assumed,  be  accepted  in  the 
first  place  ;  the  view  we  take  of  Christianity 
must  adapt  itself  to  this,  and  the  doctrines  of 
Christianity  must  take  their  chance,  if  they  come 
into  collision  with  its  findings.  But  there  is 
another  standpoint  possible.  It  seems  to  me  to 
be  truer  to  say  that,  in  a  multitude  of  respects, 
the  Christian  view  of  the  world  is  not  the  so- 
called  modern  view  ;  in  principle,  in  fact,  is 
irreconcilable  with  it  ;  and  we  ought  to  have  the 
courage  to  avow  this,  and  take  the  consequences. 
I  do  not  say  that  the  Christian  view  is  irrecon¬ 
cilable  with  true  science  or  sound  philosophy — 
that  it  is  impossible  for  a  believing  man  who  is 


PREFACE 


VI! 


at  the  same  time  a  thinking  man  to  hold  ;  but 
it  is  irreconcilable  with  many  of  the  theories  that 
profess  to  be  based  on  science  and  philosophy, 
and  is  not  capable  of  assimilation  with  these. 
We  all  acknowledge  this  in  connection  with  the 
Materialisms,  the  Monisms,  the  Agnosticisms, 
the  Pantheisms,  that  seek  to  supplant  the  Chris¬ 
tian  conception  ;  but  I  would  carry  the  principle 
a  good  deal  further — into  the  region  of  the 
doctrines  dealt  with  in  these  lectures.  How  far 
I  have  succeeded — and  no  one  is  more  conscious 
of  the  imperfections  of  my  treatment  than  myself 
—  the  reader  must  be  left  to  form  his  own 
opinion.  In  the  variety  of  views  and  reasonings 
that  are  presented,  some  food  for  reflection,  at 
any  rate,  may  be  suggested. 

My  thanks  are  due  to  Ebenezer  Russell,  Esq., 
Glasgow,  for  valuable  aid  in  the  revision  of 
the  proofs. 

JAMES  ORR. 


October  1905. 


CONTENTS 


i 

THE  CONFLICT  OF  BIBLICAL  AND  MODERN  VIEWS  OF 
MAN  AND  SIN - THE  ISSUES  STATED 

Aversion  to  Doctrines  of  the  Gospel  founded  on  altered  views  of 
their  Presuppositions.  The  Biblical  Views  of  God,  Man,  and 
Sin,  met  by  a  Counter-theory  of  the  World  and  Man.  Scientific 
Monism  (Haeckel,  etc.).  Change  on  Doctrine  of  God.  On 
Doctrines  of  Man  and  Sin.  Effect  on  Christianity.  Lectures 
to  discuss  Relations  of  Doctrines  of  Man  and  Sin  to  Modern 
Anthropological  Theories.  Extent  of  the  Antagonism.  Evolu¬ 
tionary  View  of  the  Origin  of  Man  (Haeckel,  Fiske).  Conflict 
with  Biblical  Doctrine  in  respect :  i .  of  the  Nature  of  Man  ; 
2.  of  the  Original  Integrity  of  Man;  3.  of  the  Origin,  Nature, 
and  Effects  of  Sin.  Idealistic  Evolutionism.  Incompatibility 
with  Christian  View.  Reply  that  while  Ecclesiastical  ‘Dogmas’ 
fall,  the  real  Essence  of  Christianity  is  untouched.  Fallacy  of  this  : 
1.  Not  Ecclesiastical  Christianity  alone,  but  the  Christianity  of 
the  New  Testament  (Apostolic  Gospel)  falls;  2.  Christ’s  own 
Teaching  is  Subverted.  Essence  of  Apostolic  Christianity  in 
Consciousness  of  Redemption  through  Jesus  Christ.  The  Infinite 
Value  of  the  Soul  in  Christianity.  Humanity  as  Receptive  of 
the  Divine  in  Christianity.  The  Cross  and  Human  Sin.  The 
opposing  Views  Irreconcilable,  .....  3-30 


X 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


II 

SCRIPTURE  AND  SCIENCE  ON  THE  NATURE  OF  MAN - 

THE  IMAGE  OF  GOD  IN  MAN 

Connection  of  Questions  of  Origin  and  Nature.  Monistic  View  of 
Human  Nature  (Haeckel).  Biblical  Doctrine :  Man  Made  in 
the  Image  of  God.  Creation  Narrative  in  Gen.  i.  Agreement 
of  Bible  and  Science  on  Man’s  Place  in  Creation.  Man  as  Link 
between  Natural  and  Spiritual  Worlds.  The  Second  Creation 
Narrative.  Man  as  ‘  Living  Soul.’  Relation  of  terms :  Soul, 
Spirit,  Flesh.  Man  a  Compound  Being :  Body  and  Soul.  Bearing- 
on  Doctrine  of  Death.  Image  of  God  in  Man.  Not  in  Bodily 
Form.  Essentially  a  Mental  and  Moral  Image.  Rationality  of 
Man.  Moral  Nature  and  Freedom  of  Man.  Religious  Capacity 
of  Man.  Sovereignty  over  the  Creatures.  Opposition  of  Modern 
Theories.  Denial  of  Man’s  Distinction  in  Nature  from  the 
Animals.  This  Distinction  Q ualitati've,  not  simply  in  Degree. 
Attack  on  Man’s  Nature  of  the  older  Materialism.  Change  of 
Standpoint  in  Monism.  The  ‘  Parallel  Series  ’  Theory.  Haeckel’s 
Denial  of  the  Soul,  Freedom  and  Immortality.  Theory  practi¬ 
cally  Materialistic.  Absurdity  of  Haeckel’s  Eternal  4  Substance.’ 
Stronghold  of  Monistic  Theory :  Dependence  of  Mind  on  Brain. 
Fallacies  in  this  :  i.  4  Parallel  Series  ’  untenable.  2.  Erroneous  to 
reason  from  Brain  Conditions  in  Disease  to  Brain  Conditions  in 
Health.  3.  Ignoring  of  Counter-class  of  Facts:  the  Influence  of 
Mind  on  Brain  and  Body.  The  Biblical  View  unharmed,  33-78 

III 

SCRIPTURE  AND  SCIENCE  ON  THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN - 

THE  IMAGE  AS  A  CREATION 

Biblical  View  of  Man’s  Origin.  Counter-theory  of  Monistic  Evolu¬ 
tion  (Haeckel).  Present-Day  Influence  of  the  Doctrine  of 


CONTENTS 


x; 

Evolution.  Extensions  and  Ambiguities  of  the  Doctrine. 
Evolution  and  Creation.  Evolution  not  necessarily  Darwinism. 
Sketch  and  Criticism  of  Darwinian  Theory.  Fortuity  invoked 
to  do  the  work  of  Mind.  Change  of  Attitude  of  Evolutionists. 
Inadequacy  of  Natural  Selection  to  explain  Evolution.  Principal 
Objections.  Revised  Evolutionary  Theories.  Evolution  and 
Involution.  Evolution  and  Teleology ;  Directive  Intelligence. 
Evolution  not  necessarily  by  Insensible  Gradations.  Creative 
Cause  involved  in  Founding  of  New  Kkigdoms.  ‘Enigmas’  of 
Science  (Origin  of  Life,  of  Consciousness,  of  Man).  Bearing  on 
the  Doctrine  of  the  Origin  of  Man.  Failure  of  Evolution  to 
account  for  the  mental  and  moral  Differentia  of  Man.  Unbridged 
Gulf  between  Man  and  the  Lower  Animals  in  a  physical  respect. 
The  Missing  Links  yet  Undiscovered.  Pithecanthropus  Erectus . 
Result:  Higher  Cause  implied  in  Man’s  Origin,  .  ,  81-136 

IV 

SCRIPTURE  AND  SCIENCE  ON  THE  PRIMITIVE  CONDI¬ 
TION  OF  MAN - THE  IMAGE  AS  ACTUAL  MORAL 

RESEMBLANCE 

Evolution  in  its  Bearing  on  Man’s  Mental  and  Moral  Nature. 
Alleged  gradual  Development  of  Man’s  Mind  from  Animal 
Intelligence  (Darwin,  Romanes,  Fiske).  Failure  to  explain  true 
Rationality  in  Man.  Potentiality  of  Progress  (Language,  Educa¬ 
tion,  Science,  etc.)  in  Man.  Free-Will  and  Morality  in  Man 
(Haeckel,  Fiske,  Huxley).  Bearing  on  Origin  of  Body  in  Man. 
Mind  and  Body  necessarily  rise  together.  Creative  Cause  accord¬ 
ingly  implied  in  both.  Creation  of  Man  ‘  male  and  female.’  Unity 
of  Race.  Question  of  Man’s  Primitive  Moral  Condition  Does 
Creation  in  the  Divine  Image  imply  actual  Moral  Resemblance  ? 
Biblical  View,  and  Contradiction  of  Evolutionary  Philosophy. 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


•  • 
Xll 


Darwinian  Picture  of  Primitive  Man.  Support  sought  in  Facts 
of  Anthropology,  i.  Argument  from  Existing  Savage  Races  $ 
fallacy  of  this.  2.  Argument  from  Remote  Antiquity  of  Man. 
Ussher’s  Chronology  Untenable.  Former  Exaggerated  Estimates 
of  Man’s  Antiquity.  Revised  Views.  Post-Glacial  Man.  Physical 
Science  on  Age  of  Earth  (Kelvin,  Tait,  etc.).  Recent  Beginnings 
of  History  (Babylonia,  Egypt,  etc.).  Evolution  does  not  establish 
this  View  of  Man.  1.  Evolution  is  not  necessarily  by  slow  Grada¬ 
tions.  2.  Palaeontological  Evidence :  Cave  Men,  etc.  High 
Character  of  Oldest  Skulls.  3.  High  Character  of  Early  Civilisa¬ 
tion.  4.  No  Proof  that  Civilisation  has  Originated  from  Bar¬ 
barism.  Subject  Viewed  in  light  of  true  Idea  of  Man.  The 
Primitive  Man  of  Evolution  not  simply  in  a  Non-Moral,  but  in 
an  Immoral  and  Wrong  State.  Contradiction  of  Divine  Father¬ 
hood.  Destiny  of  Man  to  Divine  Sonship  and  to  Immortality. 
These  Ideas  Contradictory  of  Evolutionary  Hypothesis, .  1 3  9- 1 9  3 


V 

SCRIPTURE  AND  SCIENCE  ON  THE  ORIGIN  AND  NATURE 
OF  SIN — THE  DEFACEMENT  OF  GOD’s  IMAGE 

\ 

Defacement  of  God’s  Image  Matter  of  Experience.  If  Man 
Created  pure,  a  ‘  Fall  ’  is  presupposed.  Idea  of  Sin  as  Apostacy 
from  God  underlies  all  Scripture.  Counter-theory  that  Man  has 
not  Fallen  but  Risen.  Objections  to  this  View.  On  Evolutionary 
Theory  Sin  loses  its  e  Catastrophic  ’  Character.  Alleged  necessity 
of  Sin  (Fiske,  Sabatier,  etc.).  Evolutionary  theory  robs  Sin  of  its 
Gravity.  Effect  on  Idea  of  Guilt.  Insufficient  to  speak  of  Realisa-  i 
tion  of  Moral  Ideal.  Moral  Law  demands  an  Upright  Nature  and 
Pure  Affections  from  the  first.  Biblical  Doctrine  of  Sin :  that 


/ 


CONTENTS 


•  •  • 
Xlll 

which  absolutely  Ought  not  to  be.  Contrast  of  Religious  and 
Philosophical  Ethics.  Sin  as  violation  of  Duty  to  God.  Religion 
recognises  Duties  to  God  as  well  as  to  Man.  Inmost  Principle 
of  Sin  :  Self-Will,  Egoism.  Sins  graded  on  this  Principle.  Narra¬ 
tive  of  Fall.  Connection  with  Superhuman  Evil.  Effects  of  Sin. 
i.  The  Spiritual  consequence  of  Sin  in  Depravation.  Bond  cut 
with  God.  Ascendency  of  Lower  Impulses.  Sin  as  Anarchy  and 
Bondage.  2.  The  Racial  Consequences  of  Sin.  Organic  Constitu¬ 
tion  of  Race.  Relation  to  Doctrine  of  Heredity.  4  Ape  and 
Tiger’  Theory  of  Original  Sin.  Objection  to  Doctrine  from 
Non-transmissibility  of  Acquired  Characters  (Weismann).  Effects 
of  Ethical  Volition  on  Mind  and  Body  are  transmissible.  Roman 
Catholic  and  Protestant  Views  of  the  Hereditary  Effects  of  the 
Fall.  Meaning  of  4  Total  Depravity,’ .  .  .  .  197-24.6 


VI 

THE  BIBLICAL  DOCTRINE  OF  MAN  AND  SIN  IN  ITS 
RELATION  TO  THE  CHRISTIAN  REDEMPTION - RE¬ 

STORATION  AND  PERFECTING  OF  THE  DIVINE 
IMAGE 

Still  to  be  considered,  3.  the  Physical  Consequence  of  Sin  in  Suffer¬ 
ing  and  Death.  Alleged  Universality  and  Necessity  of  Death  in 
the  Organic  World  (Man  included).  Biblical  View  connected: 
(1)  With  its  View  of  Man’s  Nature.  Soul  and  Body  not  intended 
to  be  Separated.  (2)  With  its  View  of  Man’s  Primitive  Condi¬ 
tion.  One  of  Moral  Uprightness.  Weismann’s  theory  that 
Death  is  not  a  Necessity  of  Organisms.  4  Immortality  of  the 
Protozoa.’  Remarkable  longevity  in  Animal  World.  Man’s 
case  stands  on  separate  footing.  He  founds  a  New  Kingdom  j  is 


XIV 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


destined  for  Immortality.  Death  a  Contradiction  of  the  true 
Idea  of  Humanity.  Posse  non  mori  and  non  posse  mori.  Harmony 
of  previous  Discussions  with  the  Scripture  Doctrine  of  Redemp¬ 
tion.  The  Doctrines  of  Man  and  Sin  implied:  i.  In  the  Pre- 
suppositions  of  Redemption,  (i)  The  infinite  Value  of  the  Soul. 
(2)  Man’s  Capacity  for  Divine  Sonship.  (3)  Man’s  Need  of 
Redemption  as  a  Sinner.  2.  In  the  End  of  Redemption.  The 
Restoration  and  Perfecting  of  the  Divine  Image.  3.  In  the  Means 
and  Method  of  Redemption.  (1)  In  the  Doctrine  of  Incarnation. 
The  Divine  Image  the  Ground  of  the  Possibility  of  Incarnation. 
Christ  the  Perfect  Realisation  of  the  Divine  Image  in  Man. 

(2)  In  the  Doctrine  of  Atonement.  Guilt  the  presupposition  of 
Atonement.  The  Racial  Aspect  of  Sin  has  its  Counterpart  in 
Redemption.  The  First  and  the  Second  Adams.  The  Penal 
Character  of  Death  implied  in  Christ’s  Death  for  our  Sins. 

(3)  In  the  Doctrines  of  Regeneration  and  Renewal.  Conformity 

to  Christ’s  Image.  (4)  In  the  Doctrine  of  Resurrection  and  the 
Christian  Hope  of  Immortality.  Christ’s  Resurrection  and  ours. 
The  Immortality  of  the  Gospel,  one  in  which  the  Body  shares;  an 
Immortality  of  the  whole  Person.  Conclusion,  .  .  249-283 


j  | 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


NOTES  TO  LECTURES 


i 

i 


I.  Modern  Naturalistic  View  of  the  World,  . 

II.  The  Creation  Narrative  and  Science, 

III.  Monistic  Metaphysics — Reaction  from  Haeckel, 

IV.  R.  Otto  on  Present-Day  Darwinism,  . 

V.  Recent  Views  on  the  Descent  of  Man, 

VI.  Modern  Theories  of  Evolution  and  the  Fall, 

VII.  Retrogression  among  Savages,  . 

VIII.  Professor  Boyd  Dawkins  on  Tertiary  Man, 

IX.  The  End  of  the  Ice  Age,  . 

X.  The  ‘New  Race’  in  Egypt, 

XI.  Otto  on  the  Sudden  Origin  of  Man,  . 

XII.  The  Lansing  Skeleton,  . 

XIII.  Weismann’s  Theory  of  Heredity, 

XIV.  Heredity  and  Responsibility.  .  , 


PAGE 

287 

288 
289 
293 
296 
298 
301 

304 

305 

306 
308 
309 
311 
315 


i 


The  Conflict  of  Biblical  and  Modern  Views 
of  Man  and  Sin — The  Issues  stated 


[ 


A 


Aversion  to  Doctrines  of  the  Gospel  founded  on  altered  views  of 
their  Presuppositions.  The  Biblical  Views  of  God,  Man,  and 
Sin,  met  by  a  Counter-theory  of  the  World  and  Man.  Scientific 
Monism  (Haeckel,  etc.).  Change  on  Doctrine  of  God.  On 
Doctrines  of  Man  and  Sin.  Effect  on  Christianity.  Lectures 
to  discuss  Relations  of  Doctrines  of  Man  and  Sin  to  Modern 
Anthropological  Theories.  Extent  of  the  Antagonism.  Evolu¬ 
tionary  View  of  the  Origin  of  Man  (Haeckel,  Fiske).  Conflict 
with  Biblical  Doctrine  in  respect:  i.  of  the  Nature  of  Man 5 
2.  of  the  Original  Integrity  of  Man  j  3.  of  the  Origin,  Nature, 
and  Effects  of  Sin.  Idealistic  Evolutionism.  Incompatibility 
with  Christian  View.  Reply  that  while  Ecclesiastical  ‘  Dogmas  ’ 
fall,  the  real  Essence  of  Christianity  is  untouched.  Fallacy  of 
this:  1.  Not  Ecclesiastical  Christianity  alone,  but  the  Chris¬ 
tianity  of  the  New  Testament  (Apostolic  Gospel)  falls ; 
2.  Christ’s  own  Teaching  is  subverted.  Essence  of  Apostolic 
Christianity  in  Consciousness  of  Redemption  through  Jesus 
Christ.  The  Infinite  Value  of  the  Soul  in  Christianity. 
Humanity  as  receptive  of  the  Divine  in  Christianity.  The 
Cross  and  Human  Sin.  The  opposing  Views  Irreconcilable. 


I 


THE  CONFLICT  OF  BIBLICAL  AND  MODERN  VIEWS 
ON  MAN  AND  SIN— THE  ISSUES  STATED 

T  N  studying  the  causes  of  the  aversion  undeni¬ 
ably  felt  in  these  times  by  many  serious  and 
thoughtful  persons  to  the  peculiar  doctrines  of 
the  Christian  religion,  we  are  early  led  to  the  dis¬ 
covery  that  the  real  rock  of  offence  lies,  less  in 
the  doctrines  themselves,  than  in  what  we  may 
call  the  presuppositions  of  the  doctrines — in  certain 
views  of  God,  man,  and  sin,  which  underlie  them, 
and  against  which  the  modern  mind  is  supposed 
to  be  in  protest.  Aversion  to  the  doctrines  of 
the  Gospel,  indeed — to  its  teachings  on  the  ruin 
of  man  through  sin,  on  redemption  by  the  aton¬ 
ing  death  of  Christ,  and  on  regeneration  by  the 
Holy  Spirit — is  not  special  to  any  one  age,  and 
has  often  other  than  intellectual  causes.  No 
careful  student,  however,  can  be  unobservant  of 
the  fact  that  Christianity  is  met  to-day,  not  by 


4 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


piecemeal  attacks  upon  its  doctrines,  or  objections 
springing  simply  from  moral  dislike,  but  by  a 
positively-conceived  counter-view  of  the  world, 
claiming  to  rest  on  scientific  grounds,  ably  con¬ 
structed  and  defended,  yet  in  its  fundamental  ideas 
striking  at  the  roots  of  the  Christian  system.  The 
popularity  of  this  counter-view  of  the  universe — 
frequently  described  as  the  4  modern  ’  view — is  not 
to  be  denied.  It  commands  wide  acceptance  ; 
multitudes  are  attracted  by  its  plausibility,  and  by 
the  seeming  cogency  of  its  scientific  proofs  ;  many 
would  deem  it  presumptuous,  and  a  mark  of 
ignorance,  to  call  in  question  a  view  believed  to 
have  behind  it  so  large  a  body  of  expert  opinion  ; 
while  perhaps  a  still  greater  number,  with  little 
first-hand  knowledge,  are  powerfully  influenced 
by  the  extent  to  which  its  theories  and  watch¬ 
words  are,  as  the  phrase  is,  ‘  in  the  air.’ 1 

In  truth,  however,  this  modern  view  of  the 
world,  as  expounded  by  its  best-known  repre¬ 
sentatives,  does  a  great  deal  more  than  simply 
destroy  belief  in  the  doctrines  we  have  been 
wont  to  call  Christian.  Carried  through  with 
unflinching  consistency,  it  is  as  fatal  to  the  primary 
1  See  Note  I.  on  Modern  Naturalistic  View  of  the  World. 


MAN  AND  SIN 


5 


truths  on  which  all  religion  rests  as  it  is  to  the 
distinctive  affirmations  of  the  Christian  Gospel. 
It  is  not  without  justification  in  the  premises  of 
his  system  that  Haeckel,  a  foremost  champion  of 
the  modern  monistic  view,  speaks  in  his  work  on 
The  Riddle  of  the  Universe 1  of  the  ideas  of  God, 
freedom,  and  immortality,  as  ‘ the  three  great 
buttresses  of  superstition,’  which  it  is  the  business 
of  science  to  destroy.  Still  more  significant,  per¬ 
haps,  of  the  currency  which  these  theories  have 
obtained,  and  of  the  influence  they  exert,  is  the 
fact  that  a  writer  like  Mr.  W.  H.  Mallock,  in  a 
work  recently  published,  entitled  Religion  as  a 
Credible  Doctrine :  a  Study  of  the  Fundamental 
Difficulty ,  should,  while  professing  to  defend  the 
ideas  of  religion  against  Haeckel  and  others  of 
his  way  of  thinking,  yet  make  abject  and  absolute 
surrender  to  Haeckel  in  nearly  every  one  of  his 
contentions.  This  capable  writer  spends  six- 
sevenths  of  his  book  in  showing,  and  all  the  skill 
of  his  resourceful  intellect  in  establishing,  that 
science,  as  Haeckel  declares,  demolishes  the  three 
great  fundamental  ideas  of  religion — God,  free- 

1  More  exactly,  "The  Riddles  ( Rathsel )  of  the  Universe.  We  quote 
from  the  English  translation  of  M‘Cabe  (popular  edition). 


6 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


dom,  immortality ;  leaves  no  place  for  them  ; 
that,  as  he  puts  it,  there  is  an  4  utter  impossibility 
of  intellectually  reconciling  religion  with  the 
essential  doctrines  of  science.’1  Then,  in  two 
closing  chapters,  he  argues  that  we  must  still  hold 
fast  by  these  ideas  on  the  ground  of  our  moral 
convictions  and  of  their  practical  value  for  life  ! 
The  persons  I  have  immediately  in  view  in  these 
lectures,  however,  do  not,  as  a  rule,  go  nearly  so 
far  as  this.  They  are,  on  the  contrary,  neither 
hostile  to  Christianity  as  such,  nor  wish  in  prin¬ 
ciple  to  break  with  it  ;  are  concerned  rather  to 
find  some  way  of  preserving  and  vindicating  the 
essentials  of  Christian  faith.  But  they  are  at  the 
same  time  profoundly  influenced  by  modern  con¬ 
ceptions,  and  are  persuaded  that,  if  Christianity  is 
to  survive,  it  must  undergo  an  entire  transforma¬ 
tion  and  re-interpretation  in  harmony  with  modern 
theories,  and  must  part  with  many  of  the  doctrines 
hitherto  regarded  as  distinctive  of  it.  The  only 
question  left  for  them  to  consider  is  what  form 
this  re-interpretation  is  to  take,  and  how  much  of 
the  old  creed  must  be  thrown  over,  in  order  to 
effect  the  desired  reconciliation. 

1  Pp.  xiv.  270  j  cf.  pp.  217,  242,  etc. 


MAN  AND  SIN 


7 


I  have  hinted  that  the  doctrines  chiefly  affected 
by  the  new  cosmical  conceptions  are  those  of  God, 
man,  and  sin ;  and  it  is  obvious  of  itself  that 
anything  which  seriously  affects  these  important 
doctrines  must  vitally  alter  the  complexion  of  our 
whole  theory  of  Christianity.  At  the  basis  of  all 
sound  thinking  in  theology  lies  of  necessity  a 
right  doctrine  of  God.  The  Christian  system  is 
an  organism,  every  part  of  which  is  sensitive  to 
change  in  any  other  ; 1  but  nowhere  is  change 
more  determinative  in  its  effects  than  here.  As  a 
man  thinks  God  to  be,  so  will  his  theology  be. 
It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  every  crucial  ques¬ 
tion  in  theology,  almost,  is  already  settled  in 
principle  in  any  thorough-going  discussion  of  the 
divine  attributes.  God,  in  the  Christian  concep¬ 
tion,  is  regarded  as  a  personal,  ethical,  and  self- 
revealing  Being,  infinite  and  eternal  in  all  His 
perfections.  He  is  thought  of  as  subsisting  in  a 
threefold  eternal  distinction  of  Father,  Son,  and 
Spirit.  He  is  righteous,  holy,  and  loving.  Any 
view,  therefore,  which,  as  in  modern  monistic  and 
pantheistic  systems,  negates  God’s  personality  and 
consciousness  ;  which,  by  limiting  His  attributes, 

1  Cf.  below,  p.  260. 


8 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


denies  to  Him  perfect  wisdom  and  power  ;  which, 
disrobing  Him  of  holiness  and  righteousness, 
denies  His  moral  government  of  the  world  and 
His  judicial  dealing  with  sin  ;  which  wholly  merges 
either  the  judicial  aspect  of  His  character  in  the 
Fatherly,  or  the  Fatherly  in  the  judicial ;  which, 
going  deeper,  denies  or  tampers  with  the  reality 
of  the  distinction  of  good  and  evil,  and  the 
ground  of  the  good  in  God’s  essential  nature  ; 
which,  confining  revelation  to  nature,  refuses  to 
acknowledge  any  j^pmiatural  entrance  of  God  in 
word  or  deed  into  history — such  false  or  defective 
views  of  God  react  at  once  on  any  conception  we 
can  form  of  Christianity,  and  either  compel  its 
rejection  altogether,  or  necessitate  its  trans¬ 
formation  into  something  altogether  different 
from  the  image  we  have  of  it  in  the  New  Testa¬ 
ment. 

If,  however,  our  doctrine  of  God  has  this 
determinative  effect  on  our  general  view  of 
Christianity,  it  must  now  be  said  that  the  same 
is  hardly  less  true  of  the  doctrines  of  man  and  sin. 
These  three  doctrines  of  God,  man,  and  sin,  are 
indeed  related,  and  in  a  manner  mutually  de¬ 
pendent.  Our  doctrine  of  God  will  manifestly 


MAN  AND  SIN 


9 


in  large  measure  determine  our  doctrine  of  man  ; 
while  the  Biblical  view  of  God  as  holy  Lawgiver 
and  Judge  is  the  necessary  presupposition  of  any 
just  conception  of  sin.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
view  we  are  led  to  form  of  man  in  his  nature  and 
origin  inevitably  reacts  on  our  conceptions  both 
of  God  and  of  sin,  and  through  these,  as  well  as 
more  directly,  affects  our  total  view  of  Chris¬ 
tianity.  Suppose,  e.g.y  we  agree  with  Haeckel 
and  his  following  in  denying  to  man  the  posses¬ 
sion  of  a  soul  capable  of  bearing  God’s  image, 
and  of  surviving  death,  or  in  denying  to  him 
moral  freedom  and  the  possibility  of  self-deter¬ 
mining  moral  life  :  it  is  evident  that  we  have 
destroyed  at  once  the  foundations  of  all  religion, 
save  as  a  baseless  superstition,  and  have  struck 
fatally  at  Christianity  as  the  religion  which  most 
exalts  man  in  his  nature  and  destiny.  The  result 
is  not  very  different  if  we  deny  to  man  the 
possession  of  a  nature  different  in  kind  from  that 
of  the  animals  beneath  him — say,  e.g .,  with  Mr. 
Mallock,  and  with  the  greater  number  of  the 
evolutionists,  that  c  the  mental  differences  between 
man  and  the  other  animals  are  differences  of 
degree  only  :  it  is  impossible  to  show  that  they 


IO 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


are  differences  of  kind.’1  For,  on  this  hypo¬ 
thesis,  to  mention  no  other  point  at  present, 
the  dividing-line  between  impersonal  and  per¬ 
sonal,  mortal  and  immortal,  vanishes.  We  are 
supposed  to  glide  by  insensible  gradations  from 
one  into  the  other.  But  we  have  only  to  fix  our 
thoughts  on  such  a  conception  as  immortality,  to 
see  that,  in  its  very  nature,  immortality  is  not  a 
thing  of  gradations  into  which  a  being  can  glide 
by  development.2  It  must  be  there,  or  it  must 
be  absent,  and  there  is  infinity  between  the  two 
conditions. 

Still  more  obvious  are  the  bearings  of  the  views 
which  we  adopt  of  the  nature  and  origin  of  man 
on  the  doctrine  of  sin.  The  consequences  here 
are  such  as  it  is  impossible  to  veil  or  minimise. 
If  man  be  conceived  of,  as  he  is  in  modern 
anthropological  theories,  as  ascending  by  slow 
gradations  from  the  stage  of  the  brute — if  his 
original  condition  is  not  one  of  purity  and  har¬ 
mony,  but  of  the  foulness  and  ferocity  attendant 
on  emergence  from  the  state  of  animalism — it  is 
plain,  and  will  be  more  fully  established  as  we 
proceed,3  that  our  whole  conceptions  of  the  nature 

1  Mallock,  p.  vii.  2  See  below,  p.  192.  3  Lecture  V. 


MAN  AND  SIN 


ii 


of  sin,  and  of  the  degree  of  blame  attaching  to 
man  in  his  existing  moral  condition,  must  be 
recast.  It  is  at  least  my  profound  conviction 
that,  on  the  basis  of  current  anthropological 
theories,  we  can  never  have  anything  but  defec¬ 
tive  and  inadequate  views  of  sin.  This,  again, 
vitally  affects  our  conception  of  the  Gospel,  for  it 
is  a  truism  that,  with  defective  and  inadequate 
views  of  sin,  there  can  never  be  an  adequate 
doctrine  of  redemption.  It  is,  in  fact,  precisely 
because  so  many  superficial  views  of  sin  are 
abroad,  that  there  is  at  the  present  time  so  general 
a  recoil  from  the  Biblical  declarations  on  the  need 
and  reality  of  atonement.  Not  merely  from  par¬ 
ticular  modes  of  stating  or  explaining  the  atone¬ 
ment,  but  from  the  idea  of  atonement  for  sin 
altogether.1 

These  considerations  will  explain  why,  in  the 
present  course  of  lectures,  I  have  chosen  as  my 
subject  the  Biblical  doctrines  of  man  and  sin  in 
their  relations  to  modern  anthropological  theories. 
I  have  named  the  subject  in  the  title  ‘  God’s 

1  It  may  be  noted  that,  with  the  tendency  to  a  break-up  of 
naturalistic  theories,  and  the  revival  of  a  more  spiritual  interpreta¬ 
tion  of  the  universe,  there  is  being  manifested  an  increasing  dis¬ 
position  again  to  do  justice  to  this  central  Christian  doctrine. 


12 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


Image  in  Man  and  its  Defacement,’  in  order  to 
bring  into  prominence  the  two  ideas  which  will 
dominate  my  treatment  :  first,  that  man,  as  he 
came  from  the  hands  of  God,  visibly  bore  his 
Creator’s  image ;  and  second,  that  sin  is  the 
eflfacement  of  that  image  of  God  in  man — never 
wholly  indeed,  but  to  a  degree  that  means  for 
man  moral  and  spiritual  ruin,  and  necessitates  a 
supernatural  remedy  if  the  Maker’s  image  is  to 
be  restored.  It  is  implied  in  what  has  been  said 
that  against  these  doctrines  of  Scripture  and  pre¬ 
suppositions  of  the  Gospel,  as  I  take  them  to  be, 
much  of  what  is  called  modern  thought  is  in 
revolt.  It  does  more  than  deny,  as  we  shall  see  ; 
it  flouts  them  with  scorn.  It  substitutes  for 
them  other  doctrines  incompatible  with  the  Bib¬ 
lical,  and  claims  to  rest  these  on  irrefragable 
grounds  of  science.  The  method  of  eclecticism 
which  many  adopt  in  trying  to  combine  the  one 
set  of  beliefs  with  the  other,  or  by  some  ingenuity 
of  re-interpretation  to  bring  them  into  harmony, 
is,  in  my  opinion,  wholly  unsuccessful.  We  have 
as  the  result  a  theology  of  patchwork — an  un¬ 
natural  compound  of  Christian  ideas  with  thoughts 
borrowed  from  half  a  dozen  alien  philosophies — a 


MAN  AND  SIN 


13 


new-fangled  scheme  sprinkled  over  with  words 
taken  over  from  evolutionary  science,  but  sadly 
lacking  in  the  ideas  which  are  central  in  the  theo- 
logy  of  the  Apostles.  The  cross,  in  short,  that 
is  attempted  between  these  opposing  conceptions 
is,  I  am  convinced,  an  impossible  one.  Better 
that  we  face  squarely  the  alternative  presented  to 
us,  and  make  our  choice.  It  will  be  my  business 
to  discuss  frankly  in  these  lectures  the  problems 
that  arise  from  comparison  of  the  modern  with 
what  I  consider  to  be  the  genuinely  Christian 
view,  and  to  endeavour  to  show  that  the  Christian 
solutions  are,  even  at  the  present  hour,  the  most 
rational  and  satisfying — the  truest  to  fact  and  to 
experience. 

It  will  now  be  my  duty,  in  the  remainder  of 
this  lecture,  to  expand  the  remarks  already 
made,  and  to  seek  to  place  in  as  strong  a  light 
as  I  can  the  nature  of  the  antagonism  which  I 
conceive  to  exist  between  the  Christian  and 
the  so-called  modern  views.  This  will  prepare  the 
way  for  the  special  discussions  of  the  succeeding 
lectures. 

If,  then,  following  the  guidance  of  the  modern 


14 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


spirit,  we  put  ourselves  in  the  standpoint  of 
dominant  anthropological  theories,  we  find  our¬ 
selves  at  a  stroke  far  removed  from  the  doctrines 
we  have  been  accustomed  to  call  Biblical.  The 
story  of  Eden,  the  picture  of  man  coming  upright 
and  pure  from  his  Maker’s  hand,  and  afterwards, 
by  his  wilful  disobedience,  falling  from  his  first 
estate,  and  dragging  down  his  posterity  with  him 
into  spiritual  ruin  and  death — this,  it  need  hardly 
be  said,  is  dismissed  as  baseless  legend — the  idlest 
of  dreams.1  They  float  down  to  us— or  are 
supposed  to  do  so — these  fables  of  the  world’s 
infancy — from  Babylonian  antiquitv,  and,  though 
purified,  and  made  the  vehicle  of  deeper  moral 
teaching,  still,  in  their  childish  naivete ,  betray  an 
age  that  knew  nothing  of  science.  Instead,  we 
have  the  nineteenth-century  gospel  of  evolution  to 
tell  us  what  man  actually  was,  and  how  he  has  come 
to  be  what  he  is  now.  The  myth  of  the  fall  of  man 
is  replaced  by  the  scientific  theory  of  the  ascent 
of  man.  Man,  as  we  now  learn,  is  the  last  and 
highest  product  of  the  evolutionary  process  which 
has  been  going  on  for  countless  ages,  first  in  the 
cosmic  and  inanimate,  next  in  the  organic,  worlds. 


1  See  Lecture  IV. 


MAN  AND  SIN 


*5 


His  ancestry,  starting  from  the  primitive  pro- 
tozoon,  is  to  be  sought  for  proximately  in  the 
forms  of  animal  life  nearest  to  his  own,  viz.,  in 
the  anthropoid  apes.  ‘  Sufficient  for  us,’  says 
Haeckel,  c  as  an  incontestable  historical  fact,  is  the 
important  thesis  that  man  descends  immediately 
from  the  ape,  and  secondarily  from  a  long  series 
of  lower  vertebrates.’ 1  Evolutionary  science 
undertakes  by  the  aid  of  embryology  and  palaeon¬ 
tology  to  trace  man’s  lineage  through  the  succes¬ 
sive  forms  of  animal  life,  and  to  show,  at  the 
upper  end  of  the  scale,  how,  in  both  mind  and 
body,  he  has  developed  from  his  original  brute 
condition  to  his  present  splendid  intellectual  and 
moral  pre-eminence.  The  nature  of  the  process 
will  engage  our  attention  in  a  succeeding  lecture.2 
Meanwhile,  one  glimpse  may  be  taken  from  a 
popular  book — Mr.  Fiske’s  Through  Nature  to 
God.  ‘  All  at  once,’  says  Mr.  Fiske,  ‘  perhaps 
somewhere  in  the  upper  eocene  or  lower  miocene, 
it  appears  that  among  the  primates,  a  newly- 
developing  family  already  distinguished  for  pre¬ 
hensile  capabilities,  one  genus  is  beginning  to 

1  Riddle  of  the  Universe ,  p.  30  (pop.  edit.).  See  below,  p.  82. 

2  Lecture  III. 


/ 


1 6 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


sustain  itself  more  by  mental  craft  and  shiftiness 
than  by  any  physical  characteristic.  Forthwith 
does  natural  selection  seize  upon  any  and  every 
advantageous  variation  in  this  craft  and  shiftiness, 
until  this  genus  of  primates,  this  Homo  Alalus 
[Haeckel’s  name  is  pithecanthropus  alalus — c‘  the 
ape-man  without  speech  ”],  or  speechless  man,  as 
we  may  call  him,  becomes  pre-eminent  for  sagacity, 
as  the  mammoth  is  pre-eminent  for  bulk,  or  the 
giraffe  for  length  of  neck.’ 1  By  and  by  Homo 
Alalus  invents  speech,  and  his  progress  is  thereby 
enormously  accelerated.  His  condition,  even  at 
this  stage,  is  naturally  one  on  which  that  of  the 
lowest  existing  savage  represents  a  great  advance. 
From  the  instincts  and  cunning  of  the  animal, 
however,  human  reason  and  conscience  are  being 
gradually  developed.  Moral  life  in  a  rudimentary 
way  has  begun.  The  masses  continue  low  and 
unprogressive  ;  but  by  a  happy  accident  of  nature, 
which  natural  selection  favours,  some  individuals 
in  the  crowd  present  higher  qualities,  and  push 
a  few  degrees  upwards.  Ideas  of  right  and  wrong 
form  themselves  on  the  basis  of  experience ;  a 
moral  ideal  begins  dimly  to  shape  itself.  So  the 

1  Page  94. 


MAN  AND  SIN 


i7 

race  improves.  Through  this  nisus,  this  impulse, 
this  propensity  to  strive  upwards,  man  has  the 
leverage  for  advance  within  himself.  Given  his 
nature,  suitable  environment,  and  natural  selection 
as  a  beneficent  deity  to  help  him  at  every  turn, 
he  is  independent  of  every  other  aid.1 

Already,  I  think,  even  on  the  basis  of  so  meagre 
a  sketch,  the  contrast  must  be  apparent  with  the 
ideas  of  man  we  have  been  accustomed  to  associate 
with  the  Christian  religion  and  its  philosophy  of 
salvation.  The  leading  points  have  already  been 
adverted  to,  but  they  will  bear  a  little  more 
elaboration. 

1 .  The  new  theories  are  in  conflict,  in  the  most 
direct  fashion,  with  the  Biblical  doctrine  of  the 
nature  of  man.  Man  is  not,  as  the  Bible  asserts, 
a  being  made  in  the  image  of  God,'  and  bearing 
•  from  the  first  His  rational  and  moral  likeness,  but 
is  evolved  into  what  he  is  through  transformation 
of  the  ape-image.2  God,  in  truth,  is  not  recog¬ 
nised  in  the  process  of  his  production  at  all.  The 
laws  of  evolution  are  competent  for  their  own 
work,  and  God  is  superfluous.  In  the  result  no 

1  See  further  on  Mr.  Fiske’s  views  below,  pp.  142-3,  148-50,  etc. 

2  Cf.  Darwin,  quoted  by  Dr.  H„  Stirling,  Darnvinianism ,  p.  157. 


B 


i8 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


clear  boundary  is  discernible  between  man  and  the 
animals  from  whom  he  sprang  :  none  as  respects 
the  body ;  none  between  animal  and  human 
intelligence  ;  none  between  animal  and  human 
morality.  Instead,  as  we  have  seen,  there  is 
throughout  the  gradual  shading  of  animal  into 
man.  No  wonder  that  on  such  a  basis  Haeckel 
denies  immortality  to  man.  For,  apart  from  the 
intrusion  of  a  supernatural  cause,  which  would 
disrupt  the  whole  system,  there  is  no  point  at 
which  immortality  can  come  in.  This  first  aspect 
of  the  conflict  between  the  Biblical  and  the  so- 
called  modern  views  of  man  will  be  discussed  in 
the  second  and  third  lectures. 

2.  There  is  a  not  less  direct  negation  by  the 
modern  theory  of  the  Biblical  view  of  an  original 
state  of  integrity  of  man.  For  this,  it  has  already 
been  shown,  there  is  no  room  left  whatever  on 
the  new  anthropological  hypothesis.  Man’s 
history  is  that  of  an  ascent — an  ascent  through 
inherent  powers — not  of  a  Ascent.  Man  begins 
at  the  foot  of  the  intellectual  and  moral  scale, 
gradually  emerging  from  the  ape  condition,  and 
slowly  working  his  way  upwards.  The  idea 
embodied  in  the  Bible  and  the  creeds  of  a  pure 


MAN  AND  SIN 


*9 


beginning  of  the  race — of  the  introduction  of 
man  upon  the  earth  in  a  condition  of  moral 
uprightness,  of  fitness  for  the  knowledge  of,  com¬ 
munion  with,  and  service  of,  his  Maker1 — is  dis¬ 
credited  and  flouted  as  beyond  the  range  of  rational 
consideration.  The  magnitude  of  the  gulf  between 
the  old  and  the  new  is  as  little  disputed  on  the  one 
side  as  on  the  other.  This  subject  of  man’s  primi¬ 
tive  condition  will  occupy  us  in  the  fourth  lecture. 

3.  It  is  equally  plain,  as  I  have  already  tried  to 
emphasise,  that  there  is  a  fundamental  contrariety 
between  the  modern  hypothesis  and  the  Biblical 
doctrine  of  sin ,  alike  in  regard  to  sin’s  origin, 
nature,  and  effects  in  humanity.  There  is,  in 
fact,  on  the  basis  of  this  theory,  no  proper 
doctrine  of  sin  possible  at  all.  Sin  loses  its 
Biblical  character  as  voluntary  transgression  of 
divine  law,  as  something  catastrophic  in  the 
history  of  the  race,  and  as  entailing  guilt,  con¬ 
demnation,  death,  and  spiritual  corruption  on 
mankind.  And  as  the  view  of  sin  presented  in 
the  Bible  is  weakened  and  destroyed,  so,  corre¬ 
spondingly,  the  need  for  redemption  through 

1  On  Mr.  Tennant’s  view  that  this  is  not  a  part  of  Biblical 
doctrine,  see  below,  pp.  157,  198,  300,  219,  etc. 


20 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


Christ  is  taken  away.  How  should  a  redeemer 
be  necessary  to  relieve  man  from  consequences 
which  flow  from  his  very  nature  as  created,  or  to 
secure  for  him  a  gain  which  evolutionary  processes 
infallibly  secure  for  him  without  supernatural 
help  ? 1 

There  is,  however,  it  is  just  to  acknowledge, 
a  much  higher  and  more  spiritual  type  of  evolu¬ 
tionary  theory  than  that  which  I  have  just 
sketched.  The  naturalistic  monism  of  writers 
like  Haeckel,  which,  it  is  claimed,  is  the  reign¬ 
ing  one  in  scientific  circles  (though  even  that 
statement,  as  we  shall  find,  needs  much  modifi¬ 
cation),2  has  not  the  whole  field  to  itself.  Ideal¬ 
istic  philosophy — especially  that  which  connects 
itself  with  Hegel — has  another  type  of  doctrine, 
which  is  not  naturalistic,  but  rational.  This 
higher  view  regards  man  as  in  his  true  nature 
spiritual.  He  is  not  a  mere  animal,  though  he 
arises  out  of  animal  conditions.  It  would  be 
truer  on  this  view  to  say  that  evolution  in  both 
the  inorganic  and  the  organic  worlds  in  nature 
is  the  unconscious  working  of  an  immanent 
reason,  than  that  self-conscious  reason  in  man 

1  See  below,  pp.  205-6.  2  See  below,  p.  71. 


MAN  AND  SIN 


21 


is  a  product  of  purely  natural  factors.  We  are 
here  admittedly  on  a  higher  plane,  and  one  which 
might  seem  to  present  greater  possibilities  of 
reconciliation  with  Christianity.  In  point  of 
fact,  however,  it  hardly  does  so.  In  the  hands 
of  most  of  the  apparent  advocates  of  this  philo¬ 
sophical  evolutionism,  the  antagonism  with 
Christian  doctrine  is  nearly  as  great  as  before. 
There  is  an  inner  spiritual  principle,  we  are 
rightly  taught,  which  lifts  man  in  nature  above 
the  animals,  and  renders  him  capable  of  rational, 
self-guided  life,  of  moral  ideas  and  ends,  of  educa¬ 
tion,  science,  and  religion.  But  this  image  of 
God  in  man  is  regarded  as,  to  begin  with,  only  a 
potency.  The  picture  given  by  this  theory  of 
man  in  his  first  appearance  and  original  condition 
is  not  very  different  from  that  of  the  naturalistic 
school.  Man,  it  is  assumed,  begins,  as  before, 
in  lowest  savagery,  or  somewhat  below  existing 
savagery,  and  gradually  works  his  way  upwards, 
through  inherent  powers  of  development.  There 
is,  as  little  as  in  the  former  case,  a  fall ;  or  rather, 
the  fall  is  held  to  be  the  expression  of  an  eternal 
truth  of  spirit ;  the  truth,  viz.,  that  man  must 
eat  of  the  tree  of  the  knowledge  of  good  and  evil 


22 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


to  know  truly  what  either  good  or  evil  is.  Sin, 
that  is,  is  a  necessary  step  in  the  transition  from 
mere  naturalness  to  true  manhood,  though  one 
that  needs  again  to  be  transcended.  It  is  evident, 
I  think,  that  this  evolutionary  scheme  fits  in  with 
Christianity  nearly  as  badly  as  the  former.  If  it 
does  more  justice  to  man’s  essential  nature,  it  errs 
as  grievously,  and  with  less  excuse,  in  depicting 
sin  as  a  necessity  of  human  development,  in 
robbing  it  of  its  tragic  character,  and  in  rendering 
superfluous  the  reconciling  work  of  Christ  and 
renewal  by  the  Spirit.  This  subject  of  the 
relation  of  the  modern  doctrine  to  sin  will  be 
discussed  in  the  fifth  and  sixth  lectures. 

There  can  be  little  doubt,  then,  I  think,  that 
whether  in  its  lower  or  in  its  higher  forms  this 
current  evolutionary  philosophy  means  the  nega¬ 
tion  of  much  that  is  vital  to  Christianity,  at 
least  as  it  has  hitherto  been  understood  among  us. 
It  dislocates  the  entire  Christian  system  ;  alters, 
where  it  does  not  overthrow,  every  doctrine  in  it. 
Neither  God,  nor  man,  nor  sin,  nor  redemption, 
can  be  conceived  of  as  before.  With  the  change 
of  attitude  to  redemption  goes  necessarily  a  change 
in  the  estimate  of  Christ’s  Person.  The  estimate 


MAN  AND  SIN 


23 


we  form  of  Christ’s  Person  will  doubtless  largely 
control  the  idea  we  form  of  His  work ;  but 
Ritschl  is  surely  so  far  right  when  he  affirms  that 
the  estimate  we  form  of  Christ’s  work  must 
mainly  control  the  idea  we  form  of  His  Person. 
The  complete  truth  is  that  the  two  doctrines  must 
always  be  held  together  in  congruity ;  in  their 
inner  and  scriptural  connection  with  each  other  ; 
and,  whenever  one  is  tampered  with,  the  other 
is  certain  ere  long  to  suffer  also.  But  in  the 
evolutionary  scheme  there  is,  as  said  earlier,  no 
place  for  a  supernatural  redeemer.  Great  per¬ 
sonalities  no  doubt  retain  their  place ;  Christ  may 
remain  as  the  crown  of  the  evolutionary  move¬ 
ment,  and  redemption  as  aid  rendered  to  the  race 
in  its  upward  march  of  progress  by  a  great  and 
good  character — One  in  whom  the  religious  prin¬ 
ciple  comes  to  its  highest  expression.  But  even 
this  the  more  thorough-going  monistic  form  of 
the  philosophy  will  by  no  means  concede. 
Spiritual  life  as  a  whole  falls  to  ruin  at  its  touch. 

Thus  far  I  have  been  looking  at  the  conflict 
between  the  Christian  and  the  modern  views  from 
the  so-called  scientific  or  modern  standpoint.  It 


1 


24. 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


may  be  well,  before  I  close  the  lecture,  that  I 
look  at  it  for  a  few  moments  from  the  side  of 
positive  Christianity.  The  answer  that  will  natu¬ 
rally  be  made  to  most  of  the  considerations  I  have 
advanced  is  that,  even  granting  it  to  be  as  I  say, 
it  is  only  the  ecclesiastical  view  of  Christianity  that 
falls — the  real,  the  original,  the  essential  Chris¬ 
tianity  remains.  It  is  not,  I  will  be  told,  a  question 
of  parting  with  Christianity,  but  a  question  of  re¬ 
interpreting  it,  so  as  to  do  justice  to  its  real 
essence,  in  harmony  with  modern  demands.  The 
things  which  are  stripped  off,  it  will  be  said — fall 
in  Adam,  death  as  the  result  of  sin,  a  supernatural 
incarnation,  an  atonement,  regeneration  by  the 
Spirit — are  accidents  :  the  substance,  a  purer 
Christianity,  abides.  The  modern  evolutionary 
conception,  it  is  taken  for  granted,  must  be 
accepted :  the  only  question  is,  how  is  Christi¬ 
anity  to  be  made  to  fit  into  it  ?  And  the  pleasing 
discovery  made — or  supposed  to  be  made — is 
that,  when  dogmatic  wrappages  are  removed, 
Christianity  is  in  deep  and  beautiful  harmony 
with  the  modern  conceptions — shines  with  a  new 
light,  and  receives  a  new  lease  of  life,  from  its 
association  with  them. 


MAN  AND  SIN 


*5 


It  is  a  pleasing  illusion  ;  and  if  it  were  not  that 
I  am  convinced  it  is  only  an  illusion,  I  should  not 
be  now  speaking  to  you  on  these  subjects.  We 
do  well  in  this  matter  to  deal  with  ourselves  in  all 
honesty  ;  and  it  should,  I  think,  with  perfect 
frankness  be  acknowledged  that,  in  this  endeavour 
to  harmonise  Christianity  with  the  new  philo¬ 
sophy,  it  is  not  the  Christianity  of  the  Church 
only  that  falls,  but  the  Christianity  of  the  New 
Testament,  It  is,  it  seems  to  me,  only  by  a 
species  of  self-deception  that  any  one  can  hide 
this  fact  from  himself.  Neither,  in  truth,  do  all 
thus  deceive  themselves.  It  is  perfectly  common 
to  hear  it  acknowledged  that,  if  the  new  premises 
are  accepted,  the  Christianity  of  the  Apostles — 
their  doctrines  of  sin,  of  the  Person  of  Christ,  of 
atonement,  of  the  new  birth,  of  justification — fall 
to  the  ground.  These  doctrines ,  it  is  argued, 
were  largely  the  result  of  their  own  thoughts, 
experiences,  and  training,  coloured  by  the  ideas  of 
their  age.  But  the  caveat  will  probably  be  made  : 
not  the  Christianity  of  Christ  —  that  abides. 
Here  again,  however — that  we  may  be  quite 
exact — it  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  Chris¬ 
tianity  spoken  of  is  not  that  of  the  Christ  of  the 


2  6 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


Gospels  as  we  have  them ,  but  the  Christianity  of 
a  Christ  shorn  of  most  of  his  actual  claims  and 
attributes,  and  reduced  to  the  necessary  natural 
dimensions  by  a  process  of  critical  recasting  and 
expurgation  of  the  records.  This  residuum  may 
be  called  Christianity  :  it  is,  however,  I  take  leave 
to  say,  a  Christianity  which  the  world  has  never 
historically  known  ;  which,  therefore,  I  may  be 
pardoned  for  refusing  to  identify  with  the  Chris¬ 
tianity  for  which  we  have  historical  attestation — 
Christianity  as  embodied  in  its  original  and  only 
authoritative  documents. 

If,  accordingly,  we  inquire  into  the  essence  of 
Christianity  as  it  meets  us  in  the  writings  of  the 
New  Testament,  I  shall  not,  I  think,  be  challenged 
for  describing  it  as,  on  its  experimental  side,  con¬ 
sisting  above  all  in  the  joyful  consciousness  of 
redemption  from  sin  and  reconciliation  to  God 
through  Jesus  Christ,  and  in  the  possession  of  a 
new  life  of  sonship  and  holiness  through  Christ’s 
Spirit.  This  undeniably,  reduced  to  its  simplest 
terms,  is  what  Christianity  meant  for  its  first 
preachers  and  their  disciples,  and  what  it  has 
meant  historically  for  the  Church  ever  since. 
But  now  mark  carefully  the  essential  implications 


MAN  AND  SIN 


27 


of  this  Apostolic  Gospel.  Harnack,  in  his  recent 
Berlin  lectures,  places  the  essence  of  Christianity 
in  the  three  great  ideas  of  the  Kingdom  of  God 
and  its  coming ;  of  God  the  Father,  and  the 
infinite  value  of  the  human  soul  ;  of  the  higher 
righteousness,  and  the  commandment  of  love. 
There  is  indeed  more  than  this  in  Christianity — 
much  more  :  the  idea  of  redemption  in  particular 
is  conspicuously  absent.  But  at  least  it  will  be 
admitted  that  these  ideas  are  in  Christianity  ; 
that,  in  particular,  the  ideas  of  God  the  Father, 
and  of  the  infinite  value  of  the  soul,  are  there. 
But  see  how  far  this  already  carries  us.  It  means 
that  man  is  affiliated  to  God  ;  that,  in  his  spiritual 
nature,  he  is  a  being  made  in  the  image  of  God  ; 
that  he  is  capable  of  knowing,  loving,  and  obey¬ 
ing  God,  and  is  destined  for  fellowship  with  God. 
There  may  be  disputes  as  to  the  sense  in  which 
we  can  speak  of  a  universal  Fatherhood  of  God 
and  a  natural  sonship  of  man  ;  but  there  will  be 
no  dispute,  at  least,  about  this,  that  Jesus  recog¬ 
nised  in  every  human  soul  an  infinite  value,  an 
essential  kinship  with  God,  a  capacity  for  sonship 
and  for  eternal  life.1  But  this  implies  a  view  of 

1  See  below,  pp.  190-3. 


28 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


man  diametrically  opposed  to  the  current  evolu¬ 
tionary  hypothesis  with  its  insensible  gradations 
from  animal  to  man. 

It  is,  however,  peculiarly  in  the  light  of  the 
Christian  doctrine  of  redemption  that  the  unten¬ 
ableness  of  the  opposite  hypothesis  is  seen.  The 
Christian  man  is  one  who  knows  himself  redeemed, 
saved,  forgiven,  renewed,  restored  to  fellowship 
with  God.  He  believes  this  to  have  been 
accomplished  at  the  infinite  cost  of  the  incarna¬ 
tion,  sufferings,  and  death  upon  the  cross,  of  the 
Son  of  God.  But  this  again  implies  a  transcen¬ 
dent  value  attaching  to  the  soul  of  man,  such  as 
only  a  being  made  in  God’s  image  could  have  ; 
implies  a  view  of  sin  which  invests  it  with  an 
unspeakably  awful  and  tragic  character;  implies  a 
view  of  Christ  which  means  that  our  nature  was 
receptive  of  the  fulness  of  the  Godhead.  Sin  is 
no  longer,  in  the  light  which  this  cross  of  Christ 
sheds  upon  it,  a  necessity  in  the  history  of  the 
race,  but  something  unnatural  and  abnormal,  the 
result  of  voluntary  apostacy  from  God  ;  some¬ 
thing  which  entails  curse  and  death,  and  which, 
because  it  is  absolutely  universal — the  whole 
world  having  gone  aside  from  original  righteous- 


MAN  AND  SIN 


29 


ness,  and  fallen  a  prey  to  corruption  and  mortality 
— must  be  traced  back  to  the  fountainhead  of  the 
race  ;  that  is,  to  a  fall  in  the  beginning  of  the 
history  of  humanity.1  But  all  this,  beyond  ques¬ 
tion,  is  in  deepest  contrast  with  a  view  in  which, 
as  formerly  explained,  sin  is  depicted,  if  not  as 
a  metaphysical,  at  least  as  a  natural  necessity  ;  in 
which  its  real  heinousness  as  offence  against  God 
is  taken  away  ; 2  where  its  foundations  are  not 
wholly  destroyed  by  the  denial  of  man’s  spiritu¬ 
ality,  freedom,  and  immortality. 

There  seems  to  me,  therefore,  no  evading  of 
the  issue  between  this  new  and  widely-accepted 
theory  of  man’s  origin,  nature,  primitive  and 
existing  moral  condition,  and  the  Christian  faith. 
The  two  theories  stand  opposed  to  each  other  in 
fundamental  respects,  and,  in  the  experience  of 
those  who  adopt  them,  inevitably  drift  apart. 
Like  oil  and  water  they  refuse  to  blend ;  one  or 
other  must  be  parted  with.  Which  of  the  two  it 
should  be,  it  is  the  purpose  of  these  lectures  to 
inquire.  If  the  foregoing  remarks  suggest  that 
any  antagonism  is  to  be  shown  to  legitimate 

1  See  more  fully  below,  pp.  198  ff.  Cf.  Lect.  VI.  p.  274. 

2  See  Lect.  V.  pp.  208-9. 


30 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


scientific  inquiry,  or  well  -  established  results  of 
anthropological  research,  I  can  only  hope  that 
the  further  course  of  the  lectures  will  dispel  that 
fear.  My  deepest  conviction  is  that  of  the  unity 
of  truth  ;  and  just  in  proportion  to  the  strength 
of  my  persuasion  of  the  truth  of  God’s  revela¬ 
tion,  and  of  the  saving  power  of  Christ’s 
Gospel,  is  the  firmness  of  my  assurance  that 
nothing  that  science  can  make  good  will  ulti¬ 
mately  be  found  to  conflict  with  the  grounds 
of  our  Christian  certainty. 


i 


Scripture  and  Science  on  the  Nature  of 
Man — The  Image  of  God  in  Man 


Connection  of  Questions  of  Origin  and  Nature.  Monistic  View 
of  Human  Nature  (Haeckel).  Biblical  Doctrine  :  Man  made  in 
the  Image  of  God.  Creation  Narrative  in  Gen.  i.  Agreement 
of  Bible  and  Science  on  Man’s  Place  in  Creation.  Man  as  Link 
between  Natural  and  Spiritual  Worlds.  The  Second  Creation 
Narrative.  Man  as ‘Living  Soul.’  Relation  of  terms:  Soul, 
Spirit,  Flesh.  Man  a  Compound  Being:  Body  and  Soul. 
Bearing  on  Doctrine  of  Death.  Image  of  God  in  Man.  Not  in 
Bodily  Form.  Essentially  a  Mental  and  Moral  Image.  Ration¬ 
ality  of  Man.  Moral  Nature  and  Freedom  of  Man.  Religious 
Capacity  of  Man.  Sovereignty  over  the  Creatures.  Opposition 
of  Modern  Theories.  Denial  of  Man’s  Distinction  in  Nature 
from  the  Animals.  This  Distinction  Qualitative ,  not  simply  in 
Degree.  Attack  on  Man’s  Nature  of  the  older  Materialism. 
Change  of  Standpoint  in  Monism.  The  ‘  Parallel  Series  ’ 
Theory.  Haeckel’s  Denial  of  the  Soul,  Freedom  and  Immor¬ 
tality.  Theory  practically  Materialistic.  Absurdity  of  Haeckel’s 
Eternal  ‘  Substance.’  Stronghold  of  Monistic  Theory  :  Depen¬ 
dence  of  Mind  on  Brain.  Fallacies  in  this  :  i.  ‘  Parallel  Series  ’ 
untenable.  2.  Erroneous  to  reason  from  Brain  Conditions  in 
Disease  to  Brain  Conditions  in  Health.  3.  Ignoring  of  Counter¬ 
class  of  Facts  :  the  Influence  of  Mind  on  Brain  and  Body.  The 
Biblical  View  unharmed. 


32 


II 


SCRIPTURE  AND  SCIENCE  ON  THE  NATURE  OF 
MAN-THE  IMAGE  OF  GOD  IN  MAN 

HE  questions  of  the  origin  and  of  the  nature 


A  of  man  are  inseparably  connected.  Theories 
of  origin,  it  is  soon  discovered,  control  in  practice 
the  view  taken  of  man’s  essential  constitution, 
and  need  to  be  checked  and  corrected  by  careful 
consideration  of  what  man  is — this  being  into 
whose  origin  we  are  inquiring.  Conversely,  the 
study  of  man’s  nature  is  speedily  found  to  be 
implicated  with  theories  of  man’s  mental  and 
moral  evolution,  which  drive  us  back  on  con¬ 
siderations  of  origin.  It  will  be  convenient  that 
in  the  present  lecture  attention  should  be  mainly 
given  to  the  Biblical  account  of  man’s  nature,  or 
to  the  doctrine  of  the  image  of  God  in  man,  and 
to  the  opposition  manifested  to  this  doctrine  from 
the  side  of  a  materialistic  monism.  The  subject 


c 


33 


34 


GOD'S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


of  origin  in  the  light  of  evolutionary  theories 
will  occupy  us  in  the  next  lecture. 

How  keen  is  the  antagonism  between  the 
Biblical  doctrine  of  man  and  the  so-called 
modern  view  may  be  seen  from  a  single  passage 
which  I  shall  quote  from  Haeckel.  4  Our  own 
human  nature,’  says  this  writer,  4  which  exalted 
itself  into  an  image  of  God  in  its  anthropistic 
illusion,  sinks  to  the  level  of  a  placental  mammal, 
which  has  no  more  value  for  the  universe  at  large 
than  the  ant,  the  fly  of  a  summer’s  day,  the 
microscopic  infusorium,  or  the  smallest  bacillus. 
Humanity  is  but  a  transitory  phase  of  the  evolu¬ 
tion  of  an  eternal  substance,  a  particular  pheno¬ 
menal  form  of  matter  and  energy,  the  true 
proportion  of  which  we  soon  perceive  when  we 
set  it  on  the  background  of  infinite  space  and 
eternal  time.’1  It  is  the  truth  of  these  allega¬ 
tions  we  are  to  test.  We  begin  with  the  Biblical 
doctrine,  and  in  the  second  part  of  the  lecture 
will  consider  the  materialistic  and  monistic 
negation. 

The  foundations  of  the  Biblical  doctrine  of 

1  Riddle  of  the  Universe ,  p.  87  5  cf.  pp.  5,  6  (pop.  edit.). 


THE  NATURE  OF  MAN 


35 


man  are  firmly  laid  at  the  very  commencement  of 
his  history  in  the  accounts  given  of  his  creation. 
In  the  narrative  of  creation  in  the  opening 
chapter  of  Genesis — the  so-called  Priestly  or 
Elohistic  narrative — we  have  already  that  noblest 
of  possible  utterances  regarding  man  :  c  God 
created  man  in  His  own  imaged  The  manner  in 
which  this  declaration  is  led  up  to  is  hardly 
less  remarkable  than  the  utterance  itself.  The 
last  stage  in  the  work  of  creation  has  been 
reached,  and  the  Creator  is  about  to  produce  His 
masterpiece.  But,  as  if  to  emphasise  the  import¬ 
ance  of  this  event,  and  prepare  us  for  something 
new  and  exceptional,  the  form  of  representation 
changes.  Hitherto  the  simple  fiat  of  omni¬ 
potence  has  sufficed — ‘  God  said.’  Now  the 
Creator  —  Elohim  —  is  represented  as  taking 
counsel  with  Himself  (for  no  other  is^  men¬ 
tioned)  :  ‘  Let  us  make  man  in  our  image,  after 
our  likeness 1  and  in  the  next  verse,  with  the 
employment  of  the  stronger  word,  ‘created* 
( bara ),  the  execution  of  this  purpose  is  narrated  : 
‘  So  God  created  man  in  His  own  image,  in  the 
image  of  God  created  He  him,  male  and  female 

1  Gen.  i.  26. 


36 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


created  He  them.’ 1  This  grand  declaration  that 
man  is  made  in  the  image  ( zelem )  of  God,  after 
His  likeness  (demutli) — I  follow  the  best  exegetes 
in  assuming  that  no  distinction  is  intended 
between  the  two  terms 2 — is,  as  Haeckel  also 
recognises,  determinative  of  the  whole  Biblical 
idea  of  man.  It  is  the  conception,  tacit  or 
avowed,  which  underlies  all  revelation  :  is  given, 
eg.,  in  Gen.  ix.  6,  as  the  ground  of  the  prohibi¬ 
tion  of  the  shedding  of  man’s  blood  ;  is  echoed  in 
Psalm  viii. ;  is  reiterated  frequently  in  the  New 
Testament  (i  Cor.  xi.  7  ;  Eph.  iv.  21  ;  Col.  iii. 
10  ;  James  iii.  9)  :  is,  in  truth,  the  presupposition 
of  the  history  of  God’s  dealings  with  man  from 
first  to  last. 

In  basing  thus  on  the  Creation  narrative  in 
Genesis  L,  I  do  not  feel  that  it  falls  within  my 
province  to  discuss  the  questions  raised  by 
criticism  as  to  the  origin  and  date  of  this 

1  Ver.  27.  Dr.  Driver  remarks :  ‘The  creation  of  man  is  intro¬ 
duced  with  solemnity:  it  is  the  result  of  a  special  deliberation  on 
the  part  of  God,  and  man  is  a  special  expression  of  the  divine 
nature’  ( Genesis ,  in  loc.).  The  plural  is  best  explained  as  the  plural 
of  majesty.  There  is  no  allusion  to  a  council  of  angels  :  critics  note 
that  angels  are  not  introduced  in  the  P  narrative. 

2  See  below,  pp.  54,  58.  Calvin  already  ( Inslit .  1.  xv.  3)  and 
most  Protestants  reject  the  idea  of  a  distinction. 


THE  NATURE  OF  MAN 


narrative  ;  nor  is  it  necessary  that  I  should  do 
so.  Enough  for  my  present  purpose  that  the 
narrative  is  there,  and  that  the  doctrine  it  en¬ 
shrines  is  that  which  underlies  all  Scripture  ;  is, 
besides,  a  doctrine  which  is  verifiable  and  capable 
of  vindication  from  the  nature  and  history  of 
man.  In  view,  however,  of  its  fundamental 
character,  and  the  importance  of  the  whole 
subject,  I  may  offer  the  following  brief  remarks 
regarding  it : — 

i.  While  it  may  be  in  itself  a  secondary  ques¬ 
tion  at  what  period  the  narrative  received  its  final 
literary  shape  or  was  incorporated  in  the  book 
of  the  law,  I  am,  in  agreement  with  many 
able  scholars,  not  persuaded  of  its  late  date  ;  am 
disposed  rather,  with  Delitzsch  and  others,  to 
look  on  the  account  as  one  of  the  oldest  we  have, 
and  as  coming  down  to  us  from  pre-Mosaic 
times.1  A  cosmogony  with  certain  resembling 
features,  resting,  no  doubt,  on  old  Babylonian 
tradition,  but  defaced  by  polytheism  and  many 
absurdities — beginning,  indeed,  with  the  genesis 


1  On  the  different  views  held  as  to  this  narrative  (Delitzsch, 
Schrader,  Dillmann,  Gunkel,  Kittel,  Oettli,  etc.)  see  my  work, 
The  Problem  of  the  Old  Testament ,  pp.  405  ff.  530-1. 


38 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


of  the  gods  themselves — is  found,  I  know,  on 
Assyrian  tablets.  There  is,  however,  to  my  mind, 
a  supreme  improbability  in  the  idea  that  any 
writer,  living,  say,  in  the  Exile,  should  borrow 
such  an  account  from  his  heathen  neighbours, 
and,  after  purging  it  from  its  polytheistic  accre¬ 
tions,  should  place  it  in  the  forefront  of  his 
Scriptures.  The  earlier  character  of  the  narrative 
seems  indicated  by  the  references  made  to  it  in 
the  Decalogue  and  in  such  Psalms  as  the  8th  and 
104th.1 

2.  With  reference  to  the  supposed  borrowing 
of  the  narrative  from  Babylonian  or  similar  myths, 
I  think  the  first  thing  that  must  strike  the  im¬ 
partial  reader  is  not  the  alleged  resemblance  to, 
but  rather  the  entire  difference  in  spirit  and 
structure  of  the  Genesis  narrative  from,  all  other 
legends  and  cosmogonies  which  religion  and 
literature  present.  These  are,  without  exception, 
polytheistic,  mythological,  fantastic  in  character  in 
the  highest  degree.  The  Biblical  story  is  the 
opposite  of  all  this  :  serious,  orderly,  monotheistic, 
rational,  the  vehicle  of  the  very  noblest  ideas  about 
God  and  His  world.  It  has  upon  it  a  stamp  of 

1  Cf.  Delitzsch,  Genesis ,  l.  pp.  63-66  (E.  T.). 


THE  NATURE  OF  MAN 


39 


grandeur  and  individual  character  which  speaks 
against  its  being  an  expurgated  edition  of  the 
heathen  fables  from  which  it  is  supposed  by  some 
to  be  derived.1 

3.  With  relation  to  science,  while  I  grant  at 
once  that  it  is  not  the  object  of  this  narrative  to 
teach  what  we  call  science,  or  to  anticipate  nine¬ 
teenth-century  discoveries,  I  confess  again  that 
what  impresses  me  most  about  this  ancient  narra¬ 
tive  is  not  its  alleged  disagreements  with  science, 
but  its  sobriety,  rationality,  and  marvellous  general 
congruence  with  the  picture  of  creation,  even  as 
modern  science  presents  it  to  us. 

4.  If,  finally,  we  look  at  the  ideas  which  the 
inspired  record  is  intended  primarily  to  convey — 
the  ideas,  viz.,  that  there  is  one  God,  who  is  the 
Almighty  Creator  of  the  world ;  that  the  world 
is  not  a  natural  and  necessary  emanation  of  the 
divine  Being,  but  originated  in  a  free  act  of  God's 
will  ;  that  creation  was  not  the  result  of  a  single 
act,  but  was  accomplished  in  an  ascending  series 
of  acts,  culminating  in  man,  in  whom  the  creative 

1  In  the  work  above-named  I  have  argued  that  the  relation  of 
Hebrew  to  Babylonian  tradition  is  probably  one  of  ‘  cognateness  ’ 
rather  than  of  ‘  derivation. 


I 


4o 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


activity  came  to  rest 1 — I  say,  if  we  look  at  these 
ideas,  it  may  be  claimed  for  them  that  there  is  not 
one  which  comes  into  conflict  with  science,  while, 
in  respect  of  details,  so  true  is  the  insight  yielded 
by  the  Spirit  of  revelation  into  -the  orderly  pro¬ 
gress  of  nature,  that  there  is  marvellously  little 
one  requires  to  revise  even  in  this  primitive  picture 
of  creation  in  order  to  bring  it  into  harmony 
with  what  our  own  advanced  science  has  to  teach 
us.2 

On  one  point,  at  least — and  that  an  all- 
important  one — there  will,  I  think,  be  general 
acknowledgment  that  the  Biblical  account  is  in 
complete  agreement  with  science ;  that  is,  in 
placing  man  at  the  summit  of  creation,  as  the  last 
and  highest  of  God’s  works  and  the  goal  of  the 
whole  creative  movement.  Even  evolutionary 
philosophy  has  no  cavil  to  make  here.  For  in  it 
also  man  is  the  last  and  highest  product  of  nature, 
the  terminal  point  of  organic  development.  It  is 
not,  so  far  as  I  know,  seriously  contended  by 
any  one — though  some  in  the  past  have  spoken  in 

1  Cf.  Driver,  Genesis ,  pp.  32,  33. 

2  See  Haeckel,  quoted  in  Note  II.  on  The  Creation  Narrative  and 
Science. 


THE  NATURE  OF  MAN 


4i 


that  way — that  humanity  will  evolve  into  some¬ 
thing  specifically  different  from,  and  higher  than, 
the  humanity  we  know.  Whatever  future  de¬ 
velopment  there  may  be,  it  seems  always  assumed 
that  it  will  be  development  within  humanity.  As 
Mr.  Fiske  puts  it  in  his  through  Nature  to  God : 
4  In  the  long  series  of  organic  beings,  man  is  the 
last ;  the  cosmic  process,  having  once  evolved 
this  masterpiece,  could  thenceforth  do  nothing 
better  than  perfect  him.’ 1  The  unity  of  the 
human  species  seems  also,  in  harmony  with  the 
Biblical  representation,  to  be  a  necessary  corollary 
from  the  doctrine  of  evolution.2 

There  is,  however,  another  side  to  the  complete 
Scripture  doctrine  of  man’s  place  in  creation  which 
requires  likewise  to  be  taken  into  account.  While 
man  is  linked  on  the  lower  side  of  his  being  with 
organic  nature,  and  in  a  manner,  physiologically 
and  otherwise,  sums  it  up  in  himself,  and  is  the 
microcosm  of  it,  he  not  less  clearly  stands  above 
nature — is  in  a  true  sense  supramXxvcA — and  on 
this  side  of  his  being  is  linked  with  a  higher 
spiritual  order.  Mr.  Fiske,  in  his  own  way,  admits 
this  also  ;  for  it  is  to  the  possession  of  intelligence 

1  Page  85.  2  See  below,  p.  154. 


42 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


by  man,  to  the  fact  that  henceforth  variations  of 
intelligence  are  more  profitable  to  him  than  varia¬ 
tions  of  body,  that  he  attributes  the  cessation  with 
him  of  further  organic  development.1  Mr.  Fiske’s 
argument,  we  shall  see  after,  is  more  specious  than 
solid  ;  but  it  will  not  at  least  be  doubted  that  it  is 
in  virtue  of  his  powers  of  mind,  including  under 
this  his  whole  spiritual  endowment,  that  man 
holds  the  unique  position  he  does  in  creation.  In 
the  words  of  Herder,  man  is  ‘  the  middle  link 
between  two  systems  of  creation  intimately  con¬ 
nected  with  each  other  ’ 2 — on  the  one  hand,  the 
highest  of  nature’s  products,  crowning  the  long 
ascent  from  lower  to  higher  forms  of  organic  life  ; 
on  the  other,  the  starting-point  of  a  new  order 
of  spiritual  existence,  or  kingdom  of  intelligence. 
Nature,  indeed,  as  we  can  now  see,  would  have 
remained  incomplete  had  not  such  a  being  appeared 
to  crown  its  formations.  For,  with  all  its  order 
and  beauty,  nature,  without  man,  is  unconscious 
of  itself ;  is  incapable  of  turning  its  eye  back 
upon  itself ;  and  of  contemplating  what  it  has 
brought  forth  ;  has  no  proper  final  cause.  Only 
when  man  appeared,  with  faculties  capable  of 

1  As  above,  pp.  83-85.  2  Ideen,  bk.  v.  6. 


THE  NATURE  OF  MAN 


43 


surveying  the  scene  of  his  existence,  of  under¬ 
standing  its  processes  and  laws,  and  of  utilising  its 
vast  resources,  was  the  Riddle  of  the  Universe 
(to  use  Haeckel’s  phrase)  solved  ;  only  then  was 
an  adequate  end — an  end  for  self — found  in  it.1 

Scripture,  therefore,  represents  the  truth  with 
perfect  accuracy  when  it  speaks  of  man  as  the 
crown  of  nature,  and  as  made  in  the  image  of 
God.  Before  considering  more  precisely  what  is 
covered  by  this  last  expression  it  will  be  proper  to 
look  briefly  at  the  second  and  more  anthropo¬ 
morphic  narrative  of  man’s  creation  in  Genesis  ii., 
which  also  has  its  contribution  to  offer  to  our 
subject.  This  second  narrative  is  sometimes 
spoken  of,  but  without  sufficient  reason,  as  in 
contradiction  with  the  first.  Its  standpoint, 
grouping,  and  mode  of  representation  are,  how¬ 
ever,  different  from  those  of  the  previous  chapter. 
The  interest  concentrates  now  specially  in  man, 
who  is,  as  before,  the  centre  and  head  of  creation, 
brought  into  being  by  a  special  supernatural  act  of 
God.  The  object  is  to  show  how  man  was  dealt 
with  by  God  at  his  creation  ;  how  he  was  placed 
in  suitable  surroundings,  provided  with  a  helpmeet 

1  Cf.  The  Christian  View  of  God  and  the  World ,  p.  135. 


44 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


in  woman — £  bone  of  his  bone  and  flesh  of  his 
flesh  ’ — made  capable  of  fellowship  with  God,  and 
of  immortal  life ;  but  how,  afterwards,  listening 
to  the  tempter,  the  newly-created  pair  disobeyed 
the  divine  command  imposed  on  them,  and 
brought  death  into  our  world  and  all  our  woe. 
In  this  narrative  the  creation  of  man  is  thus 
described  :  c  And  the  Lord  God  [Jehovah  Elohim] 
formed  man  of  the  dust  of  the  ground,  and 
breathed  into  his  nostrils  the  breath  of  life  (lit. 
the  breath  of  lives,  nishmath  hayyim )  and  man 
became  a  living  soul  (nephesh  hayyaK)! 1  It  would 
be  a  misreading  of  this  pictorial  description  of  the 
making  of  man  to  take  it  as  meaning  literally  that 
Jehovah  first  moulded  the  shape  of  a  human  body 
from  inanimate  dust,  then  by  a  subsequent  act 
breathed  life  into  it.  For  one  thing,  such  a  life¬ 
less  shape  would  not  be  in  any  true  sense  a  body 
— much  less  a  c  man.’  A  body  is  not  a  lump  of 
dead  matter,  but  is  a  thing  of  flesh  and  blood,  has 
its  parts  and  organs,  is  built  up  of  living  tissue. 
The  idea  of  the  passage  is  fully  satisfied  by 
assuming  that  man’s  body — the  organic  frame — 
was  produced  by  God,  by  whatever  processes, 

1  Verse  7. 


THE  NATURE  OF  MAN 


45 


from  lower  elements,  and  that  through  the  inspi¬ 
ration  of  the  Almighty  there  was  imparted  to,  or 
awakened  within,  the  newly-created  being  that 
higher  life  which  makes  man  what  he  truly  is — a 
personal,  self-conscious,  rational  and  moral  being. 
As  much  as  in  the  previous  case  the  narrative 
implies  a  distinctive  act  of  God  in  man’s  produc¬ 
tion  ;  but  it  is  important  to  notice  in  what 
precisely  the  assertion  of  this  distinctiveness  lies. 
It  does  not  lie  in  the  simple  expression,  4  Man 
became  a  living  soul,’  for  the  same  words  are 
used  in  Ch.  i.  20,  24,  30,  to  denote  purely  animal 
life.  Animal,  as  well  as  man,  is  ‘living  soul.’ 
Neither  does  it  altogether  lie  in  the  expression 
c  breath  of  lives,’  taken  by  itself  ;  though  it  is  to 
be  observed  that  the  term  here  employed  for 
‘  breath  ’  ( rfshamah )  is,  with  the  single  exception 
of  Gen.  vii.  22,  always  in  the  Old  Testament 
confined  to  man.1  Even  in  the  passage  named, 
when  read  with  the  close  of  the  preceding  verse  : 
‘  And  every  man  :  all  in  whose  nostrils  was  the 
breath  of  life  [lit.  the  breath  of  the  spirit  of  lives], 
of  all  that  was  on  the  dry  land  died,’  it  is  not 
quite  clear  that  it  is  not  man  who  is  specially  in 

1  Cf.  Oehler,  Theol.  of  the  O.  T.,  i.  p.  21 7. 


46 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


view  in  the  interpolated  clause.1  The  true  unique¬ 
ness  in  man’s  formation,  however,  is  expressed  by 
the  act  of  the  divine  inbreathing,  answering 
somewhat  to  the  bara  of  the  previous  account. 
This  is  an  act  peculiar  to  the  creation  of  man  ; 
no  similar  statement  is  made  about  the  animals. 
The  breath  of  Jehovah  imparts  to  man  the  life 
which  is  his  own,  and  awakens  him  to  conscious 
possession  of  it.  The  same  idea  of  the  origina¬ 
tion  of  the  spiritual  life  of  man  in  a  divine  in¬ 
breathing  appears  in  other  parts  of  Scripture, 
eg.,  in  Job  xxxii.  8,  and  xxxiii.  4  ;  Isa.  xlii.  5.  In 
the  first  of  these  passages,  for  instance,  we  read  : 
‘  There  is  a  spirit  in  man,  and  the  breath  ( nishmath ) 
of  the  Almighty  ( shaddai )  giveth  them  under¬ 
standing.’ 

This  second  narrative  of  creation  affords  the 
natural  transition  to  another  question  arising  out 
of  the  Scripture  doctrine  of  man  which  at  this 
point  demands  attention.  It  follows  from  all  that 
has  been  stated,  and  from  the  facts  of  his  con¬ 
stitution,  that  man  is  a  compound  being — related  to 
nature  and  the  lower  organic  world  through  his 
body,  and  to  God  and  the  higher  spiritual  world 

1  Cf.  Delitzsch,  Genesisy  in  Loc. 


THE  NATURE  OF  MAN 


47 


through  his  spirit.  We  are  accustomed  to  express 
this  by  saying  that  man  has  a  body  and  a  soul. 
This  is  substantially  the  Biblical  view  also  ;  but 
the  Biblical  standpoint  is  nevertheless  different 
from  ours.  We  emphasise  the  distinction  of  the 
sides  of  man's  nature — the  material  and  the 
spiritual  ;  the  Bible  regards  man  rather  in  the 
unity  of  his  person  as  made  up  of  these  two 
elements.  We  shall  see  this  best  by  looking  at 
the  meaning  of  the  term  4  soul  ’  ( nephesh ,  i pvxv)  in 
its  relation  to  the  term  4  spirit  *  ( ruah ,  7 rvevixa) 
with  the  connected  terms  4  flesh 9  ( basar ,  crdpg) 
and  4  body  ’  (crw/xa, ;  the  Old  Testament  has  not 
here  a  proper  equivalent).  There  have  been,  and 
still  are,  elaborate  discussions  and  different  theories 
as  to  the  relations,  in  the  Biblical  usage,  of 
soul  and  spirit,  and  of  both  to  flesh  ;  but  it  will 
be  sufficient  to  confine  attention  to  main  points. 

The  principal  question  is  as  to  the  relation  of 
soul  and  spirit,  and  on  this  subject  opinions  run, 
perhaps,  mainly  into  two  groups  : — 1 

1  The  different  views  may  be  seen  fully  expounded  and  discussed 
in  Laidlaw’s  Bible  Doctrine  of  Man ,  with  arts,  on  f  Soul,’  ‘  Spirit,’ 
‘  Psychology,’  in  Hastings’  Diet,  of  Bible  j  in  Dickson’s  St.  Paul's  Use 
of  the  Terms  Flesh  and  Spirit  $  and  in  the  various  works  on  Biblical 
Theology.  See  also  the  author’s  Christian  View  of  Godi  Lect.  iv. 


48 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


I.  There  is  the  view  of  those  who  take  c  spirit  ’ 
( ruah )  as  the  more  general  term,  and  regard  it  as 
denoting  the  originating  cause  or  'principle  of  life, 
and  c  soul  ’  ( nephesh )  as  the  result  of  the  creative 
inbreathing  of  spirit,  or  as  c  constituted  ’  life. 
Thus,  God’s  Spirit  is  the  source  of  life  or  soul  in 
all  living  beings,  animals  and  men  ;  and  soul  is 
the  constituted  life  of  these  beings,  the  seat  of  all 
vital  functions,  that  which  makes  them  individual 
living  beings — in  the  case  of  man  that  which 
makes  him  a  person.  It  is  perhaps  not  sufficiently- 
noticed  in  this  view  that  the  inbreathing  of  the 
divine  neshamah  (  — ruah )  in  the  creative  narrative 
is  something  peculiar  to  man.  i  Flesh  ’  ( basar ), 
in  turn,  is  the  body  as  animated  by  the  soul  ;  and 
the  seat  of  the  soul  or  life  in  the  flesh  is  peculiarly 
the  blood  (cf.  Lev.  xvii.  n).  The  flesh  is  there¬ 
fore  in  man,  at  least  as  he  now  is,  connected  with 
weakness,  frailty,  perishableness  (cf.  Gen.  vi.  3). 
Man  as  flesh  stands  opposed  to  God  whose  Spirit 
gives  him  breath.1 

1  Thus  Wendt  in  his  work,  The  Ideas  of  Flesh  and  Spirit  in 
Biblical  Usage  (see  in  Dickson  as  above),  and,  in  the  main,  Laidlaw. 
A  sentence  or  two  from  the  latter  may  make  the  point  clearer. 
‘  Nephesh  is  the  subject  or  bearer  of  life.  Ruach  is  the  principle  of 
life  j  so  that  in  all  the  Old  Testament  references  to  the  origin  of 


THE  NATURE  OF  MAN 


49 


2.  Another  view — that  which  seems  to  me 
more  correct — agrees  with  the  former  in  regard¬ 
ing  £  soul  ’  as  derived  from  c  spirit  ’ — the  divine 
Spirit — and  as  denoting  £  constituted  life  ’  in  the 
individual ;  but  differs  from  it  in  its  mode  of  con¬ 
ceiving  of  the  soul  itself,  and  of  its  relation  to 
spirit  in  man.  On  the  former  theory  soul  and 
spirit  in  man  are  the  same  thing  under  different 
points  of  view.  Viewed  in  relation  to  its  origin, 
the  vital,  conscious  principle  in  man  is  spirit 
( ruah )  ;  it  is  God’s  breath  in  man  making  him 
what  he  is.  Viewed  as  something  constituted  and 
individual,  as  part  of  the  individual  being,  it  is  soul 
{nephesh).1  On  the  second  view  nephesh  is  the 

living  beings  we  distinguish  Nephesh  as  life  constituted  in  the 
creature  from  Ruach  as  life  bestowed  by  the  Creator.  ...  A  usage 
which  is  practically  uniform,  of  putting  “spirit”  (ruach  or  neshamaK) 
for  the  animating  principle,  and  “  soul  ”  or  “  living  soul  ”  ( 'nephesh 
hayyah )  for  the  animated  result’  (Bib.  Doct.  of  Man,  rev.  edit., 
p.  88).  ‘All  through  Scripture  “spirit”  denotes  life  as  coming 
from  God  ;  “  soul  ”  denotes  life  as  constituted  in  the  man  ’  [Diet,  of 
Bible ,  iv.  p.  167). 

1  ‘  The  purpose  of  the  double  phrase,  “  soul  and  spirit,”  ’  says 
Laidlaw,  ‘  is,  at  most,  to  present  the  one  indivisible  thinking  and 
feeling  man  in  two  diverse  aspects,  according  as  these  two  terms 
originally  suggest  his  life  viewed  from  two  different  points  ’  (as 
above,  pp.  91-92;  cf.  pp.  126-7).  ‘The  two  conceptions,’  says 
Wendt,  ‘denote  the  same  quantity  ( Grosse ),  but  with  a  different 
estimate  of  value,  because  from  different  points  of  <vienju.  .  .  .  The 
mental  life-powers  are  called  ruach ,  so  far  as  they  connect  the 

D 


50 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


vital  or  animating  principle  in  animals  and  men,  and 
in  man  is  the  seat  and  source  alike  of  animal  and 
of  spiritual  life.  It  is,  in  the  first  instance,  the 
animating  principle  of  the  body,  the  source  of  the 
vital  functions,  the  seat  of  the  animal  appetites, 
desires,  and  passions.  The  body,  as  animated  by 
the  nephesh ,  is,  as  in  the  other  view,  basar ,  flesh. 
But  in  man  the  soul  or  nephesh  is  the  source  also 
of  higher  activities — those  which  we  distinctively 
call  rational  and  spiritual — which  belong  to  man 
as  a  personal,  moral,  and  religious  being.  It  is 
these  higher  activities  of  the  nephesh  which,  in  the 
Biblical  phraseology,  are  peculiarly  denominated 
‘  spirit.’ 1  The  soul,  therefore,  on  this  theory,  is 
the  source  of  two  classes  of  activities  :  the  animal, 
connected  with  the  body,  and  the  spiritual,  in 
which  lies  man’s  proper  affinity  to  God.  It  is 
the  principle  of  life  in  man  which  manifests  itself, 
on  the  one  hand,  in  the  corporeal  functions  ;  on 
the  other,  in  the  conscious  activities  of  the  mind. 

creatures  with  God  and  place  them  in  dependence  upon  Him :  they 
are  called  nephesh ,  so  far  as  they  separate  the  creatures  as  animate 
individuals  from  one  another  and  from  the  lifeless,  impersonal  world 
of  sense  '  (in  Dickson  as  above,  p.  419). 

1  Hence  such  expressions  as  a  spirit  of  wisdom,  of  knowledge,  of 
understanding,  of  discretion,  a  free  spirit,  a  humble  spirit,  etc. :  on 
the  contrary,  a  proud,  perverse  spirit,  etc. 


THE  NATURE  OF  MAN 


51 


It  is  the  bond  between  the  natural  and  spiritual 
sides  of  man’s  life— is  that,  therefore,  in  which 
lies  the  centre  of  his  personality.1 

It  will  be  seen  from  these  remarks  that  the 
modern  distinction  of  soul  and  body  is  not  quite 
the  Biblical — at  least  the  Old  Testament — one, 
as  describing  the  elements  of  man’s  personality. 
Soul,  in  the  Old  Testament,  is  not  opposed  to 
body  ;  it  is  in  body,  its  animating  and  informing 
principle.  It  is  the  possession  of  a  soul  which 
makes  a  body  ;  as,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  no 
soul  which  does  not  imply  a  body.  It  follows 
that  soul,  in  Scripture,  has  always  this  connota¬ 
tion  of  a  body.  There  may  be  spirits,  e.g.>  angels 
or  demons,  which  have  no  bodies,  but  they  are 
not  ‘  souls.’  On  the  other  hand,  souls,  as  having 
a  spiritual  origin,  and  as  spiritual  in  nature,  can 
be  properly  called  ‘  spirits.’  The  ‘  spirits  in 
prison’  in  i  Pet.  iii.  19,  e.g. ,  are  spirits  or  souls 
of  men.  But  spirits  that  never  had  bodies  could 
not,  similarly,  be  called  ‘  souls.’  If  this  view  of 
the  relation  of  soul  and  spirit  be  accepted,  it  will 
be  felt  that  it  precludes  the  idea,  which  some 

1  Cf.  Oehler,  'Theol.  of  O.  T.,  i.  pp.  218-193  Christian  View  of 
God,  pp.  137-38. 


52 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


have  entertained*  that  the  Bible  sanctions  a 
doctrine  of  ‘  trichotomy,’  or  of  three  separable 
parts  of  man’s  nature  :  body,  soul,  and  spirit. 
Spirit,  we  have  just  seen,  is  not  something  dis¬ 
tinct  from  soul  as  a  third  separable  element,  but 
denotes  the  higher,  self-conscious  activities  of  the 
soul — to  which  also,  in  Biblical  speech,  special 
names  are  given.1  The  usage  indicated  may  not 
be  carried  through  quite  uniformly  in  Scripture 
— what  verbal  usage  is? — but  examination  will 
show,  I  think,  that  it  is  the  prevailing  one.  A  ^ 
The  view  just  explained  as  to  the  constitution 
of  man’s  nature  is,  as  we  shall  come  to  see  after¬ 
wards,  of  extreme  importance  in  its  bearings  on 
general  Biblical  doctrine.  It  brings  man  before 
us  as  a  personal  unity — a  being  composed  of  body 
and  soul  in  a  unity  not  intended  to  be  dissolved. 
The  body  is  as  really  a  part  of  man’s  personality 
as  the  soul  is.  It  is  not,  as  philosophy  is  apt  to 
teach  us,  a  mere  vesture  or  accident,  or,  still 
worse,  temporary  prison-house,  of  the  soul,  but  is 
part  of  ourselves.  Not,  indeed,  in  the  sense  that 
the  soul  cannot  survive  the  body,  or  subsist  in 

1  On  these  cf.  Laidlaw,  pp.  131  ff.,  and  the  various  works  on 
Biblical  Psychology. 


THE  NATURE  OF  MAN 


S3 


some  fashion  without  it,  but  in  the  sense  that 
man  was  not  created  incorporeal  spirit.  His  soul 
was  made  and  meant  to  inhabit  the  body,  and  was 
never  intended  to  subsist  apart  from  it.  Hence 
death,  in  the  true  Biblical  point  of  view,  is  not 
something  natural  to  man,  but  can  only  be 
regarded  as  something  violent,  ^natural,  the 
rupture  or  separation  of  parts  of  man’s  being  that 
were  never  meant  to  be  disjoined.  The  soul,  in 
virtue  of  its  spiritual,  personal  nature,  survives 
the  body ;  but,  in  separation  from  the  body,  it  is, 
as  many  things  in  Scripture  (<?.£.,  its  doctrine  of 
Sheol)  show,  in  a  mutilated,  imperfect,  weakened 
condition.  This  view'  is  not  only  important  in 
itself  as  giving  its  due  share  of  honour  to  the 
body,  and  harmonising  with  the  close  relation 
between  soul  and  body  on  which  modern  psy¬ 
chology  lays  increasing  stress  ;  but  will  be  found 
to  shed  much  light  on  other  doctrines  of  Scripture 
— for  instance,  on  death,  on  immortality,  on 
resurrection,  on  the  full  scope  of  Christ’s  redemp¬ 
tion.  These  relations  will  be  considered  in  the 
concluding  lecture. 

I  return  now  to  the  more  fundamental  declara¬ 
tion  that  man  is  made  in  the  image  of  God,  and 


54 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


proceed  to  inquire  in  what  this  image  of  God, 
which  we  have  found  to  be  determinative  of  the 
Biblical  idea  of  man,  distinctively  consists. 
Generally,  it  is  evident  from  the  context  in 
Genesis  that  the  image  of  God  denotes  that  in 
which,  in  distinction  from  all  lower  creatures, 
man  resembles  God — in  which  the  print  of  like¬ 
ness  to  God  is  stamped  upon  his  nature.  I  have 
already  stated  that  the  terms  used  in  Genesis  i. — 
‘  image  ’  ( zelem )  and  ‘  likeness  ’  ( 'demuth ) — are  not 
held  to  denote  any  real  distinction  (in  verse  27 
the  one  word  c  image  ’  covers  both)  : 1  I  do  not 
therefore  spend  time  in  discussing  older  theories 
which  imply  that  such  a  distinction  is  intended.2 
In  what,  then,  I  go  on  to  ask,  does  the  image  of 
God,  or  likeness  to  God,  in  man,  actually  consist  ? 

On  this  point  the  following  remarks  may  be 
made  : — 

1.  Negatively,  it  is  plain  that  the  image  does 
not  lie  essentially  in  material  form.  There  have 
indeed  been  anthropomorphites  who  held  that 
God  had  visible  form,  and  that  man  was  His 

1  Cf.  Laidlaw,  p.  1425  Driver,  Genesis ,  p.  145  art.  ‘Image’  in 
Diet,  of  Bible. 

2  Cf.  Laidlaw,  pp.  151-52  j  Oehler,  Theol .  of  O .  Ti,  i.  p.  211  j  and 
see  below,  p.  58. 


THE  NATURE  OF  MAN 


55 


image  in  this  respect.  Swedenborgians  and 
Mormons  still  entertain  this  fancy  ;  but  I  need 
hardly  stay  to  refute  their  notions.  The  God  of 
whom  it  was  declared  that  He  had  ‘  no  similitude/ 
and  of  whom,  on  this  very  account,  the  people  of 
Israel  were  forbidden  to  make  4  any  graven  image, 
or  likeness  of  male  or  female/  1  was  not  a  Being 
whom  the  monotheistic  writer  of  Genesis  i.  could 
think  of  as  creating  man  in  His  outward  shape.2 
The  idea  of  some  of  the  Fathers  that  man  was 
made  in  the  image  of  Christ  afterwards  to  come 
( Christi  futuri ,  Tertullian),  or  that  his  bodily  form 
was  prophetic  of  the  incarnation,  is  likewise 
fanciful,  and  inverts  the  true  relation.  The  Son 
of  God  took  on  Him  our  Adamic  nature ; 8  man 
was  not  made  in  the  image  of  the  humanity  of 
Christ.  Yet  in  a  certain  sense  it  may  be  truly 
held  that  even  in  his  bodily  form  man  reflects, 
and  is  an  image  of,  the  glory  of  his  Creator.4 

'  y 

1  Deut.  iv.  1 6  :  cf.  the  Second  Commandment. 

2  Some  writers  ( \e.g.y  Kautzsch)  think  that  in  pre-prophetic  times 
Jehovah  was  conceived  of  as  having  bodily  form  ;  others  ( e.g.,  H.  P. 
Smith)  that  even  the  great  prophets  ‘no  doubt  conceived  God  as 
existing  in  human  form.’  This  seems  quite  unwarranted. 

3  Cf.  Heb.  ii.  14.  Calvin  ( Instit .  1.  xv.  3)  combats  the  views  of 

Osiander  on  the  above  points.  His  whole  section  on  this  subject  is 
interesting  and  valuable.  4  Cf.  Calvin,  as  above. 


56 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


The  body  is  the  temple  of  the  rational  spirit — is 
destined  to  be  the  temple  of  the  Holy  Ghost — 
and  in  its  erect  posture,  its  intelligent  countenance, 
its  quick-glancing  eye,  bears  the  stamp  of  its 
spiritual  dignity  upon  it.1  In  that  sense  only  is 
it  the  visible  image  of  the  invisible  God.2 

2.  Positively,  therefore,  this  image,  or  re¬ 
semblance  to  God,  must  be  supposed  to  lie 
primarily  in  man’s  nature,  and  secondarily,  in  the 
relation  which  through  that  nature  he  sustains  to 
the  lower  creation,  and  to  the  world  as  a  whole. 
As  respects  his  nature ,  the  resemblance  cannot  be 
looked  for,  as  just  said,  in  his  body,  nor  in  the 
animal  functions  of  his  soul.  It  must  be  looked 
for,  therefore,  in  that  higher  constitution  of  his 
being  which  makes  him  spiritual.8  It  is  in  the 

1  In  this  sense  some  of  the  Fathers  (as  Justin  and  Irenaeus)  referred 
‘image’  to  the  bodily  form  of  man,  and  ‘likeness’  to  his  spirit. 
The  saying  of  Novalis  may  be  compared,  as  quoted  by  Carlyle 
in  his  Heroes’.  ‘There  is  but  one  temple  in  the  Universe,  and  that 
is  the  Body  of  Man.  Nothing  is  holier  than  that  high  form. 
Bending  before  men  is  a  reverence  done  to  this  Revelation  in  the 
Flesh.  We  touch  Heaven  when  we  lay  our  hand  on  a  human 
body  ’  (Lect.  i.). 

2  The  above  refers  only  to  bodily  form.  In  a  deeper  sense,  as 
will  be  shown  later  (Lect.  VI.  p.  269),  man’s  nature,  as  grounded  in  the 
Eternal  Word,  sustains  a  relation  to  Christ — the  Image  of  the  Father. 

3  ‘It relates,’  says  Driver,  ‘from  the  nature  of  the  case,  to  man’s 
immaterial  nature.’  See  his  whole  suggestive  note.  Genesis ,  p.  15. 


THE  NATURE  OF  MAN 


57 


powers  and  activities  of  man  as  personal  spirit 
that  we  are  to  seek  his  affinity  to  God  and  re¬ 
semblance  to  Him.  The  image  of  God  intended 
in  Scripture,  in  other  words,  is  a  mental  and 
moral  image.  It  is  to  be  sought  for  in  the  fact 
that  man  is  a  person — a  spiritual,  self-conscious 
being  ;  and  in  the  attributes  of  that  personality — 
his  rationality  and  capacity  for  moral  life,  includ¬ 
ing  in  the  latter  knowledge  of  moral  law,  self- 
determining,  freedom,  and  social  affections ;  highest 
of  all,  in  his  capacity  for  fellowship  with  God. 
To  these  points  I  return  below. 

3.  As  respects  his  relation  to  nature  beneath 
him,  these  attributes  confer  on  man  a  dignity  and 
sovereignty  analogous  to  God’s  own  :  he  had,  as 
Genesis  declares,  a  delegated  power  in  creation, 
dominion  over  the  creatures.1  Some,  as  the 
Socinians,  have  placed  the  whole  image  of  God 
in  this  dominion  ; 2  but  plainly  this  sovereignty 
was  something  derivative.  It  depended  on  the 
fact  that  man  possessed  powers  and  attributes 

1  Gen.  i.  2 6,  28  j  cf.  Ps.  viii.,  and,  as  regards  the  fulfilment  of 
this  destiny  of  man  in  Christ,  Heb.  ii.  5-9. 

2  F.  R„  Tennant,  in  his  Fhe  Fall  and  Original  Sin ,  seems  to  favour 
this  interpretation  (p.  104). 


58 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


of  soul  qualifying  him  to  take  this  place,  and 
exercise  this  authority.1 

Two  further  questions  arise  in  regard  to  the 
divine  image,  which  fall  afterwards  to  be  con¬ 
sidered  in  their  proper  place. 

1.  Did  the  divine  image  in  man  include,  not 
simply  the  possession  of  the  elements  or  powers 
of  a  rational  and  moral  nature,  potencies  to  be 
subsequently  developed,  but  likewise  actual  con¬ 
formity  to  the  divine  image — holiness  or  righteous¬ 
ness  of  nature  ?  In  other  words,  was  man  from 
the  first  constituted  a  pure  and  holy  being,  and 
was  this  a  necessary  part  of  the  divine  image  ? 2 
This  raises  the  question  of  man’s  original  con¬ 
dition,  or  of  what  is  called  the  status  integritatis , 
to  be  discussed  in  the  fourth  lecture. 

2.  A  kindred  question  is — how  far  does  man 
as  fallen  possess  the  divine  image  ?  Is  it  utterly 
destroyed,  or  to  what  extent  does  he  retain  it  ? 8 

1  The  different  views  of  the  divine  image  may  be  seen  in  Laidlaw 
(ch.  vii.,  viii.)  and  in  the  other  works  and  articles  referred  to.  Jewish 
and  patristic  views  are  referred  to  by  Tennant,  as  abo vz,  passim. 

2  On  the  different  views  here,  cf.  again  Laidlaw,  Tennant,  etc., 
and  see  below,  pp.  156,  187. 

3  A  good  deal  depends  in  the  patristic  and  mediaeval  discussions 
on  this  point  on  the  untenable  distinction  between  the  4  image  ’  and 
4  likeness  ’  of  God — the  former  denoting  man’s  inherent  natural  and 
moral  endowments,  the  latter  a  4  superadded  ’  gift  of  righteousness. 


THE  NATURE  OF  MAN 


59 


The  answer  to  that  plainly  is,  in  part  to  anticipate, 
that  so  far  as  the  divine  image  answers  to  an 
indestructible  element  in  man’s  constitution- 
reason,  conscience,  freedom,  etc. — it  still  remains, 
but  in  a  broken  and  impaired  condition.  As 
respects  the  actual  exhibition  of  that  image  in 
moral  resemblance  t6  God,  it  is  largely  destroyed  ; 
even  natural  virtues  are  at  best  only  a  shadow  of 
it,  for  they  lack  the  spiritual  element  and  true 
quality  of  holiness  in  not  springing  from  the  love 
and  fear  of  God.  The  nature  is  not  in  true 
subordination  to  God,  and  does  not  shine  with 
the  lustre  of  His  Spirit. 

At  the  stage  we  have  thus  reached,  we  are 
already  far  within  the  confines  of  the  territory 
where  every  step  we  can  take  is  fated  to  be  stoutly 
contested  by  the  adherents  of  modern  theories. 
One  important  question  which  arises  immediately 
from  the  foregoing  exposition  is- — Are  we  justified 
in  assuming  that  the  self  -  consciousness  and 

The  latter  was  generally  supposed  to  be  lost  by  the  fall  ;  the  former 
not,  or  not  completely.  Cf.  Laidlaw,  pp.  152  ff.  Tennant,  in  the 
work  above  cited,  tends  unduly  to  minimise  the  teaching  of  Irenaeus 
and  others  on  the  spiritual  effects  of  the  fall.  If  both  image  and 
likeness  are  represented  by  this  Father  as  lost  in  the  fall  (p.  288),  it 
is  difficult  to  see  that  a  spiritual  ruin  is  not  involved. 


6o 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


rationality  we  have  attributed  to  man  really  con¬ 
stitute  a  distinction  between  him  and  the  lower 
animals  ?  Is  the  higher  not  simply,  as  the  evolu¬ 
tionary  theory  asserts,  the  result  of  a  gradual,  but 
perfectly  natural,  development  from  the  lower  ? 
The  question  will  have  to  be  carefully  considered 
when  we  come  to  discuss  origins  ;  but  the  general 
grounds  on  which  it  is  held  that  the  distinction 
now  assumed  is  qualitative,  and  not  simply  a 
distinction  of  degree,  may  here  be  fittingly 
indicated. 

The  actuality  and  breadth  of  the  gulf  between 
the  mental  powers  of  man  and  those  of  the  lower 
animals  is,  of  course,  denied  by  no  one.  It  is 
described  by  Mr.  Fiske  as  c  immeasurable  ’ ;  he 
even  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that,  ‘  while  for  zoological 
man  you  can  hardly  erect  a  distinct  family  from 
that  of  the  chimpanzee  and  the  orang  ;  on  the 
other  hand,  for  psychological  man  you  must 
erect  a  distinct  kingdom  ;  nay,  you  must  even 
dichotomise  the  universe,  putting  man  on  one 
side  and  all  things  else  on  the  other.’ 1  This  is 

1  As  above,  p.  82.  Haeckel  says:  ‘Reason  is  man’s  highest  gift, 
the  only  prerogative  that  essentially  distinguishes  him  from  the  lower 
animals’  ( Riddle ,  p.  6). 


THE  NATURE  OF  MAN 


6 1 


a  remarkable  admission,  and  others,  equally  strik¬ 
ing,  will  meet  us  later.  The  difference,  indeed, 
is  supposed  to  be  bridged  over  by  processes  of 
evolution  ;  this,  however,  is  mere  hypothesis,  and 
we  shall  find  that  evolution  here  has  to  encounter 
insuperable  difficulties.1  Meanwhile  the  broad 
distinction  between  man  as  a  spiritual,  rational 
being,  and  the  lower  animals,  remains. 

I.  We  found  resemblance  to  God,  first  of  all, 
in  the  fact  that  man,  like  his  Maker,  is  a  personal , 
self-conscious  being.  In  this  one  fact  he  stands 
apart  from,  and  above,  all  orders  of  the  inferior 
creation.  Man  is  not  only  conscious,  but  self- 
conscious.  He  can  turn  his  mind  back  in  reflec¬ 
tion  on  himself ;  can  apprehend  himself ;  can 
speak  of  himself  as  ‘I.’  This  consciousness  of  self 
is  an  attribute  of  personality  which  constitutes  a 
difference,  not  in  degree,  but  in  kind,  between 
the  human  and  the  merely  animal.2  No  brute 

1  Cf.  Lect.  IV. 

2  Cf.  again  Dr.  Driver’s  note  on  Gen.  i.  26:  ‘It  [the  image  of 
God]  can  be  nothing  but  the  gift  of  self-conscious  reason  which  is 
possessed  by  man,  but  by  no  other  animal.  In  all  that  is  implied  by 
this — in  the  various  intellectual  faculties  possessed  by  him ;  in  his 
creative  and  originative  powers,  etc.  .  .  .  man  is  distinguished 
fundamentally  from  other  animals,  and  is  allied  to  the  divine 
nature’  ( Genesis ,  p.  15). 


62 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


has  this  power.  None,  however  elevated  in  the 
scale  of  nature,  can  properly  be  spoken  of  as  a 
person.  The  sanctity  that  surrounds  personality 
does  not  attach  to  it.1 

2.  This  self-conscious,  personal  life  of  man, 
however,  is  itself  but  a  manifestation  of  some¬ 
thing  deeper — what  we  are  accustomed  to  call 
rationality .  We  speak  sometimes  of  animals  also 
as  possessed  of  reason,  and  in  a  spontaneous, 
instinctive  way,  within  limits,  it  is  not  denied 
that  they  do  perform  acts  analogous  to  human 
reasoning.  Yet  reason  in  man,  as  a  little  reflec¬ 
tion  on  its  nature  and  results  speedily  shows,  is 
something  qualitatively  different,  and  not  merely 
different  in  degree,  from  what  we  find  in 
animals.2  The  difference  is  seen,  for  one  thing, 
in  this,  that  man  alone  possesses  the  power  of 
abstraction  and  generalisation.  Even  Haeckel, 
apparently,  distinguishes  the  ‘  power  of  conceptual 

1  Gen.  ix.  6. 

2  ‘  It  is  true,’  says  Dr.  Driver,  ‘  that  some  of  the  faculties  men¬ 
tioned  are  possessed,  in  a  limited  degree,  by  animals  ;  but  in  none  of 
them  are  they  coupled  with  self-conscious  reason ;  and  hence  do  not 
form  a  foundation  for  the  same  distinctive  character  ’  {Genesis,  p.  15). 
So  far  as  reason  appears  in  animals,  we  may  perhaps  say  that  it  is 
rather  reason  that  possesses  them — the  reason  that  is  operative  in  all 
nature,  even  in  plants,  and  in  purely  instinctive  operations — than 
they  who  possess  and  wield  reason. 


THE  NATURE  OF  MAN 


63 


thought  and  abstraction  *  in  man  from  ‘  the  non- 
conceptual  stages  of  thought  and  ideation  in  the 
nearest  related  animals.’ 1  By  the  power  of 
abstraction  man  can  take  his  experience  to  pieces, Y 
and  hold  apart  in  thought  the  various  elements 
composing  it ;  by  the  power  of  generalisation  he 
can  combine  resembling  qualities,  and  from  them 
form  general  notions,  or  ideas  of  classes.  The 
animal  has  no  such  power.  It  sees,  e.g .,  redness 
in  objects,  but  it  is  wholly  beyond  its  power  to 
separate  this  attribute  from  the  object,  and  form 
the  abstract  notion  of  4  redness.’  As  little  is  it 
able  to  separate  this  quality  from  a  number  of 
objects,  and  group  the  latter  into  one  class  under 
the  general  notion  4  red.’ 2 *  It  is  because  he  pos- 

1  Riddle ,  pp.  38,  45. 

2  There  seems  very  general  agreement  that  the  distinction  between 
human  and  animal  intelligence  reveals  itself  peculiarly  at  this  point. 
Mr.  G.  H.  Lewes  says:  ‘The  animal  feels  the  cosmos  and  adapts 
himself  to  it.  Man  feels  the  cosmos  but  he  also  thinks  it’$  and  he 
admits  that  brutes  have  ‘no  conceptions,  no  general  ideas,  no 
symbols  of  logical  operations  ’  ( Problems  of  Life  and  Mind,  i.  pp. 

123,  124, 157).  Cf.  Mivart,  Lessons  from  Nature ,  chap.  vii.  j  an  able 
Roman  Catholic  work  on  Psychology  by  Father  Maher  (‘ Stoneyhurst 
Philosophical  Series  ’),  cited  and  reasoned  against  by  Mr.  Mallock ; 
Iverach,  Evolution  and  Christianity ,  pp.  170-71  5  more  recently, 
Henslow,  Present-Day  Rationalism  Critically  Examined ,  pp.  209, 
212-13,  219,  etc.  The  last-named  author  says  in  his  Preface: 

‘  Man  alone  has  acquired  the  power  of  making  abstractions  objects  of 


64 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


sesses  this  power  of  abstraction  that  man  is  able 
to  turn  back  his  thoughts  upon  himself  in  self- 
consciousness,  and  know  himself  as  person.  But 
even  this,  when  we  probe  the  matter  deeper,  is 
only  a  phase  of  that  more  fundamental  quality  of 
thought  in  which  its  true  essence  as  rationality 
consists — its  capacity  for  the  universal.  Thought 
in  this  relation,  as  I  have  said  elsewhere,1  may  be 
defined  as  the  universalising  principle  in  human 
nature.  It  is  that  which  negates  limits,  which 
rises  above  the  individual,  which  apprehends  the 
general  in  the  particulars,  the  law  in  the  pheno¬ 
mena,  the  finite  in  the  infinite.  It  is  the  ground 
of  man’s  capacity  for  rising  to  general  truths,  and 
of  framing  such  highest  ideas  as  infinity,  eternity, 
God,  duty,  religion.  This  power,  almost  every 
psychologist  will  acknowledge,2  the  animals  do 
not  possess.  It  belongs  to  that  true,  self- 
conscious  rationality  in  which  man  is  the  image 
of  God. 

thought.  This  lies  at  the  basis  of  all  his  superior  “  God-like  ”  powers. 
It  forms  the  sharp  line  of  demarcation  between  him  and  the  animal 
world  ’  (p.  vii.). 

1  Christian  View  of  God ,  p.  113. 

2  ( Man,’  says  Max  Muller,  ‘  alone  employs  language,  he  alone 
comprehends  himself,  alone  has  the  power  of  general  ideas — he  alone 
believes  in  God  ’  [Chips,  iv.  p.  458).  See  further  below.  Lecture  TV. 


! 


THE  NATURE  OF  MAN 


65 


3.  Should  doubt  still  remain  as  to  the  essential 
character  of  this  distinction  between  man  and 
animal,  the  doubt  should,  I  think,  be  removed  if 
we  look  at  the  consequences  of  the  presence  of  this 
power  of  rationality  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  the 
absence  of  it  on  the  other.  Rationality  is  the 
ground,  as  already  said,  of  the  possession  by  man 
of  self-consciousness ,  of  religion ,  and  of  morality — 
of  none  of  which  the  animals  are  capable.  It  is 
the  ground  of  the  faculty  of  intelligent  speech — 
of  language  :  another  faculty  possessed  only  by 
man.  It  is  the  foundation,  therefore,  of  the 
possibility  of  education  and  progress  ;  of  all  arts, 
institutions,  and  sciences.  The  animals  are 
wholly  unprogressive.  As  rational,  man  sets  ends 
before  him  and  anticipates  the  future ;  as  moral, 
he  not  only  knows  and  wills,  but  loves — using 
that  term  in  its  widest  sense,  to  embrace  the 
whole  sphere  of  affection.  He  founds  societies. 
Highest  of  all,  he  has  the  capacity  for  the  know¬ 
ledge  of  God ,  for  fellowship  with  Him,  and  for 
loving  obedience  to  Him  :  his  thoughts  touch  the 
infinite  and  reach  out  to  eternity.  In  ail  these 
and  in  many  other  respects  the  possibilities  of 
merely  animal  life  are  absolutely  transcended.  A 

E  ' 


* 


66 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


-potentiality  is  discerned  in  man  which  proves  in 
him  the  presence  of  a  spirit  of  which  the  highest 
of  the  animals  are  destitute. 

Such  then,  briefly  sketched,  is  the  Biblical  view 
of  man’s  nature,  and  it  might  seem  at  first  sight 
as  if  nothing  could  be  more  reasonable  in  itself, 
or  more  consonant  with  human  experience.  Man’s 
whole  history,  with  its  splendid  creations  in  arts, 
sciences,  morality,  institutions,  religion,  might 
appear  to  bear  witness  for  it.  Any  lower  view 
might  seem  to  involve  the  negation  of  man’s 
moral  and  spiritual  dignity,  and,  as  a  consequence, 
the  destruction,  not  only  of  Christianity,  but  of 
every  elevating  conception  of  man’s  calling  and 
destiny.  Yet,  as  we  have  had  occasion  to  see, 
this  view  is  now  keenly,  eagerly,  almost  fanati¬ 
cally  assailed,  and  that,  too,  in  the  name  of 
science.  The  whole  force  of  what  is  proclaimed 
as  4  the  modern  view  of  the  world  ’  is  directed 
against  it  ;  paeans  are  already  sung  in  many 
quarters  over  its  overthrow  ;  even  such  a  writer 
as  Mr.  Mallock,  as  I  mentioned  at  the  beginning, 
in  defending ,  too,  the  credibility  of  religion, 
ventures  to  speak  of  the  assault  as  on  scientific 
grounds  everywhere  victorious.  Postponing  for 


THE  NATURE  OF  MAN 


67 


the  present,  as  I  proposed,  the  consideration  of  the 
attack  from  the  side  of  evolution,  I  would  now 
offer  a  few  remarks  on  the  aspect  the  assault 
assumes  at  the  hands  of  philosophical  monism. 

Monism,  particularly  the  naturalistic  monism 
we  have  to  do  with  here,  may  be  defined  in 
general  as  the  affirmation  of  the  unity  of  the 
power  which  manifests  itself  in  nature  in  the  pro¬ 
duction  alike  of  material  and  of  mental  pheno¬ 
mena.  Formerly  the  attack  on  the  existence  of  a 
distinct  spiritual  principle  in  man  came  chiefly 
from  the  side  of  materialism.  The  materialistic 
hypothesis  might  be  coarse,  but  it  was  at  least 
intelligible.  Mind  was  brain,  and  brain  mind. 
Thought  was  simply  cerebral  change  :  matter  in 
motion.  The  newer  philosophy  prides  itself 
somewhat  on  the  rejection  of  this  crude  material¬ 
ism.1  Conscious  phenomena,  it  is  forced  to 
admit,  are  distinct  from  the  phenomena  of  matter. 
Mental  action  and  brain  action  represent  two  . 
series  of  facts  which  cannot  by  any  verbal 
‘  hocus-pocus  ’  (the  phrase  is  Huxley’s)  be  re¬ 
solved  into  one  another.  The  passage  from 
brain-action  to  the  conscious  phenomenon  which 

1  Cf.  Mallock,  Religion  as  a  Credible  Doctrine ,  p.  13. 


68 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


attends  it— say,  a  flash  of  light,  an  agreeable 
odour,  a  feeling  of  pain,  the  idea  of  a  relation — 
is  allowed  to  be  unthinkable.1  Yet,  though  dis¬ 
tinct,  the  two  series  of  phenomena  are  not  held  to 
be  unrelated.  They  are  in  fact  at  bottom  but 
two  manifestions  of  the  same  original  force  which 
is  the  sole  self-subsisting  principle  of  the  universe. 
This  force,  power,  substance,  or  whatever  we 
please  to  call  it,  however,  is  not  immediately  to 
be  identified  with  matter.  It  has  this  double 
form  of  manifestation,  and  appears,  now  as 
matter,  now  as  spirit.  The  two  series  of  pheno¬ 
mena  are  not  identical  ;  they  are  simply  parallel  : 
they  appear  side  by  side,  and  one  and  the  same 
power  is  represented  in  both. 

It  would  take  too  long  to  attempt  to  trace  the 
history  of  this  monistic  conception  in  its  changeful 
shapes  from  Spinoza,  its  modern  parent,  down  to 
recent  times.  What  we  are  entitled  to  affirm  of 
it  is — that  in  one  form  or  another  it  is  (or  has 
been  till  lately)  the  reigning  conception  in  scien¬ 
tific  circles  ;  and  that,  in  the  hands  of  its  more 
thorough-going  representatives,  it  is  applied  to 
discredit  entirely  the  spiritualistic  view  of  man — 


1  Sec  below,  p.  125. 


THE  NATURE  OF  MAN 


69 


to  prove  that  there  is  no  distinct  entity  such  as 
we  call  the  soul,  but  only  a  series  of  perishable 
mental  phenomena,  the  correlates  of  a  parallel 
series  of  cerebral  changes,1  and  another  form  of 
the  same  force  that  is  displayed  in  these  ;  that 
mind  or  soul,  therefore,  has  no  unity  of  its  own, 
in  virtue  of  which  it  can  survive  death  ;  that 
freedom  is  an  utter  illusion — ‘  the  human  will,’ 
says  Haeckel,  ‘  has  no  more  freedom  than  that  of 
the  higher  animals,  from  which  it  differs  only  in 
degree,  not  in  kind  ’ 2 — more  generally,  that  the 
mind  has  no  spontaneous  activity  of  any  kind,  is 
a  mere  reflex  of  the  physical  changes  of  the  brain. 
The  whole  spiritual  view  of  man  thus  falls,  and, 
before  the  unanswerable  ‘demonstrations’  of  the 
new  theory,  Christian  conceptions,  it  is  confi¬ 
dently  proclaimed,  are  to  vanish,  as  spectres 
disappear  at  daybreak.  Haeckel,  I  should  per¬ 
haps  say,  is  nearer  unabashed  materialism  than 
some  of  the  others,  though  he  too  in  name  rejects 
it.  He  speaks  even  of  the  ‘  parallel  ’  theory  as  a 
species  of  heresy;  a  departure  from  true  monism.3 

1  On  this  theory,  now  commonly  called  4  psychophysical  parallel¬ 
ism,’  see  further  below,  pp.  74  ff. 

2  Riddle ,  p.  47. 

3  Ibid.,  pp.  33-37,  64,  etc. 


?o 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


His  own  formula  is  matter  and  force — mind, 
apparently,  being  a  form  of  the  latter.1 

Two  things  must  strike  every  one  at  the  outset 
about  this  monistic  theory,  i.  That  the  Bible 
idea  of  man  is  only  got  rid  of  through  getting 
rid  of  the  Bible  idea  of  God — a  fresh  illustration 
of  the  truth  that  the  Bible  doctrines  of  God  and 
man  stand  or  fall  together  ;  and  (2)  that,  while 
professing  to  discard  the  older  materialism,  the 
theory  in  its  naturalistic  form,  is,  in  procedure 
and  results,  indistinguishable  from  materialism. 
It  ought  not  to  be  so,  at  least  in  the  4  parallelism  ’ 
form  of  it ;  for,  in  the  first  place,  if  one  of  the 
two  series  is  to  be  made  dependent  on  the  other, 
it  should,  by  admission  of  much  in  the  system 
itself,  be  matter  that  is  made  dependent  on  mind, 
rather  than  mind  on  matter  ; 2  and  secondly,  if 
mental  facts  and  physical  facts  really  constitute 

1  ‘  Monism,’  he  says,  ‘  recognises  one  sole  substance  in  the  universe, 
which  is  at  once  “  God  and  Nature  ” ;  body  and  spirit  (or  matter 
and  energy)  it  holds  to  be  inseparable’  (p.  8).  Again:  ‘Our  own 
naturalistic  conception  of  the  psychic  activity  sees  in  it  a  group  of 
vital  phenomena  which  are  dependent  on  a  definite  material  sub¬ 
stratum,  like  all  other  phenomena.  .  .  .  Our  conception  is,  in  this 
sense,  materialistic’  (p.  32).  He  blames  Virchow  and  others  for 
discarding  their  earlier  ‘materialistic’  conceptions  (p.  33).  See 
further  Note  III.  below. 

*  Huxley  and  Spencer  would  admit  this. 


THE  NATURE  OF  MAN 


71 


two  parallel  series,  not  causally  related,  then 
plainly  each  is  as  much  entitled  to  speak  for  itself 
as  the  other  is,  and  it  is  as  illegitimate  to  sacrifice 
mental  facts  at  the  shrine  of  physical  causation, as  it 
would  be  to  sacrifice  the  latter  at  the  shrine  of  mind. 
In  practice,  however,  in  all  these  theories,  it  is  the 
physical  series  of  facts  which  is  allowed  to  rule. 
Mental  facts  are  interpreted  in  terms  of  molecular 
changes,  and  the  laws  of  physics  and  chemistry  are 
applied  to  rule  out  freedom  and  mental  spontaneity. 
Thus  materialism  after  all  claims  man  for  its  prey, 
as  truly  as  on  the  older  view. 

This  leads  to  another  general  remark  that  must 
be  made  on  the  monistic  theory  as  bearing  on  its 
assault  on  the  doctrine  of  man.  I  refer  to  the 
exceeding  crudeness  of  its  metaphysics.  I  have 
observed  that  the  denial  of  the  spiritual  dignity 
of  man  by  the  new  monism  has  for  its  correlative 
the  denial  of  personality  and  self-consciousness  to 
God.  The  Power  which  manifests  itself  as  matter 
and  spirit — or  which  is  itself  identified  with 
matter  and  force — in  the  universe,  is  supposed 
to  be  destitute  of  consciousness,  intelligence,  and 
will.  Whether  this  conception  is  adequate  to  the 
explanation  of  a  universe  filled  with  evidences  of 


72 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


wise  and  benevolent  purpose,  I  do  not  now  stay 
to  discuss.  But  I  may  at  least  remark  on  the 
curious  delusion  that  any  real  difficulty  is  escaped 
by  postulating  an  infinite,  eternal,  unknowable, 
energising  substance,  source  of  all  the  variety  of 
material  and  spiritual  forces — which  is  Haeckel’s 
view — while  denying  to  that  ultimate,  self-existing 
Somewhat  intelligence  and  purpose.  How,  in¬ 
deed,  on  the  monist’s  theory,  are  such  conceptions 
arrived  at,  and  what  validity  belongs  to  them  ? 
What  business  has  a  mind  subsisting  as  the  mere 
reflex  of  brain  changes  to  be  occupying  itself  with 
such  ideas  as  those  of  eternity  and  infinity,  of  sub¬ 
stance  and  cause,  ot  force  and  energy,  and  where 
does  it  get  them  ?  Substance,  as  every  tyro  in 
philosophy  knows,  is  one  of  the  most  difficult  and 
obscure  of  metaphysical  categories,  and  force  and 
energy  are  hardly  behind  it  in  obscurity.  Yet  these 
notions  are  played  with  as  if  their  meaning  was 
clear  as  sunlight,  and  as  if  a  theory  of  the  universe 
could  be  built  up  by  their  aid  without  more  ado  ! 1 

1  It  is  not,  therefore,  to  be  wondered  at,  and  is  a  significant  fact 
that,  as  Haeckel  has  to  admit,  nearly  all  his  weightier  supporters 
have,  within  the  last  quarter  of  a  century,  deserted  him.  His  views 
are,  in  the  higher  thinking  of  his  own  country,  already  out  of  date. 
See  Note  III.  on  Monistic  Metaphysics — Reaction  from  Haeckel. 


THE  NATURE  OF  MAN 


73 


The  avowed  stronghold  of  the  theory,  however, 
as  respects  man — still  reserving  its  evolutionism 
— is  its  supposed  demonstration  of  the  depend- 
I  ence  of  mind  on  bodily,  and  specially  on  brain 
conditions.  Here  monism  believes  itself  to  have 
an  irrefragable  case.  Life,  it  is  pointed  out, 
originates  in  the  cell ;  consciousness  is  a  manifesta¬ 
tion  of  life  ;  there  are  no  mental  changes  which 
have  not  their  counterparts  in  cerebral  changes. 
Physical  changes  in  the  brain,  on  the  other  hand, 
and  the  general  health  conditions  of  the  body, 
powerfully  affect  the  mind.  Brain  disturbance 
means  disturbed  consciousness  ;  brain  disorder 
produces  insanity  or  frenzy  ;  injuries  to  brain 
tissue  destroy  or  impair  mental  powers — some¬ 
times  change  character  ;  the  action  of  drugs 
like  alcohol  or  opium  exhibits  marked  effects 
on  mental  conditions,  etc.  In  view  of  such  facts, 
how,  it  is  asked,  can  it  be  held  that  the  soul  has 
a  life  of  its  own  independently  of  the  brain,  and 
capable  of  surviving  it  ?  Is  not  the  theory  of  one 
life  which  manifests  itself  in  both  mind  and  brain 
functions  the  only  reasonable  one  ?  Must  we  not 
fall  back  on  the  c  parallel  series  ’  view  of  mental  and 
brain  phenomena,  or  some  other  phase  of  monism  ? 


74 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


On  this  theory,  so  far  as  it  takes  the  form  of 
psychical  and  physical  ‘  parallelism,’ 1  or  involves 
the  sole  dependence  of  mental  phenomena  on 
brain  conditions,  I  would  make  in  conclusion  the 
following  remarks  : — 

i.  The  alleged  parallel  series  of  mental  and 
physical  phenomena  is,  when  narrowly  scrutinised, 
a  palpable  absurdity.  Grant  that  there  is  a  series 
of  physical  changes  in  the  brain  ;  grant  that  there 
is  a  train  of  conscious  phenomena  in  the  mind ;  it 
is  still  most  evident  that  the  laws  of  physical 
causation  supposed  to  explain  the  one  give  no 
account  whatever  of  the  other.  Leaving  free¬ 
will  for  the  moment  aside — though  that  is  an 
essential  part  of  man’s  consciousness  of  himself 
—we  have  still  the  fact  to  face  that  the  train  of 
thought  in  the  mind  proceeds  on  the  principles 
of  rational  connection  of  ideas,  with  which  physical 

1  For  effective  statements  and  criticisms  of  this  theory  in  its 
different  and  often  inconsistent  forms,  reference  may  be  made  to 
Professor  Ward’s  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism ,  Lecture  xi. ;  to  an 
acute  book  by  Professor  C.  A.  Strong  of  Columbia  University,  New 
York,  Why  the  Mind  has  a  Body  (with  article  in  criticism  by  the 
present  writer  in  Princeton  'Theological  Review ,  October  1904)  ;  to 
a  valuable  German  book  by  Von  Ludwig  Busse,  Kbnisgberg,  Geist 
und  Korper ,  Seele  und  Leib  (1903:  defends  interactionism)  $  and  to 
an  older  work,  Herbert’s  Modern  Realism  Examined. 


THE  NATURE  OF  MAN 


75 


causation  has  nothing  to  do.  In  thinking  out  a 
demonstration  in  Euclid,  e.g .,  the  steps  of  the 
reasoning  are  determined  by  the  mental  percep¬ 
tion  of  the  necessary  relations  of  ideas,  while 
changes  in  the  brain,  so  far  as  due  to  purely 
physical  causes,  have  no  relation  to  rational 
successions,  but  proceed  blindly  under  mechani¬ 
cal  and  chemical  laws.  The  two  series,  in  their 
respective  determining  principles,  are  thus  quite 
disparate,  and  cannot  be  put  alongside  of  each 
other  as  ‘  parallels.' 

2.  The  reasoning,  I  observe  next,  so  largely  em¬ 
ployed  from  diseased  or  impaired  brain-conditions 
fails  in  validity  when  applied  to  the  relations  of 
mind  and  brain  in  a  state  of  health.  .  It  is  an 
argument  from  a  pathological  condition  to  a 
healthy  one.  The  influence  of  brain  disorder 
on  the  disturbance  of  mental  conditions  is  not 
denied.  Science  makes  no  new  discovery  in 
informing  us  that  a  blow  on  the  head  destroys 
consciousness  ;  that  disease  of  the  brain  produces 
insanity ;  that  when  the  brains  are  out  a  man  will 
die.  But  unless  it  is  maintained  that  there  is  no 
distinction  between  a  healthy  and  unhealthy  con¬ 
dition  of  brain,  these  phenomena  of  disease  are 


76 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


no  disproof  of  the  fact,  which  everybody  also 
knows  to  be  true,  that  in  ordinary,  normal  con¬ 
ditions  the  mind  is  master  of  itself — perceives 
justly,  reasons  soundly,  acts  rationally — behaves, 
in  every  respect,  as  a  sane  mind  should.  The 
question  is  not,  how  will  the  mind  act  in  the 
absence  or  disturbance  of  the  appropriate  brain 
conditions  ?  but,  how  does  it  act  when  these 
appropriate  conditions  are  present,  and  reason 
is  securely  seated  on  its  throne  ?  It  is  the  last 
inquiry  only  that  is  relevant. 

3.  The  gravest  fallacy  of  the  monistic  argu¬ 
ment,  however,  in  this  connection,  is  that,  while 
heaping  up  evidence  of  the  dependence  of  mind 
on  brain,  it  takes  no  account  of  the  vastly  larger 
range  of  facts  which  show  that  brain  and  body 
generally  are  not  less  habitually  influenced  by 
mind.  The  dependence  of  mind  on  brain  is, 
after  all,  only  one  side  of  the  matter.  It  cannot 
even  be  said  to  be  the  most  important  one,  for, 
on  any  just  view  of  their  relations,  it  must  surely 
be  held  that  brain  exists  to  serve  mind,  not  mind 
to  serve  brain.  Multiply  illustrations  as  one  may 
of  the  dependence  of  mind  on  brain,  it  is  equally 
certain  that  mind,  on  its  side,  is  continually 


THE  NATURE  OF  MAN 


77 


effecting  changes  in  brain,  and  controlling  and 
dominating  its  action.  The  assumption — for  it 
is  nothing  more- — that  the  changes  in  brain 
accompanying  mental  action  are  wholly  due  to 
physical  and  chemical  causes  neither  is  nor  can 
be  proved  to  be  true.  All  prima  facie  evidence 
is  against  it.  The  mind  frames  and  executes 
carefully-considered  plans  ;  it  receives  advice 
from  others,  and  acts  in  consequence  ;  it  collects 
information,  and  takes  steps  determined  by  that 
information.  Here  the  mental  link — the  link  of 
idea — is  indispensable  in  a  full  statement  of  the 
train  of  causes  and  effects.  Instances  are  con¬ 
tinually  afforded  in  experience  of  the  powerful 
influence  whidh  mind  exerts  on  body.  A  start 
of  joyful  surprise  is  occasioned  by  hearing  a  piece 
of  good  news ;  a  shock  given  to  the  system  by 
a  letter  or  telegram  announcing  a  bereavement  or 
disaster  may  issue  in  death  ;  the  martyr  is  lifted 
by  his  faith  above  the  pain  of  his  torture  ;  the 
soldier  is  unconscious  of  his  wounds  in  battle. 
Mind-cure  is  even  being  erected  into  a  pseudo¬ 
science.  Take,  however,  the  single  instance  of 
an  act  of  will  in  a  series  determined  by  some 
conscious  plan  or  end.  How  is  that  to  be 


78 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


explained  on  any  materialistic  theory  ?  Could  we 
scrutinise  the  brain  at  such  a  moment,  should 
we  not  find  that  changes  were  taking  place  in 
its  cells,  and  in  the  distributions  of  its  energy, 
for  which  it  was  necessary  to  postulate  some 
invisible  cause  ?  Just  as  in  the  phenomena  of  life 
we  see  changes  taking  place  in  the  speck  of  proto¬ 
plasm  for  which  physical  and  chemical  agencies 
are  utterly  inadequate  to  account.1  Science,  in 
such  cases,  must  do  justice  to  all  the  facts.  It 
must  not  allow  them  to  be  ruled  out  by  a  priori 
theorems  about  conservation  of  energy,  though 
it  might  easily  be  shown  that  they  imply  no 
violation  of  any  law  of  conservation  which  science 
has  established.  Mind,  in  brief,  must  be  inter¬ 
preted  through  study  of  itself.  When  this  is 
done,  the  facts  of  intellect,  of  moral  freedom,  of 
religious  aspiration,  which  Monism  would  over¬ 
throw,  will  be  found  reinstated  in  more  than 
their  former  honour.  The  Biblical  view  stands 
unharmed  by  monistic  speculations. 

1  Cf.  the  discussion  in  Henslow’s  Present-Day  Rationalis?n  Critic¬ 
ally  Examined  (1904),  chaps,  vii.,  viii. 


Scripture  and  Science  on  the  Origin  of  Man 
— The  Image  as  a  Creation 


Biblical  View  of  Man’s  Origin.  Counter-theory  of  Monistic 
Evolution  (Haeckel).  Present-Day  Influence  of  the  Doctrine 
of  Evolution.  Extensions  and  Ambiguities  of  the  Doctrine. 
Evolution  and  Creation.  Evolution  not  necessarily  Darwinism. 
Sketch  and  Criticism  of  Darwinian  Theory.  Fortuity  invoked 
to  do  the  work  of  Mind.  Change  of  Attitude  of  Evolutionists. 
Inadequacy  of  Natural  Selection  to  explain  Evolution.  Prin¬ 
cipal  Objections.  Revised  Evolutionary  Theories.  Evolution 
and  Involution.  Evolution  and  Teleology  j  Directive  Intelli¬ 
gence.  Evolution  not  necessarily  by  Insensible  Gradations. 
Creative  Cause  involved  in  Founding  of  New  Kingdoms. 
‘  Enigmas  ’  of  Science  (Origin  of  Life,  of  Consciousness,  of 
Man).  Bearing  on  the  Doctrine  of  the  Origin  of  Man. 
Failure  of  Evolution  to  account  for  the  mental  and  moral 
Differentia  of  Man.  Unbridged  Gulf  between  Man  and  the 
Lower  Animals  in  a  physical  respect.  The  Missing  Links  yet 
Undiscovered.  Pithecanthropus  Erectus .  Result:  Higher  Cause 
implied  in  Man’s  Origin. 


80 


Ill 


SCRIPTURE  AND  SCIENCE  ON  THE  ORIGIN  OF 
MAN— THE  IMAGE  AS  A  CREATION 

JN  last  lecture  the  Biblical  account  of  man’s 
origin  was  considered  in  its  connection  with 
the  subject  of  man’s  nature.  It  was  then  shown 
that,  in  the  account  in  Genesis,  man’s  creation 
is  referred  to  a  special,  supernatural  act  of  God ; 
that,  while  in  it  man  appears  as  the  head  and 
crown  of  nature — the  goal  and  resting-point  of 
the  whole  creative  movement — he  is  yet  not  a 
mere  creature  of  nature,  but  stands  in  a  peculiar 
relation  to  God,  as  bearing  His  rational  and  moral 
image,  and  standing  under  moral  and  religious 
responsibilities  to  Him.  It  was  seen  that  this 
view  of  the  spiritual  nature  and  dignity  of  man 
is  not  overturned  by  what  is  advanced  against 
it  from  the  side  of  a  materialistic  monism,  with 
its  crude  doctrine  of  a  universal  Substance,  its 


82 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


denial  of  a  distinct  spiritual  principle  in  man,  its 
theories  of  psychical  and  physical  parallelism,  and 
its  other  forms  of  naturalistic  negation.  I  am  in 
the  present  lecture  to  consider  the  Biblical  account 
of  man’s  origin  in  relation  to  theories  of  natural 
evolution. 

The  monistic  doctrine  on  this  point  may  be  suffi¬ 
ciently  summed  up  for  our  present  purpose  in  the 
following  propositions,  derived  from  Haeckel : — 

1.  There  has  been  a  slow  and  unbroken  process 
of  evolution  from  the  lowest  forms  of  organic  life 
to  the  highest  achievement  of  nature — Man.  In 
Haeckel’s  view  this  ‘  biogenetic  process,  the  slow 
development  and  transformation  of  countless 
organic  germs,  must  have  taken  many  millions 
of  years — considerably  over  a  hundred.’ 1 

2.  This  evolution  is  the  result  of  natural  causes 
which  do  not  imply  intelligence  or  purpose.2 

3.  The  immediate  ancestors  of  man  are  the 
anthropoid  apes.  To  quote  our  authority  again  : 
‘  Sufficient  for  us,  as  an  incontestable  historical 
fact,  is  the  important  thesis  that  man  descends 
immediately  from  the  ape,  and  secondarily  from 

1  Riddle  of  Universe ,  p.  5.  2  See  below,  pp.  90  ff. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


83 


a  long  series  of  lower  vertebrates  /  1  More  fully  : 
4  The  most  perfect  and  most  highly  developed 
branch  of  the  class  mammalia  is  the  order  of 
primates,  which  first  put  in  an  appearance,  by 
development  from  the  lowest  prochoriatas,  at  the 
beginning  of  the  tertiary  period — at  least  three 
million  years  ago.  The  youngest  and  most 
perfect  twig  of  the  branch  primates  is  man,  who 
sprang  from  a  series  of  man-like  apes  towards  the 
end  of  the  tertiary  period.’2 

4.  This  law  of  evolution  applies  to  the  mental 
and  moral  endowments,  not  less  than  to  the 
physical  structure  of  man. 

5.  The  doctrine  of  the  evolution  of  man  from 
lower  animals,  by  excluding  belief  in  his  essential 
distinction  from  the  animals,  is  fatal  to  the 
assumption  of  a  higher  spiritual  nature  in  man, 
and  to  belief  in  personal  immortality. 

In  his  advocacy  of  these  views,  Haeckel,  if  a 
somewhat  extreme,  may  be  taken  as  a  fairly 

1  Riddle  of  Universe ,  p.  30. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  5.  Not,  of  course,  from  any  species  of  existing  ape 
(cf.  Haeckel,  History  of  Creation,  ii.  p.  277).  So  Weismann  in  his 
most  recent  work  :  ‘  There  can  be  no  question  that  man  has  evolved 
from  animal  ancestors,  whose  nearest  relatives  were  the  Anthropoid 
Apes’  (7 he  Evol.  Theory,  E.  T.,  ii.  p.  393).  But  see  below, 
pp.  129,  136. 


84 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


representative  exponent  of  a  very  prevalent  type 
of  opinion. 

Here,  then,  it  might  seem,  we  reach  a  suffi¬ 
ciently  clear  issue.  The  boundaries  of  our  dis¬ 
cussion,  however,  are  far  from  being  yet 
adequately  defined.  There  is  no  subject  on 
which  writers  in  these  days  wax  so  easily 
eloquent  as  the  universality  of  the  great  law 
of  evolution  ;  yet  there  is  none  in  regard  to 
which  there  is  a  louder  call  for  careful  discrimina¬ 
tion  and  cautious  statement.  Evolution  has,  since 
Darwin’s  time,  become  invested  with  an  omni¬ 
potence  which,  it  may  safely  be  affirmed,  belongs 
to  it  only  through  a  haze  in  the  ideas  of  those 
who  so  exalt  it.  It  receives  extensions  and 
applications  which  carry  it  far  beyond  the 
bounds  of  established  fact.  From  the  organic 
world  it  is  extended  to  the  inorganic ;  from 
our  planet  and  the  solar  system,  to  the  cosmos  ; 
from  nature,  to  the  creations  of  man’s  mind — 
arts,  laws,  language,  institutions,  religion.  We 
speak  in  the  same  breath  of  the  evolution  of 
organic  beings — plants  and  animals — and  of  the 
evolution  of  the  steam-engine,  of  the  printing- 
press,  of  the  newspaper  ;  now,  even,  of  the 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


85 


evolution  of  the  atom.1  But  pause  for  a  moment 
to  analyse  any  one  of  these  ideas.  We  know 
where  we  are  when  we  speak  of  organic  evolu¬ 
tion — of  the  evolution  of  organic  species.  We 
mean  to  imply  a  genetic  relationship — a  parental 
tie — between  the  successive  orders  of  being — the 
derivation  of  one  from  the  other  in  unbroken 
descent,  so  as  to  exclude  what  are  called  c  special 
creations.’  Obviously,  howrever,  we  are  on  a 
quite  different  plane  when  we  speak  of  the 
evolution  of  arts,  of  language,  of  institutions, 
of  religion.  These  things  do  not  go  on  in¬ 
dependently,  reproducing  themselves  by  genetic 
descent.  Behind  them  all  is  the  omnipresent 
creative  agency  of  the  human  spirit.  It  is  a 
still  greater  divergence  from  the  original  idea 
when  we  descant,  as  is  sometimes  done,  on  the 
evolution  of  such  outward  things  as  the  steam- 
engine  or  the  printing-press.  There  is  nothing 
here  in  the  least  analogous  to  the  derivation  of 
one  organic  being  from  another.  You  have  a 

1  Valuable  remarks  are  made  on  this  point  in  an  important  series 
of  articles  by  R.  Otto  on  ‘  Darwinismus  von  Heute  und  Theologie  ’ 
(Present-Day  Darwinism  and  Theology),  in  the  German  <rTheologische 
Rundschau ,  1902-4,  to  which  fuller  reference  will  be  made  below. 
See  also  Note  IV.  on  Otto  on  Present-Day  Darwinism. 


86 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


succession  of  gradually  improved  forms  of  the 
locomotive,  beginning,  say,  with  George  Stephen¬ 
son’s  rude  ‘  Puffing  Billy  ’  ;  you  can  put  these 
in  a  row  ;  and  you  can,  if  you  please,  call  the 
series  an  evolution.  But  these  successive  engines 
did  not  produce  one  another,  were  not  derived 
from  one  another,  were  not  perfected  by  natural 
selection,  or  any  process  of  the  kind.  The  sole 
bond  that  unites  them  is  the  invisible  bond  of  idea 
in  the  successive  inventors’  minds.  It  is  there, 
and  nowhere  else,  that  the  evolution  takes  place. 
Each  new  engine,  as  it  comes  into  existence,  is  a 
product  by  itself,  the  result  of  a  new  inventive 
act — in  that  sense,  a  special  creation.  It  is  the 
same  with  language.  You  can  make  a  genea¬ 
logical  tree  of  the  various  families  of  human 
speech.  But  this  tree  does  not  grow  of  itself. 
Behind  the  whole  development,  as  above  observed, 
is  the  human  mind,  with  its  teeming  world  of 
ideas  and  feelings,  all  struggling  for  expression  ; 
and  each  new  word,  as  it  comes  into  existence 
— say  this  very  word  ‘  evolution  ’  ;  or  the  word 
‘utilitarianism,’  brought  in  by  J.  S.  Mill;  or  the 
word  ‘  solidarity,’  struck  out,  I  think,  by  Comte  ; 
or  the  word  ‘  Agnosticism,’  introduced  by  Pro- 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


fessor  Huxley — is  a  special  coinage  of  some  mind, 
the  felicitous  embodiment  of  some  thought  for 
which  a  word  was  needed.  Yet  it  takes  its  place 
in  what  is  called  an  4  evolution.’  The  idea  sug¬ 
gested — to  which,  indeed,  I  have  been  working  up 
— is  that  neither  4  evolution  ’  nor  c special  creation/ 
as  ordinarily  understood,  is  an  ultimate  concep¬ 
tion  ; 1  that  what  we  need  is  some  higher  notion 
which  will  be  seen  to  be  the  synthesis  of  both — 
in  which,  in  fact,  the  supposed  contradiction 
between  them  will  disappear.2 

Reverting  now  to  the  case  of  organic  evolution 
and  of  man,  it  will  be  found  that  here  also,  before 
we  can  proceed  profitably,  it  is  necessary  to 
define  carefully  the  sense  in  which  we  speak  of 
evolution.  No  religious  interest,  I  may  take  it 
for  granted,  is  imperilled  by  a  theory  of  evolution, 

1  The  contrary  is  the  usual  assumption.  Thus  in  Art.  ‘Evolu¬ 
tion’  in  Ency.  Brit.,  yin.  p.  752:  ‘It  is  clear  that  the  doctrine  of 
evolution  is  directly  antagonistic  to  that  of  creation.  .  .  .  The 
theory  of  evolution,  by  assuming  one  intelligible  and  adequate 
principle  of  change,  simply  eliminates  the  notion  of  creation  from 
those  regions  of  existence  to  which  it  is  applied.’  So  Professor 
Huxley,  in  his  New  York  Lectures  on  Evolution,  etc. 

*  Cf.  some  remarks  in  Argyll’s  Unity  of  Nature,  p.  272  :  ‘  Creation 
and  Evolution,  therefore,  when  these  terms  have  been  cleared  from 
intellectual  confusion,  are  not  antagonistic  conceptions  mutually 
exclusive.  They  are  harmonious  and  complementary.’ 


88 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


viewed  simply  as  a  method  of  creation,  provided 
certain  conditions  are  fulfilled,  and  certain  limits 
are  observed.  It  may  be,  I  at  least  am  not  con¬ 
cerned  to  deny  it,  that,  within  limits  which  science 
must  define  for  us,  there  has  been  organic  evolu¬ 
tion — genetic  derivation  of  one  order  or  species 
of  living  beings  from  another.  The  convergence 
of  many  lines  of  evidence  has  satisfied  the  great 
majority  of  scientific  men  at  the  present  day  that 
it  is  so.  But  our  task,  in  considering  the  bearings 
of  this  fact  on  the  Bible  doctrine  of  man,  does 
not  end  with  this  general  acknowledgment.  In 
truth  it  only  begins.  We  have  still  to  inquire 
what  is  the  real  nature  of  this  process  by  which 
we  assume  organic  forms  to  have  been  produced 
— what  causes  or  factors  are  involved  in  it — and 
what  limits  attach  to  it  as  an  explanation  of  the 
existing  order,  and  specially  of  the  appearance  of 
such  a  being  as  man.  And  here  it  will  be  found 
on  examination  that  science  no  longer  speaks  with 
a  uniform  or  decisive  voice ;  that  there  are,  in 
fact,  the  widest  divergences  between  the  different 
schools  of  evolutionists  ;  and  that,  when  evolu¬ 
tion  is  restricted  within  the  limits  which  the  best- 
established  results  of  science  at  the  present  hour 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


89 


seem  to  impose  upon  it,  the  apparent  antagonism 
between  it  and  the  Biblical  view  of  man’s  origin 
largely  vanishes.  It  is  this  position  I  desire  to 
make  good  by  a  necessarily  rapid,  but  I  hope  not 
altogether  superficial,  consideration  of  the  actual 
state  of  the  evidence.1 

I  begin  with  Darwin,  whose  theory  of  the 
origin  of  species  by  natural  selection  is  universally 
acknowledged  to  mark  the  decisive  turning-point 
in  the  history  of  modern  opinion  on  this  subject. 
Evolution  and  Darwinism,  indeed,  as  we  are  con¬ 
stantly  reminded  nowadays,2  are  not  synonymous. 
The  fact  is  one  which  it  will  be  a  main  object  of 
this  discussion  to  emphasise.  It  is  the  case,  how¬ 
ever,  that  by  very  many  who  speak  and  write  on 
evolution  the  two  are  still  practically  treated  as  if 

1  The  remarkable  and  increasing  conflict  of  opinion  in  the  evolu¬ 
tionary  schools  is  well  brought  out  by  Otto  in  the  series  of  articles 
above  referred  to  ( Theol .  Rund.y  1902,  pp.  489  ff.  5  1903,  pp.  193  ff.j 
1904,  pp.  4  ff.).  See  Note  IV.,  and  cf.  below,  pp.  97,  no  ff. 

2  Cf.  Fiske,  'Through  Nature  to  God ,  p.  81.  Spencer  was  a 
thorough-going  evolutionist,  but  rejected  Darwinism.  Professor  Hux¬ 
ley,  much  as  he  valued  the  Darwinian  theoiy,  repeatedly  emphasised 
the  distinction  in  articles  and  speeches.  ‘  That  the  doctrine  of  natural 
selection  presupposes  evolution  is  quite  true  j  but  it  is  not  true  that 
evolution  necessarily  presupposes  natural  selection.’  See  his  art.  in 
Nature ,  18955  lecture  at  Royal  Institution,  1868  j  art.  ‘  Evolution  ’ 
in  Ency.  Brit .,  vol.  viii.  $  Darwin’s  Life  and  Letters ,  ii.  p.  197,  etc. 


90 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


they  were  the  same,  and  in  the  monistic  philo¬ 
sophy  I  am  combating  this  also  is  the  constant 
assumption.1  The  distinction  is  important  for 
this  reason  that,  while  evolution  in  itself  has  no 
necessary  tendency  of  the  kind,  the  peculiar  merit 
of  Darwinism  in  the  eyes  of  its  leading  supporters 
is  that,  in  words  of  Professor  Huxley,  it  gives  its 
‘  death-blow  ’  to  teleology,  or  to  the  idea  of  pur¬ 
pose  or  design  in  nature.2  It  accomplishes  this,  it 
is  supposed,  by  showing  that  what  the  old  argu¬ 
ment  for  design  took  to  be  ends  in  nature — to 
which  the  adaptations  we  see  are  then  related  as 
means — are  in  reality  only  results  ;  appearances  of 

design  brought  about  by  the  operation  of  a  few 

* 

simple  laws  without  the  necessity  of  any  assump¬ 
tion  of  intelligence.3  That  Darwin  came  to  take 

1  Cf.  Riddle ,  pp.  28,  90,  93,  1 34,  etc.  See  also  Henslow’s  Present- 
Day  Rationalism ,  pref.  p.  vi.  Henslow  emphasises  the  above  distinc¬ 
tion  (pp.  145,  etc.). 

2  Lay  Sermons ,  p.  3  30 ;  cf.  Henslow,  Present-Day  Rationalism , 
pp.  56,  74. 

3  Cf.  Weismann,  The  Evol.  Theory ,  i.  pp.  55-56  :  ‘But  the  philo¬ 
sophical  significance  of  natural  selection  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  shows 
us  how  to  explain  the  origin  of  useful,  well-adapted  structures  purely 
by  mechanical  forces  and  without  having  to  fall  back  on  a  directi-ve 
force’  (also  p.  240).  Thus  also  Ency.  Brit.,  art.  ‘  Evolution,’  viii. 
p.  764  (Sully):  ‘The  philosophical  significance  of  the  hypothesis  of 
natural  selection,  especially  associated  with  Mr.  Darwin,  is  due,  as 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


91 


the  same  view  of  the  logical  effect  of  his  theory 
appears  from  his  letters,  in  which  he  frequently 
combats  the  idea  of  Asa  Gray  and  others  that 
adaptation  in  nature  implies  design.  4  The  old 
argument  from  design  in  nature,  as  given  by 
Paley,  which  formerly  seemed  to  me  so  con¬ 
clusive,’  he  says,  c  fails  now  that  the  law  of  natural 
selection  has  been  discovered  .  .  .  There  seems  to 
be  no  more  design  in  the  variability  of  organic 
beings,  and  in  the  action  of  natural  selection, 
than  in  the  course  which  the  wind  blows.’ 1  The 
leading  advocates  of  the  theory,  Huxley,  Romanes, 
Helmholtz,  Haeckel,  Weismann,  with  many 
more,  wrote — and  write — in  the  same  strain.2 

Professor  Helmholtz  points  out,  to  the  fact  that  it  introduces  a 
strictly  mechanical  conception  in  order  to  account  for  those  intricate 
arrangements  known  as  organic  adaptations  which  had  before  been 
conceived  only  in  a  teleological  manner.  .  .  .  His  theory,  as  a  whole, 
is  clearly  a  heavy  blow  to  the  teleological  method.’  R.  Otto,  in 
T’heol.  Rund.y  1902,  p.  486,  writes  similarly:  ‘The  most  special 
significance  of  Darwin  and  his  theory,  tnat  on  account  of  which  he 
is  named  the  Newton  of  Biology  ...  is  the  war  against  teleology.’ 

1  Life  and  Letters ,  i.  p.  309  $  cf.  Dr.  J.  H.  Stirling,  Dar^winianism, 
pp.  239  ff. 

2  Cf.  Huxley  above.  Helmholtz,  as  quoted  by  Strauss  ( Der  alte 
und  der  neue  Glaube ,  p.  216),  says:  ‘Darwin’s  theory  shows  how 
every  adaptation  of  structure  in  organisms  can  originate  without 
admixture  of  intelligence,  through  the  blind  operation  of  a  natural 
law.’  Romanes  wrote  :  ‘  If  [plants  and  animals]  were  specially 
created,  the  evidence  of  supernatural  design  remains  unrefuted  and 


92 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


So,  recently,  it  was  replied  to  Lord  Kelvin  that 
by  admitting  a  creative  and  directive  force  in 
organic  nature  we  lose  all  the  ‘advantages’  of 
Darwinism.  This  should  be  remembered  when 
stress  is  laid  on  the  supposed  hostility  of  religion 
to  science.  If  collision  came  about  between 
Darwinism  and  theology,  the  blame  does  not  rest 
altogether  on  the  theologian,  but  must  in  part  be 
borne  by  the  original  advocates  of  the  theory, 
who  openly  boasted  that  by  the  theory  of 
natural  selection  the  foundations  of  theism  were 
destroyed. 

What,  then,  are  these  laws  which,  on  the 
Darwinian  view,  enable  us  to  dispense  with  in¬ 
telligence  in  creation,  and  what  is  the  theory 
proposed  as  a  substitute  ?  The  laws  in  question 
are  so  well  known  that  it  is  hardly  necessary  that 
I  should  do  more  than  mention  them.  They  are 
mainly  these  : — i.  Indefinite  variation  ;  2.  Here¬ 
dity  ;  3.  The  Struggle  for  Existence  ;  and  4. 

Natural  Selection,  resulting  in  survival  of  the 

irrefutable,  whereas,  if  they  were  slowly  evolved,  that  evidence  has 
been  utterly  and  for  ever  destroyed  ’  ( Organic  Evolution ,  p.  13).  On 
Weismann’s  views  see  fully  in  Contemp.  Review,  November  1894. 
(in  reply  to  Lord  Salisbury).  Cf.  also  on  this  point,  Otto,  as  above 
(' Eheol .  Rund.f  1902,  pp.  484-87  j  1904,  p.  2). 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


93 


fittest.  The  theory  based  upon  them  may  per¬ 
haps  be  briefly  sketched  thus.  It  lies  in  the 
nature  of  each  organism  to  vary,  and  variations 
tend  to  be  perpetuated  from  parent  to  offspring. 
These  variations  are  fortuitous,  accidental,  ‘chance’ 
(a  word  frequently  employed  by  Darwin)  varia¬ 
tions,  not  in  the  sense  of  being  causeless,  but 
that  their  causes  do  not  imply  any  plan  or 

design.1  They  are  in  themselves  aimless,  but 

/ 

some  tend  to  the  advantage  of  the  individual 
or  species ;  others  militate  against  it.  So  keen, 
however,  is  the  struggle  for  existence  that  each 
profitable  variation,  even  the  slightest,  tells,  and  it 
is  the  fittest  members  of  the  species  that  on  the 
whole  survive.  These  favourable  specimens  hand 
down  their  advantage  to  their  descendants,  and 
the  process  is  repeated  with  the  result  of  still 
further  improvements.  Darwin  emphasises  the 
fact  that  the  variations  are  exceedingly  ‘  slight,’ 2 

1  Cf.  Stirling,  as  above,  p.  273. 

2  In  the  third  edition  of  his  Origin  of  Species  Darwin  wrote  : 
‘  Natural  selection  can  act  only  by  taking  advantage  of  slight 
successive  variations ;  she  can  never  take  a  leap,  but  must  advance 
by  short  and  slow  stages’  (p.  214).  A  little  earlier  he  had  said 
(p.  208)  :  ‘  If  it  could  be  demonstrated  that  any  complex  organ 
existed  which  could  not  possibly  have  been  formed  by  numerous, 
successive,  slight  modifications,  my  theory  would  absolutely  break 


94 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


and  that  the  time  required  for  the  accumulation 
of  favourable  variations  is  very  long.  ‘  I  cannot 
doubt/  he  writes,  ‘  that  during  millions  of  genera¬ 
tions  individuals  of  a  species  will  be  born  with 
some  slight  variation  profitable  to  some  part  of 
its  economy/  1  Through  this  slow  accumulation 
of  profitable  variations  new  organs  are  formed, 
new  species  are  gradually  produced ;  lower  forms 
of  life  are  changed  to  higher  ;  till,  at  length,  we 
rise  to  man.  All  this,  as  just  said,  is  accom¬ 
plished  through  the  blind  operation  of  the  afore¬ 
named  laws.  The  appearance  of  intelligent 
adaptation  is  produced,  but  the  real  cause,  in 
Darwin’s  words,  is  ‘  the  action  of  selection  on 
mere  accidental  variability.’ 2 

Now  the  decisive  objection  to  this  theory  of 
Darwin’s,  as  an  explanation  of  the  origin  of 
organic  forms,  apart  from  all  special  scientific 
difficulties,  is  that,  as  I  have  put  it  elsewhere, 

down.’  So  Weismann  to-day  writes :  ‘  Natural  selection  depends 
essentially  on  the  cumulative  augmentation  of  the  most  minute  useful 
variations  in  the  direction  of  their  utility  ’  (The  E<vol.  Theory,  i. 
p.  55).  This  shows,  despite  the  argumentation  of  Romanes  in 
his  Darwin  and  after  Darwin  (n.  chs.  i.  ii.  $  against  Wallace), 
that  Darwin  at  first  laid  practically  the  whole  weight  of  his  theory 
on  natural  selection.  Cf.  Mivart,  Lessons  from  Nature ,  pp.  283  ffi. 

1  Life  and  Letters ,  ii.  p.  124.  2  Ibid.,  p.  369. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


95 


under  a  veii  of  words,  it  asks  us  to  believe  that 
accident  and  fortuity  have  done  the  work  of 
mind.1  To  explain  the  adaptations  which  we 
find  in  nature  by  the  adding  of  variation  to  varia¬ 
tion  in  millions  of  successive  generations  is  to 
miss  the  essential  point.  The  real  question  is, 
how  these  variations  happen  to  be  there,  how 
they  come  to  persist  in  that  particular  line — say 
where  an  eye  or  an  ear  is  being  formed — and 
how,  in  combination  with  other  variations,  they 
come  to  make  up  in  their  totality  a  perfect  organ 
which  stands  in  correlation  with  the  rest  of  that 
particular  structure.  The  mere  lengthening  out 
of  the  process  does  not  cast  the  least  light  on  the 
ultimate  production  of  a  complex  organ  display¬ 
ing  in  every  part  the  marks  of  the  most  exquisite 
adaptation  and  design.  I  have  already  made  the 
admission  that  there  is  no  necessary  antagonism 
between  theism  and  a  doctrine  of  organic  evolu¬ 
tion  as  such.  That  species  should  have  arisen  by 
a  method  of  derivation  from  some  primeval  germ 
(or  germs)  rather  than  by  unrelated  creations, 
is  not  only  not  inconceivable,  but  may  even 
commend  itself  as  a  higher  and  more  worthy 

1  Cf.  Martineau,  A  Study  of  Religion ,  i.  pp.  278  f£ 


96 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


conception  of  the  divine  working  than  the  older 
hypothesis.  Assume  God — as  many  devout 
evolutionists  do — to  be  immanent  in  the  evolu¬ 
tionary  process,  and  His  intelligence  and  purpose 
to  be  expressed  in  it  ;  then  evolution,  so  far 
from  conflicting  with  theism,  may  become  a  new 
and  heightened  form  of  the  theistic  argument. 
The  real  impelling  force  of  evolution  is  now 
from  within  ;  it  is  not  blind  but  purposeful  ; 
forces  are  inherent  in  organisms  which,  not 
fortuitously  but  with  design,  work  out  the  variety 
and  gradations  in  nature  we  observe.  Evolution 
is  but  the  other  side  of  a  previous  Evolution  and 
only  establishes  a  higher  teleology.  The  case  is 
totally  altered,  if,  with  Darwin  and  his  more  con¬ 
sistent  followers,  we  substitute  for  intelligence 
the  blind  operation  of  natural  selection.  The 
question  is  not,  it  is  to  be  observed,  as  to  the 
existence  of  the  laws  on  which  Darwin  relies — 
laws  of  variation,  of  heredity,  of  struggle  for 
existence,  of  natural  selection— but  as  to  their 
sufficiency  of  themselves  to  explain  the  evolu¬ 
tionary  process.  It  is  here,  as  we  shall  immedi¬ 
ately  see,  that  the  crux  of  the  question  lies  as  to 
the  mode  of  origin  of  man  ;  and,  at  the  risk  of 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


97 


seeming — but  only  seeming — to  delay  in  coming 
to  my  proper  point,  I  must  ask  your  attention 
a  little  longer  to  this  fundamental  issue  in  the 
doctrine  of  evolution. 

It  is,  therefore,  of  the  utmost  interest  for  us  to 
observe  that  it  is  precisely  on  this  point  of  the 
sufficiency  of  the  factors  posited  by  Mr.  Darwin 
to  explain  evolution  that  science  itself  has  come 
to  cast  the  strongest  doubt.  On  every  side  we 
hear  the  admission  made  that  while  the  fact  of 
evolution,  or  doctrine  of  descent,  stands  secure, 
the  laws  which  Darwin  invoked  to  explain  it 
—  especially  natural  selection- — are  inadequate 
for  that  purpose,  and  that  the  real  factors  in 
evolution  are  yet  to  seek,1  and  must,  to  a  larger 

1  The  admission  is  so  universal  that  only  one  or  two  testimonies 
need  be  cited.  Weismann  says :  ‘Even  ^he  much  easier  problem, 
how  and  by  what  forces  the  evolution  of  the  living  world  has  pro¬ 
ceeded  from  a  given  beginning,  is  far  from  being  finally  settled : 
antagonistic  views  are  still  in  conflict,  and  there  is  no  arbitrator 
whose  authoritative  word  can  decide  which  is  right.  The  How  ?  of 
evolution  is  still  doubtful,  but  not  the  fact ,  and  this  is  the  secure 
foundation  on  which  we  stand  to-day :  the  world  of  life,  as  we  know 
it,  has  been  evolved,  and  did  not  originate  all  at  once  ’  ( The  E<vol. 
Theory ,  i.  p.  3). 

Huxley,  in  Nature  (Nov.  1,  1894),  quotes  from  the  great  palaeon¬ 
tologist  Zittel :  ‘For  the  naturalist  evolution  offers  the  only  natural 
solution  of  the  problem  of  the  development  and  succession  of  organic 
beings.  But  as  to  the  causes  which  bring  about  the  modification 

G 


98 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


extent  than  Darwin,  even  in  his  latest  stage, 
acknowledged,1  be  sought  within  the  organism. 
This  leads  to  a  curious  result,  the  full  bearings  of 
which  are  not  always  apprehended.  Mr.  Darwin 
was  not  the  first  to  put  forward  the  hypothesis  of 
development,  and  to  support  it  from  the  facts 
of  4  classification,’  geological  succession,  homo¬ 
logies,  embryology,  and  rudimentary  organs.’ 2 
‘  Nevertheless,’  he  tells  us  in  the  Introduction  to 
his  Origin  of  Species ,  ‘  such  a  conclusion,  even  if 
well-founded,  would  be  unsatisfactory  until  it 
could  be  shown  how  the  innumerable  species 


of  species,  and  especially  the  change  [continuously]  in  a  given 
direction,  opinions  are  yet  greatly  divided.  That  the  principle  of 
natural  selection  discovered  by  Darwin  leaves  many  phenomena 
unexplained  is  no  longer  denied  by  even  the  warmest  followers  of 
Darwin.’ 

See  also  Huxley,  Art.  ‘Evolution’  in  Ency.  Brit.,  viii.  p.  751: 
‘  On  the  evidence  of  palaeontology,  the  evolution  of  many  existing 
forms  of  animal  life  from  their  predecessors  is  no  longer  an  hypo¬ 
thesis,  but  an  historical  fact :  it  is  only  the  nature  of  the  physiological 
factors  to  which  that  evolution  is  due  which  is  still  open  to  dis¬ 
cussion.’ 

The  same  authority,  in  an  address  at  Buffalo,  August  25,  1876, 
said  :  c  The  history  of  evolution,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  is  now  dis¬ 
tinctly  traced.  We  knonv  that  it  has  happened,  and  what  remains  is 
the  subordinate  question  of  how  it  happened.’ 

1  On  the  later  modifications  in  Darwin’s  views,  cf.  Mivart, 
Lessons  from  Nature ,  chaps,  ix.,  x. ;  and  see  below,  p.  104. 

2  Life  and  Letters ,  ii.  p.  313. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


99 


inhabiting  this  world  have  been  modified  so  as  to 
acquire  that  perfection  of  structure  and  adapta¬ 
tion  which  justly  excites  our  admiration.’  In 
other  words,  the  fact  of  evolution  could  not  be 
regarded  as  satisfactorily  established  until  the 
method  of  evolution  had  been  shown  ;  and  it  is 
the  peculiar  claim  of  Mr.  Darwin’s  book  to  have 
put  the  hypothesis  of  evolution  on  a  firm  basis 
by  the  discovery  of  the  method,  viz.,  natural 
selection.  Now,  by  a  curious  inversion,  it  is 
precisely  Darwin’s  theory  of  the  how  which  is 
placed  in  doubt,  while  the  fact  of  evolution,  which 
he  thought  could  not  be  regarded  as  established 
till  the  method  was  discovered,  is  held  to  be  the 
one  thing  certain.1 

It  would  take  me  too  far  afield  to  attempt  to 
summarise,  with  any  fulness,  the  scientific  grounds 
on  which  the  Darwinian  theory  is  held  by  an 
increasing  number  of  evolutionists  to  be  inade¬ 
quate  for  the  purpose  of  explaining  the  origin  of 
species  in  nature,  including  man.  They  touch 
every  point  in  the  theory — variation,  inheritance, 

1  Romanes,  therefore,  inverts  the  true  order,  when  he  explains  ‘the 
principal  function  of  Darwin’s  work  ’  by  saying  ‘  that  in  those  days 
the  fact  of  evolution  itself,  as  distinguished  from  its  method ,  had  to 
be  proved  ’  (Darwin  and  after  Darwin ,  ii.  pp.  159-60). 


IOO 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


struggle  for  existence,  natural  selection,  insensible 
gradations,  geological  evidence,  adequacy  of  geo¬ 
logical  time,  etc.  Only  a  few  of  the  principal 
can  be  glanced  at  : 1 — 

i.  There  is  admittedly  variation  in  organisms, 
but  variation,  it  is  confidently  contended,  is 
neither  indefinite  nor  unlimited,2  and  in  the  state 
of  nature  there  is  a  strong  tendency  to  reversion 
to  type.  In  each  organism  there  is  a  limit  beyond 
which  variation  cannot  be  pushed.3  This  puts  a 
barrier  in  the  way  of  the  conversion  of  varieties 
into  species. 

Variations,  besides,  are  not  always  slight  and 
gradual.  They  may  be,  and  sometimes  are,  of  a 


1  Cf.  with  some  of  the  points  mentioned,  Henslow’s  ‘  Summary  of 
the  False  Data  upon  which  Darwinism  is  based  ’  in  his  (more  recent) 
work.,  Present-Day  Rationalism  critically  examined p.  160,  and  see 
his  whole  section,  pp.  145-60.  This  writer  goes  so  far  as  to  say: 
Darwinism  c  is  an  imaginary  process  to  account  for  evolution’ 
(p.  145).  For  an  older  summary,  see  Mivart’s  Genesis  of  Species , 
p.  21. 

2  Huxley  says,  Art.  ‘Evolution,’  Ency.  Brit.,  viii.  p.  751  :  ‘The 
causes  and  conditions  of  variation  have  yet  to  be  thoroughly  ex¬ 
plored  ;  and  the  importance  of  natural  selection  will  not  be  impaired 
even  if  further  inquiries  should  show  that  variability  is  definite,  and 
is  determined  in  certain  directions,  rather  than  in  others,  by  condi¬ 
tions  inherent  in  that  which  varies.’ 

3  In  the  case  of  the  pigeon,  eg.,  there  is  a  limit  of  size,  in  the 
number  of  tail-feathers,  etc. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


IOI 


pronounced  character,  and  involve  correlated 
changes  in  the  organism  as  a  whole.1 

2.  There  is  struggle  for  existence,  but  where 
the  struggle  is  severe  it  does  not,  it  is  argued, 
aid,  but  hinders,  evolution.2 

3.  There  is  natural  selection,  but  it  is  increas¬ 
ingly  recognised  that  natural  selection  creates 
nothing.  It  only  weeds  out  the  weak,  and  pre¬ 
serves  the  strong.  As  A.  R.  Wallace  says,  in 
writing  to  Darwin,  ‘  Nature  does  not  so  much 
select  special  varieties,  as  exterminate  the  most 
unfavourable  ones.’3  Given  the  fitter  specimen 
(or  organ),  natural  selection  comes  into  play  to 
preserve  it,  but  it  has  no  power  of  itself  to 
produce  the  fitter  specimen. 

4.  On  various  grounds  the  power  attributed  to 
natural  selection  of  infallibly  picking  out  infini¬ 
tesimal  favourable  variations,  and  preserving  them 
for  many  (perhaps  millions  of)  generations  till 
new  favourable  variations  are  added,  is  widely 
recognised  to  be  untenable.4 

I 

1  See  below,  pp.  1 1 3  ff. 

2  Cf.  Otto,  T’heol .  Rund .,  1904,  p.  61 ;  and  see  Note  IV. 

3  Life  and  Letters ,  iii.  p.  46. 

4  Thus,  eg.,  H.  Spencer,  Principles  of  Biology  (sec..  166)  $  two 
papers  on  ‘  F actors  of  Organic  Evolution 1  $  Arts,  in  Nineteenth  Cen¬ 
tury ,  February  1888  and  November  18955  G.  J.  Romanes  in  Nine - 


102 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


Here,  perhaps,  criticism  of  Darwinism  is  at  its 
keenest,  and  is  most  obviously  successful.  It  is 
forcibly  pointed  out  that  in  its  incipient  stage  an 
organ  may  be  of  no  advantage  to  its  possessor  at 
all ; 1  that  variations  do  not  occur  singly,  but 
many  together,  and  in  the  complexity  of  life  tend 
to  balance  and  neutralise  each  other  both  in  the 
individual  and  in  the  species  ; 2  that  the  forces 
destructive  of  life,  especially  in  its  lower  grades, 
are  often  on  a  scale  that  puts  slight  variations  out 
of  the  question  as  a  means  of  protection  ; 3  that 
the  chances  of  perpetuating  variations  are 

teenth  Century ,  January  1887  ;  the  Duke  of  Argyll,  Nineteenth 
Century ,  March  and  April  1895;  Mivart,  Murphy,  etc.,  with  very 
many  American  and  Continental  naturalists  (on  latter,  see  Otto, 
fheol.  Rund .,  1904,  pp.  4  ff.). 

1  ‘We  should  entirely  fail  to  form  any  conception  how  a  very 
slightly  enlarged  sebaceous  follicle,  a  minute  pimple  on  the  nose  of  a 
fish,  or  a  microscopic  point  of  ossification  or  consolidation  amongst 
the  muscles  of  any  animal,  could  give  its  possessor  any  superiority 
over  its  fellows  5  yet  by  the  terms  of  the  hypothesis  such,  and  no 
other,  must  have  been  the  origin  of  the  mammary  gland,  of  the 
powerful  offensive  weapons  of  the  sword-fish  or  saw-fish,  and  of  loco¬ 
motor  organs  generally  amongst  the  higher  animals  ’  (Elam,  Winds 
of  Doctrine ,  p.  128.  Arts,  reprinted  from  Contemp.  Review). 

2  Thus  Spencer,  etc. 

3  ‘  This  wholesale  destruction  is  effected  by  means  which  absolutely 
preclude  any  idea  of  “  struggle,”  as  influencing  the  result  in  the 
slightest  conceivable  degree.  When  clouds  of  locusts  devastate  an 
entire  district  5  when  countless  millions  of  aphides  destroy  vegetation, 
and  are  themselves  helplessly  swallowed  up  in  mass  by  ladybirds  and 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


103 


weakened  by  pairing,  etc.  The  difficulty  is 
increased  by  Mr.  Darwin’s  insistence  on  the  very 
slight — ‘  infinitesimal  ’ — character  of  the  varia¬ 
tions  necessary  for  his  theory.  For  instance,  he 
speaks  of  a  bird  being  born  with  a  beak  one- 
hundredth  of  an  inch  longer  than  usual.1 

5.  The  acknowledged  sterility  of  hybrids  is  a 
serious  block  in  the  way  of  the  theory.  This 
difficulty  weighed  strongly  with  Professor  Huxley, 
and  kept  him  from  ever  giving  his  unqualified 
assent  to  the  theory  of  natural  selection.2 

other  enemies,  etc.,  .  .  .  surely  in  all  this  the  most  vivid  imagina¬ 
tion  can  see  no  room  for  “  struggle,”  or  any  possibility  of  “  survival 
of  the  fittest.”  For  what  advantage  could  it  afford  to  an  insect  that 
was  about  to  be  swallowed  by  a  bird,  that  it  possessed  a  thousandth 
fragment  of  some  property  not  possessed  by  its  fellows  ?’  (Elam, 
pp.  123-4). 

1  Life  and  Letters ,  iii.  p.  33  :  ‘The  more  I  work,’  he  says  with 
reference  to  this  instance,  ‘the  more  I  feel  convinced  that  it  is  by  the 
accumulation  of  such  extremely  slight  variations  that  new  species 
arise.’  But  in  the  fifth  edition  of  his  Origin  of  Species  he  confesses : 
‘Until  reading  an  article  in  the  North  British  Review  (1867),  I  did 
not  appreciate  how  rarely  single  variations,  whether  slight  or  strongly 
marked,  could  be  perpetuated’  (p.  104). 

2  ‘For  all  this,  our  acceptance  of  the  Darwinian  hypothesis  must 
be  provisional  so  long  as  one  link  in  the  chain  of  evidence  is  want¬ 
ing  ;  and  so  long  as  all  the  animals  and  plants  certainly  produced  by 
selective  breeding  from  a  common  stock  are  fertile,  and  their  progeny 
are  fertile  with  one  another,  that  link  will  be  wanting’  ( Mans  Place 
in  Nature ,  p.  107);  cf.  Lay  Sermons ,  pp.  299,  302,  323-24,  337,  and 
Life  and  Letters  of  Darwin,  ii.  p.  280. 


104 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


6.  Apart  from  the  general  impossibility  of 
explaining  the  marvellous  adaptations  of  organic 
beings  by  the  action  of  unintelligent  causes,  there 
is  the  fact,  as  Darwin  was  led  ultimately  to 
acknowledge,  that  there  are  numerous  organic 
structures  which  neither  did  originate,  nor  could 
have  originated,  from  natural  selection.  This  is 
the  most  remarkable  of  Mr.  Darwin’s  later 
admissions.  He  had  earlier  stated  that,  if  it 
could  be  shown  that  any  complex  organ  could  not 
be  formed  by  numerous,  successive,  slight  varia¬ 
tions,  his  theory  ‘  would  absolutely  break  down.’ 1 
In  his  Descent  of  Man ,  however,  he  admits,  after 
reading  Nageli  and  others,  that  he  had  ‘  probably 
attributed  too  much  to  the  action  of  natural 
selection  or  the  survival  of  the  fittest.’  ‘  I  had 
not  formerly  sufficiently  considered,’  he  says,  ‘  the 
existence  of  many  structures  which  appear  to  be, 
so  far  as  we  can  judge,  neither  beneficial  nor 
injurious  ;  and  this  I  believe  to  be  one  of  the 
greatest  oversights  as  yet  detected  in  my 
work.’ 2  He  acknowledges  the  presence  in 
man,  as  well  as  in  every  other  animal,  of  struc- 

1  See  above,  p.  93. 

2  Descetit  of  Many  i.  p.  152  ;  cf.  Life  and  Letters ,  iii.  p.  159. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


i°5 


tures  which  ‘  cannot  be  accounted  for  by  any 
form  of  selection,  or  by  the  inherited  effects  of 
the  use  and  disuse  of  parts.’1  The  cause  in 
these  cases,  he  allows,  must  lie  in  powers  inherent 
in  the  organism.2 

7.  The  geological  record,  while  lending  general 
support  to  the  theory  of  descent,  is  in  manifold 
conflict  with  the  special  Darwinian  form  of  that 
theory.  Its  periods,  as  will  be  shown  later,  fall 
far  short  of  the  enormous  duration  required  for 
the  Darwinian  processes  ;  3  it  suggests  that  evolu¬ 
tion  did  not  proceed  by  slow,  continuous  changes, 
but  was  marked  by  ‘  critical  periods,’  when  new 
forms  appeared  in  great  abundance  ; 4 *  apart  from 
one  or  two  hypothetical  pedigrees,6  it  fails  to 
furnish  evidence  of  the  transmutation  of  one 


1  Descent  of  Man ,  ii.  p.  387. 

2  The  above  structures  are  referred  to  ‘unknown  agencies’  in  the 
organism  (Ibid.,  i.  pp.  154,  etc.).  These  are  the  ‘Lamarckian’ 
elements  in  Darwin  which  the  so-called  ‘pure  Darwinianism  ’ 
(Weismann,  Wallace,  etc.)  would  again  purge  out  (cf.  Weismann, 
The  E<vol.  Theory,  i.  pp.  241  If). 

It  is  to  be  noticed  that  many  hold  the  ‘  non-adaptive  1  characters 
in  the  higher  groups  to  be  fully  as  numerous  as  the  ‘adaptive’  (cf. 
Romanes,  Darwm  and  after  Darwin,  ii.  pp.  174,  256). 

3  See  below,  pp.  175  ff.  4  See  below,  p.  117. 

6  These,  however,  if  granted  (see  note  below),  support  only  the 

doctrine  of  genetic  descent,  not  the  specific  Darwinian  theory. 


io6  GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 

species  into  another  by  gradual  modification.1 
On  this  last  point  of  transitional  forms,  it  is 
difficult  to  prevent  assertion  from  outrunning  real 
evidence  ;  but  the  evidence,  up  to  the  present 
moment,  must  be  pronounced  extraordinarily 
scant.2  Zittel,  the  palaeontologist,  in  an  address 
in  1896  to  the  International  Congress  of 
Geologists,  made  the  following  weighty  state¬ 
ments  :  ‘  Although  an  abundance  of  palaeon¬ 

tological  facts  can  be  cited  in  the  most  convincing 
manner  in  favour  of  the  theory  of  descent,  on 
the  other  hand,  we  must  not  forget  that  we  still 
know  no  point  of  origin  for  numerous  inde- 

1  In  1862,  Professor  Huxley  wrote  of  the  geological  evidence:  ‘It 
negatives  these  doctrines  [of  progressive  modification],  for  it  either 
shows  us  no  evidence  of  such  modification,  or  demonstrates  it  to  have 
been  very  slight ;  and  as  to  the  nature  of  that  modification,  it  yields 
no  evidence  whatever  that  the  earlier  members  of  any  long-continued 
group  were  more  generalised  in  structure  than  the  later  ones  ’  (re¬ 
published  in  1870  in  Lay  Sermons,  p.  249). 

2  For  an  interesting  account  of  the  so-called  ‘intermediate’  forms, 
see  Professor  Huxley’s  New  York  Lectures  on  Evolution ,  (1876, 
Lectures  11.  and  hi.).  The  horse  apparently  is  the  only  instance  he 
regards  as  ‘  demonstrative  ’  (of  evolution,  not  of  Darwinism).  To 
this  extent  his  judgment  quoted  above  has  to  be  modified.  Even  the 
horse,  however,  has  not  escaped  criticism.  See,  e.g.,  Fleischmann’s 
remarks  in  Otto  ( Theol .  Rund.,  1903,  p.  191),  and  cf.  Mivart,  Genesis 
of  Species,  pp.  133-34.  Owen  is  quoted  as  saying  of  the  Hipparion 
and  other  extinct  forms  that  they  ‘differ  from  each  other  in  a  greater 
degree  than  do  the  horse,  zebra,  and  ass.’ 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


107 


pendently  arising  creatures,  and  that  the  connec¬ 
tion  between  the  larger  divisions  of  the  animal 
and  vegetable  kingdoms  is  by  no  means  so 
intimate  as  the  theory  specially  postulates.  .  .  . 
The  warmest  adherents  of  the  theory  must  at  all 
events  admit  that  extinct  links  between  the 
different  classes  and  orders  of  the  vegetable  and 
animal  kingdoms  are  forthcoming  only  in  a  small 
and  ever- diminishing  number  ’  (italics  ours).1  On 
the  whole,  therefore,  the  case  for  Darwinism  does 
not  stand  very  differently  to-day  from  what  it  did 
when  Professor  Huxley  wrote  :  4  It  is  our  clear 
conviction  that,  as  the  evidence  stands,  it  is  not 
absolutely  proven  that  a  group  of  animals,  having 
all  the  characters  exhibited  by  species  in  nature, 
has  ever  been  originated  by  selection,  whether 
natural  or  artificial.’ 2 * 

In  view  of  these  objections  to  evolution  in  its 
Darwinian  form,  we  would  seem  compelled,  either 
(1)  to  abandon  the  evolutionary  theory  altogether, 

1  See  below,  p.  131. 

2  Art.  on  ‘The  Origin  of  Species,’  18605  republished  in  Lay 

Sermons  (p.  322)  in  1870.  It  is,  pe'rhaps,  still  more  striking  to  find 
both  Mr.  Darwin  and  his  son  and  biographer  announcing:  ‘We 
cannot  prove  that  a  single  species  has  changed  ’  ( Life  and  Letters> 

iii.  p.  25). 


108  GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 

which,  as  we  have  seen,  scientific  men,  on  general 
grounds,  are  not  prepared  to  do  ;  or  (2)  to  revise 
our  conception  of  evolution,  and  seek  some  other 
rationale  of  it  than  that  offered  by  the  theory  of 
natural  selection,  while  allowing  to  the  latter 
factor  whatever  subordinate  place  may  rightly 
belong  to  it.  Adopting  this  second  alternative, 
we  have  to  ask  what  view  of  man  and  his  origin, 
consistently  with  the  facts  of  science,  a  revised 
evolutionism  has  to  yield  us. 

We  have  seen  that  the  Darwinian  theory  is 
characterised — 

1.  By  the  denial  of  teleology,  for  which  it 
substitutes  natural  selection. 

2.  By  the  assumption  that  evolution  proceeds 
by  slow  and  insensible  gradations. 

3.  By  the  assertion  that  organic  advance  has 
been  absolutely  continuous  from  the  lowest  form 
to  the  highest. 

The  newer  evolution  differs  from  the  old — 
though  the  conflict  of  views  really  dates  from  the 
beginning 1 — in  laying  stress  in  the  explanation 

1  Mivart,  Asa  Gray,  Murphy,  Owen,  Carpenter,  the  Duke  of 
Argyll,  etc.,  contended  for  these  views  from  the  first.  They  are  new 
only  as  coming  into  greater  prominence  and  more  general  acknow¬ 
ledgment,  as  the  difficulties  of  the  other  view  become  more  apparent. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


109 


of  organic  advance  mainly  on  causes  internal  to 
the  organism,  and  in  recognising  that  these 
operate,  not  blindly,  but  in  definite  and  pur¬ 
poseful  directions.  This  change  in  the  point 
of  view  from  outer  to  inner,  from  causes  working 
fortuitously  to  a  principle  of  inner  teleology,  has 
immediate  effects  on  the  rest  of  the  theory.  It 
is  no  longer  necessary,  e.g .,  that  variations  should 
be  regarded  as  slight,  or  progress  as  slow  ;  that 
specific  forms  should  be  thought  of  as  produced 
only  by  gradual  and  imperceptible  modifications  ; 
that  the  ascent  of  life  should  be  viewed  as  some¬ 
thing  absolutely  continuous.  These  consequences 
all  depend  on  the  fundamental  assumption  that 
the  effective  agency  in  evolution  is  the  fortuitous 
action  of  natural  selection.  When  that  is  parted 
with,  they  lose  their  logical  basis  and  justification. 
The  causes  of  variation  and  progressive  develop¬ 
ment  being  now  placed  chiefly  within,  there  is  no 
longer  any  reason  why  very  considerable  varia¬ 
tions,  or  even  new  types,  should  not  appear 
suddenly,  struck  out  by  the  Creative  Power  in 
the  plastic  organism.  And  this  is  the  view 
which,  I  shall  try  to  show,  scientific  facts 
support. 


r 


I  IO 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


The  new  evolutionism,  then,  so  to  designate 
it,  in  the  hands  of  many  of  its  ablest  ad¬ 
vocates,  may  be  described,  in  contrast  with  the 
other,  as  characterised  by  the  three  following 
features  : — 

1.  The  recognition  in  the  evolutionary  process 
of  directive  intelligence  —  of  the  presence  of 
‘  idea.’ 

2.  The  denial  that  the  only  mode  of  progress 
is  by  insensible  gradations. 

3.  The  conception  of  nature  as  an  ascending 
series  of  ‘  kingdoms  ’ — the  higher  in  each  case 
involving  new  factors,  and  requiring  a  specific 
cause  to  account  for  it.1 

I  shall  offer  a  few  remarks  on  these  points 
severally,  then  seek  to  show  their  bearings  on  the 
origin  of  man. 

1.  On  the  first  of  these  points  —  directive 
intelligence — it  is  not  necessary  that  I  should 
say  much.  If  the  fortuity  of  Darwinism  is 
rejected,  there  is  but  one  alternative  conception, 
whatever  the  precise  phrase  used  to  express  it 

1  I  am  aware  of  the  difficulty  of  finding  a  general  expression  for 
theories  often  so  widely  varying,  but  I  think  I  am  justified  in  regard¬ 
ing  the  above  as  fairly  typical  features,  Cf.  Otto  on  the  New 
Evolutionism  in  Note  IV. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


in 


(self-adaptation,1  orthogenesis,  or  the  like) — that 
the  changes  through  which  new  organs  are 
developed,  and  new  types  formed,  have  their 
origin  from  within,  and  are  directed  by  the 
forces  that  produce  them  to  an  end.  The  pro¬ 
cess,  indeed,  is  not  fatalistic.  On  one  side  is  the 
stimulus  of  environment ;  on  the  other,  response 
to  that  stimulus,  and  adaptation  to  the  particular 
need — with  whatever  assistance  natural  selection, 
use  or  disuse,  or  other  so-called  4  Lamarckian ? 
factors  can  yield.  But  in  and  through  all  pur¬ 
poseful  forces  are  at  work.  American  students 
are  familiar  with  this  conception  through  the 
writings  of  Le  Conte,  Asa  Gray,  Dana  ;  and  it 
has  been,  and  is  advocated  by  theistic  evolu¬ 
tionists,  and  others  not  avowedly  theistic,  in 

1  Cf.  Romanes  on  these  views,  Darwin  and  after  Darwin ,  ii. 
pp.  14.  fF.,  1 74.  4  Self-adaptation  ’  is  the  phrase  of  Henslow  and  others, 
concerning  which  Romanes  elsewhere  says :  4  It  simply  refers  the 
facts  of  adaptation  immediately  to  some  theory  of  design,  and  so 
brings  us  back  again  to  Paley,  Bell,  and  Chalmers  ’  ( Life  and  Letters 
of  G.  J.  Romanes ,  p.  361).  See  more  fully  Henslow’s  own  work 
already  referred  to,  Present-Day  Rationalism  Critically  Examined 
(1904),  with  its  advocacy  of  4  directivity  1  (chaps,  vii.,  viii.).  We 
have  such  statements  as  these :  4  Paley ’s  argument,  readapted  to 
evolution,  becomes  as  sound  as  before,  and,  indeed,  far  strengthened, 
as  being  strictly  in  accordance  with  facts’  (p.  57)5  4  Paley’s  well- 
known  argument  of  the  watch  only  requires  readjustment  to  be  as 
sound  as  ever’  (p.  94  j  on  the  eye,  p.  96),  etc. 


1 12 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


Britain,  and  on  the  Continent.1  Romanes,  who 
had  argued  against  design,  would  seem  to  have 
come  round  to  belief  in  it,  at  least  on  the  broad 
scale,  before  his  death.2  Lord  Kelvin,  in  a  recent 
memorable  utterance,  re-affirmed  his  faith  in  it, 
and  cited  the  witness  of  other  eminent  scientific 
men ;  but  in  that  pronouncement  he  only  echoed 
his  own  words  of  thirty  years  earlier  as  President 
of  the  British  Association.  ‘  I  feel  profoundly 
convinced/  he  then  said,  c  that  the  argument  from 
design  has  been  greatly  too  much  lost  sight  of  in 
recent  zoological  speculations.  Overpoweringly 

1  Bronn,  Darwin’s  German  translator,  separates  himselt  from 
Darwin  on  this  point. 

2  See  'Thoughts  on  Religion ,  pp.  30,  92-94.  Somewhat  earlier  he 
wrote :  ‘  Physical  causation  cannot  be  made  to  supply  its  own  ex¬ 
planation,  and  the  mere  persistence  of  force,  even  if  it  were  conceded 
to  account  for  particular  cases  of  physical  sequence,  can  give  no 
account  of  the  ubiquitous  and  eternal  direction  of  force  in  the  con¬ 
struction  and  maintenance  of  universal  order.  ...  By  no  logical 
artifice  can  we  escape  from  the  conclusion  that,  so  far  as  we  can  see, 
this  universal  order  must  be  regarded  as  due  to  some  one  integrating 
principle  ;  and  that  this,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  is  most  probably  of  the 
nature  of  mind.  At  least  it  must  be  allowed  that  we  can  conceive 
of  it  under  no  other  aspect  $  and  that,  if  any  particular  adaptation  in 
organic  nature  is  held  to  be  suggestive  of  such  an  agency,  the  sum- 
total  of  all  adaptations  in  the  universe  must  be  held  to  be  incompar¬ 
ably  more  so’  {Ibid.,  pp.  71-72).  We  attach  little  importance  to 
the  distinction  Romanes  is  disposed  to  draw  between  design  in  the 
(  universal  order  ’  and  design  in  particular  structures  (e.g.,  the  eye). 
The  argument  above  is  valid  equally  for  both. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


1 13 

strong  proofs  of  intelligent  and  benevolent  design 
lie  around  us,  and  if  ever  perplexities,  whether 
metaphysical  or  scientific,  turn  us  away  from 
them  for  a  time,  they  come  back  upon  us  with 
irresistible  force,  showing  to  us  through  nature 
the  influence  of  a  free-will,  and  teaching  us  that 
all  living  things  depend  on  one  everlasting  Creator 
and  Ruler.’ 

2.  The  second  point,  viz.  :  the  transformation 
of  species  by  alleged  insensible  gradations,  is  one 
of  cardinal  importance  in  the  theory  of  Darwin — 
one  he  is  never  weary  of  insisting  on.  Variations, 
he  tells  us,  are  slight,  very  minute,  infinitesmal  ; 
for  how  else  could  an  organism  built  up  by 
accumulation  of  variations  have  the  fineness  and 
continuity  of  structure  it  possesses  ?  But  is  this 
really  nature’s  method  of  advance  ?  At  least  we 
must  say,  and  Darwin  had  in  the  end  to  acknow¬ 
ledge,1  not  necessarily.  A  vast  amount  of  evi¬ 
dence  has  been  collected,  and  may  be  seen  in  the 
books,  showing  that  very  remarkable  variations 
do  appear,  new  forms,  new  structures,  quite 

1  (  An  unexplained  residuum  of  change,  perhaps  a  large  one,’  he 
says,  1  must  be  left  to  the  assumed  action  of  those  unknown  agencies 
which  occasionally  induce  marked  and  abrupt  deviations  of  structure 
in  our  domestic  productions  ’  ( Descent  of  Man ,  1.  p.  1 54). 

H 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


1 14 

suddenly,  in  both  animals  and  plants.1  There 
has  been,  accordingly,  an  increasing  disposition 
to  admit,  as  best  in  harmony  with  the  facts,  that 
the  changes  giving  rise  to  new  varieties  and 
species  may  not  always  have  been,  as  the  Dar¬ 
winian  theory  postulates,  slow  and  insensible,  but 
may  have  been  at  times  marked  and  sudden.2  I 
may  give  two  illustrations  from  unexceptionable 
authorities  in  support  of  this  statement.  Lyell, 

1  Cf.  Huxley,  Lay  Sermons,  pp.  290  ff.  (the  Ancona  Sheep),  p. 
326;  Mivart,  The  Genesis  of  Species ,,  ch.  iv.  (striking  examples) ; 
Lessons  from  Nature,  p.  3395  Argyll,  Unity  of  Nature,  pp.  271-73. 
The  most  remarkable  recent  experiments,  perhaps,  are  those  of  the 
Dutch  botanist,  De  Vries,  who  claims  to  have  produced  new  species 
from  the  evening  primrose  by  per  saltum  mutations.  His  experi¬ 
ments  have  been  confirmed  by  New  York  botanists.  See  some 
account  of  them  in  the  Princeton  fheol.  Review,  July  1904,  pp. 
439-40.  The  writer  there  points  out  that  the  result  is  produced, 
‘  not  by  the  Darwinian  hypothesis  of  accumulating  infinitesimal 
variations,  but  by  the  more  definite  route  of  considerable  mutations ; 
not  by  slow  development,  but  apparently  by  a  more  or  less  marked 
per  saltum  movement.’  See  below,  p.  116. 

2  The  Germans  speak  of  this  form  of  development  as  sprung- 
vueise.  Professor  Macloskie  of  Princeton  University,  referring  to 
the  experiments  of  De  Vries  mentioned  in  a  preceding  note,  thus 
speaks  of  the  origin  of  men  in  an  art.  in  the  Bibliotheca  Sacra,  April 
1903,  p.  267  :  ‘  Most  of  the  biologists  are  of  opinion,  and  justly  so, 
that  man  has  somehow  been  evolved.  Most  of  them  probably  think 
that  there  has  been  something  special  in  his  case,  perhaps  a  sudden 
or  per  saltum  variation,  or  a  decisive  mutation,  to  use  DeVries’s  term, 
which  would  leave  few  traces  behind,  and  nothing  of  the  “  missing- 
link  ”  kind.’ 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


1*5 


in  his  Antiquity  of  Man,  in  dealing  with  the  diffi¬ 
culty  of  the  time  involved  in  the  development 
of  man,  demurs  to  the  assumption  c  that  the 
hypothesis  of  variation  and  natural  selection 
obliges  us  to  assume  that  there  was  an  absolutely 
insensible  passage  from  the  highest  intelligence  of 
the  inferior  animals  to  the  improvable  reason  of 
man.’  He  takes  the  analogy  of  ‘  the  birth  of 
an  individual  of  transcendent  genius,’  and  asks 
‘  whether  the  successive  steps  in  advance  by  which 
a  progressive  scheme  has  been  developed  may  not 
admit  of  occasional  strides ,  constituting  breaks  in 
an  otherwise  continuous  series  of  psychical 
changes.’  He  goes  on  :  4  If,  in  conformity  with 
the  theory  of  progression,  we  believe  mankind  to 
have  risen  slowly  from  a  rude  and  humble  start¬ 
ing-point,  such  leaps  may  have  successively  intro¬ 
duced  not  only  higher  and  higher  forms  and 
grades  of  intellect,  but  at  a  much  remoter  period 
may  have  cleared  at  one  hound  the  space  which 
separated  the  highest  stage  of  the  improgressive 
intelligence  of  the  inferior  animals  from  the  first 
and  lowest  form  of  improvable  reason  of  man.’ 1 
The  other  quotation  is  from  Professor  Huxley. 

1  Antiquity  of  Man ,  p.  504. 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


1 1 6 

c  Mr.  Darwin’s  position,’  he  wrote  in  his  article  on 
‘  The  Origin  of  Species,’  ‘  might,  we  think,  have 
been  even  stronger  than  it  is  if  he  had  not  em¬ 
barrassed  himself  with  the  aphorism,  Natura  non 
facit  saltum ,  which  turns  up  so  often  in  his  pages. 
We  believe,  as  we  have  said  above,  that  nature 
does  make  jumps  now  and  then,  and  a  recognition 
of  the  fact  is  of  no  small  importance  in  disposing 
of  many  minor  objections  to  the  doctrine  of 
transmutation.’ 1  And  again,  in  his  review  of 
Kolliker  :  ‘  We  have  always  thought  that  Mr. 
Darwin  has  unnecessarily  hampered  himself  by 
adhering  so  strictly  to  his  favourite  u  natura  non 
facit  saltum .”  We  greatly  suspect  that  she  does 
make  considerable  jumps  in  way  of  variation  now 
and  then,  and  that  these  saltations  give  rise  to  some 
of  the  gaps  which  appear  to  exist  in  the  series  of 
known  forms.’ 2  Precisely,  with  the  aid  of  rapid 
c strides’  and  c jumps,’  we  can  accomplish  much; 
but  what  then  becomes  of  the  theory  of  continu¬ 
ous  evolution  by  natural  selection  of  slight  aimless 
variations?  Still  the  c jumps  ’  do  seem  to  be  there 
in  nature,  and  cannot  be  got  rid  of.  The  geo- 

1  Lay  Sermons ,  p.  326. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  342  (italics  in  the  quotations  ours). 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


117 

logical  record,  with  its  unbridged  gaps,  and 
marked  inrush  of  new  forms  at  particular  eras, 
alternating  with  periods  of  apparent  quiescence, 
has  always  been  a  trouble  to  evolutionists.  As 
G.  H.  Lewes  wrote :  c  The  sudden  appearance  of 
new  organs,  not  a  trace  of  which  is  discernible  in 
the  embryo  or  adult  forms  of  organisms  lower  in 
the  scale — e.g.,  the  phosphorescent  and  electric 
organs — is,  like  the  sudden  appearance  of  new 
instruments  in  the  social  organism,  such  as  the 
printing-press  and  the  railway,  wholly  inexplicable 
on  the  theory  of  descent.’ 1  It  is  not  wonderful, 
therefore,  that  in  recent  developments  of  evolution¬ 
ary  theory,  this  undeniable  fact  of  sudden  change 
in  organisms — carrying  with  it  correlated  changes2 
— should  be  deemed  of  essential  importance.3 

3.  A  still  more  important  point  is  raised,  when 
we  come  to  the  consideration  of  distinct  kingdoms 
in  nature.  How  is  the  gulf  to  be  bridged  over 
here — the  gulf  between  the  inorganic  and  the 

1  Physical  Basis  of  Mind ,  pp.  iio,  117.  ‘It  is  very  noteworthy,’ 
remarks  Sir  J.  W.  Dawson,  ‘that  in  the  later  Tertiary  and  modern 
times,  with  the  exception  of  man  himself,  and  perhaps  a  very  few 
other  species,  no  new  forms  of  life  have  been  introduced,  while  many 
old  forms  have  perished  ’  ( Modern  Ideas  of  Evolution ,  p.  107). 

2  Cf.  Weismann,  The  Evol.  Theory,  i.  pp.  79,  80  ff. 

3  Cf.  Otto,  Theol.  Rund .,  1904,  pp.  60-61, 


1 18 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


organic,  between  the  insentient  and  the  conscious, 
between  the  animal  consciousness,  and  the  moral 
and  spiritual  personality  of  man  ?  These  are  the 
true  f  riddles  of  the  universe,7  which  science  in  its 
highest  representatives  tells  us  frankly  it  is  unable 
to  solve — some  of  which  it  never  hopes  to  solve. 
Du  Bois-Reymond,  in  a  famous  lecture  at  Berlin,1 
specified  seven  such  limits  to  a  materialistic  ex¬ 
planation  of  nature — among  them  the  nature  of 
matter  and  force,  the  origin  of  life,  the  origin  of 
consciousness,  rational  thought  and  the  origin  of 
speech.  In  the  forefront,  in  the  development  of 
nature,  the  origin  of  life  stands  as  a  blank  wall  in 
the  way  of  any  thorough-going  theory  of  natural¬ 
istic  evolution.  Professor  Huxley,  while  acknow¬ 
ledging  that  the  verdict  of  science  is  wholly  against 
a  spontaneous  origin  of  life,  yet  declares  that  were 
it  given  him  to  look  beyond  the  abyss  of  geologi¬ 
cally  recorded  time  to  a  still  more  remote  period, 
he  would  ‘  expect  to  be  a  witness  of  the  evolution 
of  living  protoplasm  from  not-living  matter.’ 2 

1  In  bis  Die  Sieben  Weltrathsel — so  great  a  grief  of  soul  to 
Haeckel  (cf.  Riddle ,  p.  34.). 

2  Critiques  and  Addresses ,  p.  239.  Weismann  also,  while  ad¬ 
mitting  the  impossibility  of  proof,  ‘  holds  fast  ’  to  belief  in  an  original 
‘  spontaneous  generation’  ( ’The  Evol.  ‘Theory ,  i.,  p.  370). 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


119 

May  I  remark  that,  even  if  he  did  behold  this 
first  inflashing  of  life  into  the  world,  the  miracle 
of  its  appearance  would  not  be  one  whit  less  than 
before.  It  would  still  be  something  new,  not 
capable  of  being  explained  out  of  purely  physical 
and  chemical  combinations.  Professor  Ward,  in 
his  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,  comments  on  ‘  the 
light  and  airy  way  in  which  Mr.  Spencer  glides 
over  this  problem  ’ — apologising  for  the  omission 
of  the  two  volumes  of  his  system  in  which  it 
would  fall  to  be  discussed — in  contrast  with  ‘  the 
confidence  of  physicists  like  Lord  Kelvin  and 
Helmholtz,  or  of  physiologists  like  Liebig  and 
Pasteur,  that  mechanical  theories  as  to  the  origin 
and  maintenance  of  life  are  hopeless.’1  Still,  as 
the  same  writer  observes,  the  great  gap  between 
the  inorganic  and  the  organic  world  is  a  less  severe 
strain  on  naturalism  than  the  passage  c  from  the 
physical  aspect  of  life  to  the  psychical’ ; 2  and  that, 
again,  pales  before  the  crowning  difficulty  of  bridg¬ 
ing  the  gulf  between  the  animal  consciousness  and 
the  rational  intelligence  and  free-will  of  man. 

1  Chap.  i.  p.  262.  Cf.  the  whole  section. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  9.  Professor  Ward  forcibly  draws  attention  to  the 
difference  between  ‘  evolution  without  guidance  and  evolution  with 
guidance  ’  (p.  205). 


120 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


To  this  last  problem,  as  the  goal  of  our  whole 
discussion,  I  now  confine  myself ;  and  would 
simply  remark,  in  summing  up  here,  on  the 
altered  aspect  which  evolution  presents  when 
transformed  to  meet  these  new  demands  upon  it. 
It  seems  to  me  that  the  representatives  of  our 
modern  theology,  when  they  speak  of  ‘  evolution,’ 
sometimes  fail  adequately  to  realise  how  entirely 
they  have  departed  from  the  evolution  of  a 
Darwin,  or  Huxley,  or  even  Spencer,  under 
whose  names  they  shelter  themselves.  Listen, 
e.g.y  to  Professor  Sabatier  discoursing  on  the 
philosophy  of  religion.  ‘  At  each  step,’  he  says, 
‘  nature  surpasses  itself  by  a  mysterious  creation 
that  resembles  a  true  miracle  in  relation  to  an 
inferior  stage.  What,  then,  shall  we  conclude 
from  these  observations,  except  that  in  nature 
there  is  a  hidden  force,  an  immeasurable  “  potential 
energy,”  an  ever-open,  never-exhausted  fount  of 
apparitions,  at  once  magnificent  and  unexpected.’ 1 
True,  but  plainly,  on  this  hypothesis,  the  anti¬ 
thesis  between  ‘  evolution  ’  and  ‘  special  creation,’ 
as  said  before,  tends  to  disappear ;  call  these 
‘  apparitions  ’  new  species,  and  what  are  virtually 

1  Phil,  of  Rel.j  E.  T.,  p,  84. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


1 2  I 


f  special  creations  ’  are  taken  up  into  evolution  as 
phases  of  it.  Sabatier  draws  from  his  theory  the 
conclusion  that  miracles  do  not  happen.  Dr. 
Lyman  Abbott  sees  more  logically  that,  on  this 
hypothesis,  the  door  is  open  for  any  number  of 
miracles.  There  is  no  a  priori  reason,  as  he  says, 
why  the  Power  constantly  manifesting  itself  in 
usual  ways  should  not,  if  need  arises,  manifest 
itself  in  unusual  ways.1 

Let  us  now  examine  how,  as  the  result  of  these 
discussions,  the  evidence  stands  on  the  question 
of  the  origin  of  man.  I  suppose  that,  since  the 
publication  of  Darwin’s  Descent  of  Man ,  there  is 
no  subject  on  which  the  modern  mind  is  supposed 
to  have  a  more  entire  conviction  than  on  the 
evolutionary  origin  of  man.  So  far  as  this 
doctrine  is  a  corollary  from  the  general  doctrine 
of  evolution,  it  falls  under  the  remarks  already 
made.  The  question  is  not  whether  homologies, 
embryology,  and  other  physiological  facts,  establish 
a  probability  of  some  kind  of  genetic  connection 
of  man  with  inferior  forms  of  animal  life  ;  on 
that  point  science  may  and  must  be  left  to  pro- 

1  7 ’heol.  of  an  Evolutionist ,  p.  14 1. 


122 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


nounce  its  own  verdict.  The  vital  question  is 
whether  that  which  constitutes  the  differentia  of 
man — those  bodily  and  mental  characters  in  which 
he  stands  above,  and  is  distinguished  from,  the 
animals,  can  be  accounted  for  by  unaided  evolu¬ 
tion  ;  and  especially  whether  they  can  be  accounted 
for  on  the  Darwinian  theory  of  a  gradual  trans¬ 
formation  of  man  from  the  anthropoid  apes, 
through  natural  selection  acting  on  slight  un¬ 
guided  variations.  And  on  this  point  no  one 
can  say  that  the  voice  of  science  is  unanimous. 
The  latter,  or  strictly  Darwinian,  theory,  though 
it  has  still  its  influential  advocates,  our  previous 
reasonings  compel  us  to  reject.  In  the  light  of 
science  itself,  we  are,  I  believe,  entitled  to  say 
with  assurance  that,  however  man  has  originated, 
he  has  not  originated  thus.  But  it  is  very  im¬ 
portant  here  to  remember  that,  if  the  Darwinian 
theory  of  the  origin  of  species  by  unaided  natural 
selection  is  abandoned,  there  falls  with  it,  as 
already  seen,  the  necessity  of  supposing  advance 
to  have  taken  place  by  small,  insensible  gradations, 
or  of  denying  the  entrance,  from  point  to  point, 
of  new  and  higher — what,  from  the  theological 
point  of  view,  we  would  call  creative — forces,  for 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


I23 


the  production  of  new  types  of  being,  or  the 
founding  of  new  kingdoms  or  orders  of  existence. 
So  far  from  the  creation  narrative  being  here  in 
conflict  with  evolution,  I  think  it  may  be  said  to 
furnish  the  complement  and  correction  which 
certain  theories  of  evolution  need.  It  does  this 
in  three  ways  : — 

1.  By  the  recognition  of  the  element  of 
true  creation  in  nature,  or  the  production  of 
something  perfectly  new  by  the  direct  act  of 
God  (expressed  by  the  term  bar  a *).  Even 
Sabatier,  as  we  saw,  speaks  of  the  hidden 
force,  the  immeasurable  c  potential  energy,’  the 
ever-open,  never-exhausted  fount  of  apparitions  in 
nature,  which  at  each  step  4  surpasses  itself  by  a 
mysterious  creation  that  resembles  a  true  miracle.’ 

2.  In  laying  stress  on  the  production  and  pro¬ 
pagation  of  4  kinds  ’1  2 — of  specific  forms.  For  it 
is  a  false  conception  of  evolution  which  represents 
organic  life  as  in  constant  process  of  flux,  and 

1  This  term  is  used  in  Gen.  i.  at  the  first  creation  of  heaven  and 
earth  (ver.  i),  the  first  origin  of  animal  life  (water  creatures  and 
fowl,  ver.  2 1 ),  the  creation  of  man  (ver.  27),  and  is  implied  in  the 
description  of  the  origin  of  vegetation  (cf.  vers,  it,  12  with  vers. 
20,  21). 

2  Gen.  i.  11,  12,  21,  24,  25. 


124 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


ignores  the  fixity  and  persistence  of  stable  types 
as  the  goal  of  the  process.1 

3.  Specially,  in  affirming  the  existence  of  distinct 
stages  or  kingdoms  in  nature,  each  of  which  needs 
a  creative  act  of  God  for  its  introduction. 

These  conceptions,  it  has  already  been  seen, 
science  does  not  contradict,  but  in  a  remarkable 
way  confirms.  It,  too,  is  compelled  to  fall  back 
on  the  idea  of  evolution  regulated  from  within, 
and  to  dispense  with  the  idea  of  small  and  in¬ 
sensible  changes  as  the  instrument  of  advance. 
It,  too,  is  compelled  to  recognise  origins,  and  the 
appearance,  fixation,  and  persistence  of  new  types.2 
Above,  all,  it  is  compelled  to  recognise  the  rise, 
not  only  of  new  kinds,  but  of  new  orders  of  ex¬ 
istence — of  new  kingdoms  of  nature — of  c  gulfs,’  as 
in  the  transition  from  the  inorganic  to  the  organic, 
from  the  insentient  to  the  conscious,  which  no 
theory  of  evolution  enables  it  to  pass.  I  quoted 
before  Du  Bois-Reymond’s  admission  of  the  seven 
riddles  of  the  universe  ;  we  have  the  testimonies 
of  Huxley,  Tyndall,  Helmholtz,  Spencer,  and 

1  Cf.  the  views  of  Reinke,  Hamann,  etc.,  in  Otto  ( ’Theol .  Rund., 
1903,  p.  194  ff.). 

2  On  persistence  see  Huxley’s  striking  Essay  in  his  Lay  Sermons , 
p.  238  ff. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


125 


others,  that  the  chasm  between  the  physics  of  the 
brain  and  consciousness  is  intellectually  impassable 
— ‘unthinkable’;1  we  have,  finally,  the  fact  of 
such  a  thorough-going  evolutionist  as  Dr.  A.  R. 
Wallace — in  other  respects  a  ‘  pure  ’  Darwinian — 
astonishing  his  readers  by  the  acknowledgment 
that  c  there  are  at  least  three  stages  in  the  develop¬ 
ment  of  the  organic  world  when  some  new 
cause  or  power  must  necessarily  have  come  into 
action’:  viz.,  at  the  introduction  of  life,  at  the 
introduction  of  sensation  and  consciousness  ;  and 
at  the  origin  of  man.2  A  similar  view,  you  are 
aware,  is  held,  as  regards  at  least  man’s  mental 
nature,  by  many  evolutionists  of  repute.3  Our 
question,  therefore,  regarding  man  resolves  itself 
into  this  :  Is  man  really  an  appearance  of  such  a 
kind  in  nature  that  higher  causes  are  implied  in 
his  origin  ? 

Now,  if  the  answer  to  this  question  is  to  be 
based  on  the  pure  data  of  science,  apart  from 

1  See  references  in  my  Christian  View  of  God ,  p.  143.  So 
Weismann:  ‘How  the  activity  of  certain  brain-elements  can  give 
rise  to  a  thought  which  cannot  be  compared  with  anything  material , 
which  is  nevertheless  able  to  react  upon  the  material  parts  of  our 
body,  and,  as  Will,  to  give  rise  to  movement — that  we  attempt  in 
vain  to  understand1  (ft he  EojoI.  theory ,  ii.  p.  392). 

2  Darwinism ,  pp.  474-5.  3  See  below,  pp.  141  ff. 


126 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


prepossessions  derived  from  particular  theories 
of  development,  I  think  candour  will  compel  the 
acknowledgment  that  the  balance  of  probability 
is  in  favour  of  man’s  exceptional  origin.  The 
Darwinian  hypothesis  of  the  origin  of  man  by 
transformation  from  the  apes  by  slow  and  insen¬ 
sible  gradations  belongs  to  the  region  of  imagina¬ 
tion,  not  to  that  of  scientifically  established  fact, 
and  even  there,  it  is  not  too  much  to  say,  is 
being  increasingly  discredited.  There  is  no  need 
in  evolutionism,  we  have  just  seen,  apart  from 
Darwinian  assumption,  for  supposing  such  a 
gradual  transformation.  Even  Lyell,  as  I  showed, 
allows  us,  on  the  psychical  side,  4  rapid  strides,’ 
4  leaps,’  which  ‘  may  have  cleared  at  one  bound 
the  space  ’  between  highest  animal  and  lowest 
man  ;  and  Professor  Huxley  allows  us  4  jumps  ’ — 
‘saltations’ — on  the  organic  side,  which  4  give 
rise  to  some  of  the  gaps  which  appear  to  exist 
in  the  series  of  known  forms.’ 1  But  the  facts 
speak  for  themselves.  The  enormous  distance 
that  separates  man  from  the  highest  of  the  animals, 
alike  in  a  bodily  and  in  a  mental  respect,  is  not 
to  be  gainsaid,  nor,  to  do  them  justice,  do  the 

1  See  above,  pp.  115-16. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


127 


better  class  of  evolutionists  seek  to  gainsay  it. 
Mr.  Fiske,  who  is  satisfied  that  man,  both  bodily 
and  mentally,  is  evolved  by  natural  selection,  yet 
emphasises,  in  words  formerly  quoted,  the  ‘  im¬ 
measurable  ’  gap  between  the  minds  of  man  and 
ape,  and  declares  that  ‘  for  psychological  man  you 
must  erect  a  distinct  kingdom  ;  nay,  you  must 
even  dichotomise  the  universe,  putting  man  on 
one  side,  and  all  things  else  on  the  other.’ 1 
Similarly  Professor  Huxley,  while  insisting  on 
the  minute  structural  and  embryological  resem¬ 
blances  between  man  and  the  apes,2  goes  on 
frankly  to  recognise  an  ‘  immeasurable  and  prac¬ 
tically  infinite  divergence  of  the  Human  from 
the  Simian  Stirps.’ 3  He  indicates  the  essential 
superiority  of  man,  as  being  4  the  only  con¬ 
sciously  intelligent  denizen  of  this  world,’  and 

1  See  above,  p.  60. 

2  Man's  Place  in  Nature,  p.  67:  ‘It  is  only  quite  in  the  later 
stages  of  development  that  the  young  human  being  presents  marked 
differences  from  the  young  ape  ’ — the  real  point  being,  however,  that 
then  it  does  exhibit  these  marked  differences. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  103.  Yet  he  thinks  ‘some  inconspicuous  structural 
difference’  may  have  been  the  ‘primary  cause’  of  this  mighty  diver¬ 
gence — a  pure  chance  change,  apparently,  yet  we  are  asked  to  believe 
that  all  this  came  out  of  it.  A  speck  of  rust,  no  doubt,  will  stop  a 
watch  (p.  103),  but  no  number  of  specks  will  make  the  watch,  or 
keep  it  going. 


128 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


declares  that  £  no  one  is  more  strongly  convinced 
than  I  am  of  the  vastness  of  the  gulf  between 
civilised  man  and  the  brutes ;  or  is  more  certain 
that  whether  from  them  or  not,  he  is  assuredly 
not  of  them.’ 1  Even  in  regard  to  physical 
structure  significant  admissions  are  made.  Pro¬ 
fessor  Huxley  repudiates  the  view  ‘  that  the 
structural  differences  between  man  and  even  the 
highest  apes  are  small  and  insignificant  ’  ;  asserts, 
on  the  contrary,  ‘  that  they  are  great  and  signi¬ 
ficant  ;  that  every  bone  of  a  gorilla  bears  marks 
by  which  it  might  be  distinguished  from  the 
corresponding  bone  of  a  man  ;  and  that,  in  the 
present  creation,  at  any  rate,  no  intermediate 
link  bridges  over  the  gap  between  Homo  and  the 
T roglodytes .’ 2 

When  we  examine  more  minutely  into  the 
character  of  this  difference,  we  gain  new  evidence 
of  the  physical  superiority  of  man.  ‘  The  differ¬ 
ences  between  a  gorilla’s  skull  and  a  man’s,’  Pro¬ 
fessor  Huxley  informs  us,  care  truly  immense.’3 
‘It  may  be  doubted  whether  a  human  adult  brain 
ever  weighed  less  than  31  or  32  ounces,  or  that 

1  Man's  Place  in  Nature,  p.  no.  2  Ibid.,  p.  104. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  76. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


129 


the  heaviest  gorilla  brain  has  exceeded  20  ounces  ’ 
— 4  a  difference  which  is  all  the  more  remarkable 
when  we  recollect  that  a  full-grown  gorilla  is 
probably  pretty  nearly  twice  as  heavy  as  a 
Bosjes  man,  or  as  many  an  European  woman.’ 1 
Dr.  A.  R.  Wallace,  however,  puts  this  more 
strongly.  4  The  average  human  brain/  he 
remarks,  4  weighs  48  or  49  ounces,  and  if  we 
take  the  average  ape  brain  at  only  two  ounces 
less  than  the  largest  gorilla’s  brain,  or  1 8  ounces, 
we  shall  see  better  the  enormous  increase  which 
has  taken  place  in  the  brain  of  man  since  the 
time  when  he  branched  off  from  the  apes’ — 
assuming  that  he  did  so.2  Dr.  Calderwood  says  : 

1  Mans  Place  in  Nature ,  p.  102.  The  force  of  this  is  sought  to  be 
broken  after  by  the  remark  :  ‘Remember,  if  you  will,  that  there  is  no 
existing  link  between  Man  and  the  Gorilla,  but  do  not  forget  that 
there  is  no  less  sharp  a  line  of  demarcation,  a  no  less  complete  absence 
of  any  transitional  form,  between  the  Gorilla  and  the  Orang,  or  the 
Orang  and  the  Gibbon.  I  say,  not  less  sharp,  though  it  is  somewhat 
narrower.’  But  (1)  this  new  absence  of  transitional  forms  only 
creates  fresh  difficulties  for  the  Darwinian  evolutionist  (see  below), 
and  does  nothing  to  solve  that  of  the  difference  between  man  and 
the  ape  5  and  (2)  the  ‘  somewhat  ’  surely  needs  qualification.  Gorilla 
and  Orang,  Orang  and  Gibbon,  stand  in  lateral  relations,  but  man 
on  an  immensely  higher  level,  and  the  kind  of  demarcation,  as  shown 
in  the  consequences,  is  incalculably  different  in  the  two  cases. 

2  Darwinism ,  p.  458.  It  will  be  seen  below  (p.  136)  that  it  is 
now  a  very  debatable  question  whether  man  came  through  the  line 
of  the  apes  at  all. 

I 


130 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


4  The  ape’s  brain,  including  the  gorilla,  with  the 
chimpanzee,  at  its  maximum  weight  is  only  15 
ounces,  whereas  the  brain  of  man  at  its  average 
weight  is  49  ounces.’ 1  if,  as  a  last  test,  we 
take  cubic  capacity  of  cranium,  the  largest  human 
skull,  we  find,  contains  114  cubic  inches,  the 
smallest  63  ;  the  largest  adult  gorilla  skull,  34  ; 
the  smallest,  24  ;  or,  according  to  Mr.  Wallace, 
the  average  proportions  are:  anthropoid  apes,  10; 
savages,  26  ;  civilised  man,  32. 

In  light  of  these  indubitable  facts,  we  begin 
to  understand  what  Professor  Dana  meant  when 
he  spoke  of  4  an  abrupt  fall  from  existing  man 
to  the  ape  level,  in  which  the  cubic  capacity  of 
the  brain  is  one-half  less.’2  The  next  question 
which  arises  is  :  Has  science  been  able  to  do  any¬ 
thing  to  bridge  over  this  gulf,  and  show  how, 
from  the  lower  forms,  the  higher  have  been 
gradually  evolved  ?  This  question  also,  I  take 
it,  must,  if  we  confine  ourselves  to  facts,  be 
answered  in  the  negative.  It  was  shown  before3 
how  hard  it  is,  in  the  domain  of  palaeontology, 
to  prove  the  existence  of  transitional  forms  at 

1  Evolution,  p.  277.  2  Geology,  p.  603. 

3  See  above,  p.  106. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


J3T 

any  point  in  the  animal  kingdom.1  It  is  stated 
by  zoologists  that  there  are  at  least  five  distinct 
types,  or  plans,  on  which  members  of  the  animal 
kingdom  are  constructed,  which  cannot  be  reduced 
to  any  general  expression  or  formula.2  Regard¬ 
ing  these,  Professor  Huxley  wrote  in  his  lecture 
on  4  The  Study  of  Zoology,’  included  in  his  Lay 
Sermons  :  4  So  definitely  and  precisely  marked  is 
the  structure  of  each  animal  that,  in  the  present 
state  of  our  knowledge,  there  is  not  the  least 
evidence  to  prove  that  a  form,  in  the  slightest 
degree  transitional  between  any  two  of  the 
groups  Vertebrata ,  Annulosa ,  Mollusca ,  and  Ccelen- 
terata ,  either  exists,  or  has  existed,  during  that 
period  of  the  earth’s  history  which  is  recorded 
by  the  geologist  ’ ; 8  and  as  an  up-to-date  testi¬ 
mony  by  one  of  highest  authority  in  this  depart¬ 
ment,  we  have  the  words  of  Zittel  in  1896, 
already  referred  to  :  c  The  warmest  adherents  of 
the  theory  must  at  all  events  admit  that  extinct 

1  See  Professor  Huxley  above  on  apes. 

2  Others  greatly  increase  the  number  of  these  irreducible  classes. 
‘The  zoology  of  to-day,’  Fleischmann  avers,  ‘points  not  merely  to 
four,  as  Cuvier  thought,  but  to  seventeen  typical  forms  ( ' stilarten ), 
which  it  is  hopeless  to  attempt  to  derive  from  one  another’  (in 
Otto,  Theol .  Rund.j  1903,  p.  10 1). 

3  P.  1 14:  on  a  partial  later  qualification,  see  above,  p.  106. 


132 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


links  between  the  different  classes  and  orders 
of  the  vegetable  and  animal  kingdoms  are  forth¬ 
coming  only  in  a  small  and  ever-diminishing 
number.’ 1 

The  difficulty  here  signalised  of  discovering 
transition  links  is  at  its  maximum  in  the  case  of 
man.  The  palaeontological  evidence  I  shall  con¬ 
sider  in  next  lecture  :  meanwhile,  it  is  sufficient 
to  say  that  the  oldest  human  skulls  yet  discovered 
furnish  no  support  to  the  theory  of  transforma¬ 
tion.  They  fairly  equal  in  capacity  the  average 
skulls  of  the  present  day.2  The  state  of  the  case 

1  In  An  Address  delivered  before  the  International  Congress  of 
Geologists  on  ‘  Paleontology  and  Biogenetic  La<w ’  at  Zurich. 

2  Cf.,  e.g .,  the  interesting  lengthy  discussion  of  the  Engis  and 
Neanderthal  skulls  in  Part  in.  of  Huxley’s  Mans  Place  in  Nature. 
The  verdict  arrived  at  on  the  Engis  skull  (of  extreme  antiquity)  is: 
‘Assuredly,  there  is  no  mark  of  degradation  about  any  part  of  its 
structure.  It  is,  in  fact,  a  fair  average  human  skull,  which  might 
have  belonged  to  a  philosopher,  or  might  have  contained  the  thought¬ 
less  brains  of  a  savage’  (p.  156)5  and  on  the  Neanderthal  skull: 
‘In  no  sense,  then,  can  the  Neanderthal  bones  be  regarded  as  the 
remains  of  a  being  intermediate  between  Man  and  Apes’  (p.  157)5 
and  the  general  conclusion  is :  ‘  The  fossil  remains  of  Man  hitherto 
discovered  do  not  seem  to  me  to  take  us  appreciably  nearer  to  that 
lower  pithecoid  form,  by  the  modification  of  which  he  has,  probably, 
become  what  he  is’  (p.  159). 

On  one  of  the  most  recent  discoveries  (1902),  the  Lansing  skull, 
see  below,  pp.  182,  184.  Cf.  there  also  Professor  G.  F.  Wright’s 
remarks  on  the  suddenness  of  man’s  appearance. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


*33 


in  this  particular  is  not  essentially  altered  from 
what  it  was  when  Sir  Charles  Lyell  wrote  in  his 
Antiquity  of  Man  in  1863:  ‘At  present  we  must 
be  content  to  wait  patiently,  and  not  allow  our 
judgments  respecting  transmutation  to  be  influ¬ 
enced  by  the  want  of  evidence  ’ ; 1  when  Dana 
wrote  in  1875  *  ‘  No  remains  of  fossil  man  bear 
evidence  to  less  perfect  erectness  of  structure 
than  in  civilised  man,  or  to  any  nearer  approach 
to  the  man-ape  in  essential  characteristics.  .  .  . 
If  the  links  ever  existed,  their  annihilation,  with¬ 
out  trace,  is  so  extremely  improbable,  that  it  may 
be  pronounced  impossible  ’ ; 2  or  since  Virchow 
said  in  1879:  ‘On  the  whole,  we  must  readily 
acknowledge  that  all  fossil  type  of  a  lower  human 
development  is  absolutely  wanting.  Indeed,  if 
we  take  the  total  of  all  fossil  men  that  have  been 
found  hitherto,  and  compare  them  with  what 
the  present  offers,  then  we  can  maintain  with 
certainty  that  among  the  present  generation 
there  is  a  much  larger  number  of  relatively  low- 
type  individuals  than  among  the  fossils  hitherto 
known.* 3  Sir  Charles  Lyell,  quoted  above,  was 

1  P.  499.  2  Geology ,  p.  603. 

3  Address  on  The  freedom  of  Science  at  Berlin. 


*34 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


at  first  a  keen  opponent  of  transmutationism,1 
and  never  yielded  fully  to  Darwin’s  influence. 
*To  the  end  of  his  life,’  Huxley  being  witness, 
‘  he  entertained  a  profound  antipathy  for  the 
pithecoid  origin  of  man,’ 2  and  seems,  even,  from 
his  correspondence  with  Darwin,  to  have  con¬ 
tinued  to  believe  in  a  creation  of  ‘  distinct  suc¬ 
cessive  types/ 8 

I  am,  of  course,  well  aware  that  announce¬ 
ments  have  been  made  from  time  to  time  of  the 
discovery  of  the  so-called  ‘  missing  links  ’ ;  but, 
unfortunately,  these  have,  up  to  this  date,  failed  to 
get  their  credit  established.  The  most  famous  of 
these  discoveries — perhaps  the  only  one  deserv¬ 
ing  of  notice — was  that  of  Dr.  Eugene  Dubois, 
of  Amsterdam,  who,  in  1891-92,  found  in  Java 
the  skull,  thigh  bone,  and  teeth  of  a  great 
man-like  mammal,  which  he  forthwith  designated 
Pithecanthropus  Erectus ,  or  the  Erect  Ape-Man. 
Dr.  Dubois  expounded  his  discovery  at  a  meeting 
of  the  Ethnological  Society  at  Leyden  in  1895, 
but  the  chairman  of  that  body,  the  redoubtable 

1  Cf.  the  earlier  editions  of  his  Principles  of  Geology . 

1  Life  and  Letters  of  Darwin,  ii.  pp.  190,  19a. 

8  Life  and  Letters ,  ii.  p.  340. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAN 


*35 


Dr.  Virchow,  reputed  to  be  the  chief  craniologist 
in  Europe,  utterly  refused  to  be  persuaded.  He 
argued  that  the  supposed  discovery  was  no  dis¬ 
covery  at  all.  He  revised  and  disputed  Dubois’ 
measurements.  The  skull  in  question,  he  said, 
exactly  resembled  that  of  a  large  gibbon.  He  held 
that  no  reason  had  been  shown  for  believing  that  it 
belonged  to  any  other  creature  than  an  ape,  while 
he  was  also  in  doubt  whether  the  various  bones 
had  all  belonged  originally  to  one  body.  Scien¬ 
tific  opinion  has  been  keenly  divided  about  these 
Java  relics  ever  since — some  holding  with  Virchow 
that  the  creature  was  an  ape,  others  holding  that  it 
was  human,  but  very  few  accepting  it  as  an  inter¬ 
mediate  form.  Professor  Boyd  Dawkins  has  ex¬ 
pressed  doubts  whether  the  being  walked  upright.1 

1  See  further  in  Otto  ( Theol .  Rund .,  1903,  p.  188).  Otto,  refer¬ 
ring  to  the  ‘almost  dramatic  character’  of  the  proceedings  in  the 
Ethnological  Society,  says :  ‘  In  the  different  opinions  of  Dubois, 
Virchow,  Nehring,  Kollmann,  Krause,  and  others,  one  has  almost 
an  epitome  of  “the  state  of  the  Darwinian  Question”  to-day.’  One 
cause  of  the  ambiguity  seems  to  lie  in  the  difference  of  measure¬ 
ments.  *  Virchow,’  we  are  told,  ‘  opposed  to  the  highly  striking  draw¬ 
ings  of  Dubois  his  own  drawing,  according  to  which  the  curve  of 
the  Pithecanthropus  coincided  with  that  of  a  Hylobates  (Gibbon).’ 
He  thus  summed  up :  ‘  Up  to  the  present  no  one  has  succeeded  in 
making  a  diluvial  discovery  which  can  be  held  as  referring  to  a  man 
of  pithecoid  type.’ 

Cf.  Henslow,  in  Present  Day  Rationalism  (p.  209):  ‘We  have  not 


136  GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


The  remainder  of  this  discussion,  relating  to 
man’s  intellectual  and  moral  nature,  I  must  post¬ 
pone  to  next  lecture. 

yet  discovered  the  missing  links  to  prove  by  objective  evidence  the 
genealogy  of  the  genus  Homo  from  the  common  stock  with  the 
existing  ape-family.’ 

It  must  now  be  added  that  the  fundamental  premiss  of  this  whole 
discussion,  viz.,  that  man  has  descended  from  some  form  of  the 
anthropoid  ape,  is  itself,  on  what  seem  to  be  valid  grounds,  brought 
into  dispute  by  recent  anthropology.  See  Note  V.  on  Recent  Views 
on  the  Descent  of  Man. 


Scripture  and  Science  on  the  Primitive 
Condition  of  Man — The  Image  as 
Actual  Moral  Resemblance 


4 


Evolution  in  its  Bearing  on  Man’s  Mental  and  Moral  Nature. 
Alleged  gradual  Development  of  Man’s  Mind  from  Animal 
Intelligence  (Darwin,  Romanes,  Fiske).  Failure  to  explain 
true  Rationality  in  Man.  Potentiality  of  Progress  (Language, 
Education,  Science,  etc.)  in  Man.  Free-Will  and  Morality  in 
Man  (Haeckel,  Fiske,  Huxley).  Bearing  on  Origin  of  Body  in 
Man.  Mind  and  Body  necessarily  rise  together.  Creative 
Cause  accordingly  implied  in  both.  Creation  of  Man  ‘male 
and  female.’  Unity  of  Race.  Question  of  Man’s  Primitive 
Moral  Condition.  Does  Creation  in  the  Divine  Image  imply 
actual  Moral  Resemblance  ?  Biblical  View,  and  Contradiction 
of  Evolutionary  Philosophy.  Darwinian  Picture  of  Primitive 
Man.  Support  sought  in  Facts  of  Anthropology,  i.  Argu¬ 
ment  from  Existing  Savage  Races;  fallacy  of  this.  2.  Argu¬ 
ment  from  Remote  Antiquity  of  Man.  Usshers’s  Chronology 
untenable.  Former  Exaggerated  Estimates  of  Man’s  An¬ 
tiquity.  Revised  Views.  Post-Glacial  Man.  Physical  Science 
on  Age  of  Earth  (Kelvin,  Tait,  etc.).  Recent  Beginnings  of 
History  (Babylonia,  Egypt,  eto.).  Evolution  does  not  establish 
this  view  of  Man.  1.  Evolution  is  not  necessarily  by  slow 
gradations.  2.  Palaeontological  Evidence :  Cave  Men,  etc. 
High  Character  of  Oldest  Skulls.  3.  High  Character  of  Early 
Civilisation.  4..  No  proof  that  Civilisation  has  originated  from 
Barbarism.  Subject  viewed  in  light  of  true  Idea  of  Man.  The 
Primitive  Man  of  Evolution  not  simply  in  a  Non-Moral,  but 
in  an  Immoral  and  Wrong  State.  Contradiction  of  Divine 
Fatherhood.  Destiny  of  Man  to  Divine  Sonship  and  to 
Immortality.  These  Ideas  Contradictory  of  Evolutionary 
Hypothesis. 


188 


IV 


SCRIPTURE  AND  SCIENCE  ON  THE  PRIMITIVE  CON¬ 
DITION  OF  MAN— THE  IMAGE  AS  ACTUAL 
MORAL  RESEMBLANCE 

JN  the  previous  lecture  I  was  engaged  in  dis¬ 
cussing  the  bearing  of  the  doctrine  of  evolu¬ 
tion,  and  especially  of  the  Darwinian  form  of  it, 
on  the  question  of  the  origin  of  man.  I  come 
now  to  speak  of  the  closely-related,  and  from  the 
Biblical  point  of  view,  even  more  important 
subject,  of  man’s  primitive  condition.  The 
transition  may  appropriately  be  made  to  this 
inquiry  in  the  consideration  of  a  point  left  over 
from  last  lecture,  viz.,  how  far  the  theory  of 
evolution,  which  we  saw  failed  to  bridge  the  gulf 
between  man  and  the  highest  ape  in  a  physical 
respect,  is  competent  to  the  more  difficult  task  of 
accounting  for  his  intellectual  and  moral  endow¬ 
ment.  The  question  is :  Is  there  a  true  dividing- 
line  between  man  and  the  highest  of  the  animals 

1&9 


140 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


in  respect  of  intelligence  and  moral  nature  which 
evolution  cannot  cross  ?  Does  man  truly,  on  the 
mental,  moral,  and  spiritual  side,  constitute  a  new 
order  in  nature,  requiring  a  special  cause  for  his 
origin?  I  tried  to  give  some  reasons  for  an 
affirmative  answer  to  that  question  in  the  second 
lecture,  but  we  must  now  look  at  it  in  connection 
with  the  attempts  to  break  down  the  limits  be¬ 
tween  human  and  animal  intelligence,  and  show 
that  man’s  mind,  equally  with  his  body,  can  be 
explained  on  principles  of  gradual  development. 

Here,  to  avoid  misapprehension,  it  may  be  as 
well  to  say  that,  while  it  is  a  striking  fact,  the 
importance  of  which  cannot  be  minimised,  that 
no  means  have  yet  been  found  of  bridging  the 
gap  between  man  and  the  forms  of  animal  life 
most  nearly  related  to  him,  it  is  in  nowise 
essential  to  my  position  that  there  should  not 
have  existed  forms  which  might  be  described  as 
‘  transitional.’  There  is  no  a  priori  reason  why 
the  creative  plan  should  not  have  embraced  beings 
showing  much  nearer  approximations  to  man  in 
structure,  and  even  in  a  species  of  intelligence, 
than  have  yet  been  discovered.  If,  e.g .,  the  traces 
of  flint-chipping  apes  supposed  by  some  to  be 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  141 


found  in  miocene  deposits  should  be  confirmed — 
though  the  evidence,  as  we  shall  see,  is  very 
doubtful 1 — there  would  be  no  ground  for  anxiety. 
This  might  be  true,  yet  the  dividing-line  between 
man  proper  and  his  animal  predecessors,  based  on 
the  possession  of  rationality,  might  be  as  marked 
and  impassable  as  before. 

I  need  not  say,  then,  that  it  is  a  very  general 
assumption  among  evolutionists  that  man’s  intel¬ 
lectual  and  moral  nature  can  be  explained  by  slow 
evolution  from  the  rudiments  of  intelligence  and 
social  instinct  and  affection  observable  in  the 
lower  animals.  Darwin,  Romanes,2  Fiske,  and 
many  others,  have  attempted  the  task  of  showing 
how  this  can  be  accomplished.  With  monists  of 
the  standpoint  of  Haeckel  the  transformation  is  of 
course  an  article  of  faith.3  Not  all  evolutionists, 
however,  are  of  this  opinion.  Many,  as  Wallace, 
Mivart,  Murphy,  the  Duke  of  Argyll,  Professor 
Calderwood,  with  some  American  and  Continental 

1  See  below,  p.  171.  Cf.  Dawkins,  Early  Man  In  Britain ,  p.  68  j 
Mortillet,  in  Wright’s  Man  and  the  Glacial  Period  (App.  by  Haynes), 
p.  367,  etc. 

2  In  his  Mental  Evolution  in  the  Animal  IV or  Id. 

3  Cf.  his  Riddle ,  chap.  vii.  IF.  Mr.  Mallock  supports  him. 


142 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


evolutionists,  while  allowing  natural  selection 
large,  if  not  exclusive,  play  in  the  production  of 
man’s  body,  draw  the  line  very  decidedly  at  mind. 
And  surely,  as  I  sought  to  show  in  the  second 
lecture,  with  abundant  reason.  Just  criticism 
might  be  passed,  at  the  outset,  on  the  method  by 
which  the  transition  from  animal  to  human  in¬ 
telligence  is  supposed  to  be  made  out — its  essen¬ 
tial  assumptiveness,  and  continual  drafts,  in  de¬ 
fault  of  real  evidence,  on  the  resources  of  the 
inventive  imagination.  That  brilliant  writer, 
Mr.  Fiske,  e.g.f  does  wonderful  execution  by  the 
single  help  of  the  little  word  4  comes.’  A  varia¬ 
tion,  or  succession  of  such,  needed  to  produce  a 
new  organ  or  faculty,  has  only  to  be  called  for, 
and  it  4  comes.’  4  Presently  ’ — thus  he  trips  along 
— 4  the  movements  of  limbs  and  sense-organs 
come  to  be  added,  and,  as  we  rise  in  the  animal 
scale,  these  movements  come  to  be  endlessly 
various  and  complex,  and  by  and  by  implicate  the 
nervous  system  more  and  more  deeply  in  complex 
acts  of  perception,  memory,  reasoning,  and  voli¬ 
tion.’  1  ...  4  To  the  mere  love  of  life,  which  is 
the  conservative  force  that  keeps  the  whole  animal 

1  'Through.  Nature  to  God,  p.  91. 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  143 


world  in  existence,  there  now  comes  gradually  to 
be  superadded  the  feeling  of  religious  aspiration, 
which  is  nothing  more  nor  less  than  the  yearning 
after  the  highest  possible  completeness  of  spiritu¬ 
ality/1  No  doubt  it  ‘comes’;  but  the  whole 
mystery  lies  in  that  { comes  ’  !  Mr.  Fiske  finds 
the  grand  secret  of  human  progress  in  ‘  the  pro¬ 
longation  of  infancy  ’  ; 2  Mr.  Mallock  finds  it  in 
the  possession  of  a  ‘  hand.’ 3  But  where  does  the 
‘  hand  ’  come  from  ?  More  subtle,  perhaps,  is 
the  constant  no7i  sequitur  transition  from  what  we 
are  conscious  of  in  our  own  minds  to  the  explana¬ 
tion  of  seemingly  like  actions  on  the  part  of  the 
animals — though  slight  reflection  should  convince 
us  that  the  acts  in  the  latter  case  must  depend  on 
quite  dissimilar  psychical  processes.4 

1  'Through  Nature  to  God ,  p.  53.  See  below,  p.  148.  The  hypo¬ 
thetical  and  assumptive  character  of  much  of  Mr.  Darwin’s  reasoning 
has  often  been  remarked  on  (cf.  Stirling,  Darwinianism ,  p.  156  ; 
Mivart,  Lessons  from  Nature ,  pp.  88,  327  ff.,  etc.).  Here  is  a  small 
example,  begging  the  whole  point :  c  Any  animal  whatever,  endowed 
with  well-marked  social  instincts,  would  inevitably  acquire  a  moral 
sense  or  conscience,  as  soon  as  its  intellectual  powers  had  become  as 
well  developed,  or  nearly  as  well  developed,  as  in  man  ’  ( Descent  of 
Man ,  i.  p.  71).  2  Ibid.,  pp.  49,  etc. 

3  Religion  as  a  Credible  Doctrine ,  p.  62. 

4  This  is  evidenced,  for  one  thing,  by  the  fact  that  many  of  the 
acts  are  performed  perfectly  from  the  hour  of  birth,  prior  to  experi¬ 
ence,  training,  or  opportunity  for  reflection.  The  rational  being  has 


144 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


Most  of  the  evolutionary  theories  now  indi¬ 
cated  proceed,  like  Darwin’s,  on  the  assumption 
that  the  transition  from  animal  to  human  intelli¬ 
gence  is  effected  by  natural  selection  operating  on 
slight  accidental  variations,  and,  in  so  far  as  this 
is  the  case,  the  objections  already  urged  against 
the  sufficiency  of  natural  selection  to  explain  the 
evolutionary  process  hold  good.  They  err  also — 
so  far  as  the  connection  of  man  with  the  ape  is 
concerned — in  too  slight  regard  for  the  patent 
fact  that  animal  intelligence  does  not  exhibit  a 
steady  ascent  towards  man,  reaching  its  maximum 
in  the  apes  :  the  dog,  e.g .,  is  more  intelligent  than 
the  ape,  and  the  ant,  I  presume,  which  has  hardly 
a  brain  at  all,  is  more  intelligent  than  either.1 

slowly  to  acquire  his  powers  of  observing,  judging,  comparing,  con¬ 
necting  causes  and  effects,  etc.  Some  remarks  of  G.  H.  Lewes  on 
animal  versus  human  consciousness  are  worth  quoting.  *  The 
animal  world,’  he  says,  ‘  is  a  continuum  of  smells,  sights,  touches, 
tastes,  pains,  pleasures  ;  it  has  no  objects,  no  laws,  no  distinguishable 
abstractions  such  as  self  and  not-self.  This  world  we  can  never 
understand,  except  in  such  dim  guesses  as  we  can  form  respecting  the 
experiences  of  those  born  blind,  guesses  that  are  always  vitiated  by  the 
fact  that  we  cannot  help  seeing  what  we  tly  to  imagine  them  as  only 
touching’  ( Problems  of  Life  and  Mind ,  i.  p.  140  ;  cf.  pp.  123,  127). 

1  See  the  striking  illustrations  of  this  point  in  Professor  H.  Calder- 
wood’s  Relations  of  Mind  and  Brain ,  chap.  v.  Professor  Huxley  (to 
meet,  however,  an  objection)  challenges  ‘the  assumption  that  intel¬ 
lectual  power  depends  altogether  on  the  brain ’  ( Mans  Place  in 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  145 


The  chief  point  of  weakness  in  these  theories, 
however,  is  that  they  do  nothing,  really,  to  meet 
the  proof,  derived  from  the  simple  fact  of  man’s 
susceptibility  for  education  and  progress,  that 
there  are  barriers  in  their  nature  impassable 
between  animal  and  human  intelligence  ;  which, 
accordingly,  involve  a  distinction,  not  in  degree 
only,  but  in  quality  and  kind ,  between  the  two,  and 
place  man  essentially  in  an  order  and  kingdom  by 
himself.1  Lyell  naively  acknowledged  this  when 
he  spoke  of  the  space  which  separates  the  unpro¬ 
gressive  intelligence  of  the  inferior  animals  from 
the  improvable  reason  of  man.2  Professor  Calder- 
wood  laid  his  finger  on  the  point  when  he  said  of 
the  higher  mammals  that  ‘  they  give  no  signs  of 
having  at  command  a  Reflective  Intelligence  such 
as  men  possess,’ 3  and  remarked  :  c  This  funda- 

Nature ,  p.  102).  Yet  Mr.  Joseph  M‘Cabe,  in  an  article  in  the 
Hibbert  Journal  for  July  1905  (p.  751),  ventures  the  assertion  ‘that 
the  advance  [in  the  evolution  of  the  mind]  is  rigidly  proportioned  to 
the  formation  and  distribution  of  neural  cells.' 

1  Haeckel  is  content  to  rely  on  Romanes  for  *  demonstration  ’  that 
human  intelligence  and  speech  differ  only  in  degree ,  not  in  kind,  from 
those  of  the  brute  (p.  45).  Romanes,  however,  does  not  make  an 
approach  to  4  demonstrating  ’  that  $  as  little  do  Lewes,  Spencer,  and 
Darwin. 

2  Antiquity  of  Man ,  p.  504;  see  above,  p.  115. 

3  Evolution  and  the  Nature  of  Man ,  p.  99. 

K 


146 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


mental  difference  is  such  as  to  place  the  orders 
of  life  at  vast  distance  from  each  other.  This 
appears  under  every  test  that  can  be  applied — 
emotional,  industrial,  literary,  artistic.  These 
facts  show  that  the  evolution  theory  is  inapplic¬ 
able  to  mind,  and  thereby  insufficient  to  afford  a 
scientific  view  of  its  genesis.’ 1 

I  need  not  go  back,  except  in  a  word,  on  what 
was  said  in  the  second  lecture  on  man’s  dis¬ 
tinction  from  the  animals  in  an  intellectual  respect. 
It  was  then  sought  to  be  shown  that  the  real  root 
of  the  peculiarity  of  the  human  mind,  in  its  dis¬ 
tinction  from  the  animal,  lay  in  its  proper 
rationality — its  power  of  thought,  its  faculty  for 
the  universal.2  Man,  in  virtue  of  this  endow¬ 
ment,  allying  him  with  his  Maker,  is,  as  the 
animals  are  not,  a  personal,  self-conscious  being  ; 
capable  of  conceptual  thought,  of  rational 
speech,  of  education,  of  development,  of  pro¬ 
gress  ;  capable  also,  therefore,  of  moral,  self- 
regulated  life.  The  enormous  difference  of 
potentiality  involved  in  all  this  points  to  a  dis- 

1  Evolution  and  the  Nature  of  Man ,  p.  161. 

2  Mr.  Mivart  puts  the  distinctiveness  of  man  in  the  possession  of 
‘self-consciousness,  reason,  and  will,  with  rational  speech  ’  {Lessons 
from  Nature ,  p.  198). 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  147 


tinct  cause,  and  puts  a  gulf  between  man  and 
the  animals  which  no  evolutionary  theory  has 
proved  itself  capable  of  bridging.  New  effects 
imply  new  causes ;  and  here  is  a  world  of  new 
effects  1 

Some  attention  must,  however,  now  be  given 
to  the  ethical  aspect  of  man’s  nature  in  its  relation 
to  this  doctrine  of  evolution.  What  applies  to 
the  intellectual  prerogative  of  man  applies  to 
morality,  and  in  a  peculiar  way  to  man’s  attribute 
of  freedom.  It  is  very  significant  to  observe 
how  determinedly  the  apostle  of  monism  — 
Haeckel — assails  this  citadel  of  man’s  spirituality, 
moral  freedom.1  The  implication  of  his  argu¬ 
ment  throughout  is  that,  if  free-will  is  conceded, 
his  theory  breaks  down.  This,  however,  is  no 
mere  matter  of  speculation.  Man  knows  himself 
to  have,  within  limits,  the  power  of  determining 
his  actions  ;  of  affecting  the  outward  world  ;  of 
regulating  his  conduct  in  the  view  of  ends.  As 

1  Cf.  Riddle ,  p.  47.  I  do  not  here  enter  into  the  difficult  psycho¬ 
logical  and  philosophical  questions  regarding  freedom.  It  is  enough 
for  my  present  purpose  to  take  the  word  in  its  common,  well-under¬ 
stood  acceptation  ;  that  man  is,  within  limits,  a  true,  self-determin¬ 
ing  cause  of  his  own  volitions  and  actions,  and  takes  responsibility  to 
himself  for  such  acts  as  his  own. 


148 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


Professor  Huxley,  with  all  his  theories  of  auto¬ 
matism,  illogically  allows  :  c  Our  volition  counts 
for  something  as  a  condition  of  the  course  of 
events.’ 1  Freedom  in  man,  however,  is  con¬ 
nected  inalienably,  as  Kant  so  well  showed,  with 
the  consciousness  of  a  moral  law  ;  with  ideas  of 
right  and  wrong  ;  with  the  idea  of  an  ‘  ought  ’  in 
life.  What  has  evolution  to  say  to  this,  or  how 
does  it  propose  to  account  for  ideas  of  the  kind  ? 
Mr.  Fiske,  whom  we  may  again  consult,  seeks  to 
show  the  origin  of  these  ideas,  and  of  the  moral 
sentiments  generally,  from  sympathy ,  but  with  the 
usual  result  that  he  puts  into  the  process  the  ideas 
he  professes  to  evolve  from  it,  or  deftly  changes 
the  idea  in  the  course  of  the  discussion.  Mark 
the  procedure.  c  There  is  thus,’  he  says,  ‘  a  wide 
interval  between  the  highest  and  lowest  degrees  of 
completeness  in  living  that  are  compatible  with 
maintenance  of  life.  .  .  .  Now  it  is  because  of 
this  interval  .  .  .  that  man  can  be  distinguished 
as  morally  good  and  morally  bad.  .  .  .  Morality 
comes  upon  the  scene  when  there  is  an  alternative 
offered  of  leading  better  lives  or  worse  lives.  .  .  . 
This  rise  from  a  bestial  to  a  moral  plane  of  exist- 

1  Lay  Sermons ,  p.  159  j  Evolution  and  Ethics ,  p.  79. 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  149 


ence  involves  the  acquirement  of  the  knowledge 
of  good  and  evil.  Conscience  is  generated  to  play 
a  part  analogous  to  that  played  by  the  sense  of 
pain  in  the  lower  stages  of  life,  and  to  keep  us 
from  wrong-doing.’ 1  Again  :  c  Egoism  has 
ceased  to  be  all  in  all,  and  altruism  has  begun 
to  assert  its  claim  to  sovereignty.  .  .  .  This  con¬ 
ception  of  ought,  of  obligation,  of  duty,  of  debt 
to  something  outside  of  self,  resulted  from  the 
shifting  of  the  standard  of  conduct  outside  of 
the  individual’s  self.  Once  thus  externalised, 
objectivised,  the  ethical  standard  demanded 
homage  from  the  individual.  It  furnished  the 
rule  for  a  higher  life  than  one  dictated  by  mere 
selfishness.  ...  It  appears  to  me  that  we  begin 
to  find  for  ethics  the  most  tremendous  kind  of 
sanction  in  the  nature  of  the  cosmic  process.’ 2 
What  is  all  this,  we  are  constrained  to  ask,  but 
the  process  of  ‘  coming  ’  over  again  ?  the  simple 
observing  of  the  ideas  as  they  arise,  and  saying 
that  they  are  there?  As  to  how  ethical  laws 
obtain  the  character  of  an  absolute  authority — of 
a  right  to  command — there  is  not  a  scintilla  of 
explanation.  As  regards  the  4  cosmic  process,’ 

1  through  Nature  to  God,  pp.  51-52.  8  Ibid.,  pp.  106-7. 


150 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


refreshing  light  is  thrown  on  its  ‘  tremendous 
sanction  ’  by  Professor  Huxley  in  his  Romanes 
Lecture  on  Evolution  and  Ethics ,  the  thesis  of 
which  is  that  the  cosmic  process  of  natural  selec¬ 
tion  and  survival  of  the  fittest  is  the  direct  antithesis 
of  the  ethical  process,  which  combats  the  law  of 
natural  selection,  and  has  for  its  aim  the  survival 
of  the  best.  6  The  ethical  process,’  he  says  flatly, 

‘  is  in  opposition  to  the  principle  of  the  cosmic 
process,  and  tends  to  the  suppression  of  the 
qualities  best  fitted  for  success  in  that  struggle.’1 
If  evolution  is  divided  against  evolution,  how 
shall  its  kingdom  stand  ? 

A  fortiori  what  applies  to  morality  applies  to 
religion — to  the  capacity  of  the  soul  for  relations 
with  an  unseen  Spiritual  Power,  and  for  the 
various  exercises  of  love,  trust,  worship,  obedience, 
which  such  relations  call  forth  ;  but  this  I  leave 
over  for  the  present.  I  would  only  register  that 
the  outcome  of  my  argument,  so  far  as  it  has 
gone,  is  this  :  that  the  features  in  man’s  nature 
for  which  we  find  evolution  inadequate  to  account 

1  PP.  31, 81.  Mr.  Huxley  seems  to  feel  he  has  gone  far  enough, 
and  in  a  note  to  the  lecture  remarks  that,  in  strictness,  the  ethical 
process  as  well  as  the  other  is  to  be  included  in  i  the  general  process 
of  evolution.’ 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  151 


are  precisely  those  in  which  we  found  the  natural 
image  of  God  in  man  to  consist :  his  rationality, 
his  moral  nature,  his  religious  capacity.  The 
need  of  creative  action  to  account  for  man’s  spirit, 
stamped  with  its  attributes  of  rational  intelligence 
and  moral  freedom,  is  on  these  grounds,  it  seems 
to  me,  established. 

The  way  is  now  clear  to  proceed  to  other 
parts  of  the  subject ;  but,  before  I  do  this,  let  me 
ask  attention  to  one  important  corollary  from  the 
conclusion  now  reached.  I  mentioned  before  that 
not  a  few  evolutionists  admit  the  necessity  of  a 
special  supernatural  Cause,  or,  from  another  stand¬ 
point,  of  a  higher  exercise  of  the  creative  cause 
within  nature,  to  account  for  man’s  mind,  who  do 
not  feel  that  the  same  necessity  applies  to  his 
body.  That,  they  think,  may  be  left  to  the 
ordinary  evolutionary  processes.  Dr.  Calderwood 
appears  to  adopt  this  view  in  his  work  on  the 
subject ;  Dr.  A.  R.  Wallace,  in  his  Darwinism , 
seems  also  to  adopt  it.1  I  say  ‘seems’;  for  in 
his  earlier  unretracted  work  on  Natural  Selection 
in  Relation  to  Man ,  he  adduced  strong  arguments 
to  prove  that  man’s  body  likewise,  in  its  erect 

1  P.  478. 


I52 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


posture,  its  potential  capacity  of  brain  anticipating 
future  requirements,  and  other  physical  peculi¬ 
arities,  shows  marks  of  special  origin,  and  many 
have  followed  him  in  these  reasonings.  I  would 
put  the  matter,  however,  on  another  ground.  I 
confess  it  has  always  seemed  to  me  an  illogical 
and  untenable  position  to  postulate  a  special 
origin  for  man’s  mind,  and  deny  it  for  his  body. 
I  base  here  on  the  close  relation  which  every  one 
now  admits  to  subsist  between  man’s  mental  and 
physical  organisation.  Mind  and  body  constitute 
together  a  unity  in  man.  Mind  and  brain,  in 
particular,  are  so  related  that  a  sudden  rise  on  the 
mental  side  cannot  be  conceived  without  a  corre¬ 
sponding  rise  on  the  physical  side.  Evolution,  it 
will  be  admitted,  cannot  outrun  actual  acquire¬ 
ments,  and  produce  in  advance,  say,  from  the  ape- 
stock,  a  brain  fitted  to  receive  the  higher  mind 
afterwards  to  be  put  into  it.  You  could  not  put 
a  human  mind  into  a  simian  brain.  It  follows 
that,  if  you  assign  to  man  mental  attributes 
qualitatively  different  from  those  of  the  animals 
— self-consciousness,  rationality,  self-determining 
freedom — you  must  provide  an  organ  adapted  to 
their  manifestation  and  exercise.  If  you  have  a 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  153 


rise  on  the  one  side,  due  to  a  special  cause,  you 
must  have  an  equivalent  rise  on  the  other.  In 
full  accordance  with  this  is  the  fact  already  em¬ 
phasised,  that,  so  far  as  scientific  evidence  goes, 
man’s  appearance  on  the  earth  does  represent 
a  rise  even  on  the  physical  side.  The  c  missing 
link  ’  of  theoretical  evolution  has  often  been 
sought  for,  but,  as  I  showed,  has  not  yet 
been  found ; 1  and  here  we  seem  to  see  the 
reason. 

The  result  we  reach,  then,  from  this  protracted 
discussion  of  man’s  origin,  is,  I  think,  one  singu¬ 
larly  in  harmony  with  the  Biblical  doctrine,  viz.  : 
that  man,  alike  in  his  physical  structure  and  in  his 
spirit,  in  which  he  bears  the  stamp  of  the  divine 
image,  is  not,  as  naturalistic  theories  assert,  a 
mere  product  of  evolution,  but  has,  in  a  peculiar 
sense,  his  origin  in  a  direct  creative  act.  I  might 
adduce,  in  corroboration  of  this,  the  fact  that,  on 
the  Biblical  view,  and  also,  of  course,  in  the  view 
of  science,  man  was  created  c  male  and  female.’ 
Do  we  always  consider  the  difficulty  which  this 
creates  for  a  purely  evolutionary  theory  ? — that  it 
is  not  one  being  only  evolution  has  to  produce, 

1  See  above,  pp.  1 34-5. 


154 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


but  a  pair ;  a  first  pair  ;  the  male  and  female 
counterparts  of  each  other.1  To  some  it  may 
seem  a  simple  matter  :  to  me  it  appears  that, 
with  all  our  philosophy,  the  production  of  a 
first  human  pair  remains  as  much  a  mystery  of 
the  laboratory  of  nature  as  before  evolution  was 
heard  of ! 

Having  thus  completed,  as  far  as  my  limits 
permit,  the  consideration  of  man’s  origin,  I  now 
return  to  the  question  specially  proposed  as  the 
subject  of  this  lecture — the  primitive  condition  of 
man.  I  have  already  hinted  that  on  certain  im¬ 
portant  points  the  latest  verdict  of  science  and  the 
Biblical  doctrine  seem  absolutely  to  agree — e.g .,  in 
regard  to  the  unity  of  the  human  race.  If  doubts 
could  be  raised  before,  and  even  scientific  men 
like  Agassiz  could  be  found  speaking  of  ‘  distinct 
centres  of  creation  ’  for  the  human  species,  it  is 
one  thing  we  may  put  to  the  credit  of  the  evolu¬ 
tionary  philosophy  that  it  has  for  ever  banished 
such  speculations.  No  true  evolutionist  will 
allow  that  the  evolution  of  two  or  more  beings 

1  The  difficulty  applies  in  lesser  degree  to  all  species  j  it  is  at  its 
maximum  in  the  case  of  the  rational  and  moral  being. 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  155 


such  as  man,  along  distinct  and  independent 
lines,  is  for  a  moment  to  be  contemplated.  What 
Scripture  said  from  the  beginning,  that  God 
c  made  of  one  every  nation  of  men  for  to  dwell  on 
all  the  face  of  the  earth/1  science,  in  the  nineteenth 
century,  with  halting  foot  confirms.  Even  as  to 
the  where  of  man’s  origin  a  certain  measure  of 
agreement  may  be  observed  between  science  and 
Scripture.  The  subject  is  one,  naturally,  on 
which  different  theories  have  been  propounded  ; 
but  I  think  I  am  right  in  saying  that  the  lines  of 
scientific  opinion  tend  increasingly  to  converge 
on  just  that  region  which  is  the  historical  cradle 
of  the  principal  races,  and  where  the  Bible  also 
places  approximately  the  site  of  Eden.  It  is  a 
curious  fact  that  even  Haeckel  and  others  of  the 
evolutionary  school  trace  man’s  affiliations  from 
the  neighbourhood  of  the  Persian  Gulf — some¬ 
what  further  south,  however,  in  a  supposed  sub¬ 
merged  continent.2  The  Biblical  Eden  in  the 
region  of  the  Tigris  and  Euphrates  thus  begins  to 
loom  out  into  something  more  substantial  than 
myth  1 

1  Acts  xvii.  26  (R.V.). 

a  Cf.  Haeckel,  Hist,  of  Great. ,  ii.  pp.  325-6,  399. 


1 56 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


It  stands  very  differently  with  the  Biblical 
description  of  man’s  original  moral  condition.  It 
will  be  remembered  that,  when  discussing  the 
subject  of  the  image  of  God  in  man,  there  was 
one  important  question  which  I  reserved,  viz.  :  Is 
it  enough  to  constitute  the  image  of  God  in  man 
that  he  should  possess  simply  the  elements  of  that 
image  in  the  powers  of  a  rational  and  moral 
nature — potencies  to  be  subsequently  developed  ? 
Or  is  it  not  also  requisite  that  he  should  be  in  a 
state  actually  conformable  to  that  image — a  state  of 
moral  purity  and  harmony  ?  In  one  sense,  cer¬ 
tainly,  it  will  be  allowed  by  all  that  the  image  of 
God  in  the  first  human  beings  was,  and  must 
have  been,  largely  potential.  Their  powers  were 
undeveloped  ;  the  glorious  possibilities  that  lay  in 
them,  awaiting  their  unfolding  in  history,  were 
undreamt  of.  But  a  dewdrop  may  reflect  the 
sun  ;  and  man,  in  one  sense  in  his  childhood, 
may  yet  have  reflected  in  a  clear  intellect,  har¬ 
monious  affections,  and  an  uncorrupted  will,  the 
undimmed  image  of  his  Maker.  This  also,  it  will 
scarcely  be  denied,  is  the  picture  given  us  in  the 
Bible,  and  implied  in  its  later  doctrine  of  the 
apostacy  and  guilt  of  man,  and  of  the  divine 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  157 


provision  for  his  redemption.1  Man  is  pictured 
in  Genesis,  indeed,  as  beginning  his  existence 
under  the  simplest  conditions.  His  intelligence 
is  not  developed.  On  the  contrary,  he  has  every¬ 
thing  to  learn.  But  he  is  neither  a  child  nor  a 
savage.  He  is  capable  of  knowing,  understand¬ 
ing,  conversing  with,  worshipping  and  obeying  his 
Creator.  His  nature  is  undefiled  by  sin.  He 
has  the  power  to  remain  obedient.  He  is  not 
under  the  law  of  death. 

How  complete  the  contrast  of  all  this  is  to  the 
doctrine  of  modern  evolutionary  science  I  need 
not  remind  you.  It  is  here,  in  fact,  as  I  formerly 
said,  that  the  opposition  of  the  modern  and  the 
Biblical  views  of  the  world  and  man  comes  to  its 
sharpest  point,2 *  It  is  for  this  reason  that  I  have 

1  See  next  Lecture,  pp.  199  fF.  Mr.  Tennant  and  others,  however, 
do  deny  that  this  is  the  presentation  in  the  Bible  ( The  Fall  and 
Original  Sin,  pp.  10  fF.).  See  below,  pp.  198,  200,  219,  etc. 

2  In  a  note  on  ‘Adam,  the  Fall,  the  Origin  of  Evil,’  Romanes 
says :  4  These,  all  taken  together  as  Christian  dogmas,  are  un¬ 
doubtedly  hard  hit  by  the  scientific  proof  of  evolution  (but  are  the 

only  dogmas  which  can  fairly  be  said  to  be  so),  and,  as  constituting  the 

logical  basis  of  the  whole  plan,  they  certainly  do  appear  at  first  sight 
necessarily  to  involve  in  their  destruction  that  of  the  entire  super¬ 
structure  ’  (c Thoughts  on  Religion ,  p.  176).  He  thinks  the  difficulty  is 
got  over  by  treating  the  narrative  as  ‘allegorical’ — ‘a  poem  as  dis¬ 
tinguished  from  a  history.’  But  is  it  got  over?  See  below. 


158  GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


dwelt  so  long  on  the  subject  of  man’s  origin. 
The  question  of  origin  has  its  chief  interest  and 
importance  from  its  bearing  on  the  doctrine  of 
man’s  nature  and  condition,  and  through  that  on 
the  doctrine  of  sin.  I  make  no  attempt,  therefore, 
to  minimise  the  seriousness  of  the  issue  that  is 
involved.  Nor  can  I  agree  with  those  theologians 
v/ho,  sometimes  with  a  light  heart,  make  capitula¬ 
tion  of  the  whole  position  to  the  evolutionist,  and 
accept  the  consequences  in  a  weakened  doctrine 
of  the  origin  of  sin  and  of  guilt.  These  writers 
doubtless  act  in  fullest  loyalty  to  what  they  regard 
as  the  settled  teachings  of  science,  and  their 
theories  are  valuable  as  illustrating  the  best  possi¬ 
bilities  of  a  reconciliation  of  evolutionary  teaching 
with  fundamental  Christian  conceptions.1  Still  I 
cannot  regard  their  efforts  as  successful.  In¬ 
evitably  they  seem  to  me  to  minimise  the  awful 
evil  of  sin  ;  nor  do  I  think  that  some  of  the 
writers,  at  least,  realise  the  full  gravity  of  what 
they  are  giving  up.  What  is  of  immensely  greater 
moment,  I  do  not  think  there  is  any  necessity 
for  this  capitulation.  I  feel  very  certain,  on  the 

1  See  Note  VI.  on  Modern  Theories  of  Evolution  and  the  F all  j 
and  see  below,  pp.  209-10. 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  159 


contrary,  that,  so  far  as  science  is  concerned, 
there  is,  for  any  sincere  believer  in  the  incarna¬ 
tion,  and  in  the  new  creation  of  man  in  Jesus 
Christ,  no  such  necessity. 

Our  question  then  is  :  How  did  man  appear 
upon  the  earth  ?  In  what  condition?  We  know 
what  the  Adam  of  the  old  theology — with,  perhaps, 
some  traits  of  exaggeration — was  :  to  make  clear 
how  strangely  different  is  the  picture  presented 
by  modern  evolutionism,  two  extracts  will  suffice. 
Here  is  Mr.  Darwin's  description  of  the  genesis 
and  primitive  condition  of  man.  ‘  Man,’  he  says, 
‘  is  descended  from  a  hairy  quadruped,  furnished 
with  a  tail  and  pointed  ears,  probably  arboreal  in 
its  habits,  and  an  inhabitant  of  the  Old  World. 
.  .  .  At  the  period  and  place,  whenever  and 
wherever  it  may  have  been  [he  suggests  the 
eocene  period],  when  man  first  lost  his  hairy 
covering,  he  probably  inhabited  a  hot  country, 
and  this  would  be  favourable  for  a  frugiferous 
diet,  on  which,  judging  by  analogy,  he  subsisted.’ 1 
On  the  moral  aspect,  Sir  Charles  Lyell  cites  with 
approval  the  description  of  Horace  (no  mean 
precursor,  it  will  be  seen,  of  the  evolutionists)  : 

1  Descent  of  Man ,  ii.  p.  3725  cf.  p.  192. 


i6o 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


c  When  animals  first  crept  forth  from  the  newly- 
formed  earth,  a  dumb  and  filthy  herd,  they  fought 
for  acorns  and  lurking-places  with  their  nails  and 
fists,  then  with  clubs,  and  at  last  with  arms,  which, 
taught  by  experience,  they  had  forged.  They 
then  invented  names  for  things,  and  words  to 
express  their  thoughts.  After  that  they  began 
to  desist  from  war,  to  fortify  cities,  and  enact 
laws.’ 1  This  view  for  the  present  prevails.  It 
is  accepted  even  by  many  who  reject  pure 
Darwinism,  but  still  seem  to  hold  it  as  a  necessary 
implication  of  evolution  that  man  should  begin 
at  the  lowest  point  possible  to  humanity,  and 
gradually  work  up.  Support  for  it  is  thought 
to  be  found  in  the  facts  of  anthropology  and 
palaeontology,  taken  in  connection  with  the  evi¬ 
dences  of  man’s  remote  antiquity.  We  are  pointed 
to  the  savage  races  that  still  inhabit  the  earth  as 
object-lessons  of  what  man  was  before  he  attained 
to  civilisation;  to  the  remains  of  prehistoric  man 
— the  men  of  the  river-drifts  and  caves — as  proof 
at  once  of  man’s  great  age  and  rude  primitive 
condition ;  to  the  accumulating  evidences  that, 
while  our  civilisations  are  but  of  yesterday,  man’s 

1  Antiquity  of  Man ,  pp.  379-80. 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  161 


existence  on  earth  can  be  traced  back  to  a  period 
incredibly  remote — a  quarter  of  a  million,  or  half 
a  million,  years.1  These  facts,  to  many  minds, 
are  incontestable,  and  it  is  held  to  be  the  sheerest 
theological  prejudice  that  prevents  any  one  from 
drawing  from  them  their  legitimate  conclusion. 
Is  it  so  ?  Let  us  try  to  look  at  the  matter 
dispassionately. 

i.  The  argument  from  existing  savage  races  is 
one  that  need  not  long  detain  us.  Taken  by 
itself,  it  rests  on  the  unproved  assumption  that 
the  condition  of  existing  savage  races  represents 
(or  most  nearly  represents)  that  of  primitive  man. 
That,  I  am  warranted  in  saying,  is  an  assumption 
which,  in  its  proof  that  behind  many,  if  not  most, 
sav  ^e  races  there  stood  a  state  of  higher  culture 
and  civilisation,  science  itself  is  increasingly  dis¬ 
crediting.2  ‘  We  now  know,’  as  Max  Muller  says, 

1  See  the  argument  from  these  facts  as  presented  by  Driver  in  the 
Introduction  to  his  Genesis  (1904),  pp.  xxxi.  ff. 

2  A  large  body  of  evidence  on  this  point  may  be  gathered  from 
writers,  like  Spencer  and  Tylor,  who,  on  the  whole,  represent  a 
different  point  of  view.  See  a  number  of  instances  in  Mivart’s 
Lessons  from  Nature ,  ch.  vi.,  and  Note  VII.  on  Retrogression  among 
Savages.  Mr.  Spencer  himself  says  of  savages:  4  Probably  most  of 
them,  if  not  all  of  them,  had  ancestors  in  higher  states  5  and  among 
their  beliefs  remain  some  which  were  evolved  during  these  higher 
states  ’  ( Sociology ,  i.  p.  106). 

L 


i62 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


‘that  savage  and  primitive  are  very  far  from 
meaning  the  same  thing.’1  Still  less  tenable  is 
the  Darwinian  assumption  that  savages  of  low 
grade  represent  an  arrested  stage  in  the  ascent 
from  the  ape-condition  to  the  human.  No  weaker 
argument  has  ever  been  offered  than  that  which 
one  sometimes  meets  with  even  in  books  of  repute 
— that  the  difference  between  animal  and  human 
intelligence  is  not  greater  than  that  which  subsists 
between  the  baby  and  the  philosopher,  between  the 
savage  and  the  cultured  races.  This  argument  is 
a  favourite  one  with  Haeckel,2  and  after  him  by 
Mr.  Mallock.  ‘  If  there  is  no  break,’  argues  the 
latter,  ‘  between  the  consciousness  of  the  full- 
grown  man  and  the  baby’s,  how  can  we  pretend 
that,  as  an  actual  and  demonstrable  fact,  an  im¬ 
passable  gulf  yawns  between  the  baby’s  conscious¬ 
ness  and  the  dog’s.’ 3  ‘  We  may  assume  that  the 

terrier  is  not  a  Hegel,  a  Sir  William  Hamilton, 
or  a  Kant.  But  no  more  is  an  Andaman  Islander  ; 
no  more  is  an  English  baby.’4  The  fallacy  here 
is  too  transparent  to  impose  on  any  one.  The 
obvious  reply  is,  that  in  the  baby’s  consciousness 

1  Anthrop.  Rel .,  pp.  14.9,  150.  2  Riddle ,  p.  65,  etc. 

8  Religion  as  a  Credible  Doctrine ,  p.  52.  4  Ibid.,  p.  54. 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  163 


there  lie  all  the  potentialities  of  the  grown  man, 
whereas  in  the  dog’s  there  do  not.  Similarly  the 
savage,  left  to  himself,  may  be  rude  and  unpro¬ 
gressive  ;  but,  when  touched  by  higher  civilisa¬ 
tion,  still  more  by  Christian  influences,  he  exhibits 
likewise,  often  in  remarkable  degree,  all  the 
powers — intellectual  and  moral — of  high  man¬ 
hood.1  Permit  but  one  illustration.  Captain 
Cook  gave  the  name  Savage  Island  to  one  of  a 
group  in  which  the  inhabitants  were  so  fierce  that 
it  was  impossible  to  land  amongst  them.  John 
Williams  tried  to  evangelise  them,  and  was  driven 
off.  By  and  by  a  converted  Samoan  took  a 
journey  of  three  hundred  miles  to  try  to  do  them 
good.  In  twelve  years,  out  of  5000  on  the  island, 
only  eight  remained  heathen.  They  became  trans¬ 
formed  into  a  proverbially  kind  and  loving  people. 

1  The  aborigines  of  Australia  were  placed  by  Prof.  H.  Drummond 
at  ‘almost  the  lowest  level  of  humanity’  (‘Though  the  settlements 
of  the  Europeans/  he  says,  ‘  have  been  there  for  a  generation,  he  will 
find  the  child  of  nature  still  untouched,  and  neither  by  intercourse 
nor  imitation  removed  by  one  degree  from  the  lowest  savage  state  ’)  $ 
and  the  statement  of  old  books  that  those  natives  are  so  low 
intellectually  as  to  be  unable  to  count  five  is  still  sometimes  quoted. 
I  was  recently  assured,  however,  by  a  local  educationist,  that  the 
children  of  such  of  these  natives  as  have  been  Christianised  show 
themselves  quite  as  alert  and  capable  as  the  children  of  white  parents. 
At  a  recent  examination  in  a  State  school  in  Victoria,  a  girl,  daughter 


164 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


Every  year  they  sent  (at  the  time  of  my  reading 
the  account)  ^400  to  the  London  Missionary 
Society.  When  a  ship  was  wanted  for  a  New 
Guinea  Mission,  costing  ^*500,  they  voluntarily 
undertook  to  raise  the  whole  amount.  The 
Sydney  people  sent  £50  to  meet  some  extra 
expenses,  but  the  islanders  sent  it  back  with 
thanks,  preferring  to  complete  the  work  they  had 
begun.  Thirty  married  teachers  had  gone  from 
that  island  to  New  Guinea.  Can  we  doubt  it? — 
these  are  not  semi-animals,  but  children  of  the 
kingdom  of  God.1 

2.  The  weight  of  the  argument,  however,  for 
the  original  semi-brutish  condition  of  man  rests, 

of  aboriginal  parents,  who  was  in  the  sixth  class,  took  the  first  prize. 
Most  are  familiar  with  the  changes  on  the  (seemingly  hopelessly 
degraded)  Tierra  del  Fuegians,  which  so  deeply  interested  Mr. 
Darwin  as  to  lead  him  to  become  a  subscriber  to  the  Missionary 
Society  which  had  wrought  the  wonder. 

1  Perhaps  I  should  have  given  consideration  here  to  the  argument 
from  the  time  necessary  for  the  evolution  of  the  various  races  of  men. 
I  cannot  see,  however,  looking  to  the  facts  of  rapid  variation  among 
animals  under  climatic  and  other  influences  (cf.  e.g.,  Mivart,  Genesis 
of  Species ,  p.  160),  that  the  time  required  for  these  changes  need  have 
been  so  long,  or  the  changes  themselves  so  gradual,  as  many  suppose. 
It  maybe  presumed  that  early  man  would  show  greater  plasticity,  and 
be  more  susceptible  to  new  influences,  than  his  successors ;  and  in 
historical  times  there  have  been  instances  of  very  remarkable  changes. 
Dr.  Livingstone  tells  us  that  the  negro  type  occurs  rarely  in  Africa, 
and  that  the  tribes  in  the  interior  differ  greatly  in  hue  and  colour. 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  165 


not  so  much  on  the  condition  of  existing  savages, 
as  on  the  facts  of  palaeontology  and  geology, 
which  are  believed  to  establish  an  immense 
antiquity,  and  rude  primitive  state,  of  the  human 
race.  To  these  palaeontological  facts,  accordingly, 
I  now  turn — and,  first,  of  the  question  of  the 
extreme  antiquity  of  man. 

It  is  well  known  that  the  chronology  of  Arch¬ 
bishop  Ussher,  framed  from  comparison  of  the 
numbers  of  the  Hebrew  text,  placed  the  creation 
of  the  world  and  of  man  about  4004  b.c.,  while 
the  Septuagint  numbers  enlarged  this  period  to 
5508  years.1  This  calculation,  however,  is  plainly 
erroneous.  Discovery  has  shown  that  the  civili¬ 
sation  of  Babylonia  and  Egypt  of  themselves  go 
back  considerably  beyond  Ussher’s  date  for  the 
Creation,  and  this,  in  Egypt  at  least,  is  many 
long  centuries  after  the  Flood,  and  leaves  no  room 
for  the  whole  antediluvian  period.  It  is  now 
generally  acknowledged  that  the  good  Arch¬ 
bishop’s  method  of  reckoning,  though  natural  at 
the  time,  is  based  on  data  that  do  not  really  yield 
it  with  any  certainty.  The  genealogies  of  the 

1  Ussher’s  real  date  was  4138  b.c.j  the  dates  for  the  Deluge  on 
the  two  reckonings  are  respectively  2348  and  3246  B.c. 


1 66 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


patriarchs  before  the  Flood,  and  of  the  descendants 
of  Noah  after  it,  are  not  of  a  character  that  admit 
of  precise  calculations  being  based  on  them. 
They  precede  strictly  historical  times  ;  it  is  not 
improbable  that  they  represent  to  some  extent 
clan  successions ;  in  any  case  they  offer  no 
guarantee  of  completeness.1 

On  the  other  hand,  the  tendency  in  modern 
scientific  speculation  has  been  to  claim  for  man  an 
almost  fabulous  antiquity.  Common  estimates 
are  100,000  or  200,000  years ;  some,  as  Dr. 
A.  R.  Wallace,  would  go  back  half  a  million.2 
The  evidence  on  which  such  computations  are 
based  may  be  seen  in  Lyell’s  Antiquity  of 
Man  and  similar  works.  Now  it  cannot  be 
denied  that,  if  such  an  immense  antiquity 
could  really  be  made  out  for  man,  it  would 
involve  a  revolution  in  our  whole  mode  of 
conception  of  man’s  original  condition  and  sub¬ 
sequent  history.3  But  here,  now,  comes  in  the 

1  It  is  a  fault  of  Dr.  Driver’s  argument  that  he  seeks  to  fix  the 
Bible  reader  down  to  the  Ussher  chronology.  See  a  valuable  article 
by  the  late  Professor  W.  H.  Green  in  the  Bib.  Sacra  for  April  1890. 

2  In  Nature ,  Oct.  2,  1873,  PP*  462-463  ;  cf.  his  Darwinism,  p.  456. 

3  The  difficulty,  however,  is  perhaps  even  greater  for  the  evolu¬ 
tionist,  for  the  skulls  referred  to  that  remote  period  are  as  good  as 
those  of  modern  men.  See  below,  pp.  183  ff. 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  167 


remarkable  fact  that  the  original  contentions,  at 
least,  on  this  subject  have  proved  incapable  of 
being  maintained,  and  that  on  scientific  grounds 
alone  it  has  been  found  necessary  to  retrench 
enormously  the  periods  claimed  for  man’s  exist¬ 
ence  on  the  earth.1  One  after  another  of  the 
evidences  relied  on  has  been  shown  to  be 
fallacious.  No  evidence,  e,g.,  was  deemed  more 
striking  than  that  derived  from  the  stalag¬ 
mite  formations  in  Kent’s  Cavern,  Torquay. 
Professor  Boyd  Dawkins,  however — himself  an 
advocate  of  a  great  antiquity  for  man — takes  the 
ground  from  this  by  remarking  :  4  The  value  of  a 
layer  of  stalagmite  in  measuring  the  antiquity  of 
deposits  below  it  is  comparatively  little.  The 
layers,  for  instance,  in  Kent’s  Hole,  which  are 
generally  believed  to  have  required  a  considerable 

1  Professor  G.  F.  Wright  says,  in  an  article  in  Bib.  Sacra,  1903,  on 
the  Lansing  discovery  (p.  31),  ‘Geological  time  is  not  that  enor¬ 
mous  quantity  which  it  was  supposed  to  be  twenty-five  years  ago. 
During  that  period  there  has  been  a  revolution  of  opinion  respecting 
geological  time  which'  is  as  yet  scarcely  appreciated  by  anthro¬ 
pologists  and  theologians.  .  .  .  Geological  time  is  not  one-hundredth 
part  so  long  as  it  was  supposed  to  be  fifty  years  ago.  The  popular 
writers  who  glibly  talk  of  the  antiquity  of  man  upon  the  basis  of  the 
old  geologic  ratios  are  behind  the  times,  and  are  ignorant  of  the  new 
light  that,  like  a  flood,  has  been  shed  upon  this  whole  question  during 
the  last  few  years.’  See  below,  pp.  173  fF. 


1 68 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


lapse  of  time,  may  possibly  have  been  formed  at 
the  rate  of  a  quarter  of  an  inch  per  annum  ’■ — 
at  which  rate  ‘  20  feet  of  stalagmite  might  be 
formed  in  1000  years.’1  Mr.  Pengelly’s  esti¬ 
mate  for  the  deposit  was  5000  years  for  one  inch, 
and  60  times  5000,  or  300,000  years  for  5  feet  ! 
The  same  authority,  in  an  address  at  the  British 
Association,  said :  c  The  question  of  the  antiquity 
of  man  is  inseparably  connected  with  the  further 
question,  is  it  possible  to  measure  the  lapse  of 
geological  time  in  years  ?  Various  attempts  have 
been  made,  and  all,  as  it  seems  to  me,  have  ended 
in  failure.  Till  we  know  the  rate  of  causation 
in  the  past,  and  until  we  can  be  sure  that  it  is 
invariable  and  uninterrupted,  I  cannot  see  any¬ 
thing  but  failure  in  the  future.’ 2 

I  am  saved,  however,  from  the  necessity  of 
going  into  the  evidences  in  detail,  for  there  is  one 

1  Cave  Hunting ,  pp.  39-41. 

2  Report ,  September  6th,  1888.  I  may  cite  the  remarks  of 
Professor  Huxley  on  the  Somme  deposits — another  leading  evidence  : 
c  The  question  as  to  the  exact  time  to  be  attached  to  alluvial  remains 
in  the  valley  of  the  Somme  could  not  be  settled  satisfactorily.  .  .  . 
There  had  been  enormous  changes  during  the  last  five  hundred  years 
in  the  north  of  Europe.  The  volcanoes  of  Iceland  had  been  con¬ 
tinually  active  ,•  great  floods  of  lava  had  been  poured  forth,  and  the 
level  of  the  coast  had  been  most  remarkably  changed.  Similar 
causes  might  have  produced  enormous  changes  in  the  valley  of  the 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  169 


point  to  which,  I  think  I  am  right  in  saying,  the 
whole  question  now  nearly  reduces  itself,  and  on 
which  it  is  becoming  possible  to  form  some 
definite  judgment.  This  crucial  point  is  the 
relation  of  the  earliest-known  traces  of  man  to 
what  is  called  in  geology  the  Glacial  Period.  I 
think  I  am  within  the  mark  in  affirming  that 
there  is  a  considerable — probably  growing — con¬ 
census  of  opinion  among  competent  authorities 
that  the  earliest  certain  traces  of  man  are  post¬ 
glacial,1  or  at  least  not  much  earlier  than  the 
close  of  the  glacial  period.2  I  go  back  to  an 

Somme,  and  therefore  any  arguments  based,  as  to  time,  upon  the 
appearances  of  the  valley,  were  not  to  be  trusted  ’  {Brit.  Assoc.  1877). 
On  the  probable  age  of  the  deposits,  see  Prestwich’s  Geology ,  ii. 
p.  533,  and  Wright’s  Man  and  the  Glacial  Period ,  p.  355  ff. 

1  Less  certain,  because  depending  on  differing  interpretations  of 
the  phenomena,  are  the  few  evidences  adduced  of  inter-g lacial  man 
(see  below).  A  certain  ambiguity,  unfortunately,  rests  on  the  use  of 
these  terms  ‘  post-glacial,’  ‘  inter-glacial,’  etc.,  which  gives  rise  to 
some  confusion  (see  below,  p.  173).  Sir  J.  W.  Dawson  writes: 
‘  Whether  attributed,  as  by  some,  to  the  latest  inter-glacial  period, 
or  to  the  post-glacial — a  mere  question  of  terms,  not  of  facts  ’ 
{Geol.  and  Hist.  p.  21). 

2  I  observe  from  an  article  in  1 "he  Liberal  Churchman  for  June 
I9°5  (PP-  222-223),  that  Professor  G.  Henslow  is  of  a  very  different 
opinion.  ‘The  abundant  evidence,’  he  says,  ‘of  the  existence  of 
prehistoric  man  in  wellnigh  all  quarters  of  the  globe,  proves  him  to 
have  been  on  a  uniformly  low  level  of  barbarism  for  an  incalculable 
length  of  time  j  for  the  vast  antiquity  of  the  human  race  is  seen  in 
the  all  but  undeniable  proofs  of  his  pre-glacial  existence.’  And  in  a 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


170 

important  meeting  of  the  British  Anthropological 
Institute  held  in  1877  to  discuss  the  question  of 
whether  man’s  appearance  was  pre-glacial,  inter¬ 
glacial,  or  post-glacial.  Sir  John  Evans,  Pro¬ 
fessors  Huxley,  Prestwich,  Rolleston,  Dawkins, 
Hughes,  and  many  other  notables  were  present, 
and  the  almost  unanimous  conclusion  of  the 
meeting,  says  the  editor  of  Nature ,  was  that  ‘  the 
fossil  mammalia  of  the  pleistocene  tell  us  nothing 
of  the  relation  of  man  to  the  glacial  period.  .  .  . 
The  general  question  of  the  antiquity  of  man  in 
Europe  was  not  discussed,  though  we  gathered 
that  the  evidence  of  man  in  the  Italian  pliocene 
was  not  considered  satisfactory.  The  general 
impression  left  upon  our  minds  is  that  in  Britain 
there  is  no  evidence  of  any  palaeolithic  man, 
either  in  caves  or  the  river  deposits,  of  an  age 
older  than  post-glacial.’ 1  Not  much  is  to  be 


note :  ( Astronomical  considerations  would  place  the  glacial  epoch 
some  100,000  years  ago.’  The  reader  must  judge.  What  could 
set  man,  we  may  only  ask,  after  these  untold  ages  of  unprogressive 
barbarism,  suddenly  on  a  career  of  development  to  brilliant  civilisa¬ 
tion  ?  Has  this  verisimilitude  ? 

1  Nature ,  June  7,  pp.  97-8.  A  chief  evidence  of  pre-glacial  man, 
which  Professor  Boyd  Dawkins  had  at  first  accepted,  though  with 
misgiving,  was  a  fragment  of  bone,  believed  to  be  human,  found 
under  glacial  clay  in  Victoria  Cave,  near  Settle,  Yorkshire,  in  1872. 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  171 


added  in  modification  of  this  verdict  from  sub¬ 
sequent  discovery.1  There  are,  I  know,  some 
eminent  geologists  who  think  that  relics  of  man 
or  of  his  handiwork  have  been  discovered  in 
pliocene  deposits  of  the  tertiary  period — e.g .,  the 
Calaveras  skull  in  California  about  which,  from 
its  very  high  type,  even  evolutionists  are  sceptical 2 
— but  their  inferences  are  contested  by  others  of 
equal  distinction,  and  the  general  view  perhaps  is 

At  the  meeting  in  1877  above  referred  to,  Professor  Dawkins  gave 
his  reasons  for  believing  that  the  bone  was  not  human  but  ursine, 
and  held  that  the  clay  was  not  proved  to  be  glacial  clay. 

1  The  American  evidence  is  very  clearly  given  in  Dr.  G.  F. 
Wright’s  Man  and  the  Glacial  Period ,  ch.  viii.  The  deposits  incor¬ 
porating  human  relics,  with  one  doubtful  exception  (Claymont, 
Delaware),  he  places  4  well  on  towards  the  close  of  the  great  Ice  Age  ’ 
(pp.  254,  258).  [Even  these,  however,  especially  the  ‘finds’  at 
Trenton,  N.J.,  have  since  been  very  effectively  challenged  by  Mr. 
W.  H.  Holmes,  of  the  American  Geological  Survey.  See  Science , 
November  1892,  etc.].  By  far  the  most  recent  important  discovery 
in  this  connection  is  that  of  the  Lansing  Skeleton  in  Kansas  in  1902, 
which  has  been  the  subject  of  keen  discussion.  4  The  Lansing 
Skeleton,’  we  are  told,  4  affords  probably  our  oldest  proof  of  man’s 
presence  on  this  continent  ’  (Bib.  Sacra ,  1902,  p.  741).  See  Note  XII. 
on  the  Lansing  Skeleton,  and  cf.  below,  p.  184. 

2  See  below,  p.  184.  On  this,  and  on  the  evidence  for  tertiary  man 
generally,  see  Appendix  by  Professor  H.  W.  Haynes  to  Wright’s 
Man  and  the  Glacial  Period.  Professor  Haynes  remarks  on  the 
Californian  relics  (pp.  372-374) :  4  No  archaeologist  will  believe  that, 
while  palaeolithic  man  has  not  yet  been  discovered  in  the  tertiary 
deposits  of  Western  Europe,  the  works  of  neolithic  man  have  been 
found  in  similar  deposits  in  Western  America.’ 


172 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


very  fairly  summed  up  in  an  able  article  on  the 
subject  in  the  London  Quarterly  Review  for  July 
1 896.  c  We  need  no  longer/  the  writer  says,  ‘  dis¬ 
cuss  the  problem  of  tertiary  man,  as  man’s  existence 
in  these  distant  ages  has  been  most  emphatically 
denied  by  many  of  the  leading  geologists  in  Eng¬ 
land,  France,  and  America.  In  England  Sir  John 
Evans,  Sir  Joseph  Prestwich,  and  Professor 
Hughes  all  refuse  to  accept  it  ;  and  Professor 
Boyd  Dawkins,  in  his  greatest  work,  rejects  the 
idea  that  man  lived  during  the  tertiary  period.1 
Even  in  France — where  the  theory  is  more 
favourably  regarded — so  able  an  archaeologist  as 
M.  Carthaillac  rejects  the  evidence  for  tertiary 
man.  In  America  also,  Sir  J.  W.  Dawson  will 
not  accept  the  theory,  and  Professor  Haynes,  after 
having  examined  all  the  evidence  for  tertiary  man, 
at  length  rejects  the  idea  completely.’ 2 

The  question,  then,  as  to  the  age  of  the  known 

1  See  Note  VIII.  on  Professor  Boyd  Dawkins  on  Tertiary  Man. 

2  Cf.  the  confident  assertions  of  a  writer  like  Mr.  S.  Laing : 
‘The  evidence  for  the  existence  of  man,  or  for  some  ancestral  form 
of  man,  in  the  tertiary  period,  has  accumulated  to  such  an  extent  (!) 
that  there  are  few  competent  anthropologists  who  any  longer  deny 
it  ’  ( Human  Origins ,  pop.  edit.  pp.  421-4.22).  Even  Mr.  Laing,  how¬ 
ever,  is  doubtful  about  the  Calaveras  skull,  which  shows  no  approach 
to  an  ‘  ancestral  form.’ 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  173 


remains  of  man,  resolves  itself  pretty  much  into 
this  :  what  period  of  time  has  elapsed  since  the 
close  of  the  Ice  Age  ?  Formerly  hypothetical 
calculations  were  made  width  put  the  close  of  this 
age  a  very  long  way  back  indeed.  Fortunately 
the  means  exist,  especially  on  the  American 
Continent,  of  putting  these  calculations  to  a  very 
precise  test,  and  large  numbers  of  eminent  scien¬ 
tific  men  have  devoted  their  attention  to  the 
subject  with  remarkable  and,  in  the  main  point, 
singularly  accordant  results.  One  of  the  best 
accounts  of  these  computations,  and  of  the  facts 
and  theories  on  the  Ice  Age  generally,  is  found  in 
Professor  Wright’s  book,  Man  and  the  Glacial 
Period ,  in  the  International  Scientific  Series.  The 
conclusions  there  reached  are  in  harmony  with 
those  of  Professor  Prestwich,  the  greatest  English 
authority  on  pleistocene  geology.1  One  impor- 

1  Professor  Prestwich  estimated  the  duration  of  the  glacial  period 
itself  at  about  25,000  years  (in  Wright,  p.  364).  There  are  con¬ 
siderable  differences  in  the  interpretation  of  glacial  and  post-glacial 
phenomena,  some  affirming,  others  disputing,  inter-glacial  periods, 
and  many  contending  for  a  great  post-glacial  submergence  constitut¬ 
ing  a  distinct  break  between  palaeolithic  and  neolithic  man.  The 
latter  is  brought  by  many  into  relations  with  the  Biblical  Flood. 
Thus  Howarth,  Prestwich,  the  Duke  of  Argyll,  G.  F.  Wright,  Sir 
J.  W.  Dawson,  etc.  See  Howarth’s  Mammoth  and  the  Flood ; 
three  articles  on  ‘  Geological  Confirmations  of  the  Noachian  Deluge,’ 


174 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


tant  chronometer  is  Niagara  Falls,  which  are  of 
post-glacial  origin.  Lyell  computed  the  age  of 
the  Falls  at  about  one  hundred  thousand  years  ; 
but  a  series  of  accurate  surveys  have  since  been 
made  by  the  New  York  State  Geologists,  and  by 
Mr.  Woodward,  of  the  United  States  Geological 
Survey,  extending  from  1842  to  1866,  which 
have  resulted  in  showing  a  rate  of  retrocession 
of  two  and  a  half  feet  per  annum,  and  much  more 
at  the  centre.  The  whole  excavation,  in  the 
opinion  of  these  experts,  cannot  have  occupied 
longer  than  seven  thousand  years.1  Exactly 
similar  results  have  been  yielded  by  a  long  series 
of  observations  on  the  Falls  of  St.  Anthony 
at  Minneapolis.  The  length  of  time  since  the 
commencement  of  cutting  of  the  gorge  in  the 
post-glacial  age  is  reckoned  by  Professor 
Winchell  at  eight  thousand  years.2  To  these  a 
large  number  of  corroborative  calculations  have 

by  Professor  G.  F.  Wright  in  Bib.  Sacra  for  1902,  with  the  literature 
there  mentioned ;  Dawson’s  Meeting-Place  of  Geology  and  History , 
etc. 

1  Wright,  pp.  338-339.  Allowing  for  an  outlet  from  the  Great 
Lakes  in  a  dilferent  direction  in  early  post-glacial  times,  the  time 
may  be  a  little  longer  (see  art.  referred  to  below  by  Professor  Wright 
on  ‘The  Revision  of  Geological  Time  ’  in  Bib.  Sacra ,  July  1903). 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  340-341. 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  175 


since  been  added,  based  on  careful  observation, 
and  overthrowing  old  extravagant  estimates. 
Such  are  the  measurements  of  Professor  Hicks  in 
a  river-valley  in  Ohio  ;  of  Professor  Wright  in 
Andover  ;  and  of  Dr.  E.  Andrews,  of  Chicago,  on 
the  rate  of  erosion  of  Lake  Michigan.  These, 
again,  yield  the  result  that  ‘  the  post-glacial  time 
cannot  be  more  than  ten  thousand  years,  and  pro¬ 
bably  not  more  than  seven  thousand/ 1  How 
entirely  revolutionary  these  views  are  of  the 
older  calculations,  and  how  completely  they  bring 
the  age  of  man  within  limits  easily  reconcilable 
with  the  Biblical  representations,  need  not  be  dwelt 
on.  Their  bearings  also  on  the  primitive  condition 
of  man  are  great,  and  will  presently  be  indicated. 

Another  cause,  however,  which  has  necessitated 
the  revision  of  the  extravagant  estimates  of  time 
formerly  current,  and  demanded  by  the  Darwinian 
theory,  came  from  another  quarter  than  geology 
— -viz.,  physical  science  and  astronomy.  There 
seemed  practically  no  limits  to  the  drafts  which 
evolutionists,  with  the  sanction  of  geologists, 
were  prepared  to  make  on  the  bank  of  time. 

1  Bib.  Sacra ,  July  1903,  p.  346.  See  further.  Note  IX.  on  The 
End  of  the  Ice  Age. 


176 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


Darwin,  in  the  first  edition  of  his  Origin  of  Species , 
estimated  the  time  required  for  the  erosion  of  the 
Wealden  deposits  in  England  alone  at  306,662,400 
years  (!),  and  spoke  of  this  as  ‘a  mere  trifle  ’  at 
his  command  for  the  purposes  of  his  theory.1  It 
was  a  rude  blow  to  these  millionaires  in  time 
when  another  Darwin — Dr.  George  H.  Darwin, 
of  Cambridge  —  demonstrated  that  the  physical 
conditions  were  such  that  geology  must  limit 
itself  to  a  period  inside  of  100,000,000  years. 
Lord  Kelvin,  Professor  Tait,  and  Professor  New¬ 
comb  approach  the  subject  from  another  point, 
and,  on  grounds  that  seem  cogent,  bring  down 
the  whole  period  that  can  be  given  to  the  geo¬ 
logists  much  further — to  20,000,000,  15,000,000, 
or  even  to  10,000,000  years.2  In  fact,  in  a  lecture 

1  Ed.  1859,  P-  287.  a  PaPer  read  to  the  Congress  of  Zoologists 
at  Cambridge  in  1898,  Professor  Haeckel  spoke  of  1000  millions  of 
years  as  necessary  for  his  evolution  tree  !  When  reminded  that 
physical  science  would  not  allow  him  more  than  25  millions  of  years, 
he  said  that  he  had  got  the  time  from  an  eminent  geologist,  and 
that  he  himself  ‘  had  no  intuition  of  the  length  of  time.’  In  his 
Riddle  he  considerately  asks  no  more  than  48  millions  of  years  (p.  97). 

2  ‘  Lord  Kelvin  is  willing,  I  believe,’  said  Sir  Archibald  Geikie  in 
his  President’s  Address  to  the  British  Association  in  1892,  ‘to  grant 
us  some  twenty  millions  of  years,  but  Professor  Tait  would  have  us 
content  with  less  than  ten  millions.’  Professor  Tait  himself  says: 
‘  Physical  considerations  from  various  independent  points  of  view 
render  it  utterly  impossible  that  more  than  ten  or  fifteen  millions  of 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  177 


on  the  sun’s  heat,  Lord  Kelvin,  assuredly  our 
highest  authority  on  purely  physical  questions, 
declares  that  the  age  of  the  sun  is  not  more  than 
20,000,000  years 1 — which,  if  correct,  would  not 
give  more  than  possibly  6,000,000  years  to  geo¬ 
logy.  These  conclusions  have,  of  course,  been 
contested  by  geologists  and  biologists,  but 
assuredly  have  not  been  overthrown.  While 
they  stand,  or  presuming  them  to  be  even  ap¬ 
proximately  correct,  they  carry  with  them  con¬ 
sequences  fatal  alike  to  the  Darwinian  slow 
development  of  species,  and  to  the  extremely 
remote  antiquity  claimed  for  man.  For  geo¬ 
logists  are  in  the  main  well  agreed  as  to  the 
relative  periods  of  time  to  be  devoted  to  the 
palaeozoic,  mesozoic,  and  casnozoic  periods  which 
they  distinguish.  Dana’s  ratio  is  12:3:1; 
others  suggest  13  :  3  :  i.2  This  means  that  the 

years  can  be  granted.  .  .  .  From  this  point  of  view  we  are  led  to  a 
limit  of  something  like  ten  millions  of  years  as  the  utmost  we  can 
give  to  geologists  for  their  speculations  as  to  the  history  even  of  the 
lowest  order  of  fossils’  ( Recent  Advances  in  Physical  Science , 
pp.  167-168). 

1  More  strictly,  of  the  sun’s  light  ( Lects .  and  Addresses ,  p.  390). 

2  Haeckel  in  his  Riddle  gives  the  proportions  slightly  differently 
for  the  organic  period  :  primary,  34,000,000  j  secondary,  1 1,000,000  j 
tertiary,  3,000,000 — the  last  still,  however,  it  will  be  observed,  one- 
sixteenth  of  the  whole  (48,000,000). 

M 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


1*78 


caenozoic  or  newest  period,  in  the  most  super¬ 
ficial  portions  of  which  alone  man’s  remains  are 
found,  has  only  one-sixteenth  of  the  whole,  or 
considerably  less  than  1,000,000  years :  if  Lord 
Kelvin  is  right  as  to  the  age  of  the  sun,  hardly 
a  quarter  of  that  period.  Of  these  the  eocene, 
miocene,  and  pliocene  will  require  six-sevenths, 
or  even  seven-eighths,  leaving  only  a  very  small 
fraction  of  time,  perhaps  100,000  years — it  may 
be  much  less — for  the  pleistocene  period,  in¬ 
cluding  the  glacial  age  and  the  period  of  man. 
This  agrees,  it  will  be  seen,  with  approximate 
accuracy,  with  the  foregoing  calculations  as  to  the 
late  date  and  comparatively  recent  close  ot  the 
glacial  period. 

There  is  one  consideration  more  to  which  I 
would  briefly  advert.  The  results  thus  far 
reached,  not  by  Biblical  apologists,  but  by  men 
of  science  working  on  their  own  data,  agree  in  a 
remarkable  way  with  the  general  evidence  afforded 
by  history.  It  is  well  known  that  recent  dis¬ 
coveries  in  Babylonia  and  Egypt  carry  back  man’s 
appearance  in  history  several  thousands  of  years 
beyond  the  traditional  Biblical  date  ;  still,  how¬ 
ever,  not  apparently  beyond  5000,  6000,  or  at 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  179 


most  7000  years  b.c.  The  history  of  civilisation, 
as  we  now  read  it,  begins  with  Babylonia.  It 
bursts  upon  us  there,  however,  as  all  these  ancient 
civilisations  do,  in  something  like  maturity.  We 
have  not  yet  been  able  to  reach  a  period  in  the 
development  of  these  nations  when  we  leave 
behind  us  letters  and  arts.1  Behind  stands,  we 
shall  suppose,  the  age  of  palaeolithic  man— sharply 
separated,  some  believe,  by  the  post-glacial  sub¬ 
mergence  (Deluge)  from  that  of  neolithic  man — 
but  it  is  in  no  way  proved  that  this  older  age  was 
not,  in  part,  contemporary  with  a  (or  the)  higher 
civilisation.  Neither  the  recollections  nor  the 
traditions  of  these  oldest  civilised  peoples  know 
anything  of  a  past  which  would  be  compatible  with 
those  enormous  stretches  of  blank,  unprogres¬ 
sive  savagery  which  the  opposite  theory  assumes. 
There  is  much  justification  for  the  view  that,  if 
we  allow,  say,  from  12,000  to  15,000  years  since 

1  This  was  true  till  recently  of  both  Egypt  and  Babylonia.  The 
case  is  partially  altered  as  regards  Egypt  by  the  remarkable  discoveries 
between  1894  and  1901  of  the  graves  and  other  remains  of  a  race 
distinct  from  the  dynastic  Egyptians — the  so-called  4  New  Race  ’  of 
Professor  Petrie.  A  full  account  of  these  discoveries  and  of  the 
theories  to  which  they  have  given  rise  may  be  seen  in  Budge’s  History 
of  Egypt ,  1.  ch.  i.  They  do  not  essentially  affect  our  conclusions. 
See  Note  X.  on  the  ‘  New  Race  ’  in  Egypt. 


1 80 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


the  time  of  man’s  first  appearance  on  our  globe, 
we  do  ample  justice  to  all  the  facts  that  are  avail¬ 
able,  and  probably  the  lower  figure  is  nearer  the 
mark  than  the  higher. 

There  is  but  one  answer  to  all  this,  and  it 
forms  the  real  ground  on  which,  in  so  many 
quarters,  a  long  antiquity  and  semi-brutish  origin 
is  still  claimed  for  man.  It  is  the  theory  of 
evolution.  Man,  it  is  said,  must  have  been  hun¬ 
dreds  of  thousands  of  years  upon  the  earth  to 
give  time  for  his  slow  development  upwards  to 
the  stage  at  which  we  find  him  on  his  earliest 
historical  appearance.1  It  is  wonderful  to  observe 
the  hold  which  this  idea  of  man’s  extremely  slow 
ascent  from  an  animal  condition  has  on  the 
imaginations  even  of  those  who  decline  to  accept 
the  unmodified  Darwinian  hypothesis  of  his  origin. 
I  spoke  before  on  the  relation  of  evolution  to 
man’s  origin  ;  I  make  now  the  following  remarks 
on  its  bearing  on  man’s  primitive  condition  : — 

1  Thus  Wallace  argues :  Man  1  must  therefore  have  diverged 
from  the  common  ancestral  form  before  the  existing  types  of  anthro¬ 
poid  apes  had  diverged  from  one  another.  Now,  this  divergence 
almost  certainly  took  place  as  early  as  the  miocene  period,’  etc 
(Darwinism,  pp.  455-456).  So  Geikie  in  British  Association 
Address  (above). 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  181 


I.  Negatively,  I  would  say  first,  that  it  is  a 
false  issue  to  represent  the  view  just  stated  as 
following  necessarily  from  the  principles  of  evolu¬ 
tion.  From  the  Darwinian  theory  of  evolution  it 
does  follow  ;  but  that  view,  which  transforms 
man  from  the  apes  by  slow  and  insensible  grada¬ 
tions,  through  natural  selection,  has  been  shown 
to  be  without  sufficient  warrant,  and  is  widely 
discredited  among  naturalists  themselves.  The 
time  for  it,  as  we  have  seen,  cannot  be  allowed  ; 
the  agencies  invoked — fortuitous  variation,  natural 
selection,  and  survival  of  the  fittest — could  never 
have  brought  it  about  ;  chief  of  all,  it  is  contra¬ 
dicted  by  the  facts  of  man’s  mental  and  moral 
nature,  which  show  him  to  stand  on  a  different 
platform  altogether  from  the  animals,  and  to 
require  a  special  cause  for  his  origin.  But  if  such 
a  special  cause  is  postulated,  and  it  is  allowed  that 
man  represents,  mentally  and  physically,  a  rise  on 
the  previous  orders  of  nature — that  with  him 
there  is  the  introduction  of  something  new,  the 
founding  of  a  new  kingdom  —  then  there  is 
nothing  to  require  that,  on  his  first  appearance, 
man  should  answer  to  the  degrading  descriptions 
that  are  given  of  him.  It  is  a  mistake,  therefore, 


i82 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


on  the  part  of  those  who  reject  pure  Darwinism 
to  think,  as  they  often  seem  to  do,  that  evolution 
commits  them  to  assume  that  man  must  begin  at 
the  lowest  savage  state,  or  a  degree  below  it. 
The  logical  ground  for  such  a  contention  is  parted 
with,  when  it  is  granted  that  man  is  not  an  evolu¬ 
tion  by  slow  and  insensible  gradations  from  the 
ape,  but  is  the  beginning  of  a  new  order.  If 
Professor  Huxley’s  ‘jumps  ’  in  nature  are  warrant¬ 
able  anywhere,  surely  it  is  here.1  If  the  idea  of 
slow  transition  is  discarded  as  a  necessary  implicate 
of  a  theory  of  evolution — and  I  think  it  must — 
man  may  have  been  in  his  origin  as  pure  and 
upright  as  the  most  orthodox  theory  requires.2 

2.  Palaeontology,  as  before  shown,  bears  this 
out  :  on  the  one  hand,  in  failing  to  furnish  any 
evidence  of  intermediate  forms  between  man  and 


1  Prof.  G.  F.  Wright,  in  his  article  on  the  Lansing  Skull  ( Bib . 
Sacra,  1903,  p.  30)  says:  ‘There  is  not  adequate  scientific  evidence 
going  to  show  that  the  origin  of  man,  even  on  the  evolutionary 
hypothesis,  was  not  a  sudden  leap,  which  might  well  involve  a  divine 
interference,  and  might  properly  be  called  a  miracle.  Those  evolu¬ 
tionists  who  maintain  that  the  passage  from  the  physical  development 
of  the  lower  members  of  the  anthropoid  family  to  that  of  man  was 
by  infinitesimal  stages  have  few  facts  to  go  upon,  and  are  taking  an 
immense  leap  in  the  dark.’ 

2  See  passage  quoted  from  Otto  ( Theol .  Rund.,  1903,  p.  233),  in 
Note  XI.  on  The  Sudden  Origin  of  Man. 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  183 


the  ape  ;  and,  on  the  other,  by  the  accumulating 
evidence  it  affords  that  in  brain  capacity  and 
physical  characteristics,  primeval  man  stood  on  as 
high  a  level  as  the  average  man  of  to-day.  This 
is  the  disconcerting  thing  for  evolutionism,  that, 
however  far  the  remains  of  man  are  carried  back, 
we  never  get  any  nearer  a  being  not  man  :  the 
oldest  skulls  are  quite  as  good  as  the  new. 
Professor  Huxley’s  testimony  was  cited  in  last 
lecture  to  the  high  and  human  character  of  the 
Engis  and  even  of  the  (somewhat  more  degraded, 
but  less  ancient)  Neanderthal  skulls.1  The  famous 
‘  Old  Man  of  Cro-Magnon  ’  (palaeolithic)  is 
described  as  ‘  of  great  stature,  being  nearly  six 
feet  high  ’  (other  specimens  of  the  race  are  seven 
feet)  ‘ .  .  .  The  skull  proper,  or  brain  case,  is 
very  long — more  so  than  in  ordinary  skulls — 
and  this  length  is  accompanied  with  a  great 
breadth  ;  so  that  the  brain  was  of  greater  size 
than  in  average  modern  men,  and  the  frontal 
region  was  largely  and  well  developed.’ 2  The 
higher  the  antiquity  of  these  skulls,  the  greater 

1  See  above,  p.  132.  Cf.  Wright’s  Man  and  the  Glacial  Period , 
pp.  275-276. 

2  Dawson,  Meeting-Place  of  Geology  and  History ,  pp.  53-54. 


184 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


the  difficulty  for  the  evolutionist  ;  it  is  not  in¬ 
frequently,  therefore,  from  the  anthropological 
side  that  the  stoutest  opposition  comes  to  the 
admission  of  their  aged  So  we  read  in  the  article 
of  the  London  Quarterly  Review ,  formerly  quoted, 
on  the  Calaveras  skull,  attributed  by  some  to  the 
pliocene  period  :  ‘  Mr.  Laing  is  doubtful  :  and 
well  he  may  be,  for  the  skull  is  of  a  very  high  type, 
resembling  those  of  the  modern  Eskimo,  and  if 
it  be  a  genuine  pliocene  relic,  it  deals  a  death¬ 
blow  to  the  idea  that  man  was  developed  from 
an  ape,  or  any  ape-like  creature.’  Dr.  Dawson 
writes  of  a  European  skeleton  found  in  pliocene 
beds  at  Castelnedolo,  near  Brescia  :  ‘  Unfortunately 
the  skull  of  the  only  perfect  skeleton  is  said  to 
have  been  of  fair  proportions  and  superior  to  those 
of  the  ruder  types  of  post-glacial  men.  This 
has  cast  a  shade  of  suspicion  on  the  discovery 
especially  on  the  part  of  evolutionists  who  think 

1  This  has  been  anew  exemplified  in  the  case  of  the  Lansing 
Skull,  of  which  Professor  Wright  says:  ‘The  skull  does  not  differ, 
in  its  shape  and  capacity,  to  any  appreciable  extent,  from  that  of 
some  of  the  modern  Indian  tribes,  or  at  any  rate  of  individuals  of 
these  tribes.’  He  remarks  that  ‘  the  most  persistent  a  priori  objections 
to  a  recognition  of  this  skeleton  as  of  glacial  age  comes  from  the 
anthropologists’  {Bib.  Sacra ,  1903,  p.  29).  Professor  Chamberlin, 
e.g.,  assigns  to  it  ‘a  very  respectable  antiquity,  but  much  short  of  the 
glacial  invasion.’  See  Note  XII.  on  The  Lansing  Skeleton. 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  185 


that  it  is  not  in  accordance  with  theory  that  man 
should  retrograde  between  the  pliocene  and  the 
early  modern  period,  instead  of  advancing/1  The 
state  of  the  case  seems  well  summed  up  by  the 
London  Quarterly  Review  writer,  of  whose  words 
I  again  avail  myself.  ‘  On  reviewing  the  whole 
period  of  prehistoric  times,’  he  says,  ‘  the  idea 
which  strikes  us  most  forcibly  is  the  high  in¬ 
tellectual  character  of  the  earliest  men.  The 
palaeolithic  men- — the  first  revealed  to  us  by 
science — had  heads  as  large  as,  or  even  larger 
than,  the  average  inhabitant  of  Western  Europe 
in  the  present  day,  and  they  must  have  possessed 
brains  at  least  equal  in  size  to  any  men  now  living, 
while  in  strength  and  stature  and  form  they  were 
as  far  removed  from  apes  as  are  the  modern 
Europeans.  ...  It  is  therefore  certain  that 
geological  and  arch asologi cal  research  has  given 
a  verdict  strongly  opposed  to  the  idea  that  man 
has  been  developed  from  an  ape,  or  from  any 
ape-like  creature  whatever.’ 

3.  The  facts  already  adverted  to  as  to  the  high 

1  Geology  and  History ,  p.  29.  It  seems  now  commonly  agreed 
that  the  presence  of  the  skeletons  in  these  beds  is  due  to  interment 
( Man  and  Glacial  Period ,  App.  p.  366). 


i  $6  GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 

character  of  early  civilisation  are  adverse  to  the 
theory  of  the  slow  evolutionary  origin  and  original 
brutishness  of  man.  Instead  of  finding  man 
more  savage  as  we  push  his  history  backward  in 
Egypt  and  Babylonia,  we  find  him  possessed  of 
most  of  the  elements  of  civilisation — and  I  shall 
add  of  purer  ideas  of  divine  things — than  he 
subsequently  entertained.  The  progress  of  dis¬ 
covery  here  in  recent  years  has  been  a  continual 
series  of  surprises.  We  are  taken  back  6000  or 
7000  years  b.c.,  probably  more  than  half  the  total 
period  of  man’s  existence  ;  and  still  we  find  arts, 
letters,  laws,  religion,  cities,  temples,  and  most  of 
the  things  we  identify  with  progress.  This,  too, 
in  those  regions  which  most  now  acknowledge  to 
be  the  original  centres  of  the  distribution  of  the 
populations  of  the  world.  The  rude  and  degraded 
races,  on  the  other  hand,  are,  as  a  rule,  not  found 
near  the  centre  of  distribution,  but  in  outlying 
parts.  c  It  is  a  fact,’  says  the  Duke  of  Argyll,  in 
a  chapter  which  deserves  study  in  his  Unity  of 
Nature ,  ‘  that  the  lowest  and  rudest  tribes  in  the 
population  of  the  globe  have  been  found  at  the 
farthest  extremities  of  its  larger  continents,  or  in 
the  distant  islands  of  its  great  oceans,  or  among 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  187 


the  hills  and  forests  which  in  every  land  have 
been  the  last  refuge  of  the  victims  of  violence 
and  misfortune.’1 

4.  To  all  which  I  may  add,  that  there  is  yet 
no  evidence  of  a  really  degraded  or  savage  tribe 
having  raised  itself  out  of  its  degradation  without 
contact  with  a  prior  higher  civilisation.  The 
statement  of  Dr.  Whately  stands  yet  unrefuted. 
5  Facts,’  he  says,  ‘  are  stubborn  things,  and  that 
no  authenticated  instance  can  be  produced  of 
savages  that  ever  did  emerge  unaided  from  that 
state  is  no  theory ,  but  a  statement,  hitherto  never 
refuted,  of  a  matter  of  fact.’ 2 

And  now,  in  concluding  this  discussion,  I  would 
have  you  look  at  the  matter  again  in  the  light  of 
the  true  idea  of  man .  I  put  the  question  earlier  : 
Is  it  enough  to  constitute  the  image  of  God  in 
man  that  he  should  possess  these  essential  attributes 
— personality,  rationality,  morality  ? — or  is  it  not 
also  required  that  he  should  be  in  a  moral  state 
actually  conformable  to  rectitude  ?  I  mean,  if 
man  is  a  moral  being  by  nature  and  destination, 

1  Page  426.  See  his  examples,  and  the  evidence  in  a  former  note 
to  the  fact  of  degradation  among  savages. 

2  Exeter  Hall  Lecture  on  The  Origin  of  Civilisation. 


1 8  8 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


is  it  reasonable  or  allowable  to  suppose  that  he 
would  be  launched  on  time  in  a  non-moral  or 
unmoral  condition  ?  For  it  cannot  be  overlooked 
that  if  a  moral  being  is  in  a  state  unconformable 
to  moral  law — a  state  in  which  passion  has  the 
ascendency  over  reason  and  conscience,  in  which 
the  latter  are  a  mere  glimmer  or  potentiality, 
while  wild,  ungoverned  impulses  rule — he  is  not 
merely  in  an  immature ,  but  is  in  a  wrong  moral 
state.  Moral  law  requires  not  merely  the  presence 
of  the  elements  of  a  moral  nature,  but  the  due 
harmony  of  the  elements  of  the  nature,  the  due 
subordination  of  desire  and  passion  to  reason — 
it  requires  moral  clearness,  moral  purity,  moral 
freedom  ;  and  of  all  these  things  the  state  described 
is  the  negation.  I  do  not  mean,  as  I  said  before, 
that  the  moral  conditions  are  not  satisfied  by  a 
state  of  great  simplicity — of  relative  childlikeness 
— but  that  it  requires  the  pure  nature  and  inner 
harmony  of  soul  which  gives  the  possibility  of 
sinless  development.  Where  that  is  absent,  and 
fierceness,  cruelty,  and  lust  rule  instead — made 
worse,  not  better,  by  self-consciousness — you  have, 
not  a  moral  being  in  the  true  sense,  but  a  being 
whose  nature  is  a  self-contradiction.  In  con- 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  189 

sistency  with  His  very  aim,  therefore,  of  introduc¬ 
ing  upon  the  earth  a  being  fitted  to  be  its  lord — 
the  rational  and  moral  image  of  Himself — it  would 
seem  that  the  Creator  could  not  introduce  man 
in  the  condition  supposed.  It  shocks  our  ideas 
of  God’s  holiness,  of  Elis  real  care  and  interest  in 
man,  of  His  Fatherhood — of  which  many  who  hold 
these  views  I  am  combating  make  so  much — to 
think  that  He  would  do  so.  What  kind  of  a 
father  is  it — we  are  entitled  to  ask — who  would 
launch  his  children  into  the  world,  as  God  is 
supposed  to  have  launched  man,  and  would  have 
left  them  for  uncounted  ages  to  struggle  upwards 
as  best  they  could  out  of  bestial  conditions  ?  The 
Fatherhood  that  is  compatible  with  such  a  theory 
is  not  the  Fatherhood  of  the  Gospel. 

I  take  it,  then,  that  the  view  which  accords 
best  with  the  Biblical  doctrine,  and  with  the 
Christian  gospel  of  redemption,  is  also  that  which 
accords  best  with  the  facts  of  man’s  nature,  and 
with  what  we  are  entitled  to  expect  from  just 
views  of  God.  It  is  not  unreasonable  to  believe 
— and  I  for  one  do  believe  it — that  man  was 
introduced  into  the  world  in  a  manner  and  state 
conformable  with  his  moral  nature,  his  destina- 


190 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


tion  to  sonship  with  God,  and  his  glorious  pre¬ 
rogative  of  immortality — through  which  features 
he  is  distinguished  from  all  below  him  ;  that, 
not  in  name  only,  but  in  reality,  he  was  made 
in  the  image  of  God.  He  need  not  have  been 
mentally  developed  in  any  high  degree  ;  but,  as 
a  pure  being,  he  would  stand  in  a  relation  to 
God,  and  would  be  the  recipient  of  communica¬ 
tions  from  Him,  suited  to  start  him  on  his  high 
career.  He  would  not  be  left  an  orphaned  being  ; 
God  in  some  way  would  be  around  him,  near 
him,  taking  him  in  hand  as  his  teacher  and 
guide.  We  are,  after  all,  wonderfully  near  the 
old  story  of  the  Book  of  Genesis  in  this ;  and 
that  book,  I  take  it,  gives  us  in  essence  more 
sound  philosophy  on  this  point  than  all  the  sages 
we  can  consult. 

My  treatment  would  still  be  incomplete  if  1 
did  not  ask  you  further  to  observe  how,  from 
this  whole  subject  we  have  been  considering, 
there  emerge  the  two  grand  truths  which  enter 
so  deeply  into  our  Christian  view  of  man — the 
divine  sonship  of  man,  and  his  immortal  destiny. 
Sonship,  I  grant,  is  an  idea  to  which,  as  respects 
the  individual,  we  find  only  approximations  in 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  19 1 


the  Old  Testament  ; 1  it  is  in  its  perfection  a 
revelation  of  the  Gospel.  Yet  already  it  lies 
in  principle  in  the  fact  that  man  is  made  in  God’s 
image,  has  rational  and  ethical  resemblance  to 
Him,  and  through  this  spiritual  affinity  is  capable 
of  knowing,  loving,  and  serving  Him.  This, 
at  least,  we  must  surely  say  of  sonship — that  it 
lay  in  man’s  destiny,  even  as  created,  to  be  a  son 
of  God  ;  to  sustain  a  filial  relation  to  Him.  I 
mean  by  that,  that  we  must  assume  it  to  have 
lain  in  God’s  purpose  to  take  this  being  He  had 
created,  as  the  goal  of  His  dealings  with  him, 
into  that  relation  of  free,  loving,  trustful  fellow¬ 
ship  with  Himself,  which  we  properly  describe  as 
filial.  And  in  that  destiny — in  that  capacity,  and 
in  the  destination  itself — there  already  lies  the 
pledge  of  immortality .  Flow  this  is  related  to  the 
subject  of  physical  death  I  shall  consider  in  a 
future  lecture.  But  that  man,  in  the  make  and 
constitution  of  his  being,  as  bearing  the  image 
of  God,  is  adapted  for  a  larger  and  more  endur¬ 
ing  life  than  that  of  time,  I  am  entitled  to  assume. 
That  mind  of  his,  looking  before  and  after  ;  that 
spirit,  awed  with  thoughts  of  the  infinite  and 

1  E.g.,  Ps.  ciii.  1 3. 


192 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


» 


eternal,  capable  of  infinite  growth,  endowed 
for  relations  of  fellowship  with  the  Infinite 
One,  aspiring,  through  every  faculty,  to  a  know¬ 
ledge,  an  activity,  a  blessedness,  greater  than  any 
which  earth  can  yield — would  be  an  inexplicable 
riddle,  a  hopeless  self-contradiction,  if  immor¬ 
tality  were  not  his  destiny.  It  is  here,  as  I  have 
already  urged,  that  we  perceive  most  clearly  the 
bearings  on  our  Christian  faith  of  naturalistic 
theories  of  evolution.  If  man,  by  the  make  of 
his  being,  has  an  affinity  to  God  which 
gives  him  the  capacity  for  sonship,  does  not  this 
constitute  a  deeper  line  of  demarcation  between 
him  and  the  animals  than  any  we  have  yet  con¬ 
sidered  ?  On  the  other  hand,  on  the  theory  of 
insensible  gradations,  where  does  the  potency  for 
sonship  come  in  ?  Is  God  the  God  of  the  man, 
or  is  He  of  the  ape  also  ?  The  difficulty  is  even 
greater,  as  I  emphasised  before,  with  respect  to 
immortality.  It  is  a  loose  way  of  thinking  which 
conceives  the  immortality  which  is  man’s  preroga¬ 
tive  as  only  the  natural  life  indefinitely  prolonged. 
A  being  made  for  immortality,  destined  for  it,  and 
having  the  potency  of  it  within  him  by  creation, 
is  on  a  plane  of  things  as  much  above  the  animal 


PRIMITIVE  CONDITION  OF  MAN  193 


as  heaven  is  above  the  earth.  The  Gospel  brings 
life  and  incorruption  to  light ; 1  but  the  basis  in 
man’s  nature  on  which  that  great  hope  is  built 
is  laid  in  the  first  utterance  about  man  in  the 
Bible.  I  claim,  then,  that  the  Biblical  view  of 
man,  in  his  nature  and  original  condition,  is  the 
only  view  entirely  coherent  with  itself,  and  in 
agreement  with  its  own  presuppositions  in  the 
character  of  God.  Nor  has  it  been  shown  to 
be  contradicted  by  any  real  truth  or  discovery 
of  science. 

1  2  Tim.  i.  10. 


N 


Scripture  and  Science  on  the  Origin  and 
Nature  of  Sin — The  Defacement  of 

God’s  Image 


Defacement  of  God’s  Image  Matter  of  Experience.  If  Man 
Created  pure,  a  ‘Fall’  is  presupposed.  Idea  of  Sin  as  Apostacy 
from  God  underlies  all  Scripture.  Counter-theory  that  Man  has 
not  Fallen  but  Risen.  Objections  to  this  View.  On  Evolu¬ 
tionary  Theory  Sin  loses  its  ‘  Catastrophic  ’  Character.  Alleged 
necessity  of  Sin  (Fiske,  Sabatier,  etc.).  Evolutionary  theory 
robs  Sin  of  its  Gravity.  Effect  on  Idea  of  Guilt.  Insufficient 
to  speak  of  Realisation  of  Moral  Ideal.  Moral  Law  demands 
an  Upright  Nature  and  Pure  Affections  from  the  first.  Biblical 
Doctrine  of  Sin :  that  which  absolutely  Ought  not  to  be. 
Contrast  of  Religious  and  Philosophical  Ethics.  Sin  as  viola¬ 
tion  of  Duty  to  God.  Religion  recognises  Duties  to  God  as 
well  as  to  Man.  Inmost  Principle  of  Sin  :  Self-Will,  Egoism. 
Sins  graded  on  this  Principle.  Narrative  of  Fall.  Connection 
with  Superhuman  Evil.  Effects  of  Sin.  i.  The  Spiritual  con¬ 
sequence  of  Sin  in  Depravation.  Bond  cut  with  God.  Ascend¬ 
ency  of  Lower  Impulses.  Sin  as  Anarchy  and  Bondage. 
2.  The  Racial  Consequences  of  Sin.  Organic  Constitution  of 
Race.  Relation  to  Doctrine  of  Heredity.  ‘Ape  and  Tiger’ 
Theory  of  Original  Sin.  Objection  to  Doctrine  from  Non- 
transmissibility  of  Acquired  Characters  (Weismann).  Effects 
of  Ethical  Volition  on  Mind  and  Body  are  transmissible. 
Roman  Catholic  and  Protestant  Views  of  the  Hereditary 
Effects  of  the  Fall.  Meaning  of  ‘Total  Depravity.’ 


196 


V 


SCRIPTURE  AND  SCIENCE  ON  THE  ORIGIN  AND 
NATURE  OF  SIN— THE  DEFACEMENT  OF  GOD’S 
IMAGE 

'~TAHE  conclusions  reached  in  the  foregoing  dis¬ 
cussion  have  evidently  important  bearings 
on  the  doctrine  of  sin.  If  man  was  created  in 
the  image  of  God,  and  if  that  image  included 
a  pure  and  harmonious  state  of  the  moral  nature, 
it  is  certain  that  man  does  not  bear  that  undimmed 
image  now.  From  its  first  pages  to  its  last,  Scrip¬ 
ture  assumes  that  man  is  not  in  a  condition  corre¬ 
sponding  to  his  being’s  end  and  aim,  but  is  in  a  state 
of  apostacy  from  God,  and  morally  impure.  The 
indestructible  elements  of  that  image — rationality, 
self-consciousness,  conscience,  faculty  of  choice — 
he  indeed  continues  to  possess,  else  he  would  not 
be  man.1  But  the  realisation  of  the  divine  image 
in  actual  moral  likeness  to  God  is  no  longer  his. 

1  Cf.  Gen.  ix.  6  j  James  iii.  9. 


197 


198 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


He  is  no  longer  a  being  over  whom  the  Creator 
could  pronounce  the  words  ‘  very  good.’  But  if 
man  was  made  good,  and  now  is  evil,  the  infer¬ 
ence  is  irresistible  that  he  has  become  so  by 
voluntary  departure  from  rectitude.  And  if  this 
condition  is  universal,  as  Scripture  and  experi¬ 
ence  unite  in  showing  it  to  be,  this  can  only 
mean  that  the  defection  must  be  carried  back 
to  the  fountainhead  of  the  race  :  in  other  words, 
is  due  to  what  we  are  accustomed  to  speak  of 
as  a  fall. 

This  doctrine  that  sin  has  its  origin  in  man’s 
voluntary  act,  and  entered  at  the  beginning  of 
the  race,  is,  it  may  be  confidently  said,  the  only 
one  that  puts  sin  on  a  right  basis.  The  asser¬ 
tion,  indeed,  is  not  uncommon  that,  while  the 
doctrine  of  a  fall  from  original  uprightness  is 
found  in  the  beginning  of  Genesis,  and  reappears 
in  the  theology  of  Paul,  it  is  not  a  doctrine  re¬ 
cognised  elsewhere  in  the  Old  Testament — for 
example,  in  the  prophets.1  This,  however,  is 
a  contention  which  I  think  it  will  be  found  diffi¬ 
cult  to  maintain.  Even  on  the  principles  of  the 
critics,  it  can  hardly  be  doubted  that  the  story 

1  Cf.  Tennant,  The  Fall  and  Original  Sin,  pp.  90  ff. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SIN  199 


of  Eden  and  of  the  sin  of  man  was  known  to  the 
prophets.  It  formed  part  of  the  sacred  tradition 
of  their  nation,  and  is  found  in  that  part  of  the 
narrative  of  Genesis  (the  Jehovistic)  which  is 
generally  admitted  to  have  been  drawn  up,  and 
in  circulation,  before  written  prophecy  began.1 
But  a  deeper  argument  is  that  based  on  the 
whole  tenor  of  the  Scriptural  representation  of 
man.  At  no  point  in  Scripture  history  does 
man  appear  as  standing  in  right  or  normal 
relations  with  God.  His  condition  is  invariably 
pictured  as,  naturally,  one  of  rebellion  against 
God,  and  of  great  and  deepening  corruption.2 

1  The  JE  narrative  of  the  critics  is  usually  dated  ( before  Amos  or 
Hosea’  (Driver,  Genesis ,  p.  xvi.).  The  newer  form  of  the  critical 
theory  also,  in  putting  P  later  than  JE,  presupposes  that  P  was 
acquainted  with  the  contents  of  JE.  Thus  Wellhausen  writes:  £ In 
JE  the  flood  is  well  led  up  to  $  in  Q  [  =  P]  we  should  be  inclined  to 
ask  in  surprise  how  the  earth  has  come  all  at  once  to  be  so  corrupted, 
after  being  in  the  best  of  order,  did  we  not  know  it  from  JE  ’  ( History 
of  Israel ,  p.  310).  Even  Carpenter,  after  informing  us  that  P  1  knows 
no  Eden,’  etc.,  writes  :  ‘  If  the  Toledtioth  [P]  sections  do  not  describe 
the  origin  of  evil  and  the  entiy  of  sin  and  suffering,  they  are  not 
indifferent  to  them,  rather  does  the  method  of  Genesis  v.  presuppose 
them,  and  Chap.  vi.  13  records  their  consequences’  (Oxford  Hex.  i. 
P-  132)- 

2  Dillmann,  in  his  Alttest.  fheol. ,  while  attributing  the  story  of 
the  fall  to  the  deeper  insight  of  the  prophetic  narrator  (J),  neverthe¬ 
less  holds  that  the  Old  Testament  everywhere  presupposes  the  rule 
of  sin  and  death  in  humanity,  in  contradiction  to  its  original  destiny, 


200 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


What  language  could  be  stronger  than  that  in 
Genesis  of  the  race  before  the  Flood :  ‘  God  saw 
that  the  wickedness  of  man  was  great  in  the 
earth,  and  that  every  imagination  of  the  thoughts 
of  his  heart  was  only  evil  continually.’ 1  Could 
the  universality  of  human  transgression  be  more 
vividly  depicted  than  in  Psalm  xiv.  2  :  c  The  Lord 
looked  down  from  heaven  upon  the  children  of 
men,  to  see  if  there  were  any  that  did  under¬ 
stand,  that  did  seek  after  God.  They  are  all 
gone  aside  :  they  are  together  become  filthy  ; 
there  is  none  that  doeth  good,  no,  not  one  ’  ? 
The  prophets  depict  a  moral  condition  in  Israel 
and  in  the  surrounding  heathen  peoples  in  the 
highest  degree  abhorrent  to  Jehovah,  and  bringing 
down  on  them  His  severest  judgments.  I  need 

and  the  presence  of  an  inborn  evil  tendency  (pp.  368,  376,  ff.).  ‘So,’ 
he  concludes,  ‘we  are  brought  back  to  the  doctrine  of  the  prophetic 
narrator  of  an  original  state  [of  integrity]  and  fall  of  the  first  man, 
who,  from  an  uncorrupted  nature,  giving  entrance  to  sin,  did  that 
which  had  fatal  consequences  for  the  whole  race’  (p.  380). 

1  Gen.  vi.  5;  cf.  viii.  21.  Mr.  Tennant  will  not  allow  that  even 
in  the  ‘  Jahvist  ’  writer  this  evil  imagination  is  connected  with  the 
fall  which  that  writer  narrates,  and  even  holds  it  to  be  ‘expressly 
implied’  in  Chap.  viii.  21  (God’s  compassion)  ‘that  such  an  evil 
inclination  is  partly  due  to  the  constitution  which  man  received  at 
the  hand  of  his  Maker’  {Fall  and  Original  Sin ,  p.  98).  Why,  then, 
should  God  judge  it  as  He  does  ? 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SIN  201 


not  remind  you  of  Paul’s  description  of  the  origin 
of  heathenism  through  voluntary  parting  with  an 
original  knowledge  of  God — ‘  knowing  God, 
they  glorified  Him  not  as  God,  neither  gave 
thanks  ;  but  became  vain  in  their  reasonings,  and 
their  senseless  heart  was  darkened’;1  or  of  his 
demonstration  of  how  both  Jews  and  Gentiles 
have  come  short  of  God’s  glory,  and  are  under 
condemnation.2  The  only  reasonable  presupposi¬ 
tion  of  such  a  moral  condition — if  human  beings 
were  created  as  we  should  expect — is  a  voluntary 
declension  of  the  race  from  an  original  state  of 
uprightness.  If  a  fall  were  not  narrated  in  the 
opening  chapters  of  Genesis,  we  should  still  have 
to  postulate  something  of  the  kind  to  account 
for  the  Bible’s  own  representations  of  the  state 
of  man.3 

To  this  Scriptural  doctrine  of  the  origin  of 
human  sin  through  man’s  voluntary  renunciation 

1  Rom.  i.  21.  2  Rom.  iii. 

3  Whether  is  it  more  reasonable  to  regard  the  story  of  the  fall 
as  a  private  speculation  of  a  prophetic  narrator,  which  there  is 
nothing  in  the  narrative  to  suggest  it  was  (it  plainly  gives  itself  out 
in  its  whole  character  and  Babylonian  colouring  as  old)j  or  as  a 
genuine  world-old  reminiscence  of  the  most  tragic  event  in  the 
history  of  the  race  ? 


202 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


of  his  allegiance  to  his  Creator,  it  has  already- 
been  shown  that  the  modern  evolutionary  philo¬ 
sophy  stands  in  strongest  opposition.1  It  is  an 
axiom  of  the  modern  view  that  man  has  not,  as 
theology  has  taught,  fallen,  but  has  risen  ;  that 
his  history  has  been  a  slow  ascent  from  an  in¬ 
credibly  low  state  of  animalism  to  his  present 
high  stage  of  attainment  ;  that  the  forces 
through  which  this  rise  is  effected  are  inherent 
in  human  nature,  and  operate  through  the  law 
of  selection  and  survival  of  the  fittest.  To 
speak  of  an  Eden  in  the  past  which  man  has 
forfeited  is  held  to  be  in  contradiction  with 
every  principle  of  modern  knowledge.  I  have 
already  given  my  reasons  for  believing  that  this 
account  of  man’s  origin  and  primitive  condition, 
and  of  his  slow  ascent  from  lowest  savagery  to 
noblest  civilisation,  cannot  be  sustained.  There  is 
no  evidence,  I  have  sought  to  show,  that  man 
was  originally  in  this  unspeakably  degraded  con¬ 
dition,  and  there  is  the  strongest  a  priori  pre¬ 
sumption,  derived  from  his  moral  constitution 
and  relationship  to  God,  that  he  was  not.  There 
is  no  proof  that,  if  he  ever  was  in  the  low  state 

1  See  above,  pp.  14  ff.,  157  ff. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SIN  203 


described,  he  could  by  his  unaided  powers  have 
raised  himself  out  of  it.  There  is  no  analogy  to 
such  spontaneous  rise  from  lower  to  higher.  It 
has  been  shown  that  the  assumption  that  savage 
races  —  whether  modern  or  prehistoric  —  stand 
nearer  to  primitive  man,  is  unfounded.1  Savage 
races,  as  experience  proves,  have  all  the  moral  and 
spiritual  capabilities  which  we  ourselves  possess, 
and  behind  them  often  stand  the  evidences  of 
higher  civilisation.  What  explanation  could  be 
given  of  incalculable  ages  of  immobile  savagery, 
to  be  followed,  within  the  last  few  thousand  years, 
by  a  sudden  leap  into  advanced  civilisation  ? 
Much  stronger  is  the  probability  that  primeval 
man  stood  nearer  in  capacity  to  the  races  that 
evolved  the  mighty  civilisations  we  are  now  dis¬ 
interring  from  the  mounds  of  Assyria  and  Baby¬ 
lonia,  than  to  any  feebler  type. 

Yet  not  only  is  this  doctrine  of  man’s  primitive 
barbarism,  and  of  his  slow  ascent  through 
natural  evolution  to  his  present  intellectual, 
moral,  social,  and  religious  eminence,  an  article 
of  faith  in  the  new  science  ;  but  it  is  taken 

1  See,  further,  the  valuable  remarks  on  this  subject  in  the  Duke 
of  Argyll’s  Unity  of  Nature,  pp.  378,  386  ft'.,  522  ff. 


204 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


over  by  Christian  teachers,  and  is  rapidly  be¬ 
coming  an  article  of  faith  in  the  ‘new  theology,’ 
which,  it  is  claimed,  is  to  displace  the  old.  That 
through  it  the  doctrine  of  sin,  as  hitherto  under¬ 
stood,  undergoes  a  vital  alteration,  is  hardly 
denied.  Sin,  in  truth,  ceases  to  be  sin,  in  the 
full  Biblical  sense  of  the  term.  It  loses  the 
tragic  and  catastrophic  character  it  possesses  on 
the  Biblical  view,  and  becomes  a  necessity  of 
man’s  development — a  stage  it  was  inevitable 
man  should  pass  through  in  the  course  of  his 
moral  ascent.  That  this  is  so  in  the  coarser 
forms  of  naturalistic  evolutionism  is  apparent  at 
a  glance.  There  is,  as  we  saw,  a  positive  gloating 
on  the  part  of  writers  like  Haeckel  over  man’s 
alleged  natural  degradation,  and  subjection  to 
determinism.  It  is  in  the  image  of  the  ape  man 
is  made,  not  in  the  image  of  God.  But  even  in 
writers  of  a  higher  stamp  —  and  it  is  important 
to  notice  this — there  is  no  shrinking  from  the 
assertion  of  the  necessity  of  sin,  or  what  is  called 
such.  In  Mr.  Fiske,  e.g.y  by  whom  the  story  of 
Eden  is  made  a  pale  reflection  of  Zoroastrianism, 
the  necessity  of  sin  is  deduced  from  what  he  calls 
c  the  element  of  antagonism  ’  in  the  universe.  It 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SIN  205 


is  undeniable,  he  says,  that  we  cannot  know  any¬ 
thing  except  as  contrasted  with  something  else.1 
‘If  we  had  never  felt  physical  pain,  we  could 
not  recognise  physical  pleasure.  ...  In  just  the 
same  way  it  follows  that,  without  knowing  that 
which  is  morally  evil,  we  could  not  possibly 
recognise  that  which  is  morally  good.  Of  these 
antagonistic  correlatives,  the  one  is  unthinkable  in 
absence  of  the  other.  ...  In  a  happy  world  there 
must  be  sorrow  and  pain,  and  in  a  moral  world 
the  knowledge  of  evil  is  indispensable.  The 
stern  necessity  for  this  has  been  proved  to  in¬ 
here  in  the  innermost  constitution  of  the  human 
soul.  It  is  part  and  parcel  of  the  universe.’  2 
It  is  worth  while  following  this  out  a  little 
further.  The  existence  of  moral  evil,  it  is  said, 
is  ‘  purely  relative,’  yet  it  is  ‘  profoundly  real,  and 
in  a  process  of  perpetual  spiritual  evolution  its 
presence  in  some  hideous  form  throughout  a 
long  series  of  upward  stages  is  indispensable. 
.  .  .  In  a  process  of  spiritual  evolution,  there¬ 
fore,  evil  must  be  present.  But  the  nature  of 
evolution  also  requires  that  it  be  evanescent.’ 3 

1  ’Through  Nature  to  God,  pp.  34-35. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  36-37.  3  Ibid.,  pp.  54-55. 


206 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


If  we  inquire  how  this  1  evanescence  ’  of  evil  is 
to  be  brought  about,  we  find  ourselves  quite  able 
to  dispense  with  any  supernatural  help,  and  with 
the  agency  of  a  Redeemer  ;  this,  too,  it  must  be 
said,  is  the  true  logic  of  the  theory.  ‘  From  the 
general  analogies  furnished  in  the  process  of 
evolution,  we  are  entitled  to  hope  that,  as  it 
approaches  its  goal,  and  man  comes  nearer  to 
God,  the  fact  of  evil  will  lapse  into  a  mere 
memory,  in  which  the  shadowed  past  shall  serve 
as  a  background  for  the  realised  glory  of  the 
present.’ 1  Professor  A.  Sabatier,  also,  in  the 
Preface  to  his  Philosophy  of  Religion ,  in  replying 
to  criticisms,  boldly  affirms  sin  to  be  a  necessity 
for  man  by  his  creation,  and  explicitly  accepts 
determinism.  But,  I  ask,  can  this  account  of  the 
nature  of  sin  be  admitted  by  any  one  who  in  his 
conscience  has  realised  the  awful  and  tragic  signi¬ 
ficance  of  that  dread  reality  ?  Does  it  not  rather 
evacuate  sin  of  all  its  real  meaning  ?  If  sin  lies 
in  the  constitution  of  things  by  creation — if  it  is 
a  necessary  outcome  of  the  condition  in  which 
God  made  man,  and  of  the  nature  He  has  given 
him — how  can  the  creature  be  asked  to  assume 


1  Ibid->  p-  55- 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SIN  207 

responsibility — at  least  serious  responsibility — for 
it?  I  do  not  think  much  time  need  be  spent 
over  Mr.  Fiske’s  assumed  law  of  antagonism — a 
sort  of  survival  of  the  Zoroastrianism  he  con¬ 
demns,  with  a  touch  of  Hegelian  dialectic  thrown 
in.  Evil,  indeed,  can  only  be  known  as  the  nega¬ 
tion  of  good  ; 1  but  it  does  not  follow  that  good 
— the  positive  conception— can  only  be  known 
through  experience  of  evil.  This  is  precisely  the 
serpent’s  doctrine  in  Eden  over  again.  I  do 
not  know  how  Mr.  Fiske  would  apply  his 
doctrine  to  God  Himself ;  but  it  is  reasonably 
obvious  that  logic  would  require  him  to  take  up 
sin  into  the  life  of  the  Absolute — else  how  could 
God  be  good  ? — or  to  deny  moral  character  to 
Deity  altogether.  Christian  faith,  at  least,  which 
knows  of  one  absolutely  sinless  Personality  in 
the  history  of  mankind,  will  not  be  readily  led 
away  by  these  a  priori  sophisms. 

It  is  now  to  be  observed,  however,  that, 'even 
where  the  word  ‘  necessity  ’  is  not  used,  the  thing 
is  still  there  in  every  evolutionary  theory  in  which 
sin  is  viewed  as  an  unavoidable  result  of  man’s 
nature  and  environment.  I  do  not  say  that,  in 

1  See  below,  p.  215. 


I 


208  GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 

some  of  these  theories,  there  may  not  still  be 
room  for  a  measure  of  voluntary  departure  from 
such  weak  and  wavering  standards  of  right  as 
man,  even  in  his  rudimentary  stage,  may  be  sup¬ 
posed  to  recognise.  Grant  everything  that  can 
be  asked  on  this  score  ;  allow  that  from  the 
beginning  there  stirs  in  man’s  nature  the  dis¬ 
tinctively  human  element,  that  in  some  dim  way 
ideas  of  right  and  wrong  begin  to  shape  them¬ 
selves,  that  there  are  still  possible  certain  ele¬ 
mentary  exercises  of  choice,  which  sometimes  may 
be  morally  better,  sometimes  morally  worse.  Still 
this  in  no  way  yields  us  the  Biblical  idea  of  sin. 
This  departure  from  rudimentary  ideas  of  right 
in  a  being  still  rude  and  ignorant,  wild  and 
lawless  in  his  passions,  fierce  and  cruel  in  dis¬ 
position,  violent  and  sensual  in  his  conduct,  is  so 
natural,  so  inevitable,  so  forced  on  him  by  his 
nature  and  circumstances — the  palliation  for  even 
grosser  violations  of  morality  is  so  great — that 
nothing  like  serious  responsibility  can  be  held  to 
attach  to  such  a  being  for  his  ‘  falls  ’ ;  the  idea  of 
guilt  is  weakened  almost  to  the  vanishing  point  ; 
while  the  enormity  of  the  wrong  act  as  sin,  i.e., 
as  offence  against  God,  practically  disappears,  for 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SIN  209 


there  is  hardly  any  idea  of  God,  or  of  responsi¬ 
bility  to  Him,  to  produce  the  sense  of  sin,  not  to 
say  to  give  depth  and  gravity  to  it.  If  it  be  con¬ 
sidered  that  these  theories,  even  the  highest  of 
them  :  (1)  leave  the  greater  part  of  what  is  ordi¬ 
narily  considered  wrongdoing — e.g .,  lust,  cruelty, 
bloodshed,  cannibalism — outside  the  category  of 
sin,  on  the  ground  that  the  conscience  of  primi¬ 
tive  man  was  not  yet  sufficiently  developed  to 
regard  these  things  as  wrong  ;  (2)  attribute  to 
man’s  first  ideas  of  right  and  wrong  so  feeble  and 
confused  a  character  that  disobedience  to  them  is 
a  transgression  absolutely  venial  ;  (3)  deprive  his 
acts,  as  just  said,  of  the  character  of  sin,  through 
the  absence  of  serious  moral  views  of  God  ;  (4) 
preclude  the  'possibility  of  a  sinless  development  of 
the  race — it  will  be  seen,  I  think,  that  the  accept¬ 
ance  of  such  views,  however  earnestly  held,  must 
involve  a  subversion  of  the  Biblical  conception, 
which  has  for  its  presuppositions  God’s  change¬ 
less  holiness  in  His  relations  with  man,  moral  law 
apprehended  with  sufficient  clearness  to  show 
man  his  duty,  the  possibility  of  obedience,  and 
sin  as  voluntary  departure  from  rectitude. 

It  looks  plausible,  I  know,  to  say  that,  how- 

o 


210 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


ever  low  we  begin  with  man — however  savage  or 
semi-brutal  his  primitive  condition — there  is  still 
some  point  at  which  the  moral  consciousness 
awakens,  and  man’s  c  fall  ’  takes  place  whenever 
consciously  he  prefers  something  which,  even  by 
his  poor  standard,  he  counts  wrong.  This  is  the 
idea  which  lies  behind  most  of  those  modern 
theories  of  the  ‘  fall  ’  to  which  reference  was  made 
in  a  former  lecture.1  But,  apart  from  the  objec¬ 
tion  just  urged  of  the  attenuation  of  the  ideas  of 
sin  and  guilt,  it  is  a  defect  of  these  theories  that 
they  take  no  account  of  the  fact  that  it  is  wrong 
for  a  moral  being  to  be  in  this  state  of  un¬ 
redeemed  brutality  at  all ;  that  morality  requires 
not  only  moral  acts ,  but  moral  state  and  disposi¬ 
tions,  right  affections,  harmony  of  the  will  with 
what  is  good  ;  and  that  of  all  this  the  state  sup¬ 
posed  is  the  absolute  negation.  It  does  not  rid 
us  of  this  difficulty  to  talk  of  the  moral  ideal  as 
in  process  of  realisation.  That  ideal  is  not  a 

1  See  above,  p.  158.  It  will  be  seen  from  the  above  argument 
that  I  am  not  fairly  open  to  the  charge  of  setting  aside  these  theories, 
or  the  view  of  man’s  origin  on  which  they  depend,  in  the  interest  of 
a  ‘  dogma,’  or  for  the  sake  of  what  some  may  be  pleased  to  call  an 
old  scrap  of  Hebrew  literature — the  early  chapters  of  Genesis.  I 
base  my  objections  on  the  far  deeper  ground  that  sin  is  actually  sin — 
one  of  the  surest  e  value-judgments  ’  I  know.  (Cf.  p.  300.) 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SIN  21 1 


thing  which  belongs  to  man’s  perfected  condition 
only,  but  has  its  claims  upon  him  from  the  first, 
and  demands  balanced,  harmonious,  dutiful  char¬ 
acter  at  every  stage  of  the  development.1  May  I 
not  add  that  it  is  an  unwarranted  assumption  in 
all  these  evolutionary  theories  that  the  highest 
type  in  a  series  is  only  to  be  looked  for  at  its  close. 
It  is  not  clear  that  it  has  been  so  even  in  nature, 
\for  while  on  the  whole,  of  course,  there  has  been 
advance,  it  is  likewise  true  that,  in  the  different 
orders,  the  higher  forms — in  some  cases,  witness 
e.g .,  the  colossal  reptiles  of  the  mesozoic  age,  the 
very  highest — appear  early,  to  be  followed  by 
degradation  or  extinction.2  It  has  not  been  so  in 
philosophy,  in  literature,  in  art  ;  there,  as  a  rule, 
the  master-spirits,  the  epoch-makers — the  Homers, 
the  Platos,  the  Shakespeares,  the  Handels,  the 
Kants  and  Hegels — come  first,  and  give  the 
lead  which  others  Ion  go  intervallo  follow.  It  has 
certainly  not  been  so  in  Christianity.  In  it  the 
Archetype  precedes  the  development  which  results 
from  Him  and  is  determined  by  Him,  and  which, 

1  Cf.  Dorner,  System  of  Doctrine ,  iii.  pp.  36-37. 

2  ‘  Each  new  organic  form,  or  each  new  variety  of  both,  seems 
always  to  have  been  introduced  with  a  wonderful  energy  of  life  ’ 
(Argyll,  Unity  of  Nature ,  p.  42 5). 


212 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


in  Church  and  individual,  is  yet  far  from  having 
attained  its  ‘  perfect  measure.’ 1  Why  should  it 
not  have  been  so  with  man  ?  Who  can  say  that 
it  was  not  ? 

In  antithesis  to  these  evolutionary  conceptions, 
we  have  now  to  look  at  the  Biblical  conception 
of  sin,  and  of  its  effects  on  human  nature  in  the 
defacement  of  God’s  image.  Sin,  in  the  Biblical 
point  of  view,  is,  as  I  have  already  said,  the 
tragedy  of  the  universe.  It  is  that  which  abso¬ 
lutely  ought  not  to  be  :  ‘  not  something  natural 
normal,  and  necessary,  but,  both  as  actual  and 
as  hereditary,  something  which  must  find  its 
explanation  in  a  free  act  of  the  creature,  annulling 
the  original  relation  ot  the  creature  to  God.’ 2 
Sin,  therefore,  it  is  first  to  be  observed,  is  not 
merely  an  ethical ,  but,  as  Ritschl  truly  says,  is  a 
religious  conception.8  It  does  not  denote  simply 
wrong  of  man  against  man,  but  expresses  a  re¬ 
lation  of  the  individual  and  his  action  to  God . 
It  does  not  regard  the  wrong  act  simply  as 
violation  or  transgression  of  moral  law,  but  as 
violation  of  duty  towards  God,  or  offence  against 

1  Eph.  iv.  13.  2  Christian  View  of  God,  p.  174. 

8  Justification  and  Reconciliation ,  pp.  350,  3535  cf.  p.  27  (E.  T.). 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SIN  213 


Him.  ‘Against  Thee,  Thee  only,  have  I  sinned.’1 
Ordinarily  we  speak  of  sins  against  our  fellow- 
men  ;  in  strictness  we  wrong  our  fellow-men — we 
sin  against  God.  It  is  this  reference  to  God,  I 
think  we  may  say,  which  chiefly  differentiates 
philosophical  ethics  —  the  ethics  of  the  moral 
philosophy  class-room — from  the  ethics  of  re¬ 
ligion ,  in  their  respective  judgments  upon  con¬ 
duct.  Moral  science,  like  religion,  works  with 
the  ideas  of  law,  duty,  right,  wrong  ;  but  its 
standard  is  the  law  in  reason — in  conscience  ;  it 
does  not  bring  deeds  into  the  light  of  God’s 
judgment,  or  regard  them  in  their  turpitude  as 
offences  against  Him.  Religion,  on  the  other 
hand,  views  moral  law  itself  as  emanating  from 
God,  and  having  its  ground  in  His  essential 
Being  ;  it  brings  conduct,  and  behind  conduct 
the  state  of  the  heart,  into  the  light  of  the  divine 
holiness  ;  it  judges  of  the  quality  of  the  deed  by 
its  contrariety  to  the  divine  purity,  and  by  its 
enormity  as  disobedience  to  the  divine  will.  We 
cannot,  therefore,  speak  properly  of  sin  except  in 
the  sphere  of  religion  ;  and  only  that  religion  can 
yield  an  adequate  idea  of  sin  which,  like  the 
Biblical,  is  based  on  a  right  conception  God  as 

1  Ps.  li  4. 


214 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


the  all-holy  and  all-good.1  There  is,  however,  a 
second  respect,  arising  from  the  same  cause,  in 
which  philosophical  ethics  and  the  ethics  of  re¬ 
ligion  differ.  The  philosophical  treatment,  as  a 
rule,  takes  cognisance  of  duty  only  as  it  relates  to 
man  himself  and  to  his  fellow-men  ;  it  does  not 
take  cognisance  of  any  special  class  of  duties 
which  relate  directly  to  God.  Duty  falls  under 
the  two  main  heads  of  duties  to  ourselves  and  to 
our  neighbours  ;  it  is  completed  when  we  have 
discharged  our  obligations  in  these  two  directions. 
But  religion  goes  far  beyond  this.  If  we  stand  in 
relations  to  our  fellow-men,  far  more  fundament¬ 
ally  do  we  stand  in  relation  to  God,  and  owe  to  Him 
our  love,  trust,  reverence,  obedience,  with  their 
appropriate  manifestations  in  worship.  Nay,  our 
duties  to  our  fellow-men  will  not  be  rightly  per¬ 
formed,  from  the  religious  point  of  view,  unless 
where  this  higher  duty  to  God  is  fulfilled.  To  love 
the  Lord  our  God  with  all  our  heart,  and  soul, 
and  strength,  and  mind — this,  Jesus  says,  is  the  first 
and  great  commandment ;  and  the  second  is  like 
to  it,  ‘  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbour  as  thyself.’ 2 

1  In  philosophical  ethics,  as  in  Kant,  you  have  autonomy  $  in 
religion,  as  J.  Muller  points  out,  t/zeonomy. 

2  Matt.  xxii.  36-405  Mark  xii.  29-31. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SIN  215 


Sin,  therefore,  is  not  simply  wrongdoing  as 
between  man  and  man,  but,  far  more  radically, 
consists  in  a  wrong  state  of  heart  and  will  towards 
God.  It  is  not  simply  avojiia  in  the  narrower 
sense,  but  dcrefie ta — godlessness. 

This  fundamental  judgment  in  regard  to  the 
nature  of  sin  is  now  to  be  borne  in  mind  in  the 
attempt  to  discover  the  true  principle  of  sin — that 
which  underlies,  and  gives  unity  to,  all  its  mani¬ 
festations.  The  first  thing  to  be  distinctly  held 
fast  here  is,  that  sin,  as  that  which  absolutely 
ought  not  to  be,  subsists  only  as  the  negation  or 
contradiction  of  the  good — has  no  meaning  or 
quality  as  evil  save  as  the  antithesis  of  the  good 
of  which  it  is  the  contradiction.  What,  then, 
shall  we  say  is  the  inner  principle  or  essence  of 
the  good  ?  Kant  has  finely  said  that  there  is 
nothing  truly  good  on  earth  but  a  good  will,1 
and  he  finds  the  principle  of  that  good  will  in 
unconditional  reverence  for  the  moral  law.  Re¬ 
ligion,  however,  goes  yet  deeper,  and,  in  accord¬ 
ance  with  the  distinction  between  philosophical 
and  religious  ethics  just  indicated,  finds,  with 
Augustine,  the  true  principle  of  the  good  will  in 

1  Groundwork  oj  Met.  of  Ethics ,  ch.  i. 


21  6 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


love  to  God.1  A  will  destitute  of  that  principle 
—a  neutral,  indeterminate  will,  if  such  a  thing 
were  possible — still  more  a  will  enthralled  and 
controlled  by  passion — would  not  be  a  good  will 
in  the  religious  sense.  In  contrast  with  this,  how 
are  we  now  to  define  the  principle  of  the  evil  will  ? 
Shall  we  say  with  Martensen  that  the  essence  of 
sin  is  the  choice  of  the  world  instead  of  God 2 — 
the  loving  and  serving  of  the  creature  more  than 
the  Creator  ? 8  Or  must  we  not  go  deeper,  and, 
with  Augustine  again,  say  that  the  real  essence  of 
the  evil  act,  when  man  chooses  the  world,  is  not 
his  making  the  world  his  end,  but  the  self-will 
which  throws  off  God’s  authority,  and  arrogates 
to  itself  the  right  to  choose  its  own  end,  and  that 
another  end  than  God’s  ?  Here,  probing  the 
matter  to  its  core,  we  seem  to  get  at  the  real 
principle  of  sin.  The  principle  of  the  good  is 
love  to  God,  subjection  of  the  whole  will  to  God. 
Sin  in  its  essence  is  the  taking  into  the  will  of  the 
principle  opposite  to  this — that  not  God’s  will,  but 
my  own  will,  is  to  be  the  ultimate  law  of  my  life. 

1  On  Augustine’s  views,  cf.  my  Progress  oj  Dogma ,  pp.  145  fF.  j 
and  see  below,  p.  123. 

2  Cf.  Martensen’s  Ethics ,  i.  pp.  96  fF. 

3  Cf.  Rom.  i.  25. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SIN  217 


It  is  the  exaltation  of  self  against  God :  the.  setting 
up  of  self-will  against  God’s  will :  at  bottom  Egoism. 

While  sin  is  the  product  of  this  baleful  prin¬ 
ciple,  it  by  no  means  follows  that  it  discovers  its 
full  heinousness,  or  works  out  its  whole  deadly 
effect,  in  the  first  moment  of  transgression,  or  for 
long  thereafter.1  Still,  it  is  in  the  nature  of  a 
principle  to  manifest  itself,  and,  however  veiled 
the  real  nature  of  the  egoistic  principle  in  sin  may 
be  from  the  subject  himself,  or  in  its  first  mani¬ 
festations,  it  is  certain,  sooner  or  later,  to  reveal 
itself  in  its  true  and  naked  character.  This,  in 
truth,  is  the  principle  according  to  which,  as  we 
find,  we  can  most  naturally  grade  the  manifesta¬ 
tions  of  sin  in  history.  (1)  Lowest  in  the  scale 
stand  fleshly  sins — lust,  drunkenness,  and  the 
like— which  often,  through  the  social  element 
involved,  have  the  power  of  veiling  for  a  time 
the  naked  selfishness  of  the  principle  in  which 
they  originate.  It  is,  however,  a  poor  disguise 
at  the  best  ;  and  closer  observation  soon  dis¬ 
covers,  in  the  callous  heartlessness  with  which 

1  There  are  many  checks  to  the  working  out  of  this  principle  in  the 
action  of  conscience,  the  natural  affections,  the  sense  of  shame,  pru¬ 
dential  considerations,  and,  at  a  more  developed  stage,  in  human  law, 
education,  social  custom,  public  opinion,  impressions  of  religion,  etc. 


21  8 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


the  lustful  man  throws  off  his  victim,  and  in 
the  drunkard’s  cruel  neglect  of  wife  and  home, 
how  the  Satanic  side  of  fleshly  sin  leers  through 
all  the  coverings  by  which  sentiment  or  joviality 
may  seek  to  mask  its  hideousness.  (2)  Mounting 
higher,  we  enter  the  sphere  of  spiritual  sin — 
pride,  vanity,  envy,  jealousy,  love  of  power, 
covetousness,  etc.  ;  and  how  clearly  here  is  the 
egoistic  principle  manifest — exaltation  of  self, 
grasping  for  self,  isolation  of  self,  resentment 
at  the  rivalry  or  success  of  others  !  (3)  More 

hateful  still — now  merging  in  the  diabolical — 
are  those  phases  of  sin  in  which  evil  is  loved 
for  its  own  sake — cruelty  for  cruelty’s  sake, 
wanton  delight  in  the  ruin  or  infliction  of  suffer¬ 
ing  on  others  ;  undisguised  malevolence  or  malice. 
(4)  The  final  stage  is  reached  when,  throwing  off* 
its  last  cloak,  evil  comes  boldly  out  as  God- 
hating,  God- denying,  God-blaspheming  —  the 
stage  of  blasphemy — as  has  happened  in  memor¬ 
able  periods  of  the  world’s  history.1  Evil  which 
has  reached  this  height  of  wilful  sinning  against 

1  On  the  development  and  forms  of  sin,  cf.  Muller,  Doctrine  of  Sin , 
i.  pp.  147-182;  specially  on  this  last  stage,  see  Christlieb,  Modern 
Doubt ,  pp.  1  38-140. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SIN  219 


light  puts  the  subject  of  it  almost  past  redemption. 
It  is  the  prelude  to  final  obduracy  :  the  blasphemy 
against  the  Holy  Ghost 1 — the  sin  unto  death  2 
— for  which,  when  consummated,  there  is  no 
repentance. 

Sin,  therefore,  in  its  essential  nature,  is  a  revolt 
of  the  creature  will  against  the  Creator — a  volun¬ 
tary  departure  from  the  good.  This  is  precisely 
the  idea  embodied  in  the  old-world  story  of  the 
fall  in  Genesis,  where  sensuous  allurement,  and 
the  desire  for  forbidden  knowledge,  have  behind 
them  the  subtle  infusion  of  doubt  of  God’s  Word 
into  the  mind — 4  Yea,  hath  God  said.’ 3  It  is  in 
the  inward  defection  from  God,  not  in  the  mere 
eating  of  the  tree,  that  sin  begins,  that  the  real 
fall  takes  place.4  This,  however,  is  not  the  whole. 
It  is  a  feature  of  the  story  which  should  not  be 
neglected  that  temptation  comes  to  the  woman 
from  without — from  the  serpent  ;  which,  whether 
taken  literally  or  symbolically,  represents  here 

1  Matt.  xii.  31.  2  1  John  v.  1 6.  3  Gen.  iii.  i. 

4  Mr.  Tennant,  with  Wellhausen,  evacuates  the  story  of  nearly 
all  moral  content,  by  denying  that  the  knowledge  of  1  good  and  evil  ’ 
gained  by  eating  of  the  tree  was  ‘  moral  knowledge  ...  1  it  is,  on 
the  contrary,  general  knowledge,  or  cleverness,  which  is  here  pro¬ 
hibited,  and  which  man  is  represented  as  anxious  to  possess’  (The 
Fall  and  Original  Sin,  pp.  13,  14). 


220 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


a  power  of  evil  suggestion  other  than  man’s  own 
thoughts.  It  is  not  enough  to  say  that  the 
serpent  is  simply  one  of  the  beasts  of  the  field 
which  the  Lord  had  made :  the  ‘  subtilty  ’  it 
displays  rises  above  animal  conditions  into  the 
region  of  the  preternatural.1  The  serpent  of 
the  story  not  only  talks — of  itself  a  feature  con¬ 
trary  to  the  tenor  of  the  Bible  representations, 
which  carefully  observe  the  limits  between  man 
and  the  animals — but  it  talks  evil?  which,  if 
nothing  more  than  an  animal  is  intended,  con¬ 
flicts  with  the  idea  of  a  good  creation  by  Jehovah. 
Those,  indeed,  who  treat  the  narrative  as  sym- 

1  Dr.  Driver  says  :  ‘  It  appears  soon,  however,  that  it  [the  serpent] 
~  is  more  than  an  ordinary  animal  ;  it  possesses  the  faculty  of  speech, 

which  it  exercises  with  supreme  intelligence  and  skill.  .  .  .  The 
serpent  had,  moreover,  in  antiquity,  the  reputation  of  wisdom 
(cf.  Matt.  x.  1 6),  especially  in  a  bad  sense;  it  was  insidious, 
malevolent,  “  subtil.”  And  so  it  appears  here  as  the  representative 
of  the  power  of  temptation ;  it  puts  forth  with  great  artfulness 
suggestions  which,  when  embraced,  and  carried  into  action,  give  rise 
to  sinful  desires  and  sinful  acts.  The  serpent  is  not,  however, 
identified  in  the  narrative  with  the  Evil  One’  ( Genesis ,  p.  44). 

2  Cf.  Oehler,  Old  Test.  Theol.  i.  p.  250.  Mr.  Tennant  understates 
the  case  when  he  says  that  in  the  story  ‘  the  serpent  is  regarded  as 
clever  rather  than  evil’  (The  Fall  and  Original  Sin ,  p.  28).  Dr. 
Driver  comments  on  Gen.  iii.  4,  5:  ‘The  serpent  now  goes  on  to 
deny  flatly  the  truth  of  the  [divine]  threat,  to  suggest  an  unworthy 
motive  for  it,  and  to  hold  out  the  hope  of  a  great  boon  to  be  secured 
by  disobedience  ’  (p.  45). 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SIN  221 


bolical — its  elements  borrowed  from  Babylonia 
— are  least  of  all  entitled  to  take  the  serpent 
as  a  simple  animal,  and  few  of  them,  perhaps, 
do.1  It  is,  I  take  it,  best  interpreted  as  the 
personification  of  an  evil  principle  outside  man  2 
— if  not  yet  the  ‘  Satan  ’  or  4  Devil  ’  of  later 
Scripture,  yet  in  consonance  with  that  idea,  and 
a  stage  on  the  way  towards  it.  It  will  not  be 
denied  that  the  idea  that  evil  originated  on  our 
earth  through  an  Evil  One — through  contact  with 
a  superhuman  Evil — is  one  deeply  embedded  in 
the  New  Testament.3 

A  catastrophe,  then,  permitted  by  God  in  His 


1  Professor  W.  R.  Smith  (quoted  by  Tennant,  p.  28)  says: 
‘  The  demoniac  character  of  the  serpent  in  the  garden  of  Eden  is 
unmistakable  5  the  serpent  is  not  a  mere  temporary  disguise  of 
Satan,’  etc.  Mr.  Tennant  himself  says:  ‘He  was  even  more  than 
the  ordinary  Jinn  or  demoniac  animal.  He  is  acquainted  with  the 
real  nature  and  potency  of  the  forbidden  tree,  and  speaks  as  if  he 
were  on  terms  of  intimacy  with  the  divine  circle.  .  .  .  This  certainly 
seems  to  point  to  a  more  primitive  story,  in  which  the  serpent  was  a 
superhuman  being,  higher  than  man,’  etc.  (p.  72). 

2  The  serpent  coiling  up  behind  the  woman  has  his  place  in  the 
Babylonian  ‘  temptation-seal,’  which  probably,  though  a  good  many 
scholars  dispute  it,  has  some  relation  to  this  narrative.  Probably 
further  discovery  will  yet  throw  clearer  light  upon  the  picture. 

3  John  viii.  44  5  xvi.  iij  2  Cor.  xi.  3  5  1  Tim.  ii.  145  Heb.  ii.  14  j 
Rev.  xii.  9,  etc. 


222 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


mysterious  Providence  for  ends  on  which  only 
the  future  could  throw  light,  took  place  in  the 
entrance  of  sin,  the  disastrous  effects  of  which 
reach  down  through  all  time.  Some  of  these 
effects  we  are  now  to  glance  at.  I  shall  briefly 
speak,  with  main  respect  to  our  leading  thought 
of  the  defacement  of  the  divine  image  in  man  : 
(i)  of  the  spiritual  consequence  of  sin  in  the 
depravation  of  the  individual  ;  (2)  of  the  racial 
consequence  in  hereditary  evil  ;  and  (3)  of  the 
physical  consequence — which  is  also  racial — in 
disease  and  death. 

1.  The  real  ruin  of  the  soul,  spiritually ,  is 
only  seen  when  we  keep  true  to  our  first  principle, 
and  regard  sin  in  its  religious  aspect,  i.e.>  in  its 
relation  to  God.  So  long  as  only  moral  law  is 
regarded,  it  may  be  difficult  to  feel  that  sin  is 
other  than  a  comparatively  venial  offence — the 
transgression  of  some  particular  precept — which 
need  not  involve  serious  and  irremediable  injury 
to  him  committing  it.  We  cannot  but  judge 
differently  when  we  see  in  sin— what  in  reality 
it  is — the  revolt  of  the  creature-will  against  the 
Creator,  and  the  taking  of  an  altogether  new 
principle  into  the  soul — the  principle,  viz.,  that 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SIN  223 


not  God's  will,  but  my  own  will,  is  to  be  my 
law.  Sin  means,  as  above  shown,  that  hence¬ 
forth  my  life  is  not  to  be,  as  it  ought  to  be, 
from  God  to  God— His  will  my  law,  His  glory 
my  end  ;  but  from  self  to  self — egoistic  in  prin¬ 
ciple  and  aim.  The  gravity  of  such  an  act, 
rupturing  the  original  bond  between  the  soul 
and  God,  is  further  seen  when  we  reflect  that 
the  motive  of  such  an  act  is  necessarily  to  obtain 
tor  some  impulse  an  unlawful  gratification,  or, 
more  generally,  to  give  the  creature  a  place  in  the 
affections  which  does  not  rightfully  belong  to  it.1 

It  is  obvious  from  this  that  sin,  though  spiritual 
in  its  origin,  is,  as  I  have  elsewhere  tried  to  ex¬ 
plain,2  anything  but  spiritual  in  its  effects.  Its 
first  and  immediate  effect  is  to  destroy  the  bal¬ 
ance  or  harmony  of  principles  in  the  soul,  to 
dethrone  love  to  God  from  its  place  of  supremacy 
in  the  soul,  and  give  the  lower  and  sensuous  side 
of  the  nature  an  undue  and  wrongful  predomin¬ 
ance.  Not  only  are  these  lower  principles  now 
in  the  place  of  ascendency,  but,  the  spiritual  bond 
being  cut  which  kept  them  in  due  relation  and 


1  Rom.  i.  21,  25. 


2  Christian  View  of  God,  pp.  172-17 3. 


224 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


subordination,  they  are  now  turbulent,  disorderly, 
warring  among  themselves,  their  motions  are 
violent  and  irregular,  sin  reveals  itself  as  a  prin¬ 
ciple  of  anarchy  (avo/xia).  This  is  on  the  man- 
ward  side  ;  but  on  the  Godward  side  also  there 
is  necessarily  a  change,  owing  to  the  fact  that 
the  creature  has  now  become  guilty  and  impure, 
and  has  ceased  from  the  relation  of  dependence. 
For  even  in  the  unfallen  state  it  must  be  noted 
— and  it  was  one  of  the  merits  of  Augustine  to 
emphasise  this — man  was  not  an  independent, 
self-acting  unit,  but  stood  necessarily  in  a  rela¬ 
tion  of  dependence  on  God,  and  drew  continually 
his  supplies  of  strength  from  Him.  His  life  was 
never  intended  to  be  one  lived  from  himself,  but 
was  to  be  a  life  in  God.  Sin  alters  this  in  destroy¬ 
ing  that  relation  of  dependence,  and  making  it 
impossible  for  God  to  hold  communion  and 
friendship  with  one  who  has  become  guilty  and 
impure,  while  awakening  in  man  the  sense  of 
shame  and  distrust  and  fear  towards  God,  through 
this  consciousness  of  guilt.  Thus,  on  the  one 
hand,  man  falls  into  bondage  to  the  sensuous 
and  worldly  principles  for  the  sake  of  which  he 
surrendered  his  allegiance  to  God  ;  and,  on  the 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SIN  225 

other,  he  has  lost  his  love  to  God,  and  is  deprived 
of  the  spiritual  aids  which  his  dependence  on 
God  and  his  fellowship  with  God  afforded  him. 
While  in  the  centre  of  his  being  he  has  enthroned 
a  principle  which  in  its  essence  is  God-negating. 

From  these  points  of  view  we  can  readily 
understand  most  of  the  lights  in  which  sin,  in 
its  effects  on  human  nature,  is  presented  to  us 
in  Scripture,  with  profoundest  echo  of  the  truth 
of  its  declarations  in  human  experience.  It  is 
truly,  as  the  terms  used  to  describe  it  teach,  a 
missing  of  the  mark,  or  turning  aside  of  man 
from  his  true  end — the  glory  of  God 1  (a/xapria)  ; 
transgression  of  a  law  (7rapa/3acris)  ;  a  falling 
away,  or  defection  ( VapaTTroj/xa )  ;  lawlessness 
(avo/ua).  But  more  particularly — 

(1)  In  this  inversion  of  the  lower  and  higher 
principles  of  man’s  nature — the  predominance  of 
the  earthly  and  sensuous,  and  the  enfeeblement 
and  relative  inoperativeness  of  the  spiritual— we 
have  the  basis  of  the  Pauline  description  of  man 
as  flesh  (crdp£).  It  is  not  meant  that  the  spiritual 
nature  is  altogether  suppressed — the  vovs  is  there 
with  its  ineffectual  protests2 — nor  is  it  meant 

1  Rom.  iii.  23. 


2  Rom.  vii.  23,  25. 


226 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


that  all  sins  are  what  we  call  ‘  fleshly  ’  ;  but  the 
whole  nature  has  become  one  in  which  the  natural, 
the  sensuous,  the  carnal,  have  attained  a  sinful 
predominance,  and  give  a  character,  a  tinge,  a  bias 
to — infect  with  their  disturbing  influences — every 
part  of  the  soul.  Deepest  of  all,  there  is  aliena¬ 
tion  of  the  heart  from  God,  arising  from  the 
taking  into  the  heart  of  a  new  principle  opposed 
to  God — the  principle  of  egoism .  The  Scripture 
does  not  describe  the  effect  of  the  introduction 
of  this  new  principle  too  strongly  when  it  says  : 

‘  The  mind  of  the  flesh  is  enmity  ( egOpa )  against 
God.’1  Ordinarily  this  egOpa  may  be  latent; 
may  manifest  itself  as  simple  indifference  ;  but 
wherever  the  claims  of  religion  are  brought  more 
closely  home  to  it,  it  speedily  appears  as  open 
dislike,  repugnance,  impatience  ;  as  the  opposi¬ 
tion  between  God’s  will  and  the  worldly,  sinful 
way  of  life  becomes  manifest,  it  develops  into 
open  hatred.  It  is  thus,  accordingly,  that  the 
worldly  life  is  described  throughout  Scripture — 
as  godless .  ‘  There  is  no  fear  of  God  before  their 

eyes.’ 2  Nothing  is  truer  to  experience.  This  is 

1  Rom.  viii.  7. 

8  Ps.  x.  45  Rom.  iii.  185  cf.  Eph.  ii.  125  iv.  18,  etc. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SIN  227 


the  root-sin  of  human  life,  and  only  familiarity- 
can  veil  from  us  its  awful  heinousness ;  only 
thoughtlessness  can  hide  from  us  the  marvel 
involved  in  it,  that  beings  made  in  God’s  image, 
and  capable  of  knowing,  loving,  and  obeying 
Him,  should  yet  repel,  shun,  dislike,  and  flee 
from  Him ;  should  resent  being  reminded  of 
Him  ;  should  wish  to  be  without  Him.  Surely 
no  one  who  thinks  rightly  will  say  that  this  is 
natural}  There  is  more  than  even  unnaturalness 
in  it ;  there  is  frightful  guilt. 

(2)  In  this  ascendency  of  the  lower  over  the 
higher  elements  in  man’s  nature  we  can  under¬ 
stand  the  descriptions  that  are  given  by  Paul,2 
and  in  the  Scriptures  generally,  of  the  sinful 
state,  as  one  of  enslavement — bondage  (SovXeia). 
The  individual,  whether  he  realises  it  or  not,  is 
enslaved,  held  in  thrall,  by  sin,  and  is  unable  to 
deliver  himself  out  of  that  state  and  regain  by 
his  own  efforts  spiritual  freedom  and  power. 

(3)  I  would  only  add  that,  on  the  basis  of 
what  we  have  found  to  be  true  of  man’s  aliena- 

1  On  the  ‘  unnaturalness  ’  of  man’s  moral  condition,  see  the 
striking  remarks  of  the  Duke  of  Argyll  in  his  Unity  of  Nature , 
pp.  370  ff. 

2  Cf.  Rom.  vii. 


228 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


tion  from  God,  and  general  spiritual  insuscepti¬ 
bility,  those  Scriptures  are  justified  which  speak 
of  the  sinful  state  as  one  of  spiritual  death — 
of  loss,  that  is,  of  the  true  life  the  soul  should 
possess  in  God,  with  subjection  to  carnal  prin¬ 
ciples,  and  absence  of  spiritual  interests  and  aims.1 
I  do  not,  however,  at  present  dwell  on  this. 
Enough  has  been  said  to  show  in  how  true  a 
sense  we  must  speak  of  an  obscuration  or  deface¬ 
ment  of  the  image  of  God  in  man — a  loss  of 
that  purity  and  harmony  of  nature  in  which  he 
was  created,  with  resultant  weakening  and  de¬ 
pravation  in  all  his  faculties  and  powers. 

2.  I  come  now  to  the  second  and  still  more 
difficult  aspect  of  the  effects  of  sin  in  our  nature 
— the  racial.  If  sin  is  voluntary  and  individual 
in  its  origin,  it  does  not  follow  that  it  is  only 
individual  in  its  results.  Here  open  up  the  large 
and  complicated  problems  of  hereditary  evil,  or 
what  is  ordinarily  called  Original  Sin,  to  which 
modern  discussions  on  heredity  lend  new  im¬ 
portance. 

It  seems  hard  to  deny — though  there  are  those 
in  both  ancient  and  modern  times  who  have  dis- 

1  Cf.  Rom.  viii.  6  j  Eph.  ii.  1-3  j  v.  14,  etc. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SIN  229 


puted  it 1 — that  evil  has  a  racial  side.  It  is  one 
of  the  things  which  distinguish  the  human  family 
from  other  conceivable  orders  of  beings  that  it  is 
a  race ,  and  that  therefore  any  act  performed  by  a 
progenitor  in  a  representative  capacity  must  have 
racial  consequences.  This  is  the  real  answer  to 
the  objection  often  raised  to  the  justice  of  the 
arrangement  which  admits  of  such  racial  effects 
accruing  from  a  primal  transgression.  That  ob¬ 
jection  cannot  be  answered  on  a  merely  in¬ 
dividualistic  basis  ;  what  is  really  impugned  is 
the  organic  constitution  of  the  race,  which  we 

1  Pelagius  taught  that  Adam’s  fall  injured  no  one  but  himself,  and 
leaves  the  power  of  human  nature  unimpaired  for  good.  Ritschl, 
in  modern  times,  it  is  well  known,  rejected  the  idea  of  original  sin. 
Mr.  Tennant  thinks  also  that  ‘there  is  no  hint  ’  in  Genesis  iii.  ‘of 
Adam’s  moral  condition  being  fundamentally  altered  by  his  act  of 
disobedience.  .  .  .  The  idea  that  his  sin  was  the  source  of  the  sinful¬ 
ness  of  succeeding  generations,  or  in  any  way  an  explanation  of  it, 
is  altogether  absent  from  the  narrative.  .  .  .  The  history  in  Genesis 
iii.  was  not  intended  by  its  ultimate  compiler  to  supply  an  explana¬ 
tion  of  the  cause  of  universal  sinfulness  ’  (Fhe  Fall  and  Original  Sin, 
pp.  9,  io,  n  ;  cf.  p.  89).  If  the  narrative  is  not  intended  to  furnish 
an  explanation  of  the  universal  sin  and  death  which  is  everywhere 
else  assumed,  it  is  difficult  to  see  what  it  means,  or  why  it  stands 
where  it  does.  Mr.  Tennant’s  view  is  not  that  of  most  exegetes, 
nor  does  it  seem  quite  consistent  with  some  of  his  other  statements. 
E.g.,  on  pp.  11,  72-73  he  seems  to  see  in  the  narrative  an  attempt  to 
explain  the  existence  of  human  ills,  and  to  trace  their  cause  to  sin, 
etc. 


230 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


know  to  be  a  fact,  apart  from  all  moral  or 
theological  difficulties  arising  out  of  it.  As  an 
aid  to  the  removal  of  these  difficulties,  I  may  put 
the  matter  thus.  There  are,  so  far  as  we  can  see, 
two  possible  principles,  and  only  two,  on  which  a 
moral  society  could  be  constituted.  The  one  is 
the  principle  of  strict  individualism — each  indi¬ 
vidual  created  separately,  and  standing  or  falling 
by  himself,  with  strictly  individual  responsibility.1 
Here  there  can  be  no  talk  of  racial  constitution, 
or  hereditary  vitiation  of  nature.  The  other 
is  the  principle  on  which  our  own  race,  like  the 
whole  of  organic  nature,  is  constituted.  Here 
there  is  a  race  of  beings  evolved  from  a  single 
source — generation  born  from  generation — heredi¬ 
tary  transmission  of  nature  and  qualities  —  in¬ 
timate  connection  of  the  members  with  each 
other,  and  a  necessary  participation  of  each  in 
the  life — in  the  goods  and  evils — of  the  whole, 
with  a  consequent  share  of  responsibility  for  the 
whole.2  This  idea  of  a  corporate  unity,  or 
organic  constitution,  of  the  race  enters  deeply 
into  modern  scientific  thought.  On  the  question 

1  Such,  we  may  suppose,  is  the  constitution  of  the  angelic  world 
(Matt.  xxii.  30).  2  Cf.  Rom.  xiv.  7. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SIN  231 


of  the  justice  of  such  a  constitution,  considered  in 
itself,  there  can,  I  think,  be  little  difference  of 
opinion.  It  is  obvious  that  an  organic  constitu¬ 
tion  is  one  of  enormous  advantage  to  the  race, 
provided  the  race  develops  normally,  in  harmony 
with  its  true  idea  and  destination.  It  is  in  that 
case  the  most  beneficent  of  all  constitutions  ;  an 
instrument  adapted,  through  the  operation  of 
inheritance,  for  conferring  the  highest  possible 
blessings  upon  those  under  it.  Equally  obvious 
is  it,  however,  that  where  sin  enters,  the  effect 
is  as  if  an  engine  were  reversed  ;  and  all  the 
powers  of  this  mighty  constitution,  intended  to 
conserve  and  to  hand  down  good,  become  as 
potent  to  accumulate  and  hand  down  evil.  So 
it  is  that  we  are  compelled  to  speak  of  racial  as 
well  as  of  individual  effects  of  sin.  If  heredity  is 
admitted  in  this  sphere — on  which  I  speak  after 
— a  fall  from  original  integrity  such  as  I  have 
already  described,  with  the  profound  disturbance 
and  perversion  in  the  life  of  the  soul  that  accom¬ 
panied  and  followed  it,  could  not  take  place  with¬ 
out  producing  the  most  powerful  effects  in  the 
natures  of  those  descending  from  the  first  trans¬ 
gressors.  So  violent  a  disturbance  as  sin  creates 


232 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


must  propagate  itself  in  after  generations.  If  it 
is  the  first  man — the  protoplast  of  the  race,  in 
whom  all  the  potencies  of  humanity  are  germin- 
ally  concentrated — who  sins,  its  effects  must  be 
serious  in  the  highest  degree,  and  will  reveal 
themselves  in  a  universal  defection  of  the  race. 
The  how  of  this  propagation  of  a  vitiated  nature 
may  be  mysterious  to  us  ;  but  it  is  only  part  of 
that  general  mystery  of  transmission  which  every 
doctrine  of  heredity  has  to  face.1  Here  theories 
of  traducianism  and  creationism  maintain  their 
battles,  with,  as  it  appears  to  me,  a  side  of  truth 
in  each  ; 2  here  science  brings  in  its  startling  sug¬ 
gestion  of  the  immortality  of  the  reproductive 
germ,  and  the  absolute  continuity  of  the  life  of 
the  species.3  But  the  fact  of  itself  seems  un- 

1  c  How  can  such  hereditary  transmission  of  the  characters  of  the 
parent  take  place  ?  How  can  a  single  reproductive  cell  reproduce 
the  whole  body  in  all  its  details?’  (Weismann,  Essays  on  Heredity , 
i.  p.  73)- 

2  The  fact  that  life  is  propagated  by  life,  organism  by  organism, 
and  that  the  characteristics  of  the  parent,  not  only  the  generic,  but 
the  particular,  are  handed  down  to  the  offspring,  is  undeniable 
(Traducianism)  j  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  as  obvious  that  in  each 
human  soul  there  is  a  principle  which  raises  it  to  the  rank  of  person¬ 
ality,  which  is  original,  distinctive,  differentiated  from  every  other, 
and  therefore  properly  to  be  attributed  to  the  Creative  Source.  Cf. 
Martensen,  Dogmatics ,  pp.  14 1-2. 

s  On  this  theory  of  Weismann’s  see  below,  pp.  253  ff. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SIN  233 


deniable  that  we  do  by  birth  inherit  a  nature 
which  is  impure  and  biassed  to  evil ;  that  person¬ 
ality  awakens  and  evolves  itself  in  a  nature 
already  fallen,  perverted,  and  prone  to  sin — 
which,  therefore,  in  the  judgment  alike  of  God 
and  of  the  individual’s  own  conscience,  is  itself 
evil.1 

The  theory  of  evolution  also,  it  is  now  to  be 
observed,  has  its  doctrine  of  original  sin— the 
4  ape  and  tiger  ’  theory,  we  may  call  it,  to  distin¬ 
guish  it  from  the  Biblical,  with  which,  as  a  little 
reflection  shows,  it  is  in  principle  irreconcilable. 
We  have,  indeed,  on  this  theory,  the  inheritance 
of  baser  tendencies,  but  they  are  simply  our 
natural  heritage  from  our  brute  ancestors,  and 
have  no  moral  cause  in  the  history  of  the  race, 
which  stamps  on  them  the  character  of  sin.  Mr. 
Fiske,  again,  may  be  taken  to  represent  this 
theory.  4  Thus,’  he  says  in  his  book  on  Man  s 
Destiny ,  4  we  see  what  human  progress  means.  It 
means  throwing  off  the  brute-inheritance — gradu¬ 
ally  throwing  it  off  through  ages  of  struggle  that 
are  by  and  by  to  make  struggle  needless  .  .  . 
the  ape  and  tiger  in  human  nature  will  become 

1  Rom.  vii.  i8,  20,  23. 


234 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


extinct.  Theology  has  much  to  say  about  original 
sin.  This  original  sin  is  neither  more  nor  less 
than  the  brute  -  inheritance  which  every  man 
carries  about  with  him,  and  the  progress  of 
evolution  is  an  advance  towards  true  salvation.’ 1 
No  doubt  there  are  elements  in  human  nature 
that  resemble,  and  only  too  forcibly  recall,  the 
ape  and  tiger — the  wolf,  the  fox,  the  serpent  also, 
and  many  other  animals — though  it  is  not  sug¬ 
gested  that  man  has  been  evolved  along  the  line 
of  the  tiger,  the  wolf,  or  any  of  these  other 
creatures  ;  which  are  not,  therefore,  exactly  an 
‘  inheritance  ’  from  the  latter.  It  need  only  here, 
however,  be  remarked,  that  if  original  sin  were 
simply  our  4  brute-inheritance,’  it  would  in  no 
proper  sense  be  sin  at  all.  The  victim  of  it 
might  groan  under  it  as  an  all  but  unendurable 
cross,  but  he  could  never  judge  of  it  as  the  re¬ 
ligious  man  does,  when  he  looks  down  into  his 
heart,  and  condemns  himself  for  the  self-seeking, 
impure,  and  God-resisting  tendencies  he  finds  in 
constant  operation  there.2 * 

1  P.  103. 

2  Matt.  xv.  19.  Cf.  the  Duke  of  Argyll,  Unity  of  Nature ,  pp. 

367  ff. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SIN  235 


An  objection,  however,  to  this  doctrine  of  an 
inherent  sinful  bias  in  our  nature,  due  to  a  4  fall,’ 
comes  from  the  side  of  the  newer  school  of  evolu¬ 
tion,  which  deserves  more  careful  consideration. 

It  is  well  known  that  disputes  on  heredity  turn 
mainly  at  the  present  moment  on  the  question  of 
the  transmissibility  of  acquired  characters.  Briefly, 
the  question  is  :  Are  acquired  characters  inherited? 
Spencer  and  the  older  evolutionists  said  Yes ;  , 

Weismann  and  an  important  school  of  younger 
biologists  say  No.  Much  depends  on  the  answer 
given  to  this  question  for  the  theory  of  evolution 
itself.  4  If  these  views  be  correct/  says  Weis¬ 
mann,  4  all  our  ideas  upon  the  transformation  of 
species  require  thorough  modification,  for  the 
whole  principle  of  evolution  by  means  of  exercise 
(use  and  disuse),  as  proposed  by  Lamarck,  and 
accepted  in  some  cases  by  Darwin,  entirely  col¬ 
lapses/  1  The  consequences,  however,  are  hardly 
less  serious  for  theology,  since,  if  sin  is  voluntary 
in  origin,  as  I  have  contended  it  must  be,  its 
effects  on  human  nature  take  their  place  among 
those  4  acquired  *  characters  to  which  it  is  held 
that  the  law  of  heredity  does  not  apply.  The 

1  Essays ,  i.  p.  69. 


236  GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


theory  has,  in  fact,  been  applied  in  this  way,  with 
great  acuteness,  to  disprove  the  doctrine  of  ori¬ 
ginal  sin  by  Mr.  F.  R.  Tennant,  in  his  recent 
Hulsean  Lectures  on  The  Origin  and  Propagation 
of  Sin.  ‘  The  question,’  says  this  writer,  4  turns 
entirely  on  the  possibility  of  the  transmission  of 
acquired  modifications  as  distinguished  from  con¬ 
genital  variations,’  and  he  declares,  ‘  The  conviction 
very  largely  prevails  amongst  the  authorities  that 
unequivocal  instances  of  such  transmission  have 
never  yet  been  supplied.’  €  Heredity,’  he  thinks, 
‘  in  the  strict  sense  of  inheritance  by  birth  or 
descent,  and  not  in  that  of  appropriation  of 
environment,  cannot  take  place  “  in  the  region 
of  the  spiritual  personality.”  ’ 1 

The  speculation  is  ingenious,  though,  as  regards 
the  question  of  original  sin,  experience  will,  I  fear, 
prove  too  strong  for  it.  The  fact  that  the  sub- 

1  Pp.  34,  36,  37.  A  chief  reason  which  Mr.  Tennant  gives  is 
that  ‘it  is  almost  impossible  to  conceive  the  nature  of  the  mechanism 
whereby  a  specific  effect  produced  upon  any  organism  could  so 
modify  its  reproductive  organs  as  to  cause  a  corresponding  modifica¬ 
tion  in  the  offspring’  (p.  37).  But  is  a  ‘mechanical’  explanation 
the  right  one,  and  should  the  fact  wait  on  our  ability  to  conceive  such 
‘mechanism’?  Mr.  Tennant  moves  here  too  closely  in  the  steps 
of  Weismann,  whose  mechanical  theories  will  not  comport  well 
with  other  parts  of  Mr.  Tennant’s  doctrine.  See  Note  XIII.  on 
Weismann’s  Theory  of  Heredity. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SIN  237 


ject  of  the  transmissibility  of  acquired  modifica¬ 
tions  is  so  keenly  debated  by  opposing  schools  of 
biologists 1  is  itself  an  evidence  that  the  last  word 
has  not  been  spoken  regarding  it,  and  suggests 
the  probability  that  the  truth  does  not  lie  wholly 
on  either  side.  This,  if  I  mistake  not,  is  really 
the  state  of  the  case.  It  seems  to  me  that 
heredity  in  these  discussions  is  treated  too  much 
en  bloc ,  and  that  we  are  not  necessarily  shut  up  to 
the  alternative — either  all  acquired  characters  are 
hereditary,  or  none  are.  It  may  be  necessary,  if 
admittedly  difficult,  to  make  a  distinction.  What 
occurs  to  me  is,  that  there  are  some  changes 
which  go  deeper  into  the  nature  than  others,  and 
produce  profounder  and  more  permanent  effects 
on  the  organism,  and  that  these  may  be  trans¬ 
missible,  while  others  are  not.  Physical  changes, 
e.g.y  arising  from  external  and  accidental  causes,  as 
mutilations,  go  least  deeply  into  the  nature,  and 
are  ordinarily  not  inherited.2  We  are  here,  as 

1  Weismann  himself  says  in  the  Preface  to  his  new  work :  c  I 
only  know  of  two  prominent  workers  of  our  day  who  have  given 
thorough-going  adherence  to  my  view :  Emery  in  Bologna  and 
J.  Arthur  Thomson  in  Aberdeen’  ( The  E<vol.  Theory ,  i.  p.  viii). 
One  of  the  most  important  criticisms  is  in  Romanes,  Darwin  and 
after  Darwin ,  ii. 

3  Even  here  there  are  facts  adduced  by  the  opponents  of  the  theory 


238 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


yet,  at  the  periphery  or  circumference  of  the 
being.  Intellectual  acquisitions,  again,  are  not 
inherited— e.g.,  skill  in  languages  or  in  music — 
though  the  talent  which  makes  these  acquisitions 
possible  is.  Here,  however,  it  becomes  more 
difficult  to  prove  a  negative,  and  high  authorities 
maintain  that  to  some  extent  acquired  skill  is 
inherited.1  Darwin,  e.g .,  writes  :  c  A  horse  is 
trained  to  certain  paces,  and  the  colt  inherits 
similar  movements.  Nothing  in  the  whole  circuit 
of  physiology  is  more  wonderful.’ 2  Non-trans¬ 
mission,  however,  it  must  be  allowed,  is,  in  this 
sphere,  the  rule,  and  transmission  is  the  exception. 
However  it  may  be  with  horses  and  dogs,  we 
know  very  well  from  experience  that  a  parent’s 
acquired  skill  and  knowledge — his  acquaintance, 
for  instance,  with  Latin  or  French — do  not 


not  easily  explained  away  ;  account  has  to  be  taken  also  of  the 
physical  effects  produced  by  emotion  (see  below),  and  of  the  results 
produced  through  long  exposure  to  climatic  influences  (change  of 
colour,  thicker  hairy  covering,  etc.).  Ordinarily,  however,  it  will  be 
agreed  that  physical  mutilations  (e.g.,  loss  of  a  finger  or  leg),  and 
artificial  marks  generally,  are  not  inherited.  Yet  it  is  in  this  sphere 
chiefly  that,  so  far  as  one  can  see,  experiments  have  been  attempted. 

1  Spencer’s  whole  theory  of  mental  and  moral  evolution  is  built  on 
this  possibility. 

2  Animals  and  Plants  under  Domestication ,  n.  chap.  x.  p.  307 
(American  edition). 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SIN  239 


descend  to  his  offspring.1  We  are  still  here  in 
a  region  which  lies  outside  the  depths  of  the 
personal  life.  It  seems  different  when,  from  the 
physical  and  mental,  we  enter  the  region  of 
emotional  life,  and  of  the  life  of  feeling  generally. 
Deep  impressions,  as  every  one  is  aware,  are  often 
made  on  the  organism  by  emotion — impressions 
which  seem  to  go  down  to  the  very  seat  of  life — 
and  certain  of  the  physical  effects  these  entail  are 
surely  transmissible  to  offspring.2  Their  general 
effects,  in  debilitated  and  unstable  nervous  system, 
are  admittedly  transmissible.3 

Even  in  the  emotional  region,  however,  we  are 
still  outside  the  properly  voluntary  life  of  man  ; 

1  it  is  a  somewhat  different  question  whether  education  and 
culture  may  not  have  some  more  general  effect  in  developing  capa¬ 
city  and  heightening  refinement. 

2  A  strong  mental  shock — the  witnessing  of  a  murder,  for 
example — may  produce  effects  upon  the  body  which  descend  to 
offspring.  Dr.  Carpenter  gives  striking  instances  of  the  physical 
effects  of  emotion.  He  narrates  the  case  of  a  lady  who  saw  the 
window-sash  descend  on  the  hand  of  her  child,  cutting  off  three  of 
its  fingers.  Within  twenty-four  hours  the  three  corresponding 
fingers  of  her  own  hand  were  inflamed  and  suppurating  ( Mental 
Physiology ,  p.  682). 

3  Cf.  Romanes’s  criticism  of  Weismann’s  admissions  on  this 
score  ( Darwin  and  After  Darwin,  ii.  p.  108).  ‘Even,’  he  says, 
discussing  a  case  of  artificially  produced  epilepsy,  4  if  it  be  but  a 
44  tendency,”  a  £<  disposition,”  or  a  44  diathesis  ”  that  is  transmitted, 
it  is  not  less  a  case  of  transmission,’  etc. 


240 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


but  I  would  now  remark  that  it  is  in  the  volun- 

* 

tary,  and  specially  in  the  moral  life,  that  the 
deepest  effects  of  all  seem  to  be  produced  upon 
his  nature.  Here  influences  proceed  from  the 
centre  of  the  personality,  which  powerfully  affect 
the  whole  being,  and,  as  an  accumulation  of  evi¬ 
dence  seems  to  prove,  transmit  results,  beneficial 
or  baneful,  to  succeeding  generations.  The  moral 
forces  of  life,  if  good,  act  as  a  lever  to  lift  up  ;  if 
evil,  are  as  an  axe  to  break  down.  In  a  recent 
life  of  the  late  Principal  John  Cairns  the  sugges¬ 
tive  remark  is  made  :  c  The  home  at  Dunglass, 
where  religion  was  always  the  chief  concern,  was 
the  nursery  of  a  strong  mind  as  well  as  of  a  strong 
soul,  and  both  were  fed  from  the  same  spring. 
In  this  case,  as  in  so  many  others,  spiritual  strength 
became  intellectual  strength  in  the  second  genera¬ 
tion.’1  This  is  a  not  uncommon  experience. 
Where  the  moral  root  is  present,  brain-power 
strengthens  ;  where  the  moral  root  is  wanting, 
brain-power  deteriorates.  This  brings  us  directly 
to  the  cases  of  those  who  form,  or  are  seduced 
into,  vicious  habits.  All  such  cases  Weismann 
would  explain  as  the  result  of  congenital  predis- 

1  Life  of  Cairns,  by  his  nephew,  in  ‘Famous  Scots  Series,’  p.  28. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SIN  241 


position,  with  which  will  and  conduct  have  no¬ 
thing  to  do.  But  is  this  arguable  ?  Take  the 
case,  e.g .,  of  an  individual  who  has  no  hereditary 
tendency  to  drunkenness — none  at  least  which  has 
ever  appeared,  or  which  would  appear  in  his 
descendants,  if  he  had  continued  to  live  in 
sobriety — but  who  is  thrown  into  company,  and 
induced  to  form  habits  which  end  in  his  becoming 
a  confirmed  drunkard.  Is  it  really  disputable  that 
the  effects  of  such  lapse  in  deteriorated  organ¬ 
ism,  depraved  appetite,  and  weakened  will,  are 
handed  down  to  offspring  ?  Dr.  Carpenter,  e.g., 
in  his  Mental  Physiology,  writes  :  4  The  drunkard 
not  only  injures  and  enfeebles  his  own  nervous 
system,  but  entails  mental  disease  upon  his  family. 
His  daughters  are  nervous  and  hysterical ;  his 
sons  are  weak,  wayward,  and  eccentric,  and  sink 
under  the  pressure  of  excitement,  or  of  some  un¬ 
foreseen  emergency,  or  the  ordinary  calls  of  duty.’ 

4  The  children  of  drunkards  are  deficient  in  bodily 
and  vital  energy,  and  are  predisposed  by  their 
very  organisation  to  have  cravings  for  alcoholic 
stimulants.’ 1  Such  testimony,  agreeing,  I  sup- 

1  P.  370.  The  sentences  are  quoted.  Another  scientific  writer, 
quoted  by  Elam  in  his  A  Physicians  Problem  (p.  30),  says:  ‘The 

Q 


242 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


pose,  with  the  experience  of  most,  could  be 
indefinitely  multiplied.  Now,  unless  it  is  main¬ 
tained  that  the  same  results  would  have  followed 
from  the  parent’s  constitution  though  he  had  not 
personally  fallen  into  vice,  there  would  seem  to  be 
here  clear  evidence  of  heredity  of  acquired  states. 

The  conclusion  I  arrive  at,  accordingly,  is  that 
there  are  moral  changes  which  go  into  the  depths 
of  the  nature  as  nothing  else  can  do,  and  that  the 
results  of  these  changes  are  transmissible.  I  have 
used  the  familiar  illustration  of  intemperance ; 
but  of  course  the  same  line  of  reasoning  applies  to 
all  forms  of  vice.  I  take,  therefore,  precisely 
the  opposite  view  to  that  of  Mr.  Tennant,  in  the 
Hulsean  Lectures  formerly  quoted  :  £  Heredity 
in  the  strict  sense  .  .  .  cannot  take  place  in  the 
region  of  the  spiritual  personality.’  It  is,  to  my 
mind,  in  the  spiritual  personality  that  we  must 
seek  the  cause  of  the  worst  evils  heredity  entails 
upon  us.  But  if  this  law  holds  good  generally, 
it  must  surely  hold  good  peculiarly  with  regard 

most  startling  problem  connected  with  intemperance  is,  that  not 
only  does  it  affect  the  health,  morals,  and  intelligence,  of  the  offspring 
of  its  votaries,  but  that  they  also  inherit  the  fatal  tendency,  and  feel 
a  craving  for  the  very  beverages  which  have  acted  as  poisons  on 
their  system  from  the  commencement  of  their  being.’ 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SIN  243 


to  the  first  act  of  sin  in  the  progenitors  of  the  race. 
This  involved  a  shock  to  the  moral  and  spiritual 
nature  which  we  can  now  only  faintly  measure  ; 
it  was  the  rupture  of  the  original  bond  between 
the  soul  and  God,  and  the  dissolution  of  the  har¬ 
mony  of  the  soul  within  itself ;  and  its  effect  on 
the  organism  must  have  been  proportionally  great. 
In  any  case  the  fact  is  there,  that  the  natural  con¬ 
dition  of  ,  man  is  one  of  moral  depravation,  and 
that  this  evil  bias  descends  from  generation  to 
generation.  Hereditary  sin  is  a  deep,  dark  strain 
in  the  history  of  our  race,  not  to  be  explained 
away. 

To  discuss  more  particularly  the  character  and 
degree  of  this  hereditary  deterioration  of  the 
nature  through  sin,  and  to  investigate  its  bearings 
on  responsibility,1  would  carry  me  further  away 
from  my  immediate  subject  than  I  can  venture  at 
present  to  go.  Roman  Catholic  theology,  it  is 
well  known,  distinguishes  between  man  as  a  purely 
natural  being,  and  the  gift  of  supernatural  right¬ 
eousness  bestowed  on  him  at  his  creation.  This 
latter  is  conceived  of  as  something  over  and  above 
his  true  nature — a  donum  superadditum  ;  man  would 

1  See  Note  XIV.  on  Heredity  in  Relation  to  Responsibility. 


244 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


have  been  complete  and  faultless  without  it.  The 
effect  of  the  fall  is  that  man  comes  into  the  world 
wanting  this  supernatural  endowment,  but  other¬ 
wise  not  greatly  impaired.1  Baptism  restores  the 
lost  grace.  One  consequence  of  this  theory  is, 
that,  admitting  concupiscence  to  remain  even  in 
the  baptized  person,  it  refuses  to  regard  concupi¬ 
scence  as  sin,  while  allowing  that  Paul  in  Romans 
does  so  characterise  it.2  The  true  element  in  this 
view  is,  that  it  recognises  that  man,  even  in  the 
unfallen  state,  was  dependent  for  his  spiritual  per¬ 
fection  on  gracious  communications  from  God  ; 3 
but  it  errs  in  regarding  this  higher  endowment  as 
something  separable  from  man’s  true  nature,  and 
its  absence  as  not  seriously  impairing  or  corrupt¬ 
ing  his  natural  faculties.  On  the  other  hand, 
when  Protestant  theology  speaks  of  c  total  de¬ 
pravity,’  ‘  the  corruption  of  the  whole  nature,’  and 
the  like,  we  are  not  to  read  into  these  expressions 
the  sense  which  is  sometimes  taken  from  them, 
but  which  they  were  never  intended  to  bear,  that 
every  man,  in  his  natural  condition,  is  as  bad  as  he 

1  Cf.  Laidlaw,  Bible  Doct.  of  Man ,  pp.  153  ff.  Hence  Roman 
Catholic  theologians  can  provide  for  unbaptized  children  in  a  place 
of 1  natural 1  happiness. 

2  Rom.  vii.  20. 


3  See  above,  p.  224. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SIN  245 


can  be.  It  is  not  implied,  e.g .,  by  these  expres¬ 
sions,  that  man  does  not  retain  many  traces  of  the 
divine  image  in  intellect,  in  conscience,  in  will,  in 
natural  affections,  in  traits  of  character  pleasing 
and  praiseworthy  in  themselves.  It  is  not  meant 
that,  in  the  moral  sphere,  man  does  not  retain  a 
measure  of  freedom,  and  is  not  capable  of  exhibit¬ 
ing  many  virtues ;  or  that,  even  in  the  religious 
sphere,  there  is  not  still  in  his  heart  an  inextin¬ 
guishable  longing  after  God — at  least  a  conscious¬ 
ness  of  unrest  in  sin,  and  in  all  things  earthly, 
testifying  to  the  need  of  God.  What  they  do 
signify  is,  that  there  is  nevertheless  no  part  of 
man’s  nature  which  has  escaped  the  defiling  and 
perverting  influence  of  sin  ;  that  sin  infects  the 
whole  man ;  that  there  is  no  faculty  or  member  of 
his  soul  or  body  of  which  it  can  be  said — this  is 
perfectly  pure.1  The  virus  of  sin  is  in  the  system, 
and  subtly,  or  more  manifestly,  affects  every  part. 
Only,  when  everything  is  said  in  extenuation,  it  is 
difficult  to  exaggerate  the  awfulness  of  the  change 
which  sin  has  wrought  in  human  nature,  or  the 
dire  ruin  that  is  certain  to  result,  if  grace  does 
not  mercifully  interpose. 

1  See  above,  pp.  225-6, 


246 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


3.  I  have  now,  lastly,  to  speak  of  the  physical 
consequence  of  sin  in  death,  or  of  the  penal  effect 
of  sin  in  the  dissolution  of  man’s  composite  per¬ 
sonality  as  a  being  consisting  of  body  and  soul. 
I  shall  discuss  this  in  next  lecture  ;  then  bring  the 
subject  to  a  close  by  considering  the  bearings  of 
the  whole  on  the  system  of  Christian  doctrine. 


The  Biblical  Doctrine  of  Man  and  Sin  in  its 
Relation  to  the  Christian  Redemption 
— Restoration  and  Perfecting  of  the 
Divine  Image 


Still  to  be  considered.  3.  The  Physical  Consequence  of  Sin  in 
Suffering  and  Death.  Alleged  Universality  and  Necessity  of 
Death  in  the  Organic  World  (Man  included).  Biblical  View 
connected:  (1)  With  its  View  of  Man’s  Nature.  Soul  and 
Body  not  intended  to  be  Separated.  (2)  With  its  View  of 
Man’s  Primitive  Condition.  One  of  Moral  Uprightness. 
Weismann’s  theory  that  Death  is  not  a  Necessity  of  Organisms. 
‘  Immortality  of  the  Protozoa.’  Remarkable  Longevity  in  Animal 
World.  Man’s  case  stands  on  separate  footing.  He  founds  a 
New  Kingdom  ;  is  destined  for  Immortality.  Death  a  Contra¬ 
diction  of  the  true  Idea  of  Humanity.  Posse  non  mori  and  non 
posse  mori .  Harmony  of  previous  Discussions  with  the  Scrip¬ 
ture  Doctrine  of  Redemption.  The  Doctrines  of  Man  and  Sin 
implied:  1.  In  the  Presuppositions  of  Redemption.  (1)  The 
infinite  Value  of  the  Soul.  (2)  Man’s  Capacity  for  Divine 
Sonship.  (3)  Man’s  Need  of  Redemption  as  a  Sinner.  2.  In 
the  End  of  Redemption.  The  Restoration  and  Perfecting  of 
the  Divine  Image.  3.  In  the  Means  and  Method  of  Redemption. 
(1)  In  the  Doctrine  of  Incarnation.  The  Divine  Image  the 
Ground  of  the  Possibility  of  Incarnation.  Christ  the  Perfect 
Realisation  of  the  Divine  Image  in  Man.  (2)  In  the  Doctrine 
of  Atonement.  Guilt  the  Presupposition  of  Atonement.  The 
Racial  Aspect  of  Sin  has  its  Counterpart  in  Redemption.  The 
First  and  the  Second  Adams.  The  Penal  Character  of  Death 
implied  in  Christ’s  Death  for  our  Sins.  (3)  In  the  Doctrines  of 
Regeneration  and  Renewal.  Conformity  to  Christ’s  Image. 
(4)  In  the  Doctrine  of  Resurrection  and  the  Christian  Hope  of 
Immortality.  Christ’s  Resurrection  and  ours.  The  Immortality 
of  the  Gospel,  one  in  which  the  Body  shares  j  an  Immortality 
of  the  whole  Person.  Conclusion. 


248 


VI 


THE  BIBLICAL  DOCTRINE  OF  MAN  AND  SIN  IN  ITS 
RELATION  TO  THE  CHRISTIAN  REDEMPTION- 
RESTORATION  AND  PERFECTING  OF  THE  DIVINE 
IMAGE 

I  have  spoken  of  the  spiritual  consequences  of 
sin  in  individual  depravation,  and  of  the  racial 
consequence  in  hereditary  evil,  or,  as  it  is 
commonly  called,  Original  Sin.  It  remains  to 
speak — 

3.  Of  the  physical  consequence  of  sin  in  suffer¬ 
ing  and  death. 

There  is  nothing,  perhaps,  on  which  the 
c  modern  ’  view  of  the  world  is  clearer,  or  asser¬ 
tion  is  more  confident,  than  on  the  universal 
reign  of  death  over  all  creatures,  man  included. 
The  idea  that  physical  death  is  not  a  part  of  man’s 
natural  lot,  but  has  entered  the  world  through 
sin,  is  scouted  as  an  absurdity.  The  Book  of 
Genesis,  it  is  generally  allowed,  represents  death  as 

249 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


250 

the  penalty  of  transgression,1  and  Paul  expressly 
affirms  that  death  entered  the  world  through 
man’s  sin.2  But  the  story  in  Genesis  is  dismissed 
as  a  myth  ;  and  Paul’s  opinion,  based  on  that 
story,  is  held  to  be  of  no  authority  for  us.  Even 
Christian  theologians,  in  deference  to  the  evolu¬ 
tionary  philosophy,  very  generally  concede  that 
physical  death,  as  such,  has  no  relation  to  sin,  but 
must  be  viewed  as  the  natural  fate  of  man.  But 
I  would  ask  seriously  :  Is  it  so  ?  I  shall  not  base 
my  demur  on  the  simple  statement  in  Genesis,  or 
even  on  the  dictum  of  the  Apostle  Paul.  I  take 
my  stand  on  a  much  broader  foundation — the 
whole  Scripture  doctrine  on  the  nature  and 
destiny  of  man,  and  on  the  character  of  his 
redemption.  If  the  connection  of  physical  death 
with  sin  is  found  to  be  an  implicate  of  the  total 
Christian  view,  we  may  be  disposed  to  treat  Paul’s 
doctrine  with  more  respect. 

1  Gen.  ii.  17;  iii.  19.  Mr.  Tennant,  on  the  other  hand,  is  4  more 
than  doubtful’  whether,  within  the  limits  of  the  Old  Testament, 
4  death  was  as  yet  regarded  as  caused  by  Adam’s  sin.’  4  It  may  be 
assumed,  then,  that  there  is  no  indication  of  the  view  that  death  is  a 
consequence  of  our  first  parents’  sin  in  Hebrew  literature  of  earlier 
date  than  Ecclesiasticus  ’  {The  Fall  and  Original  Sin ,  pp.  104,  117- 
11 9).  Our  view  is  that  this  idea  was  present  as  far  back  as  the 
fall-story  goes  (see  above,  p.  199). 

2  Rom.  v.  12. 


CHRISTIAN  REDEMPTION  251 


Everything  depends  here,  I  grant  :  (1)  on  what 
we  suppose  man’s  nature  to  be  ;  and  (2)  on 
what  view  we  take  of  the  original  condition  of 
man.  On  both  points  we  have  seen  that  the 
Christian  view  and  the  so-called  ‘  modern  ’  view 
go  very  widely  apart ;  but  I  have  sought  to  show 
also  that  there  are  the  strongest  grounds  in  both 
reason  and  science  for  holding  the  Christian  view 
to  be  the  true  one. 

(1)  In  respect  of  the  nature  of  man,  we  have 
seen  reason  to  regard  man  as  a  compound  beings 
the  denizen  of  two  worlds,  by  his  soul  united  to 
the  spiritual  world  of  rational  and  moral  life,  and 
by  his  body  united  to  nature  below  him.1  His 
complete  personality  consists  of  neither  of  these 
two  elements  in  separation,  but  in  the  union  of 
both.  He  is  not  pure  spirit,  like  the  angels, 
but  incorporated  spirit.  Death,  therefore,  is 
not  the  same  thing  to  him  as  it  is  to  the  lower 
animals — unless,  indeed,  we  deny  to  him,  as  we 
do  to  them,  immortality.  Neither,  as  I  said 
before,  is  the  body  to  be  regarded  in  his  case, 
as  the  old  philosophers  thought  of  it,  as  a 
material  prison-house,  from  which  he  should  be 
glad  to  escape  in  death.  It  is  part  of  himself : 

1  See  above,  p.  46. 


252  GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 

an  integral  part  of  his  total  personality,  and  body 
and  soul  in  separation  are  neither  of  them  the 
complete  man.  It  follows,  if  we  deal  firmly  with 
this  conception  of  man,  that  death  is  to  him  not 
a  natural  process,  but  something  altogether 
^natural — the  violent  separation  of  two  parts  of 
his  being  which  God  never  meant  to  be  separated  ; 
a  rupture,  a  rending  asunder,  a  mutilation,  of  his 
personality.1  The  analogy  of  the  animals  is  not  in 
point  here  ;  for  man  is  not  a  mere  animal.  He 
has  what  they  lack,  a  personal  life,  and  an  im¬ 
mortal  nature  and  destiny.  It  is  quite  arbitrary, 
therefore,  to  reason  from  the  one  to  the  other. 
If  man’s  soul  perished  at  death,  the  analogy 
would  be  complete.  But  it  is  an  article  of  our 
faith  that  it  does  not  perish.  The  Bible  here  is 
quite  in  harmony  with  natural  feeling.  We 
instinctively  feel  death,  with  its  inroads  of  disease, 
and  the  long  struggle  which  often  leads  up  to  it, 
to  be  something  foreign  to  the  true  idea  of  man 
— something  tragic,  mournful,  lamentable  ;  and 
neither  in  heathen  religions  nor  in  the  Bible  is 
the  life  of  a  disembodied  spirit  viewed  as  either 
a  complete  or  a  desirable  one. 

1  See  above,  p.  53. 


CHRISTIAN  REDEMPTION  253 


(2)  In  respect  of  the  original  state  of  man  I 
have  tried  to  show  reason  for  rejecting  the  con¬ 
clusion  of  popular  anthropology,  which  necessitates 
death  as  part  of  man’s  natural  lot.1  The  stand¬ 
point  of  science  itself,  I  ought  here  to  remark,  is 
itself  changing  in  a  remarkable  way  in  regard  to 
death  and  its  necessity  in  the  living  organism. 
Formerly  death  was  regarded  as  self-evidently  a 
natural  necessity — a  law  of  all  living  beings  that 
involved  no  mystery  ;  the  wonder  was,  not  that 
organisms  should  wear  out  and  die,  but  that  they 
continued  to  live  so  long.2  It  is  a  startling 
change  when  we  find  a  biologist  like  Weismann 
— so  thoroughly  naturalistic  in  his  general  views 
— speaking  of  ‘  the  question  of  the  origin  of 
death  *  as  4  one  of  the  most  difficult  problems  in 
the  whole  range  of  physiology,’ 3  and  declaring  on 
grounds  of  pure  science  that  there  is  no  ascertain¬ 
able  reason  why  living  organisms,  apart,  i.e.,  from 
injury  and  violence,  should  ever  die  at  all.  In 
point  of  fact,  he  contends,  in  unicellular  animals 

1  See  above,  Lect.  IV. 

2  Prof.  G.  Henslow,  e.g.,  lays  it  down  categorically  in  The  Liberal 
Churchman  (June  1905,  p.  223):  ‘Physiology  shows  that  a  gradual 
decay  and  death  of  the  body  are  as  inevitable  and  necessary  a  part 
of  man’s  terrestrial  economy  as  are  his  growth  and  development.’ 

3  Essays  on  Heredity ,  i.  p.  20. 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


254 

— not  only  in  the  Amoebae  and  the  low  unicellular 
Algae,  but  also  in  ‘  the  far  more  highly  organised  5 
Infusoria — they  do  not  die.  He  has  even  coined 
a  phrase,  c  the  immortality  of  the  Protozoa.’ 
Here  are  a  few  sentences  illustrating  his  view. 

‘  In  the  same  manner,’  he  says,  ‘  from  a  physio¬ 
logical  point  of  view,  we  might  admit  that  we 
can  see  no  reason  why  the  functions  of  the  organ¬ 
ism  should  ever  cease.’ 1  ‘  Death,  i.e.,  the  end  of 

life,  is  by  no  means,  as  is  usually  assumed,  an 
attribute  of  all  organisms.  An  immense  number 
of  low  organisms  do  not  die,  although  they  are 
easily  destroyed,  being  killed  by  heat,  poisons, 
etc.  As  long,  however,  as  the  conditions  which 
are  necessary  for  their  life  are  fulfilled,  they  con¬ 
tinue  to  live,  and  they  thus  carry  the  potentiality 
of  unending  life  in  themselves.’ 2  4  The  low 

unicellular  organisms  are  potentially  immortal.’ 8 
4  Each  individual  of  any  such  unicellular  species 
living  on  the  earth  to-day  is  far  older  than  man¬ 
kind,  and  is  almost  as  old  as  life  itself.’ 4  But 
even  in  higher  organisms  death,  in  his  view,  is  no 
inherent  necessity  of  the  organism,  but  is  only 


1  Essays  on  Heredity ,  i.  p.  73. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  33. 


3  Ibid.,  p.  26. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  73. 


CHRISTIAN  REDEMPTION 


255 


explicable  through  c  utility/  i.e.y  the  advantage  to 
the  individual  or  species  of  limited  existence — an 
explanation  which  I  do  not  discuss.  As  he  says, 

‘  Death  is  to  be  looked  upon  as  an  occurrence 
which  is  advantageous  to  the  species  as  a  con¬ 
cession  to  the  outer  conditions  of  life,  and  not  as 
an  absolute  necessity,  essentially  inherent  in  life.’ 1 
c  The  above-mentioned  hypothesis  upon  the  origin 
and  necessity  of  death  leads  me  to  believe  that 
the  organism  did  not  finally  cease  to  renew  the 
worn-out  cell-material  because  the  nature  of  the 
cells  did  not  permit  them  to  multiply  indefinitely, 
but  because  the  power  of  multiplying  indefinitely 
was  lost  when  it  ceased  to  be  of  use.’ 2  He  shows 
that  the  necessity  of  death  is  not  explained  by 
such  causes  as  the  greater  size  and  complexity  of 
the  animal,  the  rate  at  which  the  animal  lives,  etc. 
Facts  demonstrate  that  no  fixed  relation  exists 
between  size  or  activity,  and  degree  of  longevity. 
The  instances  he  adduces  are  very  curious.  c  Of 
all  organisms  in  the  world  large  trees  have  the 
longest  lives.  The  Andansonias  of  the  Cape 
Verd  Islands  are  said  to  live  for  6000  years. 
The  largest  animals  also  attain  the  greatest  age. 

1  Essays  on  Heredity,  i.  p.  26.  2  Ibid.,  p.  25. 


256  GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


Thus  there  is  no  doubt  that  whales  live  for 
some  hundreds  of  years.  Elephants  live  200 
years.’1  This  great  age  is  attained  also  by  many 
of  the  smaller  animals,  such  as  the  pike  and  carp. 
Eagles,  vultures,  falcons,  ravens,  parrots,  wild 
geese,  etc.,  are  said  to  live  upwards  of  100 
years.  Eagles  and  vultures  have  lived  in 
captivity  104  and  118  years.2  One  begins  to  see 
that  there  is  no  inherent  impossibility  in  the 
great  ages  of  the  patriarchs,  or  even  in  ante¬ 
diluvian  longevity,  after  all.  It  is  interesting 
in  this  connection  to  recall  that  the  skulls  and 
skeletons  of  the  palasolithic  men  of  the  mammoth 
period  point  to  a  race  of  remarkable  height  and 
strength — some  seven  feet  high — and,  apparently, 
of  great  longevity.3  In  Egypt,  we  are  told,  110 

1  Essays  on  Heredity ,  i.  p.  6.  2  Ibid.,  pp.  6,  12,  36-37. 

3  This  at  least  is  the  view  of  Sir  J.  W.  Dawson.  See  his  Meeting 
Place  of  Geology  and  History,  pp.  53,  58,  62,  66,  etc.  Speaking  of  the 
Mentone  and  related  skeletons,  he  says  :  1  Another  point  which  strikes 
us  in  reading  the  descriptions  of  these  skeletons  is  the  indication 
which  they  seem  to  present  of  an  extreme  longevity.  The  massive 
proportions  of  the  body,  the  great  development  of  the  muscular 
processes,  the  extreme  wearing  of  the  teeth  among  a  people  who 
predominantly  lived  on  flesh  and  not  on  grain,  the  obliteration  of 
the  sutures  of  the  skull,  along  with  indications  of  slow  ossification  of 
the  ends  of  the  long  bones,  point  in  this  direction,  and  seem  to 
indicate  a  slow  maturity  and  great  length  of  life  in  this  most  primi¬ 
tive  race  ’  (p.  63). 


CHRISTIAN  REDEMPTION  257 

years  was  regarded  as  the  number  of  a  perfect 
life.1 

These  speculations  of  Weismann,  it  is  obvious, 
however,  apply  to  all  animals,  and  can  be  pressed 
no  further  than  to  show  that  death  is  not  an 
inherent  necessity  of  the  animal  organism.  Man’s 
case  still  stands  on  its  own  peculiar  footing.  I  do 
not  question  the  prevalence  of  death  in  the  animal 
world — there  is  not  a  word  in  Scripture  to  suggest 
that  animals  possessed  immortality,  or  came  under 
the  law  of  death  for  man’s  sin.  But  man,  as  a 
rational,  spiritual  being,  stands  on  a  different  foot¬ 
ing  entirely.  He  founds  a  new  kingdom — the 
kingdom  of  rational  and  moral  life  ;  he  bears  the 
directly  imprinted  image  of  his  Maker  ;  he  comes 
from  his  Creator’s  hand,  as  I  have  tried  to  show, 
in  a  condition  of  purity  befitting  his  high  voca¬ 
tion.  The  law  of  mere  animal  life  has  no  neces¬ 
sary  application  to  him.  Both  on  the  ground  of 
the  composite  nature  of  man,  and  on  the  ground 
of  his  peculiar  standing  as  a  rational  and  moral 

1  Cf.  Ebers  (art.  ‘Joseph  ’  in  Smith’s  Dictionary  of  Bible ,  second  ed. 
i.  p.  1804)  and  other  authorities.  In  the  view  of  some,  the  venerable 
moralist  Ptah-hotep,  of  the  fifth  dynasty  (c.  3000  B.c.),  claims  to  be 
already  that  age  when  he  wrote  his  book  (Birch,  Egypt ,  p.  50,  etc.). 
This  was  the  age  of  Joseph  at  his  death  (Gen.  1. 

R 


258 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


agent,  wearing  the  moral  image  of  God,  we  are 
entitled  to  expect  something  wholly  different. 

On  both  of  these  grounds,  therefore,  as  well  as 
on  others  afterwards  to  be  exhibited,  connected 
with  the  Christian  system,  I  resist  the  conclusion 
that  death  was  the  normal  lot  of  man,  and  can 
only  find  a  clear  and  consistent  position  on  the 
hypothesis  that  it  was  not.  We  shall  see  that  this 
idea  of  man’s  nature  as  above  the  law  of  death, 
and  of  the  connection  of  death  with  sin,  enters  far 
more  vitally  into  the  organism  of  Christian  truth 
than  many  people  suppose.  It  affects  the  general 
view  taken  of  death  in  Scripture  ;  the  doctrine 
of  Christ’s  death  as  an  atonement  for  sin  ;  the 
doctrine  of  the  resurrection,  both  Christ’s  and  the 
believer’s  ;  the  Christian  hope  of  immortality,1  etc. 
We  have  but  to  ask  the  question  :  Would  Christ, 
apart  from  His  crucifixion,  have  been  subject  to 
bodily  decay  and  death  ?  to  see  how  closely  the 
fact  of  death  bears  on  the  true  idea  of  humanity. 
The  only  view  that  seems  tenable,  on  grounds  of 
Scripture,  seems  to  be  that  man,  in  his  original 
destiny,  was  not  subject  to  mortality — that  death 
was  not  an  element  in  his  original  destiny,  but 

1  See  above,  p.  53,  and  the  further  illustration  below. 


CHRISTIAN  REDEMPTION  259 


enters  our  race,  as  the  Bible  affirms,  through  sin. 
Man,  we  should  perhaps  rather  say,  was,  as  created, 
in  strictness  neither  mortal  nor  immortal  as  regards 
his  body.  His  condition  was,  as  Augustine  said, 
posse  non  mori.  Had  he  continued  obedient,  con¬ 
tinuance  of  life  would  have  been  assured  to  him  : 
his  state  would  have  become  non  posse  mori.  The 
conditions  under  which  life  would  have  been  lived 
had  this  possibility  been  realised — what  changes 
the  body,  inhabited  by  a  pure  soul,  growing  con¬ 
tinually  in  wisdom  and  goodness,  would  have 
undergone  ;  what  transformation  or  ‘  translation  ’ 
would  finally  have  awaited  it— analogous,  perhaps, 
to  that  of  Enoch  or  Elijah,  or  to  the  change 
which  it  is  said  will  pass  on  living  believers  at 
the  Lord’s  Parousia 1 — are  matters  which  lie 
beyond  our  ken,  and  on  which  it  is  useless  to 
speculate.  Sin  did  enter  the  world,  and  with 
sin  came  that  separation  of  soul  and  body  we 
call  deaths  the  effect  of  which,  so  different  from 
what  lay  in  God’s  original  design  for  humanity, 
we  sorrowfully  know. 

I  have  now  finished  the  consideration,  in  its 

1  1  Cor.  xv.  51. 


260 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


main  issues,  of  the  Biblical  doctrine  of  man  and 
his  sin  in  its  relation  to  modern  anthropological 
theories.  My  task,  however,  would  still  be  incom¬ 
plete  if,  in  concluding  the  lectures,  I  did  not  seek 
to  indicate,  in  however  summary  a  way,  some  of 
the  bearings  of  this  important  subject  on  the 
Christian  system  as  a  whole.  The  connection 
of  Christian  truth,  which  it  is  always  interesting 
to  trace,  of  itself  makes  this  desirable  ;  but  there 
are  two  considerations  which  render  it  almost 
imperative  that  such  a  concluding  glance  at  the 
correlations  of  doctrine  should  not  be  omitted. 
In  the  first  place,  the  intimate  connection  of  the 
doctrines  we  have  been  considering  with  the  other 
parts  of  the  Christian  system  is  fitted  to  have  a 
distinctly  confirmatory  effect  upon  our  judgments, 
and  pro  tan  to  to  serve  as  a  test  of  the  accuracy  of 
the  conclusions  at  which  we  have  arrived.  I  do 
not  think  it  can  be  sufficiently  emphasised  that 
Christian  truth  forms  an  organism — has  a  unity 
and  coherence  which  cannot  be  arbitrarily  dis¬ 
turbed  in  any  of  its  parts  without  the  whole 
undergoing  injury.  Conversely,  the  proof  that 
any  doctrine  fits  in  essentially  to  that  organism 
— is  an  integral  part  of  it- — is  one  of  the  strongest 


CHRISTIAN  REDEMPTION  261 


evidences  we  can  have  of  its  correctness.  And  in 
the  second  place,  the  doctrine  of  the  divine  image 
in  man  cannot  be  regarded  as  fully  exhibited  till 
it  has  been  shown  how  this  image,  lost  or  defaced 
by  sin,  has  been  graciously  restored  and  perfected 
in  Christ,  Himself  the  perfect  image  of  God  in 
humanity,  and  the  complete  revelation  of  the 
divine  idea  of  humanity.  To  this  concluding 
indication  of  the  relation  of  the  Biblical  doctrines 
of  man  and  sin  to  the  Christian  redemption  I  now, 
accordingly,  proceed. 

1.  That  the  Biblical  doctrine  of  the  image  of 
God  in  man,  and  of  sin  as  the  voluntary  departure 
from  a  condition  of  actual  moral  likeness  to  God, 
has  much  to  do  with  the  -presuppositions  of  the 
Christian  redemption,  has  already,  I  hope,  been 
shown  with  sufficient  clearness. 

(1)  On  this  doctrine  rests,  first  of  all,  the  idea 
of  the  infinite  value  of  man  in  God’s  sight,  and 
of  his  capacity  for  such  a  redemption  as  Christ 
brings.  The  infinite  value  of  the  soul  is  rightly 
specified  by  Professor  Harnack  in  his  recent 
lectures  as  an  essential  part  of  Christ’s  Gospel.1 
It  is  a  mistake,  however,  to  speak  of  this  idea, 

1  See  above,  p.  27. 


262 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


as  is  sometimes  done,  as  one  which  Christ  first 
brought  into  the  world.  It  is,  in  truth,  an  idea 
which  has  its  ultimate  ground  in  the  doctrine 
which  stands  on  the  first  page  of  the  Old  Testa¬ 
ment,  and  which  underlies  every  part  of  the 
teaching  of  Scripture. 

It  is  the  fact  that  man  is  made  in  the  rational 
and  moral  image  of  God  which  gives  him,  in  a 
universe  of  selfless  things,  the  value  of  an  end  in 
himself ;  which  leads  God  to  set  value  on  him, 
and  even  in  his  sin  to  desire,  and  take  infinite 
pains  for,  his  recovery.  Jesus  but  brings  out 
into  diviner  clearness  this  great  underlying  truth 
of  all  revelation  about  man.  It  is  sometimes  very 
confidently  asserted  that,  in  the  Old  Testament, 
the  individual  as  such  counts  for  nothing  in  his 
relations  to  God ;  that  only  the  tribe  or  the  nation 
has  value.  Nothing,  in  my  opinion,  could  be 
wider  of  the  mark.  To  begin  with,  it  is  not  a 
tribe  or  nation  that  is  said  to  be  created  in  the 
image  of  God,  but  an  individual  fair — man  and 
woman  (‘  male  and  female  ’)  ;  in  the  second  narra¬ 
tive,  Adam  and  Eve.  Enoch  and  Noah  are 
individual  examples  of  piety,  and  with  Noah, 
as  a  representative  individual,  God  makes  His 


CHRISTIAN  REDEMPTION  263 


covenant.  Abraham,  father  of  the  Jewish  nation, 
to  whom  every  pious  Israelite  looked  back  as  the 
type  of  the  true  religious  relation  to  God,  was 
eminently  an  individual — called  of  God,  taken 
into  covenant  with  Him,  made  the  channel  of 
blessing  to  the  world.  Even  under  the  Law,  not 
to  multiply  examples  from  history,  from  psalms, 
and  from  prophets,  the  individual  transgressor 
was  made  responsible  for  his  sin,  and  was  required 
to  bring  his  individual  sacrifice  in  atonement.  It 
is  nothing  to  the  point  to  speak  of  these  early 
narratives  as  legendary.  Assume  for  argument’s 
sake  that  they  are  ;  they  at  least  embody  what 
men  in  the  age  when  they  were  written  believed 
about  God  and  His  relations  with  the  individual, 
and  furnish  proof  that  in  their  view  the  individual 
had  value  in  God’s  sight. 

(2)  What  is  true  generally  of  the  infinite  value 
of  man  in  God’s  sight  is  true  particularly  of 
man’s  capacity  for  a  divine  sonship.1  Man,  in 
the  Christian  Gospel,  is  called  to  a  relation  of 
sonship  to  God.  But  such  a  relation  would  be 
an  impossibility  for  a  being  who  was  not  already, 
in  the  essence  of  his  nature,  akin  to  God  ;  who 

1  See  above,  pp.  190  ff. 


264 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


was  not,  as  the  Bible  says,  made  in  the  image  of 
God.  1  grant — indeed  would  contend — that  the 
sonship  received  in  Christ  is  a  gift  of  grace,  a 
surpassing  manifestation  of  love,1  the  result  of 
a  new  life  imparted  to,  and  of  a  new  relation 
bestowed  on,  those  who  are  united  by  faith  to 
the  Son  of  God.  Nevertheless  I  have  sought 
to  show  above 2  that  a  relation  properly  described 
as  filial  was  the  goal  of  the  divine  dealings  with 
man  even  in  creation ;  and  on  any  view  a  kinship 
with  God  in  respect  of  rational  and  moral  faculty 
— a  spark  of  divinity  in  man’s  soul — must  be 
allowed  to  be  the  necessary  presupposition  of 
such  gracious  sonship  as  God  bestows  on  us  in 
Christ. 

(3)  Most  clearly  of  all  are  the  doctrines  we 
have  been  expounding  the  indispensable  foundation 
of  the  representations  which  the  Bible  everywhere 
gives  of  man’s  guilty  and  moral  and  spiritual  ruin , 
rendering  redemption  necessary.  Throughout 
Scripture,  as  we  have  seen,3  there  is  but  one 
picture  given  of  man’s  moral  state.  He  is  a 
being  who  has  missed  his  mark — who  has  turned 
aside  from  the  end  of  his  creation,  and  is  in 
1  John  iii.  i.  2  P.  191  3  Lect.  V. 


CHRISTIAN  REDEMPTION  265 


revolt  from,  and  active  rebellion  against,  his 
Creator.  For  this  reason  he  has  come  under 
condemnation.  A  judgment  of  God — a  kgltol- 
Kpifxa — rests  upon  him  which  he  is  powerless 
of  himself  to  remove.  His  actual  spiritual  con¬ 
dition  is  described  in  the  darkest  colours.  Forget¬ 
ful  of  his  Maker,  he  is  unholy,  prone  to  evil, 
the  subject  of  sinful  affections,  following  vanity, 
fulfilling  the  desires  of  the  flesh  and  of  the  mind.1 
He  is  not  only  morally  impure,  but  is  in  bondage 
to  sin,  and  again  is  impotent  to  deliver  himself 
from  its  rule.  He  is,  as  Paul  says,  c  in  the 
flesh,’ 2  or,  as  John  puts  it,  is  ruled  by  principles 
which  exclude  the  love  of  the  Father,  as  the 
lust  of  the  flesh,  the  lust  of  the  eyes,  and  the 
pride  of  life.3  It  is  this  view  of  man’s  condition 
which  is  the  presupposition  of  the  Gospel,  and 
it  is  not  denied  that  the  picture  is  entirely  altered, 
and  loses  its  gravity,  on  the  premises  of  the  new 
evolutionary  school.4  The  old  doctrine  faithfully 
reflects  at  least  the  teaching  of  Scripture  on  man’s 
ruin,  guilt,  and  disabilities  ;  but  the  old  doctrine 
emphatically  needs  the  old  view  of  man’s  essential 


1  Eph.  ii.  1-3. 

3  1  John  ii.  j6. 


2  Rom.  viii.  8. 

4  See  above,  pp.  208-9  ;  cf.  Note  VI. 


266 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


nature  as  made  in  the  image  of  God,  and  of 
his  voluntary  fall,  to  sustain  it.  A  theology  which 
thinks  to  do  justice  to  the  Scripture  teaching  on 
man’s  sin,  condemnation,  and  need  of  renewal, 
while  rejecting  the  Scripture  presuppositions  of 
man’s  fall,  and  subjection  to  death  through  sin, 
is  bound,  with  whatever  good  intentions,  to  be 
a  failure. 

2.  These  are  some  of  the  presuppositions  of 
the  Christian  doctrine  of  redemption.  Let  us 
now  advance  to  look  at  the  'principal  end  of  the 
Christian  redemption.  The  close  connection  of  the 
Christian  system  with  our  subject  is  obvious  when 
we  reflect  that,  from  one  point  of  view,  the  whole 
of  Christianity — perhaps  I  should  rather  say,  so 
as  to  include  all  dispensations,  the  whole  Scriptural 
scheme  of  redemption — is  but  a  divine  counsel 
and  provision  for  repairing  the  ruin  of  man’s  sin, 
and  carrying  through  the  ends  of  man’s  creation, 
while  exalting  him  in  Christ  to  a  dignity  and 
privilege  to  which,  on  the  mere  creation  basis, 
he  could  never  have  attained.  It  aims  supremely 
at,  in  other  words  has  for  its  end,  the  restoration 
and  perfecting  of  the  divine  image  in  man,  lost 
or  defaced  by  sin.  Many  passages  in  Scripture 


CHRISTIAN  REDEMPTION  267 


declare  this  in  effect,  notably  Eph.  iv.  23,  24 — 
‘  Be  renewed  in  the  spirit  of  your  mind,  and 
put  on  the  new  man,  which  after  God  hath 
been  created  in  righteousness  and  holiness  of 
truth’;  and  Col.  iii.  10 — f  Seeing  that  ye  .  .  . 
have  put  on  the  new  man,  which  is  being  renewed 
unto  knowledge  after  the  image  of  Him  that 
created  him.’  To  the  same  effect  are  all  the 
Scriptures  which  make  conformity  to  Christ  the 
goal  of  renewal.  For  Christ  is  pre-eminently 
the  image  of  God  in  our  humanity. 

3.  When,  from  the  end  contemplated  in  the 
Gospel,  we  look  to  the  redeeming  scheme  itself, 
and  consider  the  means  or  method  by  which  this 
great  end  is  to  be  accomplished,  we  find  that 
the  Gospel  system  gathers  itself  up  into  certain 
great  doctrines,  of  which,  in  the  present  con¬ 
nection,  we  may  look  specially  at  four,  viz., 
incarnation,  atonement,  regeneration,  resurrection 
and  immortal  life.  With  all  these  the  doctrines 
I  have  been  expounding  on  the  nature  of  man 
stand  in  inseparable  connection  ;  with  their  re¬ 
moval,  not  one  of  the  other  doctrines  could 
logically  be  maintained. 

(1)  The  great  central  mystery  of  the  Christian 


268 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


faith  is  undeniably  the  doctrine  of  the  incarnation 
— that  God,  in  the  Person  of  the  Son,  has  become 
man  for  our  salvation.  Of  that  doctrine  the 
Scripture  affirmation  of  the  divine  image  in  man  is, 
beyond  a  doubt,  the  indispensable  presupposition. 
It  would  be  so  if,  with  certain  theologians,  we 
consented  to  recognise  Jesus  simply  as  the  most 
perfect  revelation  of  God  in  humanity  —  the 
incarnation  of  the  principle  of  the  absolute  re¬ 
ligion — the  archetype  and  model  of  the  perfect 
religious  relation  of  man  to  God.  Such  theories 
err,  not  in  what  they  affirm,  but  in  what  they 
fail  to  affirm,  or,  more,  deny.  Jesus  is  all  that 
these  theories  represent — the  perfect  revelation 
of  God  in  humanity  ;  only,  if  faith  is  to  rise 
to  the  full  height  of  the  Christian  testimony, 
and  safeguard  itself  from  sinking  back  into 
humanitarianism — which  is  the  modern  tendency  1 
— it  must  affirm  a  great  deal  more.  It  must 
recognise  that  here  is  one  who,  in  the  root  of 
His  Personality,  is  divine,  as  no  other  is  divine 
— who  had  a  subsistence  in  and  with  God 
prior  to  His  manifestation  in  time 2 — who,  as 

1  See  my  Christian  View  of  God,  Lect.  ii. 

2  John  i.  i  ;  xvii.  5,  245  Col.  i.  15,  etc. 


CHRISTIAN  REDEMPTION  269 


God’s  eternal  Image  to  Himself,  was  before  all 
worlds,  and  was  the  Creator  of  the  worlds  :  the 
Everlasting  Son.  But  in  whatever  degree  the 
Person  of  Christ  is  worthily  conceived,  the  affirma¬ 
tion  of  man  made  in  the  image  of  God  is  the 
foundation  of  it. 

(a)  First,  if  the  subject  is  taken  at  its  deepest, 
we  perhaps  gain  a  point  of  view  that  carries  us 
further  than  we  have  yet  been  able  to  go  in  the 
apprehension  of  the  nature  of  the  divine  image  itself. 
It  lies  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  that  the  Son 
of  God  is  the  Father’s  eternal  image  ;  but  more, 
that  He  is  the  principle  of  revelation  in  the 
divine  Being  ;  more  still,  that  the  revelation  in 
the  creation  of  the  world  and  of  man  takes  place 
through  the  Son,  and  that,  in  a  profound  sense, 
He  is  the  abiding  ground,  connecting  point,  and 
sustaining  power  in  creation — nay,  is  Himself 
the  end  of  it.  All  things  were  created  in  Him 
and  for  Him,  and  in  Him  all  things  consist,  or 
hold  together.1  He  is  the  Creator,  and  the  life 
and  light,  of  man.2  Must  we  not  say,  then,  that 
if  man  bears  the  divine  image  in  his  soul,  it  is 
because  his  being  is  grounded  in,  and  derives 
1  Col.  i.  16,  17.  2  John  i.  14. 


270 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


its  godlike  attributes  and  powers  from,  the  Son 
or  Word,  who  is  Himself  the  essential  and  eternal 
image  of  God  ?  In  this  sense  it  is  not  erroneous 
to  say  that  man  was  created  in  the  image  of  the 
Son,  and  that  it  is  the  same  image  in  which  he  was 
created  which  was  afterwards  realised  in  humanity 
in  the  incarnation. 

( b )  Waiving  such  transcendental  speculations, 
it  is  at  least  certain  that  it  is  the  fact  that 
humanity  is  created  in  the  image  of  God  which 
made  such  an  event  as  the  incarnation  possible. 
The  simple  fact  that  God,  in  the  person  of  the 
Son,  has  entered  into  our  humanity — has  assumed 
our  humanity  to  Himself — has  made  it  the  organ 
of  the  perfect  revelation  of  the  Godhead,  is  proof 
that  in  humanity  there  is  a  receptiveness  for  the 
divine — an  affinity  to  the  divine — which  could 
not  belong  to  it  save  as  it  bore  by  creation  the 
image  of  the  Eternal.  On  the  other  hand,  if  we 
concede  this  dignity  to  belong  to  humanity,  then 
a  point  of  view  is  gained  which  makes  incarnation 
— even  a  personal  incarnation — not  only  possible, 
but  even  reasonable  and  natural.  That  God 
should  enter  into  closer  and  ever  closer  relations 
with  this  humanity  He  has  made — should  in- 


CHRISTIAN  REDEMPTION  271 


creasingly  identify  Himself  with  it — should  make 
it  the  organ  of  His  perfect  revelation  of  Himself 
— is  no  more  than  might  have  been  anticipated.1 
Two  things  at  least  are  certain  :  (1)  that  without 
this  doctrine  of  the  divine  image  in  man  the 
incarnation  is  an  impossibility  ;  and  (2)  with  this 
doctrine  the  chief  a  priori  objections  to  the  in¬ 
carnation  disappear. 

(c)  The  last  point  I  shall  mention  in  which 
our  doctrine  connects  itself  with  the  incarnation 
is,  that  in  Jesus  Christ  there  is  historically  pre¬ 
sented  to  us  the  actual  realisation  of  the  divine 
image  in  man.  So  far  as  the  assumption  of  our 
nature — true  body  and  true  soul — involves  the 
manifestation  of  the  general  attributes  of  humanity 
(reason,  conscience,  will,  etc.),  I  need  not  dwell 
upon  it.  The  resplendently  glorious  fact  about 
Christ  as  man  is  that  in  Him  we  have  the  perfect 
realisation  of  the  moral  image  of  the  Father. 
Alone  of  all  who  have  ever  lived  on  earth,  Jesus 
was  absolutely  and  stainlessly  holy.  No  flaw  of 
imperfection  marred  His  character  ;  every  moral 
and  spiritual  excellence  existed  in  Him  in  the 
highest  conceivable  degree  ;  His  will  was  through- 

1  Cf.  Christian  View  of  God ,  pp.  1 20-1 21. 


272 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


out  in  complete  unison  with  the  Father’s.  While 
of  every  other  it  has  to  be  confessed  that  out  of 
the  heart  proceed  evil  thoughts  and  desires,  the 
thoughts  and  affections  that  issued  from  His 
heart  were  wholly  pure.  In  His  spirit  shone  the 
light  of  a  perfect  knowledge  of  the  Father  ;  His 
life  was  the  model  of  perfect  love,  trust,  obedience, 
submission  to  God’s  Fatherly  will ;  the  quality  of 
everything  He  thought,  said,  and  did,  was  what 
we  call  filial.  He  was  the  perfect  realisation  of 
the  spirit  of  sonship.  In  Him  therefore,  as  the 
central  personage  of  history — the  archetypal  man, 
second  Adam  of  the  race,  its  new  and  saving  head 
— there  was  given  the  perfect  realisation  of  the 
divine  image  in  human  nature,  and  in  that  the 
revelation  of  the  capability  of  humanity  to  bear 
that  image.  Moreover,  in  His  archetypal  char¬ 
acter  Jesus  is  the  realisation  of  the  end  or  destiny 
of  man.  So  far  as  the  image  of  God  embraced 
the  idea  of  lordship  over  creation,  that  idea  is 
now  perfectly  realised  in  Him.  4  We  see  not  yet 
all  things  put  under  him  ’ — man — 4  but  we  see 
Jesus  .  .  .  crowned  with  glory  and  honour.’1 

(2)  I  now  pass  to  the  second  great  doctrine 


t 


1  Heb.  ii.  9.  See  above,  p.  57. 


CHRISTIAN  REDEMPTION  273 


on  our  list — the  doctrine  of  atonement — and  here 
again  the  close  correlation  of  Christ's  work  with 
the  doctrines  we  have  been  considering  is  very 
apparent.  As  the  incarnation  connected  itself 
specially  with  the  doctrine  of  the  image  of  God 
in  man,  so  the  atonement  connects  itself  specially 
with  the  doctrine  of  sin  and  death.  In  various 
well-known  passages  in  the  Gospels  Jesus  ex¬ 
pressly  attributes  to  His  sufferings  and  death  a 
redeeming  efficacy,  and  connects  them  with  the 
forgiveness  of  sins  and  life  of  the  world.1  More 
fully  and  clearly  His  death  is  uniformly  repre¬ 
sented  in  the  Apostolic  Gospel  as  a  true  pro¬ 
pitiatory  sacrifice  for  sin — the  one  means  by 
which  guilt  is  purged,  sin  put  away,  peace  made 
with  God,  reconciliation  effected.  Paul  sums  up 
the  Gospel  he  preached  in  the  two  articles,  that 
Christ  died  for  our  sins  according  to  the  Scrip¬ 
tures,  and  that  He  rose  from  the  dead  on  the  third 
day,  according  to  the  Scriptures.2  Christ’s  Cross  is 
thus  the  meeting-place  between  God  and  a  sinful 
humanity.  From  the  standpoint  of  the  New 
Testament,  I  cannot  allow  that  the  reality  of 

1  Matt.  xx.  285  xxvi.  28;  Luke  xxiv.  46-475  John  iii.  14-17,- 
vi.  51,  etc.  2  1  Cor.  xv.  3,  4. 

S 


274 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


Christ’s  atoning  work,  on  which  our  whole  salva¬ 
tion  rests,  can  be  lawfully  made  so  much  as  an 
open  question  in  the  Christian  Church.  But 
nothing  can  be  plainer  than  that  this  doctrine 
of  Christ’s  atonement  stands  vitally  in  connection 
with  the  body  of  Scripture  teaching  on  man’s  sin, 
and  of  God’s  relation  to  that  sin. 

(#)  The  first  presupposition  of  the  doctrine  of 
atonement  is  that  the  world  is  in  a  state  of  sin 
and  guilt  from  which  it  needs  redemption.  This 
has  been  largely  dwelt  on  in  previous  lectures,1 
but,  as  the  hinge  of  the  whole  discussion,  cannot 
have  too  much  prominence  given  to  it.  If  sin  is 
not,  indeed,  that  infinitely  evil  and  condemnable 
thing  which  the  Bible  represents  it  to  be — some¬ 
thing  against  which  the  holiness  of  God  must 
eternally  declare  itself  in  judgment  and  penalty  ; 
if  the  world  is  not  really  in  a  state  of  estrange¬ 
ment  from  God,  and  lying  under  the  doom  of 
death,  with  eternal  judgment  to  follow  ;  if  sin 
is  truly  nothing  more  than  an  imperfect  stage 
in  man’s  ascent  from  the  brute  condition  to  true 
moral  life — then  the  foundations  are  self-evidently 
taken  away  from  every  doctrine  of  atonement, 

1  See  above,  pp.  19,  28,  197  ft'. 


CHRISTIAN  REDEMPTION  275 


for  there  is,  in  truth,  no  real  guilt  left  to  atone 
for.  The  world  is  not  perishing,  but  improving. 
Evolution  has  power  within  itself  to  accomplish 
the  perfection  of  the  race,  and  a  Saviour  is  ren¬ 
dered  superfluous.1  It  is  for  this  very  reason,  as 
I  showed  at  the  beginning,  that  so  many,  under 
the  influence  of  the  new  conceptions,  have  become 
estranged  from  the  New  Testament  doctrine  of 
the  Cross.  The  remedy  will  only  be  found  in 
a  return  to  more  Scriptural  views  of  God’s  holi¬ 
ness,  of  man’s  nature  as  made  in  the  image  of 
God,  and  of  the  voluntary  origin  and  deadly 
effects  of  man’s  sin. 

(*)  ^  is  important  to  notice,  however,  that 
the  same  doctrine  of  sin  which  shows  the  need 
of  atonement,  furnishes  also  a  helpful  light  on 
the  possibility  of  atonement.  We  saw,  in  speaking 
of  sin,  that,  through  the  organic  constitution  of 
our  race,  sin  has  not  only  an  individual,  but  a 
racial  aspect.  No  man  lives  to  himself,  and  no 
man  dies  to  himself.2  We  are  compelled,  whether 
we  will  it  or  no,  to  assume  responsibilities  for 
one  another,  to  be  the  means  of  blessing  or  of 
curse  to  others,  to  lift  others  up,  or  drag  them 

1  See  above,  pp.  17,  23,  206.  2  Rom.  xv.  7. 


27  6 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


down,  by  our  well-doing  or  ill-doing.  It  is  as 
the  result  of  this  organic  constitution  of  the  race 
that  the  innocent  are  continually  called  upon  to 
suffer  for  the  guilty.  Through  it  we  are  involved 
in  ruin  by  the  transgression  of  our  first  head. 
But  it  is  clearly  most  equitable  that  if,  under  the 
government  of  God,  this  principle  has  wrought 
for  our  undoing  as  a  race,  there  should  be  ad¬ 
missible  a  counter-application  of  it  in  grace  for 
our  salvation.  If  in  Adam  all  die,  why  should  it 
be  objected  to  that  in  Christ  all — all  in  actual 
relation  with  Him — should  be  made  alive  ?  If  by 
the  trespass  of  the  one  (or  one  trespass)  judg¬ 
ment  came  upon  all  men  to  condemnation,  why 
should  it  not  be  that  by  the  righteousness  of  the 
one  (or  one  act  of  righteousness)  the  free  gift 
should  come  unto  all  men  unto  justification  of 
life  ?  If  by  the  one  man’s  disobedience  many  were 
made  sinners,  why  cavil  at  it  that  by  the  obedience 
of  the  one  many  are  made  righteous  ?  So  Paul 
argues  in  Romans  v.,1  and  his  reasoning  seems 
irrefutable.  The  organic  constitution  of  our  race, 
most  beneficent,  as  we  saw,  in  itself,  but  which 
tells  so  heavily  against  us  where  sin  is  concerned, 


1  Ver.  i2-2i. 


CHRISTIAN  REDEMPTION  277 


again  proves  its  beneficence  by  becoming,  through 
the  Second  Adam,  the  instrument  of  our  salva¬ 
tion.  The  representative  principle  brought  us 
under  condemnation  ;  the  same  representative 
principle  works  deliverance. 

(r)  Look  finally  in  this  connection  at  the  place 
of  death  in  Christ’s  work.  4  Christ  died  for  our 
sins.’  Everywhere  in  the  New  Testament  the 
very  kernel  of  His  reconciling  work  is  placed  in 
that  submission  to  death.  Why  was  this  ?  There 
is  but  one  answer — death  was  that  in  which  was 
expressed  the  judgment  of  God  upon  the  sin  of 
our  race.  It  appears  in  the  context  of  New 
Testament  doctrine  as  a  penal  evil  to  which 
Christ  voluntarily  submitted  for  the  abolition  of 
our  curse.  He  was  made  sin  for  us  ;  He  re¬ 
deemed  us  from  the  curse  of  the  law,  having 
become  a  curse  for  us  :  as  it  is  appointed  unto 
men  once  to  die,  and  after  this  the  judgment ;  so 
Christ  was  once  offered  to  bear  the  sins  of  many.1 
Even  Dr.  M4Leod  Campbell  says  —  in  this,  I 
think,  coming  very  near  the  heart  of  the  matter 
— 4  Further,  as  our  Lord  alone  truly  tasted  death, 
so  to  Him  alone  had  death  its  perfect  meaning  as 

1  2  Cor.  v.  21  j  Gal.  iii.  13.5  Heb.  ix.  27,  28. 


278 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


the  wages  of  sin.  ...  For  thus,  in  Christ’s 
honouring  of  the  righteous  law  of  God,  the  sentence 
of  the  law  was  included,  as  well  as  the  mind  of  God 
which  that  sentence  expressed.  .  .  .  Man  being 
by  the  constitution  of  humanity  capable  of  death, 
and  death  having  come  as  the  wages  of  sin,  it 
was  not  simply  sin  that  had  to  be  dealt  with,  but 
an  existing  law  with  its  penalty  of  death,  and  that 
death  as  already  incurred.’ 1  But  if  this  is  all 
wrong — if  death  has  no  such  meaning,  but  is 
simply  the  natural  fate  of  all  living  beings — what 
becomes  of  this  New  Testament  interpretation  of 
the  death  of  Christ  ?  It  is  subverted.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  fact  that  this  view  of  death  is 
implied  in  the  New  Testament  doctrine  of  atone¬ 
ment  confirms  our  previous  conclusions,  and 
shows  the  intimate  coherence  and  firm  consistency 
of  the  Biblical  system  of  ideas. 

(3)  The  third  New  Testament  doctrine  to 
which  reference  was  made  was  the  doctrine  of 
regeneration  by  the  divine  Spirit.  It  is  not  only 
forgiveness  of  sins  that  man  needs,  but  renewal 
unto  holiness  ;  a  radical  change  of  heart,  the  im- 
partation  of  a  new  principle  of  life,  progressive 

1  "The  Nature  oj  the  Atonement ,  pp.  259-262  (4th  edit.). 


CHRISTIAN  REDEMPTION  279 


transformation  in  sanctification  into  the  image  of 
Him  who  created  him.  But  it  need  hardly  be 
said  that  this  whole  doctrine  of  the  work  of  the 
divine  Spirit,  of  which  the  New  Testament  is  so 
full,  rests  again  on  just  those  conceptions  of  man’s 
nature,  and  of  the  origin,  character,  and  effects  of 
his  sin,  which  have  already  been  unfolded.  In 
the  doctrine  of  the  divine  image  in  man  lies  the 
ground  of  that  receptiveness  of  man  for  the  new 
divine  life  which  the  Spirit  imparts — a  life  which, 
once  imparted,  becomes  the  individual’s  own  life. 
In  the  doctrine  of  man’s  fall,  and  of  the  effects  of 
the  fall  in  depravation,  hereditary  sin,  and  spiritual 
inability,  we  have  the  explanation  of  his  need  of 
regeneration.  In  the  positive  realisation  of  the 
divine  image  in  Christ,  we  have  the  model  or 
pattern  to  which  his  redeemed  nature  is  now  to  be 
conformed.  To  put  on  the  new  man  is  but  to 
put  on  the  image  of  God  in  Christ.  To  this  we 
are  predestinated  that  we  should  be  conformed  to 
the  image  of  His  Son.1 

(4)  Finally,  the  doctrine  of  man  has  a  most 
direct  bearing  on  the  Christian  doctrine  of  immor¬ 
tality  ,  and,  as  included  in  this,  on  the  Christian 

1  Rom.  viii.  29. 


28o 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


hope  of  resurrection.  It  has  already  been  noted  as 
a  feature  of  the  Biblical  religion  that  it  puts  a 
marked  honour  on  the  body.  The  body  is  never 
despised,  as  it  is  in  some  other  religions,  and  as  it 
came  to  be  afterwards  in  the  Christian  Church 
itself :  it  is  honoured,  magnified,  spoken  of  as  the 
temple  of  the  Holy  Ghost ;  a  great  destiny  is 
prepared  for  it.  Therefore  God  is  to  be  glorified 
in  it ;  it  is  to  be  kept  pure  for  His  service 
during  life.1  Accordingly,  as  was  to  be  antici¬ 
pated  in  the  religion  of  the  incarnation,  Christi¬ 
anity  never  loses  sight  of  the  body  in  its  hopes  for 
the  future.  The  Christian  religion  knows  nothing 
of  the  abstract  immortality  of  the  soul  of  the 
philosophic  schools.  It  affirms  the  survival  of  the 
soul  ;  but  the  disembodied  state,  as  we  saw  before, 
is  always  regarded  as  a  mutilated,  imperfect,  tem¬ 
porary  one.  The  immortality  of  which  it  holds 
out  the  hope  is  an  immortality  of  the  whole  man 
— body  and  soul  together.  It  is  the  whole  man 
in  his  complex  nature  that  Christ  has  redeemed, 
not  a  part  of  man  simply.2  It  will  be  seen  how 

1  Rom.  xii.  i  $  i  Cor.  vii.  19-20. 

2  Cf.  Laid  law,  Bible  Doctrine  of  Man,  pp.  341  ff.  •  Salmond, 
Immortality,  p.  469  (4th  Ed.). 


CHRISTIAN  REDEMPTION  281 


entirely  this  accords  with  the  views  to  which  we 
were  led  of  the  composite  nature  of  man,  and  of 
death  as  a  violent  and  non-natural  rupture  of  the 
parts  of  that  nature. 

An  immediate  corollary  of  this  view  is  the 
doctrine  of  resurrection  ;  and  it  is  most  instructive, 
and  confirmatory  of  our  previous  reasonings,  to 
note  how  deeply  this  doctrine  enters  into  the 
substance  of  the  Christian  system.  It  is  usual 
with  many  to  trace  this  doctrine  of  resurrection 
to  late  Parsee  or  other  external  influences.  To 
my  mind  it  has  its  roots  in  the  essential  Biblical 
ideas  of  God,  man,  sin,  death,  and  redemption, 
and  in  more  or  less  pronounced  form  can  be 
traced  through  the  whole  of  Scripture.  The 
Old  Testament  saint  shuddered  at  the  thought 
of  Sheol,  and  when  he  rose  to  the  hope  of  immor¬ 
tality  through  his  faith  in  God,  it  was  to  the  hope 
of  deliverance  from  Sheol ,  and  of  restored  life  in 
God’s  presence  and  fellowship.1  I  do  not  think 
we  read  too  much  into  the  Old  Testament  expres¬ 
sions  on  these  subjects ;  I  think  we  often  read 
too  little.  But  it  is  nevertheless  in  the  New 
Testament,  and  through  Jesus  Christ,  that  life 

1  See  in  Christian  View  of  God,  App.  to  Lect.  V. 


282 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


and  in  corruption  have  been  brought  clearly  to 
light.1  And  here  the  doctrine  of  resurrection 
assumes  at  once  a  leading  place  in  the  Christian 
hope.  Jesus  Himself  did  not  remain  in  the  grave. 
He  rose  in  the  body.  His  was  no  mere  immor¬ 
tality  of  the  soul ;  He  claimed  the  body  as  part 
of  Himself.  In  the  body  He  ascended  ;  in  the 
body,  now  glorified,  He  lives  and  rules  ;  in  the 
body  He  will  appear  again,  the  second  time,  unto 
salvation.  Not  only,  however,  has  He  himself 
risen  in  the  body,  but  His  resurrection  is  set 
forth  as  the  pledge  of  ours.2  The  hope  of  the 
believer  is  not  simply  that  his  soul  shall  live 
hereafter,  but  he  looks  for  the  adoption,  to  wit, 
the  redemption  of  the  body.3  The  body  of  his 
humiliation  shall  yet  be  changed  into  the  image 
of  Christ’s  glorious  body.4  The  problems  and 
difficulties  of  the  doctrine  of  the  resurrection 
I  cannot  even  touch  on  here — they  arise  in  part 
from  misconceptions  which  do  not  properly 
belong  to  the  doctrine  ; 6  but  there  is  surely  no 
mistaking  the  bearings  of  these  remarkable  lines 

1  2  Tim.  i.  io.  2  i  Cor.  xv.  20  ff. 

3  Rom.  viii.  23.  4  Phil.  iii.  21. 

5  Even  Romanes  seemed  prepared  latterly  to  accept  the  bodily 
resurrection  (1 Thoughts  on  Religion ,  pp.  145,  162). 


CHRISTIAN  REDEMPTION  283 


of  truth  on  such  questions  as  whether  death  is 
a  natural  fate  for  man,  and  on  the  view  which 
Scripture  takes  of  human  nature  generally. 

Here  I  close  this  imperfect  survey  of  an  inter¬ 
esting  section  of  divine  truth.  The  conclusion 
I  draw  for  myself,  and  which  1  would  fain  have 
others  draw,  is  that  ‘  the  firm  foundation  of  God 
standeth,’ 1  and  that,  as  time  rolls  on,  and  the 
full  bearings  of  scientific  discoveries  become 
apparent,  there  will  be  felt  to  be  less  need  than 
ever  for  being  ‘  carried  about  with  every  wind 
of  doctrine.’2  ‘Now  unto  the  King  eternal, 
incorruptible,  invisible,  the  only  God  .  .  .  ‘  the 
blessed  and  only  Potentate,  the  King  of  kings, 
and  Lord  of  lords ;  who  only  hath  immortality, 
dwelling  in  light  unapproachable  ;  whom  no  man 
hath  seen,  nor  can  see.’  .  .  .  ‘  Unto  Him  be  the 
glory  in  the  Church  and  in  Christ  Jesus  unto  all 
generations  for  ever  and  ever.  Amen.’ 3 

1  2  Tim.  ii.  19.  2  Eph.  iv.  14. 

3  1  Tim.  i.  1 7  j  vi.  15,  1 6  j  Eph.  iii.  21. 


NOTES  TO  LECTURES 


NOTE  I 


MODERN  NATURALISTIC  VIEW  OF  THE  WORLD  (p.  4) 

In  general,  what  I  mean  by  the  4  modern  *  view  of  the 
world  in  these  lectures  is  the  type  of  theory  which,  some¬ 
times  in  a  more  reasoned-out  and  aggressive,  sometimes  in  a 
more  diffused  form,  is  found  underlying  a  large  part  of  the 
scientific  thought  of  our  time;  which  is  characterised  by  a 
tendency  to  a  materialistic  and  mechanical  explanation  of  the 
phenomena  of  life  and  mind,  by  the  rejection  of  ‘teleological’ 
considerations,  and,  of  course,  by  an  utter  abandonment  of 
the  idea  of  the  entrance  of  the  supernatural  into  human 
history  and  experience,  and  therefore  of  the  conception  of 
divine  revelation.  It  is  the  type  of  theory  ably  combated 
in  such  books  as  Ward’s  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism ,  and 
Balfour’s  Foundations  of  'Belief  How  deeply  it  has  infected  the 
thought  of  the  age  may  be  seen  from  current  literature,  or 
from  the  popularity  of  Haeckel’s  work  referred  to  in  the  text. 
A  suggestive  light  is  afforded  by  the  remarks  on  the  prevalent 
scientific  attitude  in  Professor  W.  James’s  Ingersoll  Lectures 
on  Immortality.  Yet  in  the  better  circles  of  thought  there 
is  already  a  profound  reaction  from  it,  without,  however, 
always  the  complete  throwing  off  of  its  influences,  or  such 
return  to  a  full  Christian  belief  as  happily  was  witnessed  in 
the  case  of  the  late  Professor  Romanes  (see  below,  Note  III.). 
There  is  often  a  breaking  with  the  modern  view  in  parts — 
and  these,  as  in  the  matter  of  teleology,  very  essential  parts  ; 
while  in  other  respects,  by  a  curious  inconsistency,  the 
‘modern’  theories  are  held  to  be  unimpaired  and  irrefragable. 

287 


NOTE  II 


THE  CREATION  NARRATIVE  AND  SCIENCE  (p.  40) 

Haeckel’s  tribute  to  the  creation  narrative  in  Genesis,  as 
coming  from  an  unexpected  quarter,  is  worth  re-quoting. 
He  says  :  ‘  The  Mosaic  history  of  creation,  since,  in  the  first 
chapter  of  Genesis,  it  forms  the  introduction  to  the  Old 
Testament,  has  enjoyed,  down  to  the  present  day,  general 
recognition  in  the  whole  Jewish  and  Christian  world  of 
civilisation.  Its  extraordinary  success  is  explained,  not  only 
by  its  close  connection  with  Jewish  and  Christian  doctrines, 
but  also  by  the  simple  and  natural  chain  of  ideas  which  runs 
through  it,  and  which  contrasts  favourably  with  the  confused 
mythology  of  creation  current  among  most  of  the  ancient 
nations.  First,  God  creates  the  earth  as  an  inorganic  body  ; 
then  he  separates  light  from  darkness,  then  water  from  the 
dry  land.  Now  the  earth  has  become  habitable  for  organisms, 
and  plants  are  first  created,  animals  later  ;  and  among  the 
latter  the  inhabitants  of  the  water  and  of  the  air  first,  after¬ 
wards  the  inhabitants  of  the  dry  land.  Finally,  God  creates 
man,  the  last  of  all  organisms,  in  His  own  image,  and  as  ruler 
of  the  earth.  Two  great  and  fundamental  ideas,  common 
also  to  the  non-miraculous  theory  of  development,  meet  us  in 
the  Mosaic  hypothesis  of  creation  with  surprising  clearness  and 
simplicity — the  idea  of  separation  or  differentiation,  and  the 
idea  of  progressive  development  or  perfecting.  Although 
M  oses  looks  upon  the  result  of  the  great  laws  of  organic 
development  (which  we  shall  later  point  out  as  the  necessary 
conclusions  of  the  doctrine  of  descent)  as  the  direct  actions 
of  a  constructing  Creator,  yet  in  his  theory  there  lies  hidden 

the  ruling  idea  of  a  progressive  development  and  a  differen- 
288 

l 

\ 


NOTES 


289 


tiation  of  the  originally  simple  matter.  We  can  therefore 
bestow  our  just  and  sincere  admiration  on  the  Jewish  law¬ 
giver’s  grand  insight  into  nature,  and  his  simple  and  natural 
hypothesis  of  creation,  vyithout  discovering  in  it  a  so-called 
divine  revelation  ’  ( History  of  Creation ,  i.  pp.  37- 38).  The 
two  grounds  which  lead  Haeckel  to  conclude  that  it  cannot 
be  a  divine  revelation,  viz.  :  (1)  the  geocentric  error  that  the 
earth  is  the  central  point  in  the  universe  ;  and  (2)  the 
anthropomorphic  error  that  man  is  the  premeditated  end  of 
the  creation  of  the  earth,  are  not  of  a  kind  likely  to  disturb 
many  people’s  minds.  The  second  (so-called)  ‘error’  most 
will  probably  look  on  as  an  indubitable  truth ;  and,  in 
light  of  the  revelations  of  such  a  book  as  Dr.  A.  R.  Wallace’s 
Man's  "Place  in  the  Universe,  they  may  think  twice  before 
unconditionally  condemning  even  the  view  that  makes  our 
world  and  man  the  centre  of  the  physical  universe. 


NOTE  III 

MONISTIC  METAPHYSICS - REACTION  FROM  HAECKEL 

(P-  72) 

Nothing  could  well  be  cruder  or  less  defensible  than  the 
strange  mixture  of  scientific,  scholastic,  and  Spinozistic  ideas 
which  Haeckel  dignifies  with  the  name,  ‘  our  Monistic 
philosophy.’  As  H.  Spencer  works  with  the  idea  of 
‘  Unknowable  Power,’  so  Haeckel  works  with  the  idea  of 
one  sole  eternal  ‘  Substance  ’ — an  idea  which  he  professes  to 
derive  from  Spinoza  and  Goethe  ( Riddle  of  Universe ,  pp.  8, 
vo-77,  etc.),  but  which  he  employs  in  a  sense  which  is  a 
travesty  of  the  meaning  of  these  thinkers.  As  hinted  in  the 
text,  % substance’  is  one  of  the  obscurest  categories  in  the 


290 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


region  of  philosophy,  and,  in  the  shape  in  which  Haeckel 
uses  it,  is  really  a  survival  of  scholasticism.  Spinoza  dis¬ 
tinguishes  ‘Thought’  and  ‘Extension’  as  attributes  of  a  Reality 
identified  with  neither  ;  but  Haeckel,  while  in  terms  doing 
the  same,  in  reality  identifies  ‘  substance  ’  with  ‘  matter,’  and 
‘  thought  ’  with  material  ‘  force  ’  or  ‘  energy,’  and  so  falls 
back  into  a  view  indistinguishable  from  crass  materialism. 
A  few  sentences  from  his  book  will  put  this  clearly.  The 
basis  of  his  system  is  the  loudly-vaunted  ‘  Law  of  Substance,’ 
which  ‘  fundamental  cosmic  law  ’  ‘  establishes  the  eternal 
persistence  of  matter  and  force ;  their  unvarying  constancy 
throughout  the  entire  universe  ’  (p.  2 ;  cf.  more  fully,  p.  75). 
Again  :  ‘  Monism  recognises  one  sole  substance  in  the 
universe,  which  is  at  once  “God  and  Nature”;  body  and 
spirit  (or  matter  and  energy)  it  holds  to  be  inseparable.’  .  .  . 

‘  We  adhere  firmly  to  the  pure,  unequivocal  monism  of 
Spinoza:  Matter,  or  infinitely  extended  substance,  and  Spirit 
(or  Energy),  or  sensitive  and  thinking  substance,’  etc.  (p.  8). 
The  notion  of  substance  (matter  and  spirit),  accordingly,  is 
resolved  into  ‘  the  chemical  law  of  the  “  conservation  of 
matter,”  and  the  younger  physical  law  of  the  “  conservation 
of  energy”’  (p.  75).  The  ‘soul’  is  a  mode  of  material 
force.  ‘  Our  own  naturalistic  conception  of  the  psychic 
activity  sees  in  it  a  group  of  vital  phenomena  which  are 
dependent  on  a  definite  material  substratum  [this  he  names 
‘psychoplasm’],  like  all  other  phenomena.  .  .  .  Our  con¬ 
ception  is  in  this  sense  materialistic  ’  (p.  32).  It  need  only 
be  remarked  :  (1)  that  ‘force’  and  ‘energy’  (notions  which 
Haeckel  wrongly  identifies)  are  as  mysterious  and  difficult  of 
apprehension  as  ‘substance’;  (2)  that  the  forces  or  energies 
connected  with  matter  are  something  quite  different  from 
what  Spinoza  meant  by  ‘thought’;  and  (3)  that  the  law  of 
‘conservation  of  energy,’  which  has  to  do  only  with  motions, 
affords  no  clue  whatever  to  the  wholly  disparate  phenomena 


NOTES 


291 


of  consciousness.  The  energy  of  brain  action  is  accounted  for 
wholly  in  brain  changes,  and  consciousness  absorbs  no  share  of 
it.  It  is,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  physicist,  an  ‘epi- 
phenomenon,’  to  explain  which  theories  of  ‘  psycho-physical 
parallelism  ’  are  invented — theories  which  Haeckel,  with  his 
thesis  of  unity,  contemptuously  sets  aside  (p.  76). 


Popular  as  this  crude  philosophy  may  be  in  certain  circles, 
it  is  well  to  recognise  that  it  is  really  an  inheritance  from  the 
materialistic  tendencies  of  the  middle  of  last  century,  and  has 
long  been  on  the  wane  among  really  influential  thinkers.  We 
do  not  need  to  go  further  for  proof  of  this  than  Haeckel’s 
own  pages.  Haeckel  has  not  only  to  confess  that,  ‘however 
natural  the  thought  may  be  [that  mind  and  matter  are  simply 
“two  different  aspects  of  one  and  the  same  object,  the 
cosmos”],  it  is  still  very  far  from  being  generally  accepted’ 
(p.  76)  ;  but  it  is  his  constant  lament  in  the  course  of  his 
discussion  that  most  of  his  own  great  lights  have  deserted  him. 
If  his  theories  were  true,  we  should  expect  that  scientific  men 
who  once  upheld  them  would  only  grow  the  firmer  in  their 
conviction  as  time  went  on.  Unfortunately,  as  his  pages 
show,  the  opposite  has  been  the  case.  One  of  his  chief 
authorities,  e.g.,  from  whom  much  was  hoped,  was  Virchow. 
Virchow,  in  the  days  of  his  early  activity,  was  a  monist  of 
fHaeckel’s  own  type — ‘a  pure  monist  in  the  best  days  of  his 
scientific  activity  .  .  .  one  of  the  most  distinguished  repre¬ 
sentatives  of  the  newly-awakened  materialism’  (p.  33).  But 
Haeckel  has  to  bemoan  his  defection.  ‘Twenty-eight  years 
afterwards  Virchow  represented  the  diametrically  opposite 
view’  in  his  famous  speech  on  The  Liberty  of  Science 
(1877),  and  monism  has  to  throw  him  overboard  (p.  34). 
Du  Bois-Reymond  is  a  second  example.  His  loss  has  also  to 
be  mourned.  *  The  more  completely  the  distinguished 


292 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


orator  of  the  Berlin  Academy  had  defended  the  principles  of 
the  monistic  philosophy  .  .  .  the  more  triumphant  was  the 
cry  of  our  opponents  when  in  1872,  in  his  famous  Igno- 
rabimus  speech,  he  spoke  of  consciousness  as  an  insoluble 
problem,  and  opposed  it  to  the  other  functions  of  the  brain 
as  a  supernatural  phenomenon ’  (p.  34).  A  third  illustrious 
example  is  Wundt.  In  Germany  Wundt  is  considered  to  be 
the  ablest  living  psychologist.  Wundt,  too,  began  as  a  monist 
after  Haeckel’s  own  heart.  His  work  On  Animal  and  Human 
Psychology  in  1863  extended  the  law  of  the  persistence  of 
force  to  the  psychic  world,  and  made  use  of  a  series  of  facts 
of  electro-physiology  by  way  of  demonstration.  But,  alas  ! 
thirty  years  afterwards  (1892)  Wundt  published  a  second 
and  much-modified  edition  of  his  work.  ‘  The  important 
principles  of  the  first  edition  are  entirely  abandoned  in  the 
second’:  the  monistic  standpoint  is  exchanged  for  a  dualistic 
one.  Wundt  tells  us  that  ‘he  learned  many  years  ago  to 
consider  the  work  a  sin  of  his  youth’;  it  ‘weighed  on  him 
as  a  kind  of  crime,  from  which  he  longed  to  free  himself  as 
soon  as  possible.’  As  Haeckel  says  in  sorrow,  ‘  In  the  first 
edition  he  is  purely  monistic  and  materialistic ;  in  the  second 
edition  purely  dualistic  and  spiritualistic’  (p.  36).  There  is 
yet,  however,  another  example.  Perhaps  the  one  man  on 
whose  support,  next  to  Darwin’s,  Haeckel  leans  in  his  book 
is  George  J.  Romanes.  His  praise  of  Romanes  is  continual. 
‘I  am  completely  at  one  with  him  and  Darwin,’  he  declares, 
‘in  almost  all  their  views  and  convictions’  (p.  38).  Yet,  as 
every  one  now  knows,  Romanes  too  deserted  him,  and  died  a 
devout  believer.  All  the  things  that  Haeckel  had  thrown 
overboard — the  soul,  free-will,  immortality — became  to  Ro¬ 
manes  again  the  profoundest  verities.  (See  his  Thoughts  on 
Religion ,  edited  by  Gore  ;  and  Life  and  Letters ,  by  his  wife.) 
Yet  Haeckel  pleases  himself  with  the  belief  that  science  has 
destroyed  Christianity  ! 


NOTE  IV 


R.  OTTO  ON  PRESENT-DAY  DARWINISM  (p.  85) 

The  important  series  of  articles  in  the  Theologiscbe  Rundschau 
— a  Review  of  sufficiently  4  advanced  *  standpoint — by  Rudolf 
Otto  on  Darwinismus  von  Heute  und  Tbeologie  (‘  The  Dar¬ 
winism  of  To-day  and  Theology’),  to  which  repeated 
reference  is  made  in  the  footnotes,  are  five  in  number,  and 
appear  in  the  issues  for  December  1902,  May  and  June 
1903,  and  January  and  February  1904.  They  are  exceedingly 
able  and  well-informed,  full  and  candid  in  exposition,  acute 
in  criticism,  and,  altogether,  highly  significant  as  a  sign  of 
the  times.  They  give  a  vivid  impression  of  the  extraordinary 
divergence  of  view  which  has  manifested  itself  in  evolutionary 
schools  on  the  Continent ;  emphasise  the  distinction  between 
a  4  doctrine  of  descent’  and  the  acceptance  of  the  Darwinian 
hypothesis  of  evolution  by  natural  selection  ;  heap  up  evidence 
of  what  is  termed  (notwithstanding  the  advocacy  of  Weis- 
mann  and  other  ‘pure’  Darwinians,  who  still  depart  con¬ 
siderably  from  Darwin)  the  ‘Verfall’  (Decay)  of  Darwinism 
in  Germany  ;  bring  out  the  crucial  point  at  which  the 
Darwinian  theory  touches  theology — the  denial  of  4  tele¬ 
ology*;  and  make  clear  the  points  in  which  the  newer 
evolutionism  breaks  with  the  old  (inadequacy  of  4  natural 
selection  ’  and  of  the  principle  of  ‘  utility  ’  to  explain 
structures,  denial  of  production  of  new  forms  by  slow  and 
insensible  gradations,  need  of  teleological  principle,  etc. — 
see  below),  and  the  multiplied  difficulties  attendant  on  the 
Darwinian  view  generally.  The  author  shows  how  during 
the  last  forty  years  4  the  differentiation  and  ramification  of 
Darwinian  theories  has  become  the  longer  the  wider,*  and 

how  4  the  number  and  the  manifold  grouping  and  shading  of 

293 


294 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


Darwin’s  scholars  are  well-nigh  unbounded’  (December  1902, 
p.  489).  He  points  out  that  the  characteristic  thing  in 
Darwinism — that  which  specially  interests  and  constitutes  a 
danger  for  theology — is  its  *  natural  teleology,’  /.<?.,  the  ex¬ 
planation  of  the  apparently  purposeful  and  planned  in  nature 
by  the  operation  of  ‘  natural  ’  causes,  without  intentional 
direction  or  striving  to  an  end.  ‘  In  this  sense  his  doctrine 
is  an  attempt  at  the  abolition  ( Aufhebung )  of  ‘teleology’ 
(January  1904,  p.  2  ;  cf.  December  1902,  p.  486).  We 
cannot  enter  into  the  detail  of  Otto’s  argument,  supported  by 
an  exhaustive  survey  of  the  literature  of  the  subject  during 
the  last  ten  years  or  more  ;  but  may  give  the  resume  with 
which  he  closes  of  the  chief  contrasts  between  the  newer  and 
the  older  (, i.e .,  Darwinian)  evolution.  He  places  the  points 
side  by  side  in  parallel  columns,  heading  the  one  ‘  Darwin  ’ 
and  the  other  ‘  Korschinsky  und  die  Neueren  ’  (‘ Korschinsky 
and  the  Newer  School  ’) : — 


Darwin 

1.  All  organic  being  is  capable 
of  modification.  Variation  partly 
from  inner,  partly  from  external 
causes.  Insignificant,  impercep¬ 
tible,  individual  differences. 


2.  Struggle  for  existence.  This 
accumulates,  heightens,  fixes  useful 
properties,  and  causes  those  which 
are  not  useful  to  disappear.  All 
marks  and  peculiarities  of  a  formed 
species  are  results  of  a  long-con¬ 
tinued  process  of  natural  selection. 

3.  The  species  is  subjected  to 
constant  modification.  Continuous 
object  of  natural  selection  and  en¬ 
hancement  of  properties.  Through 
this  again  the  origin  of  new  species. 


The  Newer 

1.  All  organic  being  capable  of 
modification.  This  capability  a  fun¬ 
damental,  inner  property  of  living 
beings  generally, independentof  external 
conditions.  It  is  preserved,  usually  in 
a  latent  form,  by  inheritance.  It  breaks 
out  here  and  there  in  sudden  changes. 

2.  Sudden  changes.  These  are  under 
favourable  conditions  the  starting- 
points  for  enduring  races.  The  marks 
sometimes  useful,  sometimes  quite  in¬ 
different  to  use  or  hurt.  Sometimes 
not  in  accord  with  external  relations. 

3.  All  species,  once  firmly  built  up, 
remain  5  still,  through  Heterogenesis 
there  enters  a  splitting  off  (. Abspaltung ) 
of  new  forms,  and  shattering  of  the 
vital  equilibrium.  The  new  at  first 
insecure  and  wavering.  Gradually 
attains  stability.  Then  new  forms  and 
races  with  a  constitution  gradually 
attaining  fixity. 


NOTES 


295 


4.  The  sharper  and  more  painful 
the  operation  of  external  conditions 
of  existence,  the  more  intense  the 
struggle  for  existence,  and  the  more 
rapid  and  sure  the  development  of 
new  forms. 

5.  The  chief  condition  of  de¬ 
velopment,  therefore,  struggle  for 
existence  and  natural  selection. 


6.  If  there  were  no  struggle  for 
existence,  there  would  be  no  evolu¬ 
tion,  no  adaptation,  no  perfecting. 


7.  Advance  in  nature,  the  *  per¬ 
fecting  ’  of  organisms,  is  only  a 
more  complicated,  ever  more  com¬ 
plete  adaptation  to  external  con¬ 
ditions.  It  is  attained  in  a  purely 
mechanical  way,  through  accumu¬ 
lation  of  marks  at  one  time  useful. 


4.  Only  under  exceptionally  favour¬ 
able  conditions,  only  if  the  struggle  for 
existence  is  weak  or  not  present,  can 
new  forms  originate  or  become  fixed. 
Under  hard  conditions  none  originate. 
If  they  do  originate,  they  forthwith 
perish. 

5.  Struggle  for  existence  only  deci¬ 
mates  the  (in  itself)  much  richer  fulness 
of  possible  forms.  It  hinders,  where 
it  exists,  the  springing  up  of  new  varia¬ 
tions,  and  is  an  obstacle  in  the  way  of 
new  formation.  In  itself  it  is  a  factor 
hostile  and  not  favourable  to  evolution. 

6.  If  there  were  no  struggle  for 
existence,  there  would  be  no  perishing 
of  forms  which  had  originated,  or  were 
in  process  of  origination.  The  world 
of  organisms  would  then  be  a  genea¬ 
logical  tree  ( Stammbaum )  of  enormous 
height,  and  perfectly  illimitable  fulness 
of  forms. 

7.  The  adaptation  wrought  by  natu¬ 
ral  selection  has  nothing  to  do  with 
perfecting  ^  for  the  organisms  which 
physiologically  and  morphologically 
stand  higher  are  not  always  better 
adapted  to  external  relations  than  those 
which  stand  lower.  Evolution  is  not 
explicable  mechanically.  The  origin 
of  higher  forms  out  of  lower  is  only 
possible  through  a  tendency  to  advance 
which  resides  in  the  organisms.  This 
tendency  is  nearly  related  to,  or  identi¬ 
cal  with,  the  tendency  to  change.  It 
impels  the  organisms,  so  far  as  external 
conditiQns  permit,  towards  perfection. 


Otto  concludes  :  ‘  This  means  now,  certainly,  the  recog¬ 
nition  of  development  and  derivation,  but  sets  Darwinism  aside 
as  a  superseded  hypothesis ;  partly  establishes,  partly  renders 
possible,  the  striving  to  an  end,  inner  causation,  teleology  ;  sets 
aside  the  accidental  factors  that  stand  in  the  foreground,  and 
opens  a  glimpse  into  the  metaphysical  background  of  things’ 
(February  1904,  pp.  60-62).  See  further  below,  Note  XI. 


NOTE  V 


RECENT  VIEWS  ON  THE  DESCENT  OF  MAN  (p.  1 36) 

In  the  argument  in  the  text,  I  have  been  content  to  go  on 
the  assumption  of  Haeckel,  Huxley,  Weismann,  etc.,  that 
man  is  physically  descended  from  some  form  of  anthropoid 
ape  (not  of  existing  species).  I  have  no  interest  in  question¬ 
ing  the  fact,  if  it  should  turn  out  to  be  established.  It  is 
right,  however,  to  point  out  that,  so  far  from  being  estab¬ 
lished,  this  line  of  descent  for  man  through  the  anthropoid  apes 
is  very  extensively  challenged  by  recent  evolutionists.  Some 
go  so  far  as  to  say  that  4  the  prevailing  view  is  that  man  cannot 
have  come  from  the  apes,  nor  from  the  lemurs,  and  that, 
beyond  this,  the  ease  is  perplexing.’  However  this  may  be, 
it  cannot  be  disputed  that  the  anthropoid  descent  is  now 
widely  contested.  In  his  Lessons  from  Nature ,  Mr.  Mivart 
already  dwelt  on  the  enormous  difficulty  of  bringing  man 
into  relation  with  any  known  form  of  ape,  his  structure 
exhibiting  affinities  with  many  widely  separated  forms,  lower 
and  higher,  among  the  primates  (pp.  1 7 1  ff.).  4  It  is  manifest,’ 
he  says,  4  that  man,  the  apes,  and  the  half-apes  cannot  be 
arranged  in  a  single  ascending  series,  of  which  man  is  the 
term  and  conclusion.  .  .  .  On  any  conceivable  hypothesis 
there  are  many  similar  structures,  each  of  which  must  be 
deemed  to  have  been  independently  evolved  in  more  than 
one  instance.  ...  In  fact,  in  the  words  of  the  illustrious 
Dutch  naturalists,  Messrs.  Schroeder,  Van  der  Kolk,  and 
Vrolik,  44  the  lines  of  affinity  existing  between  different 
primates  construct  rather  a  network  than  a  ladder” ’(pp.  173, 
174,  175).  A  ‘fatal  objection  against  deriving  the  human 
species  directly  from  monkeys’  has  been  4  found  in  the 
structure  of  the  hind  members.  The  human  foot  and 

296 


NOTES 


297 


the  hind  hand  of  all  the  monkeys  are  both  excessively 
specialised  and  fixed,  but  in  opposite  directions,  one  for 
strength  and  erectness,  the  other  for  flexibility,  prehension, 
and  climbing.  Hence  neither  can  be  derived  from  the  other, 
nor  can  there  be  any  intermediate  form,  except  such  as  may 
continue  the  unspecialised  limb  of  an  ancestor  from  which 
both  may  have  been  descended’  (Professor  G.  Macloskie,  in 
article  on  ‘  Problems  in  Evolution  ’). 

The  trend  of  recent  investigation,  in  view  of  these  diffi¬ 
culties,  has  been  to  seek  the  ancestry  of  man  in  some  earlier 
form  from  which  the  various  groups  (anthropoid  apes,  man, 
etc.)  may  have  descended.  The  anthropologist  Topinard 
took  a  step  in  this  direction  in  deriving  the  anthropoid  apes 
and  man  alike  from  the  Pithed ,  or  Old  World  Monkeys  ( Phe 
Monist,  October  1895:  I  am  indebted  for  this  and  other 
references  to  Dr.  B.  B.  Warfield).  Professor  Cope,  on  the 
other  hand,  thinks  a  derivation  through  the  monkeys  im¬ 
possible,  and  would  substitute  for  it  a  descent  of  the  Ant  hr  0- 
pomorpha  (including  man  and  the  anthropoid  apes)  from  the 
Lemurs  ( Primary  Factors  of  Organic  Evolution ,  1896,  p.  154). 
Finally,  the  learned  Professor  of  Zoology  in  the  University 
of  Utrecht,- A.  A.  W.  Hubrecht,  on  the  basis  of  extensive 
comparative  studies  on  the  Lemurs  and  the  Tarsii  (included 
by  Cope  among  the  Lemuridas),  contends  that  the  placental 
characters  of  the  Lemurs  exclude  them  from  consideration, 
and  argues  for  a  derivation  from  a  Tarsiad  form.  But  along 
with  this  goes  the  singular  admission:  ‘Tarsius  has  taught 
us  ...  to  entertain  a  certain  amount  of  healthy  scepticism 
with  respect  to  the  traditional  tables  of  mammalian  descent. 
The  genera  known  to  us  very  rarely  converge  towards  known 
predecessors  as  we  go  backwards  in  geological  time  ;  their 
respective  genealogies  run  much  more  parallel  to  each  other, 
the  point  of  meeting  being  thus  continually  transported 
further  backwards  towards  yet  older  geological  strata’  ( The 


298 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


Descent  of  the  Primates ,  1897,  pp.  39,  40).  To  the  unscien¬ 
tific  mind  this  looks  very  much  like  the  yielding  up,  not  only 
of  the  descent  of  man  from  anthropoid  apes,  but  of  the  proof 
of  evolutionary  descent  in  toto.  For  parallel  lines,  however 
far  carried  back,  do  not  meet.  And  what  of  the  unconscion¬ 
able  number  of  4  missing  links ’  it  is  now  necessary  to  suppose? 


NOTE  VI 

MODERN  THEORIES  OF  EVOLUTION  AND  THE  FALL 

(P.  158) 

It  is  natural  that  Christian  theologians  who  accept  the 
doctrine  of  evolution  should  be  concerned  about  its  bearings 
on  the  doctrines  of  the  Fall  and  of  Sin,  and  should  do  their 
best  to  show  how  the  two  doctrines  can  be  reconciled. 
There  is,  as  I  seek  to  show  in  the  text,  no  contradiction, 
except  on  a  particular  view  of  evolution,  viz.,  that  man  has 
slowly  emerged  from  a  state  of  animalism  and  barbarism,  and 
did  not  start  off  with  a  pure  and  harmonious  nature.  This, 
however,  is  the  view  of  man’s  origin  currently  accepted, 
with  which  it  is  sought  to  be  shown  that  the  doctrine  of  a 

.  I 

real  ‘fall’  can  somehow  be  reconciled.  The  ablest  attempt, 
probably,  is  that  of  Canon  Gore  (now  Bishop  of  Worcester) 
in  a  lecture  at  Sheffield  01  f  The  Theory  of  Evolution  and 
the  Christian  Doctrine  of  the  Fall,’  of  which  a  fairly  full 
account  is  given  in  The  Expository  Times  for  April  1897. 
Dr.  Driver  represents  the  same  point  of  view  in  a  note  on 
the  subject  in  his  Genesis ,  pp.  56-57.  Other  expositions  on 
more  or  less  similar  lines  may  be  seen  in  Illingworth’s  Bampton 
Lectures ,  pp.  143  ff.,  154  ff.  ;  in  Bernard’s  article  on  4  Sin’  in 
Dictionary  of  Bible  (iv.  p.  528)  ;  in  Griffith-Jones’s  Ascent 
through  Christ ,  pp.  138  ff.;  in  Abbott’s  Theology  of  an  Evolu- 


NOTES 


299 


tionist ,  pp.  3  1  ff.;  in  Shepherd’s  Three  Bulwarks  of  the  Faith , 
pp.  29  ff,  etc.  Professor  G.  Henslow  has  a  few  remarks 
on  the  subject  in  his  Present-Day  Rationalism,  pp.  318-319. 
For  a  sober  discussion  of  the  subject  from  an  independent 
standpoint,  see  Principal  Simon’s  Bible  Problems ,  ch.  vi. 

The  crucial  point  in  all  these  theories  is  the  compatibility 
of  a  fall  and  of  the  Biblical  view  of  sin  with  an  account  of 
man’s  origin  and  nature  which  makes  sin  a  necessity  of  his 
development.  That  difficulty,  it  seems  to  me,  is  nowhere 
satisfactorily  dealt  with,  nor  do  I  believe  it  can  be  got  over  on 
the  original  assumption.  It  is  quite  fair  to  say  with  Bishop 
Gore,  Dr.  Driver,  and  most  of  these  writers,  that  the  Bible 
does  not  represent  man  as  created  ‘  perfect,’  i.e.,  highly 
developed,  civilised,  etc.  That  is  so,  but  ‘perfect’  in  this 
sense  is  one  thing,  and  pure,  harmonious,  capable  of  a  life 
of  obedience,  is  another ;  and  it  is  the  latter  which  the  brute 
genesis  of  man  denies.  Bishop  Gore  is  also  justified  in 
protesting  against  a  science,  or  theory  of  evolution,  which 
denies  ‘  freedom  ’  to  man.  ‘  If  science  persists  in  denying 
that  sin  is  sin  ’ — I  quote  from  the  summary  in  Expository 
Times — ‘  persists,  that  is  to  say,  in  denying  that  man  has  any 
freedom  of  will,  and,  therefore,  that  he  can  have  any 
responsibility  for  his  actions — if  science  persists  in  denying 
that,  then  science  and  the  Bible  can  never  agree  together.’ 
But  the  real  issue  is  not  with  a  theory  of  determinism  of  this 
kind.  Whatever  limited  measure  of  freedom  we  ascribe  to 
man  in  the  process  of  his  ascent  from  the  animal  condition, 
no  one  who  accepts  the  ordinary  evolutionary  theory  can 
possibly  hold  that  it  amounted  to  power  to  live  or  develop  in 
a  sinless  condition.  With  brute  passions  and  propensities  at 
their  maximum,  made  fiercer  and  more  lawless,  probably,  by 
the  dawn  of  self-consciousness,  while  reason,  conscience, 
power  of  self-control,  are  yet  a  feeble  glimmer,  there  is  no 
escape  from  the  conclusion  that  sin  is  inevitable,  and  will  be 


300 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


the  dominant  fact  in  man’s  development  for  an  incalculable 
period.  To  the  reply  that  may  be  given,  that  sin  is  not  sin, 
or  is  not  imputed,  where  there  is  no  law,  it  must  be  answered 
that  human  sin,  in  that  case,  is  emptied  of  nearly  all  its  depth 
of  significance  in  the  Bible  (see  in  text,  pp.  208-9) ;  and  it 
is  still  not  shown  that  a  point  ever  comes  at  which  sinless 
obedience  is  possible.  It  would  be  different  if  some  other 
view  of  development  were  adopted,  according  to  which  man’s 
immediate  progenitors  did  not  evince  any  such  violence  of 
passions  and  propensities  as  will  could  not  from  the  first 
perfectly  control  ;  but  that  is  not  the  view  usually  held  by 
evolutionists.  When,  therefore.  Dr.  Driver  says :  ‘It  is 
sufficient  for  Christian  theology,  if  we  hold  that,  whatever 
the  actual  occasion  may  have  been,  and  however  immature, 
in  intellect  and  culture,  he  may  have  been  at  the  time,  man 
failed  in  the  trial  to  which  he  was  exposed,  that  sin  thus 
entered  into  the  world,  and  that  consequently  the  subsequent 
development  of  the  race  was  not  simply  what  God  intended 
it  to  be :  it  has  been  attended  through  its  whole  course  by 
an  element  of  moral  disorder,  and  thus  in  different  ways  it 
has  been  marred,  perverted,  impeded,  or  thrown  back  ’ 
( Genesis ,  pp.  56-57),  he  misses  the  essential  point,  which  is 
that,  in  the  condition  in  which  evolutionary  science  starts 
man  off,  he  had  no  alternative  but  to  fail.  No  doctrine 
of  abstract  ‘freedom’  can  be  strained  so  far  as  to  obviate 
that  conclusion. 

With  some  words  of  Bishop  Gore  in  his  lecture  I  am 
most  heartily  in  accord.  ‘  The  doctrine  of  sin  and  of  the 
fall  in  its  true  importance  has  a  far  securer  basis  than  the 
supposition  that  Genesis  iii.  is  literal  history.  The  doctrine 
of  the  fall  is  not  separable  from  the  doctrine  of  sin,  or  the 
doctrine  of  sin  from  that  of  moral  freedom.  It  rests  on  the 
broad  basis  of  human  experience,  which  is  bound  up  with  its 
reality.  Most  of  all,  it  rests  for  Christians  on  the  teaching 


NOTES 


3QI 


of  Christ,  for  Chrises  teaching  and  action  postulate  through¬ 
out  the  doctrine  of  sin.  But  that  doctrine,  in  its  turn,  goes 
back  upon  the  Old  Testament,  which  is  full  of  the  truth  that 
the  evils  of  human  nature  are  due  not  to  its  essential  con¬ 
stitution,  but  to  man’s  wilfulness  and  its  results  ;  that  the 
disordering  force  in  human  nature  has  been  moral,  the  force 
of  sin ;  that  human  history  represents  in  one  shape  a  fall 
from  a  divine  purpose,  a  fall  constantly  repeated  and  renewed 
in  acts  of  disobedience.’  What  I  say  is  that  such  a  view  of 
sin  and  of  the  moral  state  of  the  world  requires  for  its  basis 
a  different  account  of  the  origin  of  man  and  of  his  primeval 
constitution  from  that  which  ordinary  evolutionary  theories 
yield. 


NOTE  VII 

RETROGRESSION  AMONG  SAVAGES  (p.  l6l) 

The  following  are  some  instances  illustrating  the  statement 
that  races  ranked  as  savage  have  often  behind  them  a  much 
higher,  and  sometimes  very  advanced,  civilisation. 

Dr.  Tylor  observes :  ‘Degeneration  probably  operates  even 
more  actively  in  the  lower  than  in  the  higher  culture.  Bar¬ 
barous  nations  and  savage  hordes,  with  their  less  knowledge 
and  scantier  appliances,  would  seem  peculiarly  exposed  to 
degrading  influences.’  He  gives  an  instance  from  West 
Africa,  and  continues  :  ‘In  South-East  Africa,  also,  a  com¬ 
paratively  high  barbaric  culture,  which  we  especially  associate 
with  the  old  descriptions  of  the  Kingdom  of  Monomotapa, 
seems  to  have  fallen  away,  and  the  remarkable  ruins  of  build¬ 
ings  of  hewn  stone  fitted  without  mortar  indicate  a  former 
civilisation  above  that  of  the  native  population’  {^Primitive 
Culture ,  p.  39). 


302 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


The  same  writer,  in  a  paper  in  Nature,  i  8  8 1 ,  p.  29,  says: 
4  Dr.  Bastian  has  lately  visited  New  Zealand  and  the  Sandwich 
Islands,  and  gathered  some  interesting  information  as  to  native 
traditions.  The  documents  strengthen  the  view  which  for 
years  has  been  growing  among  anthropologists  as  to  the  civili¬ 
sation  of  the  Polynesians.  It  is  true  that  they  were  found 
in  Captain  Cook’s  time  living  in  a  barbaric  state,  and  their 
scanty  clothing  and  want  of  metals  led  superior  observers  even 
to  class  them  as  savages ;  but  their  beliefs  and  customs  show 
plain  traces  of  descent  from  ancestors  who  in  some  way  shared 
the  higher  culture  of  the  Asiatic  nations.’ 

A  remarkable  fund  of  information  on  the  degradation  of 
savages  is  contained  in  an  address  by  Mr.  Albert  J.  Mott  on 
4  The  Origin  of  Savage  Life,’  delivered  before  the  Literary 
and  Philosophical  Society  of  Liverpool,  October  6,  1873. 
Speaking  of  Easter  Island  in  the  Pacific,  Mr.  Mott  says: 
4  Easter  Island  stands  alone  in  the  Pacific  Ocean,  2000  miles 
from  South  America,  and  about  1000  from  the  nearest 
islands  that  are  habitable.  It  is  about  twelve  miles  long  by 
four  in  width  ;  not  so  large  as  Jersey.  The  inhabitants, 
about  1000  in  number,  are  savages.  .  .  .  This  island  is 
strewed  with  hundreds  of  carved  stone  images,  many  of 
them  of  extraordinary  size.  Some  are  nearly  40  feet 
long.  Many  of  them  are  over  15  feet.  Two  of  the  smaller 
ones  are  in  the  British  Museum.  One  of  these  is  8  feet 
high,  and  weighs  4  tons.  Many  of  these  images  had  separate 
stone  crowns  placed  upon  their  heads,  the  crowns  being  from 
2  to  10  feet  across.  Thirty  of  these  crowns  were  found  on 
the  hill  from  the  rock  of  which  they  were  sculptured,  waiting 
to  be  removed.  The  images  were  generally  set  on  pedestals, 
upon  raised  terraces,  of  which  there  are  many.  .  .  . 

‘  Similar  terraces  and  images  have  been  seen  in  other  islands 
now  uninhabited.  The  ruins  of  ancient  stone  buildings  of 
great  extent  are  found  in  the  Philippine  Islands,  the 


NOTES 


3°  3 


Ladrones,  the  Marshall  and  Gilbert  groups ;  the  Society 
Islands,  the  Navigators  and  the  Marquesas.  They  thus  ex¬ 
tend  over  10,000  miles  of  ocean.’ 

The  same  authority  says :  ‘The  whole  of  North  America, 
from  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  to  Canada,  is  full  of  ancient  works 
of  earth  and  stone,  chiefly  found  in  the  form  of  mounds  and 
embankments.  They  exist  in  countless  thousands,  and,  I 
believe,  in  every  State  :  but  the  most  remarkable  are  in  the 
great  plain  or  valley  between  the  Alleghanies  and  the  Rocky 
Mountains,  a  district  at  least  1000  miles  square.  Some 
lines  of  embankment  are  30  feet  high.  Many  areas  en¬ 
closed  by  them  are  from  one  to  two  hundred  acres  ;  some 
are  double  this  size.  .  .  .  Many  of  the  enclosures  are  in  the 
form  of  circles  and  squares,  and  in  many  cases  these  figures 
are  mathematically  exact,  notwithstanding  their  great  size. 

.  .  .  Neither  a  true  circle,  with  a  radius  of  850  feet,  nor  a 
true  square,  with  a  side  of  1080  feet,  can  be  drawn  upon 
open  ground  by  any  one  without  the  help  of  exact  measures 
and  mathematical  knowledge.’ 

He  goes  on  to  adduce  evidence  that  the  North  American 
Indians,  ‘instead  of  springing  from  some  lower  state  like  that 
of  the  Australians,’  are  ‘  the  successors  of  a  people  in  every 
respect  much  higher  than  themselves.’ 

Reference  only  need  be  made  to  the  exhumed  cities  of 
New  Mexico,  about  which  much  has  been  written.  The 
ruins  are  very  extensive,  covering  hundreds  of  miles.  The 
articles  recovered  include  many  thousands  of  clay  vessels, 
implements  of  stone,  utensils,  articles  of  clothing  and  of 
ceremony,  and  also  a  vast  number  of  prehistoric  relic*. 


NOTE  VIII 


PROFESSOR  BOYD  DAWKINS  ON  TERTIARY  MAN  (p.  1 72) 

The  following  quotations  from  Professor  Boyd  Dawkins’s 
work,  Early  Man  in  Britain ,  summarise  that  writer’s  views 
on  the  question  of  Tertiary  Man. 

Eocene. — ‘  It  is  obvious  that  man  had  no  place  in  such  an 
assemblage  of  animals  as  that  described  in  this  chapter.  To 
seek  for  highly-specialised  man  in  a  fauna  where  no  living 
genus  of  placental  mammal  was  present  would  be  an  idle  and 
hopeless  quest  ’  (p.  36). 

Miocene. — ‘  Man,  the  most  highly  specialised  of  all 
creatures,  had  no  place  in  a  fauna  which  is  conspicuous  by 
the  absence  of  all  the  mammalia  now  associated  with  him  ’ 
(p.  67).  This  on  the  ground  of  the  fact  that  ‘no  living 
species  of  land  mammal  has  been  met  with  in  the  Miocene 
fauna.’  He  combats  the  views  of  those  who  think  that  traces 
of  man  are  found  in  France  belonging  to  this  period.  Either 
the  flints  relied  on  are  not  artificial ;  or,  ‘  If  they  be  artificial, 
then  I  would  suggest  that  they  were  made  by  one  of  the 
higher  apes  then  living  in  France  rather  than  by  man  ’ 

(p.  68). 

‘  When  all  this  is  taken  into  account,  it  will  be  seen  how 
improbable,  nay,  how  impossible  it  is  that  man,  as  we  know 
him  now,  the  highest  and  most  specialised  of  all  created 
forms,  should  have  had  a  place  in  the  Miocene  world’  (p.  69 : 
Professor  Dawkins  spells  throughout  ‘  Meiocene,’ ‘Pleiocene  ’). 

Tliocene. — ‘  There  is  an  argument  against  the  probability 
of  man  having  lived  in  Italy  in  Pliocene  times  that  seems 
to  me  unanswerable.  ...  It  is  to  my  mind  to  the  last  degree 
improbable  that  man,  the  most  highly  specialised  of  the 
animal  kingdom,  should  have  been  present  in  such  a  fauna  as 

804 


NOTES 


305 


this,  composed  of  so  many  distinct  species.  They  belong  to 
one  stage  of  evolution,  and  man  to  another  and  a  later  stage. 
.  .  .  As  the  evidence  stands  at  present,  the  geological  record 
is  silent  as  to  man’s  appearance  in  Europe  in  the  Pliocene 
age.  It  is  very  improbable  that  he  will  ever  be  proved  to 
have  lived  in  this  quarter  of  the  world  at  that  remote  time, 
since  of  all  the  European  mammalia  then  alive  only  one  has 
survived  to  our  own  day  ’  (p.  93). 

Tleistocene. — Traces  of  man  in  Early  Pleistocene  are 
doubtful  ;  Dr.  Dawkins  thinks  he  finds  evidences  of  man 
in  Mid-Pleistocene;  these  Prestwich  would  relegate  to  late 
Pleistocene  (p.  142). 


NOTE  IX 

THE  END  OF  THE  ICE  AGE  (p.  1 75) 

Mr.  Warren  Upham,  a  high  American  authority,  writing 
on  ‘  Primitive  Man  in  the  Ice-Age  ’  in  the  Bib.  Sacra  for 
October  1902,  apropos  of  the  Lansing  Skeleton  (see  Note  XII.), 
says  :  ‘According  to  the  computations  and  estimates  of  Pro¬ 
fessor  N.  H.  Winchell,  Dr.  Edmund  Andrews,  Professor 
G.  F.  Wright,  and  others,  based  on  the  rates  of  recession  of 
waterfalls,  of  the  accumulation  of  beach  sands,  and  of  erosion 
and  deposition  of  sediments  by  streams  and  lakes,  the  time 
since  the  moraine  hills  were  amassed,  and  since  men  lost  their 
implements  in  the  gravels  and  sands  of  the  valleys  flooded 
from  the  latest  ice-melting,  has  been  about  7000  years. 
Many  independent  estimates  of  the  length  of  this  post¬ 
glacial  period  have  been  made  both  in  America  and  Europe, 
which  agree  together  so  well  that  this  measure  of  the  lapse 
of  time  since  the  Ice  Age  may  be  accepted  with  confidence’ 

(p.  73 2)- 


u 


3°6 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


I  quote  this  because  Mr.  Upham,  with  his  views  of  the 
length  of  the  Ice  Age,  is  himself  an  advocate  of  a  very  high 
antiquity  of  man  in  Europe  (p.  741). 

For  the  most  recent  calculations  as  to  the  end  of  the  Ice 
Age  in  America — approximately  in  Europe — see  article  on 
4  The  Revision  of  Geological  Time/  by  Professor  Wright  in 
Bib.  Sacra ,  July  1903.  Professor  Winchell  writes  in  Sep¬ 
tember  1902:  ‘Post-glacial  time  has  been  computed  in 
various  ways,  and  it  has  been  pretty  nearly  unanimously 
agreed  that  post-glacial  time  does  not  exceed  10,000  years, 
and  probably  amounts  to  about  8000  years.’  Professor 
Salisbury,  of  the  New  Jersey  State  Geological  Survey,  writes 
in  his  Report  in  1902:  ‘Many  lines  of  calculation,  all  of 
them  confessedly  more  or  less  uncertain,  point  to  the  retreat 
of  the  last  ice-sheet  from  the  northern  part  of  the  United 
States  6000  to  10,000  years  ago.  While  these  figures  are  to 
be  looked  on  as  estimates  only,  there  are  so  many  lines  of 
evidence  pointing  in  the  same  direction  that  the  recency 
(geologically  speaking)  of  the  last  glaciation  must  be  looked 
upon  as  established’  (p.  579).  A  valuable  paper  of  older 
date  by  Mr.  P.  F.  Kendal  and  Mr.  Gray  on  ‘  The  Cause  of 
the  Ice  Age,’  read  to  the  British  Association,  August  4, 
1892,  should  also  be  consulted. 

NOTE  X 

THE  ‘NEW  RACE’  IN  EGYPT  (p.  1 79) 

The  state  of  opinion  as  to  the  character  of  early  Egyptian 
civilisation  has  been  materially  affected  by  the  remarkable  dis¬ 
coveries  made  since  1894  of  the  tombs  and  relics  of  a  race 
presenting  peculiarities  quite  distinct  from  those  of  the 
dynastic  Egyptians  (cf.  Budge,  History  of  Egypt ,  i.  pp.  5  ff. : 


NOTES 


3°7 


a  good  collection  of  the  relics  in  Turin  Museum).  Pro¬ 
fessor  Petrie,  one  of  the  most  diligent  explorers,  holding  its 
people  to  be,  not  pre-dynastic,  but  intruders  into  Egypt 
between  the  fifth  and  the  eleventh  dynasties,  designates  them 
‘The  New  Race’;  others  take  them  to  be  the  aborigines  in¬ 
habiting  the  country  when  the  dynastic  Egyptians  invaded 
it.  They  represent  a  type  of  civilisation  quite  distinct  from, 
and  much  ruder  than,  that  of  the  dynastic  Egyptians.  Still 
they  can  in  no  way  be  spoken  of  as  uncivilised.  Their 
tombs  abound  in  pottery — vases,  jars,  bowls,  saucers,  etc., 
some  being  of  most  unusual  shapes,  and  others  being  orna¬ 
mented  with  unusual  designs  (Budge,  p.  7).  Some  of  the 
tombs  seem  to  have  been  stately  affairs  (p.  12)  ;  others  were 
built  of  crude  bricks,  and  were  partially  destroyed  by  fire 
(p.  13)  ;  others  were  mere  pits,  sometimes  roofed  over  (p.  9). 
Professor  Petrie  says  of  them  :  ‘  They  were  great  hunters, 
they  were  acquainted  with  the  metals  gold,  silver,  and  copper, 
they  were  right-handed,  they  could  spin  and  weave,  they  were 
masters  in  the  art  of  working  in  stone  and  in  the  production 
of  vases  and  vessels  of  beautiful  shape  and  form  ’  (p.  25). 
They  had  a  peculiar  system  of  sepulture — the  knees  being 
sharply  bent  and  the  thighs  drawn  up  into  a  sitting  posture  ; 
while  often  the  skull  was  removed,  and  the  body  otherwise 
mutilated  or  dismembered — Professor  Petrie  thinks  was  some¬ 
times  partly  eaten  (pp.  10,  26). 

The  problems  connected  with  this  alleged  ‘  New  Race  ’  are 
still  far  from  being  fully  solved.  If  they  were,  as  Dr.  Budge 
and  others  think,  the  aboriginal  inhabitants,  it  is  singular  that 
no  representations  of  them  should  be  found  on  the  monu¬ 
ments  :  it  is  in  favour  of  Professor  Petrie’s  view,  also,  that 
the  period  between  the  fifth  and  the  eleventh  dynasties  is  a 
monumental  hiatus,  which  requires  to  be  filled  up  in  some 
way  (it  is  certain  that  the  ‘  New  Race  9  was  in  Egypt  before 
the  twelfth  dynasty).  On  the  other  hand,  the  resemblance  in 


3°8 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


burial  customs  (interment  in  sitting  posture,  mutilations,  etc.) 
to  those  of  later  palaeolithic  man  (Cro-Magnon,  Mentone, 
etc.),  may  suggest  a  much  earlier  period,  with  distinct  break 
from  the  Egyptians.  No  means  at  least  of  bridging  the 
chasm  between  the  two  races  seems  yet  to  have  been  found. 
Probably  the  difficulty  felt  will  be  in  crediting  palaeolithic 
man  with  a  civilisation  so  high  as  already  appears  in  this  race  ; 
but,  apart  from  a  priori  assumptions,  that  difficulty  need  not 
stagger  us.  More  light,  no  doubt,  will  soon  be  obtained. 


NOTE  XI 

OTTO  ON  THE  SUDDEN  ORIGIN  OF  MAN  (p.  182) 

In  the  third  of  his  articles  on  ‘  Present-Day  Darwinism  and 
Theology’  in  the  Theologische  Rundschau  (see  above,  Note 
IV.),  R.  Otto  has  some  striking  remarks  on  the  bearings  of 
evolution  on  the  origin  of  man.  ‘  But  even  on  the  theory  of 
descent,’  he  says,  ‘  e.g.,  in  the  way  of  development  by  a  sudden 
leap  ( sprungweise ),  the  difference  in  man  might  quite  well  be 
so  great,  that,  in  spite  of  his  bodily  derivation,  he  might, 
according  to  his  spiritual  capabilities,  and  emotional  and 
moral  endowments,  belong  to  a  perfectly  new  category, 
raising  him  far  above  all  his  predecessors.  Nothing  whatever 
hinders,  and  much  speaks  on  behalf  of,  the  supposition  that 
the  last  leap  ( sprung )  out  of  animality  into  humanity  was  one 
so  great,  that  with  it  took  place  a  free  and  rich  development 
of  the  psychical  ( seelischen ),  incomparable  to  all  that  had  gone 
before  ;  through  which,  in  truth,  it  [the  psychical]  first  came 
to  itself,  and  caused  all  that  had  preceded  to  rank  as  its 
prelude’  (June  1903,  p.  233). 

I  may  perhaps  add  to  this  a  sentence  on  sudden  develop- 


NOTES 


309 


ments  from  Professor  Cope’s  work,  The  Origin  of  the  Fittest . 
He  says :  4  The  results  of  such  successful  metamorphoses  are 
expressed  in  geological  history  by  more  or  less  abrupt  transi¬ 
tions,  rather  than  by  uniformly  gradual  successions’  (p.  123). 


NOTE  XII 

THE  LANSING  SKELETON  (p.  1 84) 

Full  information  regarding  this  discovery,  which  has  been 
the  subject  of  much  interesting  discussion,  and  has  important 
bearings  on  the  age  of  man  in  America,  may  be  seen  in  a 
succession  of  papers  in  the  Bibliotheca  Sacra  for  1902 
(October)  and  1903  (January  and  July).  Lansing  is  a  place 
in  Kansas  (about  eighteen  miles  from  Kansas  City),  and 
there,  in  February  1902,  a  human  skeleton  was  found  beneath 
a  bed  of  loess,  through  which  a  tunnel  was  being  excavated 
for  the  purposes  of  a  farm.  The  skull  is  of  a  type  not  differ¬ 
ing  appreciably  from  that  of  modern  Indian  tribes.  The 
decision  of  the  age  of  the  skeleton  depends  on  the  view 
taken  of  the  nature  of  the  deposit  under  which  it  is  buried— 
whether  4  true  loess,’  belonging  to  what  is  called  the  4  Iowan  ’ 
stage  of  the  glacial  period  ;  or  post-glacial  alluvium  of  much 
later  date — a  point  on  which  opinions  seem  hopelessly 
divided.  ‘As  yet,  however,  they  [the  experts]  have  not  been 
able  to  agree,  and  the  two  interpretations  offered  by  geologists 
are  supported  by  leading  advocates  of  the  divergent  views  ’ 
(July  1903,  p.  572). 

It  will  be  seen  that  on  the  determination  of  this  question 
of  the  age  of  the  skeleton  it  depends  whether  (so  far  as 
known)  man  appeared  in  America  during  or  after  the  glacial 
period.  Prior  to  this  discovery,  the  only  alleged  trace  of 


3io 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


inter-glacial  man  (though  of  a  late  stage  of  the  glacial  period) 
was  a  slate  implement  found  at  Clayton,  Delaware,  and  this 
was  regarded  as  indecisive.  Mr.  Warren  Upham,  who 
reports  on  the  new  discovery,  believes  that  the  loess  under 
which  the  skeleton  was  found  ‘'was  chiefly  deposited  in  a  late 
part  of  the  Ice  Age,’  and  he  regards  the  Lansing  skeleton  as 
‘  probably  our  oldest  proof  of  man’s  presence  on  this  Conti¬ 
nent’  (October  1902,  pp.  734,  741).  He  assigns  to  it  an 
antiquity  of  about  12,000  or  15,000  years.  Professors  G.  F. 
Wright,  N.  H.  Winchell,  and  others,  agree  with  Mr.  Upham 
in  his  general  conclusions.  On  the  other  hand,  a  formidable 
body  of  authorities — Professor  T.  C.  Chamberlin,  Professor 
S.  W.  Williston,  Professor  E.  Calvin,  Professor  R.  D.  Salis¬ 
bury,  and  others — dispute  entirely  Mr.  Upham’s  view  of  the 
deposit,  and  assign  to  the  skeleton  ‘  a  very  respectable  anti¬ 
quity,  but  much  short  of  the  close  of  the  glacial  invasion  ’ — 
give  ‘  the  fossil  man  a  considerable  antiquity/  but  deny  ‘  him 
the  age  of  glacial  time’  (July  1903,  pp.  573,  576). 

The  interesting  feature  in  this  discussion  is  that  the  oppo¬ 
sition  to  the  age  of  the  skeleton  comes,  curiously,  not  from 
those  whose  prepossessions  are  in  favour  of  conservative  views, 
but,  as  Professor  Wright  points  out,  from  the  ‘  anthro¬ 
pologists  ’ — i.e. ,  the  evolutionists,  like  Professors  Chamberlin 
and  Williston,  who  find  in  what  they  call  the  ‘  modern ’ 
character  of  the  skull  ‘evidence  which  is  convincing  to  some 
of  them  that  it  cannot  be  very  ancient’  (January  1903, 
pp.  29,  30).  Hence  they  decline  to  admit  it  to  be  glacial. 
The  more  ‘advanced’  science  here,  accordingly,  yields  the 
more  conservative  result.  It  is  not  a  very  remote  antiquity, 
comparatively,  that  Mr.  Upham  asks  for  the  skull,  yet  it  is 
refused  to  him.  It  will  probably  be  felt  that  even  the 
Lansing  skeleton  does  not  carry  us  much  further  in  our  search 
for  indubitable  evidence  of  inter-glacial  man. 


NOTE  XIII 


weismann’s  theory  of  heredity  (p.  236) 1 

All  theories  of  heredity  have  for  their  aim  the  explanation 
of  how  the  characters  of  a  parent  are  transmitted  to  his  or 
her  offspring.  Weismann’s  theory  may  be  looked  at,  first,  as 
a  theory  of  heredity  generally  ;  and,  second,  in  its  peculiarity 
as  a  denial  of  the  transmissibility  of  ‘  acquired  characters.’ 
The  two  aspects  are  related,  for  Weismann’s  differs  chiefly 
from  other  theories  in  the  stringency  with  which  it  carries 
out  the  demand  for  a  ‘  mechanical  ’  explanation  of  the  facts 
of  inheritance.  The  case  for  the  denial  of  the  inheritance  of 
acquired  characters  is  based,  partly,  indeed,  on  the  alleged 
insufficiency  of  the  evidence  for  such  inheritance  ;  but  partly 
also,  and  perhaps  primarily,  on  the  supposed  necessity  of 
finding  a  ‘  mechanical  ’  explanation  of  the  process.  How 
this  works  out  we  shall  see  below. 

The  first  condition  of  a  ‘modern  theory  of  heredity,  then 
— Weismann’s  included — is  that  the  explanation  is  to  be 
‘  mechanical.’  No  talk  of  a  living,  organising  principle  in 
germ-cells,  or  in  the  structures  that  proceed  from  these,  can 
be  admitted.  But  here  the  curious  fact  emerges  that,  with 
all  this  desire  to  dispense  with  a  vital  principle,  it  yet  seems 
impossible,  when  the  actual  construction  of  a  theory  is  at¬ 
tempted,  to  get  on  without  it.  This  will  be  seen  by  glancing 
at  the  relation  of  Weismann’s  theory  to  preceding  theories. 
There  is,  e.g .,  Mr.  Darwin’s  theory,  on  which  he  set  much 

1  This  and  the  following  Note  consist  of  paragraphs  from  two  lectures 
on  ‘  Heredity  and  Sin,’  delivered  to  the  Summer  School  of  Theology  of 
Glasgow  College,  at  its  meeting  in  Edinburgh,  1904.  They  are  here  in¬ 
serted  as  germane  to  the  subjects  under  discussion. 


311 


312 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


store — the  theory  of  ‘  Pangenesis. *  The  problem,  it  will  be 
remembered,  is,  how  parental  traits  can  be  transmitted  to  off¬ 
spring  ?  how  a  single  reproductive  cell  can  reproduce  the 
whole  body  in  all  its  parts?  The  essence  of  Darwin’s  theory 
is  that  every  cell  in  the  whole  organism  is  continually,  and  at 
every  stage  in  its  development,  throwing  off  minute  portions 
of  itself — granules,  or  ‘gemmules,’  as  Darwin  calls  them — 
which,  by  a  mysterious  law,  find  their  way  to,  and  get  stored 
up  in,  the  reproductive  cell,  or  in  each  such  cell,  whence, 
under  suitable  conditions,  a  new  organism  is  produced,  con¬ 
taining  all  the  parts  of  the  former.  But,  setting  aside  the 
thousand  other  difficulties  which  attend  this  theory,  there  is 
one  which  Darwin  could  not  ignore,  viz.,  how,  even  supposing 
the  gemmules  all  safely  stored  up  in  the  reproductive  germ, 
they  manage  to  arrange  themselves  in  the  precise  positions 
and  relations  necessary  to  build  up  the  new  organism.  The 
gemmules  pour  in,  as  it  were,  at  random  ;  the  parts  are  in¬ 
finitesimally  small  ;  they  are  numerous  beyond  computation  : 
how  is  it  that  each  gemmule  is  guided  to  the  exact  place  it  is 
meant  to  occupy  in  this  mazy  whirl,  and  manages  afterwards 
to  keep  to  it  ?  Darwin’s  answer  is  in  the  phrase,  ‘  elective 
affinities.*  The  gemmules  have  mutual  ‘affinities*  which  lead 
to  their  arranging  themselves  in  precisely  the  proper  order 
and  relations.  But  this  ‘  elective  affinity  * — what  is  it  but  our 
organising  principle  over  again?  As  Weismann  says:  ‘An 
unknown  controlling  force  must  be  added  to  this  mysterious 
arrangement,  in  order  to  marshal  the  molecules  which  enter 
the  reproductive  cell  in  such  a  manner  that  their  arrangement 
corresponds  with  the  order  in  which  they  must  emerge  as 
cells  at  a  later  period  ’  ( Essays  on  Heredity ,  i.  p.  77). 

Mr.  Spencer  also  criticises  Darwin,  and  has  his  own  theory, 
but  I  cannot  see  that  he  is  in  much  better  case.  He  rejects 
‘elective  affinity,’  but  only  to  substitute  for  it  what  he  calls 
‘polarity.’  There  is,  he  tells  us  in  his  Biology ,  ‘an  innate 


NOTES 


3*3 


tendency  in  living  particles  to  arrange  themselves  into  the 
shape  of  the  organism  to  which  they  belong.’  For  this 
property  there  is  no  fit  term  ;  so  he  proposes  this  word 
‘polarity’  (cf.  his  chapter  on  ‘Waste  and  Repair’).  Here 
also,  it  would  seem,  we  might  as  well  go  back  at  once  to  our 
‘vital  principle.’ 

Weismann,  discarding  these  theories,  takes  another  line, 
which  opens  the  way  into  his  peculiar  doctrine.  He  falls 
back  on  what  he  calls  the  ‘  immortality  ’  of  the  reproductive 
cell,  or  at  least  of  the  germ-plasm  contained  in  it  ( Essays ,  i. 
p.  209).  In  contrast  with  the  ‘somatic’  cells  which  compose 
the  structure  of  the  body  (though  these  also  originate  in  the 
reproductive  cell),  the  reproductive  cell,  or  germ-cell,  or 
germ-plasm,  is  absolutely  continuous.  It  divides  and  sub¬ 
divides  perpetually,  but  never  dies.  Each  part,  moreover, 
has  in  it  all  the  properties  and  the  peculiar  molecular  structure 
of  the  original  cell  ;  it  therefore  produces,  when  developed, 
precisely  the  same  kind  of  body.  Thus,  he  thinks,  he  solves 
the  problem,  ‘  How  is  it  that  a  single  cell  of  the  body  can 
contain  within  itself  all  the  hereditary  tendencies  of  the 
whole  organism?’  (p.  169).  But  it  may  be  doubted  whether, 
so  far  as  the  essential  point,  viz.,  how  the  germ-cell  comes 
to  possess  this  peculiar  molecular  structure,  is  concerned,  we 
are  not  left  as  much  in  the  dark  as  ever.  To  explain  the 
rise  and  growing  complexity  of  structure  in  the  cell  we 
are  thrown  back  on  the  Darwinian  hypothesis  of  unaided 
natural  selection  working  on  chance  variations  in  forms  of 
life  originally  unicellular,  and  therefore  structureless.  But 
even  if  it  were  granted,  which  it  cannot  be,  that  chance 
variations  could  ever  produce  the  complex  and  finely  adapted 
structures  which  we  see,  there  remains  the  difficulty  of  how 
a  single  cell  can  give  off  its  infinitely  complex  molecular 
constitution  in  its  entirety  to  myriads  of  derivative  cells,  be 
it  by  fission  or  in  any  other  way.  It  seems  necessary  that  we 


3H 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


supplement  the  process  by  a  factor  which  Weismann  refuses 
to  recognise — an  internal,  directing,  organising  principle  ;  a 
principle  which  has  in  it  the  potency  for  building  up  a 
structure  of  a  given  type  from  the  materials  furnished  to 
it.  To  what  but  this  does  Weismann  himself  come  back 
in  the  admission  that  the  unsolved  mystery  of  cell-life  is 
4  assimilation  ’ — the  power,  as  he  explains  it,  which  the  organ¬ 
ism  possesses 4  of  taking  up  certain  foreign  substances,  viz.,  food, 
and  of  converting  them  into  the  substance  of  its  own  body  * 
{Essays,  i.  p.  73)  ? 

It  can  now,  perhaps,  easily  be  seen  how,  with  logical 
stringency,  Weismann  arrives  at  his  conclusion  that  acquired 
characters  cannot  be  inherited.  Given  his  theory  that  all 
changes  that  are  inheritable  take  place  in  the  reproductive 
germ,  which,  as  ‘immortal,’  simply  perpetuates  itself,  then 
the  impossibility  is  seen  of  finding  any  4  mechanism  ’  by 
which  changes  occurring  in  other  parts  of  the  organism — in 
the  4  somatic  ’  cells — can  be  transmitted  to  the  reproductive 
cell,  so  as  to  become  a  permanent  part  of  the  structure  of  the 
latter.  4  Use  and  disuse/  as  he  says  in  one  place,  ‘cannot 
produce  any  effect  in  the  transformation  of  species,  simply 
because  they  can  never  reach  the  germ-cells  from  which  the 
succeeding  generation  comes  *  (i.  p.  400).  The  pillar  of  the 
theory,  therefore,  is  that  all  changes  that  are  reproducible  are 
in  the  germ-cell,  and  in  the  germ-cell  alone  ;  and  that  this  is 
unreachable  by  influences  from  changes  in  other  parts  of  the 
organism.  The  theory  may  be  summed  up,  in  closing,  in  one 
or  two  sentences  of  his  own.  4  The  foundation  of  all  the 
phenomena  of  heredity,’  he  says,  4  can  only  be  the  substance 
of  the  germ-cells ;  and  the  substance  transfers  its  hereditary 
tendencies  from  generation  to  generation,  at  first  unchanged, 
and  always  uninfluenced  in  any  corresponding  manner  by  that 
which  happens  during  the  life  of  the  individual  which  bears 
it.  .  .  .  Heredity  depends  on  the  continuity  of  the  molecular 


NOTES 


3i5 


substance  of  the  germ  from  generation  to  generation.  ...  I 
believe  that  an  explanation  can  in  this  case  be  reached  by  an 
appeal  to  known  forces,  if  we  suppose  that  characters  acquired 
(in  the  true  sense  of  the  term)  by  the  parent  cannot  appear 
in  the  course  of  the  development  of  the  offspring,  but  that  all 
the  characters  of  the  latter  are  due  to  primary  changes  in  the 
germ  7  (i.  pp.  69,  70,  78). 

It  is,  however,  obvious  that  the  problem  is  transformed  if, 
discarding  the  attempt  at  a  purely  ‘  mechanical 5  explanation  of 
vital  phenomena,  we  fall  back  on  the  idea  of  the  organism  as 
animated  by  a  single  life  pervading  its  multitudinous  cells,  in 
which,  therefore,  every  part  is  in  rapport  with  every  other, 
so  that  no  changes  can  take  place  in  any  part  that  are  not 
attended  by  changes  in  other  parts  which  defy  all  purely 
physical  explanation. 


NOTE  XIV 

HEREDITY  AND  RESPONSIBILITY  (p.  243) 

Heredity,  in  the  naked,  unqualified  form  in  which  it  is 
often  presented  by  science,  would  seem  to  destroy  responsi¬ 
bility  at  its  base.  I  do  not  quote  Haeckel,  but  give  one 
sentence  from  Maudsley,  cited  by  Dr.  Amory  Bradford  in 
his  book  on  Heredity  :  ‘There  is  a  destiny  made  for  man  by 
his  ancestors,  and  no  one  can  elude,  were  he  able  to  attempt 
it,  the  tyranny  of  his  organisation’  (pp.  81  ff.).  At  first 
sight  it  might  seem  as  if  the  theory  of  Weismann,  in  denying 
the  inheritance  of  contracted  tendencies  (as  by  vice),  did 
something  to  relieve  this  pressure  on  posterity ;  and  so  Mr. 
Tennant,  e.g.,  is  disposed  to  welcome  its  assistance.  But  it  is 
a  serious  price  we  have  to  pay  for  any  seeming  help  of  this 


316 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


kind.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  no  doctrine  rivets 
fatality  on  man  so  completely  as  this  doctrine  of  Weis- 
mann's.  It  does  this  by  withdrawing  the  whole  sphere  of 
volitional  life  from  the  action  of  heredity,  and,  as  a  corollary 
of  that,  withdrawing  heredity,  which  becomes  a  purely 
fatalistic  process,  completely  from  the  control  of  will.  The 
tendencies  now  hereditary  were  in  their  origin  simply  un¬ 
favourable  variations ;  a  rigid  necessity  has  ruled  the  subse¬ 
quent  development ;  will  has  no  influence  at  all  in  changing 
things  from  their  preordained  course.  We  have  been  accus¬ 
tomed  to  believe  that  a  man’s  actions,  good  or  evil,  had  some 
influence,  not  only  on  his  own  character,  but  on  that  of  his 
offspring.  This,  if  Weismann  is  to  be  credited,  is  a  total 
mistake.  So  far,  if  the  tendency  was  evil,  this  may  seem  a 
relief.  But  it  is  not  a  relief  in  reality,  for  evil  tendencies  are 
still  inherited,  only  they  are  now  withdrawn  in  their  origin 
from  the  sphere  of  moral  causation,  and  laid  upon  the  nature 
as  a  blind  result  of  accidental  variation  in  the  germ-cell. 
There  is  no  gain  there.  Further,  as  human  will  had  no  share 
in  inducing  the  deterioration  which  we  see  in  so  many  broken 
specimens  of  our  kind,  so  neither  can  will  aid  in  remedying 
it.  It  can  at  least  do  nothing  through  the  principle  of 
heredity.  That  moves  on  its  own  splendidly  isolated  way, 
unaffected  by  accidents  of  external  condition,  by  helping  or 
hindering  influences  of  environment,  by  good  or  evil  volitions 
of  progenitors.  It  is  the  deepest  weakness  of  our  so-called 
modern  ‘  scientific  ’  view  that  there  is  in  it  no  room  for 
personality,  for  will,  for  action  outwards  on  the  chain  of 
*  mechanical  ’  causation  ;  therefore  no  room,  properly,  for 
responsibility  or  moral  recovery.  Even  Spencer  declares  that 
our  faith  in  the  reality  of  freedom  is  ‘an  inveterate  illusion  ’ ; 
that  man  is  no  more  free  than  a  leaf  in  a  tornado,  or  a  feather 
in  Niagara  (see  the  discussion  in  his  Tsy  etiology ,  i.  pp.  500  ff.). 
Happily  for  mankind,  we  are  not  shut  up  to  these  doleful 


NOTES 


3*7 

theories,  which  would  make  work  for  the  recovery  of  the  lost 
a  dismal  mockery ! 

Taking  heredity  at  its  best,  however,  even  freed  from 
these  exaggerations,  we  have  to  admit  that  the  prospect  for 
multitudes  under  its  influence  is  sufficiently  dark,  and  even, 
it  might  seem,  hopeless.  Heredity  of  nature  is  powerful 
enough  for  evil  ;  but  we  have  to  add  to  it,  in  the  case  of 
myriads,  ‘social’  heredity — that  great  complex  of  influences, 
education,  example,  custom,  which  we  call  ‘  environment,’ 
which  also  in  large  measure  is  an  outgrowth  and  product 
of  heredity  of  nature.  Leaving  uncivilised  races  out  of 
account,  and  looking  only  at  our  own  doors— -at  the  kind  of 
surroundings  into  which  multitudes  of  children  are  continu¬ 
ally  being  born,  at  the  foul  and  degrading  influences  which 
enswathe  them  from  their  infancy,  at  the  sordidness  and 
misery  of  their  physical  upbringing — what  chance,  we  are 
compelled  to  ask,  have  they  of  ever  becoming  good  and 
virtuous  members  of  society,  not  to  say  heirs  of  the  kingdom 
of  heaven?  Received,  as  Professor  Seeley  puts  it  in  his  Ecce 
Homo ,  from  the  first  hour  of  their  existence  into  the  devil’s 
church  by  a  kind  of  infant  baptism,  have  they  a  chance  at 
all?  Our  hearts  almost  fail  us  in  trying  to  answer  that 
question.  Yet  they  should  not  fail  us ;  for  there  is  no  evil 
destiny  binding  human  beings  to  ruin,  and  the  success  of  our 
efforts  in  solving  this  dark  problem  will  be  in  precise  propor¬ 
tion  to  the  loftiness  of  our  motives,  the  wisdom  of  our 
methods,  and  the  inflexibility  of  our  determination  to 
persevere  until  the  work  is  done. 

Certainly  it  is  impossible  to  hope  for  large  success  with 
environment  left  precisely  as  it  is.  In  these  homes,  amidst 
these  surroundings,  with  these  temptations,  it  is,  humanly 
speaking,  next  to  impossible  to  grow  up  good ;  though, 
through  the  marvellous  grace  of  God,  in  seeming  defiance  of 
all  laws  of  heredity,  even  this  miracle  does  sometimes  happen — - 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


318 

a  wondrous  encouragement  and  proof,  if  one  were  needed, 
that  heredity  is  not  the  sole  lord  of  human  life! 

Plainly,  Christian  duty,  so  far  as  this  side  of  the  matter  is 
concerned,  is  to  aim  at  breaking  up  this  wrong  environment, 
and  securing,  if  need  be  compelling,  decent  conditions  of 
existence  for  our  fellow  human  beings — at  giving  them, 
especially  the  young,  a  chance.  Still,  this  is  only  the 
beginning.  To  combat  positively  the  influences  of  heredity 
and  environment  we  must  next  call  into  play  the  latent  forces 
of  personality.  Appeal  must  be  made  to  every  faculty  that 
constitutes  man  a  moral  and  responsible  being — to  reason,  to 
conscience,  to  will,  to  affection,  to  the  power  which  every  soul 
in  some  degree  has  of  appreciating  what  is  praiseworthy  and 
right  when  put  before  it.  Above  all,  the  individual  we  seek 
to  save  must  be  made  to  feel  that  he  has  personality — has  a 
soul — is  not  the  plaything  of  outside  forces.  For  that  in  one 
sense  is  the  supremely  helping  conviction  ! 

I  have  to  add  that  all  this  which  has  been  said  would  fall 
short  of  the  need  of  the  situation  if  there  were  not  yet  diviner 
powers  to  be  invoked.  Deliverance  from  sin’s  power,  in  the 
last  resort,  can  only  come  from  God  Himself,  and  it  does 
come  in  the  Christian  Gospel.  From  the  standpoint  of 
heredity,  Christ  Himself  is  the  supreme  miracle  in  the  history 
of  our  race.  For  here  was  One  who  was  truly  of  our¬ 
selves,  yet  in  Whom  this  power  of  heredity  for  evil — though 
He  felt  the  pressure  of  temptation — was  absolutely  broken, 
over  Whom  it  had  no  influence  whatever.  Who  was  pure  in 
the  midst  of  the  world’s  defilement,  in  Whom  the  law  of  the 
Spirit  of  Life  continually  bore  sway!  Surely  this,  in  any 
light  in  which  we  can  regard  it,  is  a  proof  that  heredity  is  not 
everything  :  that  One  at  least  has  walked  our  earth  in 
absolute  superiority  to  its  influences  ;  that  He  submitted,  in 
mind  and  body,  to  the  very  worst  the  world  could  do  to 
Him,  yet  proved  Himself  its  Conqueror  !  But  the  kernel  of 


NOTES 


3i9 


the  matter  is  only  reached  when  we  learn  that  His  victory 
is  intended  to  be  ours  also,  and  that  through  His  life,  and 
Cross,  and  Resurrection,  there  is  opened  to  the  world  a 
divine  deliverance  from  all  its  sin,  peace  with  God,  and  the 
power  of  an  endlessly  holy  and  blessed  life  I 


INDEX 


Animal  and  human  intelligence, 
9,  59  ff.,  1 41,  144  ff.  (See  Man.) 

Antiquity  of  man,  160;  Ussher’s 
chronology,  165  ;  extreme  claims 
for,  166,  168,  176,  180;  revised 
views,  167;  relation  to  glacial 
period,  169  ff.,  173  ff.;  physical 
science  on,  176  ff.;  ancient  civi¬ 
lisations,  178-9,  203;  bearings 
of  evolution  on,  180  ff. 

Argyll,  Duke  of,  on  creation  and 
evolution,  87  5  on  sudden  origins, 
1145  on  man’s  mind,  141 ;  on 
primitive  man,  186,  203  ;  on 
flood,  1735  on  high  character  of 
early  types,  2115  on  unnatural¬ 
ness  of  man’s  moral  condition, 
227,  234. 

Atonement,  modern  repugnance  to, 
11,  275;  a  Scriptural  doctrine, 
'258,273,275-6;  coherence  with 
Christian  view,  274 ;  meaning 
of  death  in,  277-8 ;  MfLeod 
Campbell  on,  277. 

Augustine,  on  unfallen  man,  224; 
on  death,  259. 

A 

Babylonia,  early  civilisation  in, 
165,  178-9,  186. 


Brain,  in  man  and  apes,  128  ff.; 
dependence  of  mind  on,  69,  73, 
75  ff.  (See  Mind.) 

Budge,  E.  A.  W.,  on  4  New  Race  ’ 
in  Egypt,  179,  306  ff. 

Cairns,  J.,  28. 

Calderwood,  H.,  141,  144,  145, 
151. 

Calvin,  on  image  of  God,  55. 

Campbell,  J.  M‘Leod,  on  atone¬ 
ment,  277. 

Carpenter,  W.  B.,  108;  on  here¬ 
dity,  241. 

Christ,  Person  of,  23;  eternal 
Image  of  God,  269  ;  realises 
image  of  God  in  humanity,  55, 
57,  271;  atoning  work,  28, 
273  ff. 

Christianity,  conflict  with  modern 
view,  4,  17  ff.,  29;  demand  for 
re-interpretation  of,  6 ;  of  Christ 
and  Apostles,  25-6 ;  Harnack 
on,  27,  261  ;  positive  essence  of, 
26-8;  an  organism  of  truth,  7, 
260. 

Creation  narratives,  35  ff.,  43  ff . ; 
relation  to  Babylonia,  38;  re¬ 
lation  to  science,  39,  288. 

331 


X 


322 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


Dana,  J.  D.,  hi;  on  man  and 
ape,  130,  133;  on  geological 
periods,  177. 

Darwin,  Charles,  his  theory  of 
origin  of  species,  89  ff. ;  rejec¬ 
tion  of  teleology,  90-1 ;  inade¬ 
quacy  of  theory,  95  ff. ;  scientific 
objections  and  difficulties,  99  ff.; 
concessions  of,  104.,  1 1 3  ;  modern 
changes  on  theory,  104  ff.,  293 
ff. ;  on  antiquity  of  man,  176; 
on  descent  of  man,  121-2;  on 
primitive  man,  159;  on  evolu¬ 
tion  of  intelligence,  141,  143-4; 
on  inheritance  of  habits,  238. 

Darwinian  theory,  not  identical 
with  evolution,  89  ff. ;  sketch 
of,  92  ff.;  modern  admissions  of 
inadequacy,  99  ff.;  more  recent 
views,  104  ff.,  293  ff.  (See  Dar¬ 
win,  above.) 

Dawkins,  W.  B.,  on  Pithecan¬ 
thropus,  135  ;  on  early  man,  141  ; 
on  antiquity  of  man,  170-1  ;  on 
Tertiary  man,  172,  304  ff. 

Dawson,  J.  W.,  on  ice-age,  169, 
173-4;  on  appearance  of  new 
species,  117;  on  flood,  173; 
on  primitive  man,  183-4,  256. 

Death,  in  relation  to  man,  53, 
249  ff.,  280-1 ;  Weismann  on, 
253  ff . ;  relation  to  hope  of 
resurrection,  280-1  ;  in  Christ’s 
work,  277. 

Delitzsch,  F.,  37-8,  46. 

De  Vries,  his  production  of  new 
species,  114. 

Driver,  S.  R.,  on  man’s  creation, 


36,  40 ;  on  image  of  God  in 
man,  54,  56,  61 ;  on  reason  in 
man,  62  ;  on  antiquity  of  man, 
161,166;  on  JE  narrative,  199  ; 
on  fall,  220,  298,  300. 

Drummond,  H.,  163. 

Dubois,  E.,  his  Pithecanthropus 
Erectus ,  134-5. 

Du  Bois-Reymond,  E.,  his  seven 
riddles,  118,  124;  Haeckel  on, 
291. 

Egypt,  early  civilisation  in,  165, 
178;  the  ‘New  Race’  in,  179, 
306  ff. 

Ethics,  philosophical  and  Chris¬ 
tian,  213-4. 

Evolution,  ambiguity  of  term,  84 
ff. ;  and  creation,  87  ;  not  neces¬ 
sarily  Darwinism,  89;  distinc¬ 
tion  of  fact  and  honxs,  97  ff. ; 
naturalistic,  15,  82;  idealistic, 
20-2;  bearings  on  religion,  87, 
96  ;  newer  theories  of,  1 10, 294-5; 
evolution  of  mind,  144  ff. ;  of 
moral  ideas,  147  ff . ;  of  body, 
1 5 1  ff. ;  bearings  on  antiquity  of 
man,  180  ff.  (See  Darwin,  Dar¬ 
winian  theory,  Otto,  Man,  Sin, 
etc.) 

Factors  in  evolution,  still  under 
investigation,  97-8  ;  Darwin’s 
views  on,  98  ;  his  later  admis¬ 
sions,  104,  1 13;  newer  theories 
regarding,  no  ff,  293  ff. 

Fall,  of  man,  modem  denials  of, 
14,  19,  21-2,  29,  204  ft.,  208-9; 


INDEX 


323 


evolution  and,  2i,  157  ff.,  219-20, 
298  ff. ;  reality  of,  29,  197  ff, 
219  ff.,  221.  (See  Man,  Sin,  etc.) 

Fiske,  J.,  on  rational  nature  of 
man,  41,  60,  127,  1545  on  Dar¬ 
winism,  89,-  on  evolution  of 
man,  15  ff,  141-3  5  on  evolution 
of  moral  ideas,  148-505  on  Sin, 
204-5,  207,  233-4. 

Geological  time,  167,  175  ff  5 
periods,  177. 

God,  Biblical  doctrine  of,  7  5  im¬ 
portance  of  doctrine,  7  ff.  j  de¬ 
fective  views  of,  7,  8,  53. 

Gray,  Asa,  91,  108,  111. 

Haeckel,  E.,  his  monism,  5,  9, 
20 ;  his  materialism,  69-70,  290  5 
metaphysics  of,  71  ff,  289  ff.; 
on  evolution  of  man,  15,  16, 
82  ft'.  5  low  view  of  man,  34; 
on  reason  in  man,  62,  1625 
denial  of  free-will,  5,  9,  69, 
147 ;  of  immortality,  6,  9  ;  on 
antiquity  of  man,  176  ;  on 
creation  narrative,  288. 

Harnack,  A.,  27,  261. 

Henslow,  G.,  on  reason  in  man, 
63  ;  on  life,  78  ;  on  Darwinism, 
90,  1005  on  design  (directivity), 
90,  1 1 1  ;  on  factors  in  evolu¬ 
tion,  97-8  ;  on  missing  links, 
1 3  5-6  5  on  antiquity  of  man, 
169  ;  on  death,  253  ;  on  fall,  299. 

Huxley,  T.  H.,  on  mind  and  brain, 
67,  1 14 ;  on  evolution  and  crea¬ 


tion,  87;  on  Darwinism,  89, 
100,  120  ;  on  teleology,  90-1  ; 
on  sterility  of  hybrids,  103  ;  on 
transitional  forms,  106-7,  131  ; 
on  origin  of  life,  1 1 8  ;  on  per¬ 
sistence  of  types,  1 24  5  on ‘jumps’ 
in  nature,  116,  126,  182  ;  on 
man  and  ape,  127-8;  on  oldest 
skulls,  132,  183  ;  on  Lyell,  135  ; 
on  ethical  process,  148,  150; 
on  antiquity  of  man,  168,  170. 

Image  of  God,  in  man,  evolution¬ 
ary  denial  of,  5,  1 7,  1  34,  204  ;  in 
rational  constitution,  53  ff. ;  in 
dominion,  57  ;  in  moral  resem¬ 
blance,  58,  156  ff.,  187  ff.,  197  ; 
grounded  in  Logos,  269  ;  de¬ 
faced  by  sin,  12,  58-9,  197,  222  ; 
realised  in  Christ,  271  ;  restored 
in  redemption,  261,  266  ff. 

Immortality  of  man,  53  ;  man’s 
destiny,  257  ff.  5  Christian  hope 
of,  279  ff. 

Kelvin,  Lord,  on  design,  112; 
on  age  of  world,  176  ;  on  age 
of  sun,  177. 

Laid  law,  J.,  on  soul  and  spirit, 
47-9,  52  ;  on  image  of  God,  54, 
58-9  ;  on  superadded  righteous¬ 
ness,  59,  244. 

Laing,  S.,  on  antiquity  of  man, 
172,  184. 

Lansing  Skeleton,  132,  171,  182, 
184,  309  ff 


324 


GOD’S  IMAGE  IN  MAN 


Lewes,  G.  H.,  63  ;  on  new  types, 
1175  on  animal  intelligence, 

*4  5- 

Longevity,  in  animals  and  man, 
255-6. 

Lyell,  Charles,  on  ‘ leaps’  in  nature, 
1 1 5,  145  ;  on  origin  of  man, 
134,  i59_6o}  on  antiquity  of 
man,  166. 

M‘Cabe,  J.,  5,  145. 

Mallock,  W.  H.,  concessions  to 
Haeckel,  5,66-7;  on  animal  and 
human  intelligence,  9,  162;  on 
the  ‘  hand,’  143. 

Man,  Biblical  doctrine  of,  9,  17, 
34  ff. ;  creation  narratives  re¬ 
garding,  36  ff.,  43  ff.  ;  head  of 
creation,  40-1  ;  link  between  two 
worlds,  41  ff. ;  compound  being, 
46  ;  soul  and  spirit  in,  47  ff. ; 
image  of  God  in,  54  ff. ;  dis¬ 
tinct  in  nature  from  animals, 
60  ff.,  139  ff. ;  reason  in  man, 
62  ff.,  145-6  ;  unity  of  man,  41, 
1 54  ;  theories  of  descent  of  man, 
10,  15  ff.,  18,  82  ff.,  129,  136, 
296  ff.;  special  origin  of,  125, 
133,  141  ff.,  151  ff.,  182,  308  ; 
primitive  condition  of  man,  159 
ff.,  181  ff. ;  results  of  evolution¬ 
ary  view  of,  17  ft’.,  208-9  ;  skulls 
of  early  man,  132,  183  ff.,  309  ff; 
divine  sonship  of,  190  ff. ;  im¬ 
mortality  of,  1 90,  249  ff.,  279  ff. ; 
redemption  of,  266  ff.  (See  Image 
of  God,  Fall,  Sin,  etc.) 

Martensen,  M.,  on  sin,  216,  232. 


Materialism,  in  modern  monism, 
67,  70,  290. 

Max  Muller,  on  reason  in  man, 
64  ;  on  savages,  161. 

Mind  and  Brain,  their  relations, 

73  ff-,  !25>  J44>  152. 

Mivart,  St.  George,  on  natural 

selection,  94 ;  on  Darwinism, 
98,  100,  102,  108,  143  ;  on 
reason  in  man,  63,  146;  on 
special  origin  of  man,  141  ;  on 
rapid  changes,  164;  on  man’s 
descent,  296. 

Monism,  5,  20  ;  naturalistic,  67  fF. ; 
metaphysics  of,  7  ff.,  289  ff. 

Oehler,  G.  F.,  on  man’s  nature, 
45,  51  ;  on  image  of  God,  54; 
on  fall,  220. 

Organism  of  truth,  in  Christianity, 
7,  260. 

Otto,  R.,  on  Darwinism,  85,  89, 
91-2,  101,  106,  no,  124,  131, 
29 3  ff. ;  on  Pithecanthropus ,  135; 
on  sudden  origins,  117,  182, 
308-9. 

Parallelism,  psycho-physical,  69, 

74  ff- 

Pengelly,  W.,  on  Kent’s  Cavern, 

168. 

Petrie,  W.  M.  Flinders,  on  ‘New 
Race’  in  Egypt,  178,  307. 
Prestwich,  Jos.,  on  glacial  age, 

169,  170,  172-3  ;  on  early  man, 
305- 

Reason  in  man,  62  ff,  146.  (See 
Man.) 


INDEX 


Regeneration,  267,  278-9. 

Resurrection,  53,  280,  281-2. 

Romanes,  Geo.  J.,  on  Darwinism, 

91)  94>  99)  IQI)  io5)  111  5  on 
design,  91,  111-12;  on  animal 

intelligence,  141,  145  ;  on  evolu¬ 
tion  and  fall,  157;  on  heredity, 
23 7,  2395  return  to  Christian 
belief,  287,  292. 

Salmond,  S.  D.  F.,  on  immor¬ 
tality,  280. 

Sin,  8  ff.,  197  ff . ;  subversion  in 
modern  view,  19  ff.,  22,  158, 
188,  202  ff.,  204,  208-9,  265  ; 
Biblical  doctrine  of,  19,  198  ff., 
212 ;  Mr.  Fiske  on,  204  ff .  j 
nature  of,  212;  principle  of, 
215  ff. ;  grades  of,  217  ff. ;  re¬ 
sult  of  temptation,  219-215 
effect  in  depravation,  222  ff. ; 
racial  effects — original  sin,  228 
ff.  5  theoiy  of  brute  inheritance, 
233-45  s^n  and  heredity,  235  ff., 
'31 5  ff.  5  meaning  of  total  de¬ 
pravity,  245  5  physical  conse¬ 
quences — death,  249  ff. 

Skulls,  oldest,  132,  183  ff.,  309  ff. 

Soul  and  Spirit,  their  relations,  47  ff. 

Spencer,  H.,  1205  on  savages,  1615 
on  Darwin,  101-2,  312  ;  on  mind 
and  brain,  1255  on  heredity,  238. 

Strong,  C.  A.,  on  mind  and  body, 

74- 

Tait,  P.  G.,  on  age  of  world, 
176-7. 

Teleology  and  evolution,  90-92, 
94  ff-)  108-9,  1 10  ff.,  295.  (See 


325 

Darwin,  Huxley,  Romanes,  Otto, 
etc.) 

Tennant,  F.  R.,  on  primitive  con¬ 
dition  of  man,  19,  1575  on 
image  of  God,  57-8 ;  on  fall, 
198,  200,  219-21  j  on  original 
sin,  229,  236. 

Variation,  law  of,  92  ff.  5  not  in¬ 
definite,  120}  not  always  slight, 
100-1,  1045  due  to  inner  causes, 
105,  hi,  113;  often  sudden, 
ii4ff.,  308.  (See Darwin, Huxley, 
Otto,  etc.) 

Virchow,  R.,  on  man  and  ape, 
133-4  5  Haeckel  on,  70,  291. 

W  ard,  J.,  on  psycho-physical  paral¬ 
lelism,  745  on  origin  of  life, 
1 19  5  on  naturalism,  287. 

Weismann,  A.,  on  evolution  of 
man,  83,  297  5  on  natural  selec¬ 
tion,  90-1-2-4  5  on  factors  in 
evolution,  97,  105  5  on  corre¬ 
lated  changes,  1 17  ;  on  spontane¬ 
ous  generation,  1185  on  mind 
and  brain,  1255  theory  of  hered¬ 
ity)  232)  335-6-7-9)  3”  ff)  3J5- 
16  }  on  death,  253  ff. 

Wendt,  H.  H.,  on  soul  and 
spirit,  48-9. 

Wright,  G.  F.,  on  geological  time, 
1 67,  3065  on  glacial  age,  169, 
173-4;  on  flood,  173-45  on 
antiquity  of  man,  171,  173,  183, 
1 8  5,  305-6  ;  on  Lansing  Skeleton, 
132,  167,  171,  182,  184,  310. 


Zittel,  Karl  von,  97,  106,  131. 


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